[Federal Register: December 5, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 234)]
[Notices]
[Page 72417-72422]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr05de02-29]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[Report No. AUC-02-50-A (Auction No. 50); DA 02-3234]
Auction No. 50 Narrowband PCS Spectrum Auction Scheduled for
March 26, 2003; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening
Bids and Other Auction Procedures
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of 54 Personal
Communications Service (PCS) licenses in the 900 MHz band (``narrowband
PCS'') scheduled to commence on March 26, 2003. This document also
seeks comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other
auction procedures.
DATES: Comments are due on or before December 9, 2002, and reply
comments are due on or before December 16, 2002.
ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail
to the following address: auction50@fcc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Auctions and Industry Analysis
Division: For legal questions: Chris Shields, Legal Branch at (202)
418-0600. For general auction questions: Jeff Crooks, Operations Branch
at (202) 418-0660 or Lisa Stover, Operations Branch at (717) 338-2888.
Commercial Wireless Division: For service rule questions: JoAnn Epps or
Melvin Spann, Licensing and Technical Analysis Branch at (202) 418-
0620.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 50
Comment Public Notice released November 26, 2002. The complete text of
the Auction No. 50 Comment Public Notice, including attachments, is
available for public inspection and copying during regular business
hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th
Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC, 20554. The Auction No. 50
Comment Public Notice may also be purchased from the Commission's
duplicating contractor, Qualex International, Portals
[[Page 72418]]
II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC, 20554,
telephone 202-863-2893, facsimile 202-863-2898, or via e-mail
qualexint@aol.com.
1. By the Auction No. 50 Comment Public Notice, the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') announces the auction of 54
Personal Communications Service (PCS) licenses in the 900 MHz band
(``narrowband PCS'') scheduled to commence on March 26, 2003 (``Auction
No. 50''). This auction will include six regional licenses and 48 Major
Trading Area (MTA) licenses. The spectrum to be auctioned remains
unsold from a previous auction, or was previously associated with
licenses that have been cancelled or terminated. A complete list of
licenses available for Auction No. 50 is included as Attachment A of
the Auction No. 50 Comment Public Notice. The following table describes
the licenses that will be auctioned:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bandwidth
Channel No. Channel description Frequency bands (kHz)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional Licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16.......................................... One 12.5 kHz/50 kHz paired 901.8125-901.8250, 930.65- 62.5
channel. 930.70 MHz.
17.......................................... One 12.5 kHz/50 kHz paired 901.8150-901.8375, 930.70- 62.5
channel. 930.75 MHz.
------------
Regional Subtotal....................... .......................... ......................... 125
---------------------------------------------
MTA Licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26.......................................... One 50 kHz unpaired 901.35-901.4 MHz......... 50
channel.
27.......................................... One 50 kHz unpaired 901.4-901.45 MHz......... 50
channel.
29.......................................... One 50 kHz/50 kHz paired 901.95-902.0, 930.8- 100
channel. 930.85 MHz.
30.......................................... One 50 kHz/100 kHz paired 901.65-901.7, 930.3-930.4 150
channel. MHz.
31.......................................... One 50 kHz/150 kHz paired 901.7-901.75, 930.85-931 200
channel. MHz.
32.......................................... One 12.5 kHz/100 kHz 901.8375-901.85, 940.9- 112.5
paired channel. 941 MHz.
------------
MTA Subtotal............................ .......................... ......................... 662.5
============================
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: For Auction No. 50, licenses are not available for every
channel number listed in the table in every market. See Attachment A
of he Auction No. 50 Comment Public Notice to determine which
licenses will be offered.
2. The Balanced Budget Act of1997 requires the Commission to
``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this
subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of
bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction
procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced
Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to
familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the
day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau,
under its existing delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of
auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction. The
Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following issues relating to
Auction No. 50.
Auction Structure
A. Simultaneous Multiple round (SMR) Auction Design
3. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction
No. 50 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. As described further,
this methodology offers every license for bid at the same time with
successive bidding rounds in which bidders may place bids. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
B. Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility
4. The Bureau has been delegated authority and discretion to
determine an appropriate upfront payment for each license being
auctioned, taking into account such factors as the population in each
geographic license area, and the value of similar spectrum. As
described further, the upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by
each bidder to establish eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront
payments related to the specific spectrum subject to auction protect
against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with
a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of
the auction. With these guidelines in mind for Auction No. 50, the
Bureau proposes to calculate upfront payments on a license-by-license
basis using the following formula:
$.00001 *kHz* License Area Population with a minimum of $500 per
license.
5. Accordingly, the Bureau lists all licenses, including the
related license area population and proposed upfront payment for each,
in Attachment A of the Auction No. 50 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
6. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the number of bidding
units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a bidder's
``maximum initial eligibility.'' Each license is assigned a specific
number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in
Attachment A of the Auction No. 50 Comment Public Notice, on a bidding
unit per dollar basis. This number does not change as prices rise
during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to
specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any combination
of licenses as long as the total number of bidding units associated
with those licenses does not exceed its maximum initial eligibility.
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction. Thus, in
calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the
maximum number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high
bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering
that number of bidding units. The Bureau seeks comment on this
proposal.
C. Activity Rules
7. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a
percentage of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction rather than wait until the end to participate. A
[[Page 72419]]
bidder that does not satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding
eligibility in the next round or must use an activity rule waiver (if
any remain).
8. The bureau proposes to divide the action into three stages, each
characterized by an increased activity requirement. The auction will
start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction generally will
advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two, and form
Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction activity level, as measured
by the percentage of bidding units receiving new high bids, is
approximately twenty percent or below for three consecutive rounds of
bidding. However, the Bureau further proposes that it retains the
discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement during the
auction. In exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a
variety of measures of bidder activity, including, but not limited to,
the auction activity level, the percentage of licenses (as measured in
bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and
the percentage increase in revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these
proposals. For Auction No. 50, the Bureau proposes the following
activity requirements:
Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the auction, a
bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be
active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current
bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level
will result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the
next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During
Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (\5/4\).
Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 90 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by ten-ninths (\10/9\).
Stage Three: In each round of the third stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 98 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by fifty/forty-ninths (\50/49\).
9. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Comments that
believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and
suggested alternative activity rules.
D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
10. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round.
Note: Once a proactive waiver is submitted during a round, that
waiver cannot be submitted.
11. The FCC Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with
insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if
available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system
will automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at
the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below
the minimum required unless: (i) There are not activity rule waivers
available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum
requirements.
Note: If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy
the required activity level, its current eligibility will be
permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from the
auction.
12. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism
during the bidding period by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function
in the bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the
activity rules as described. Once eligibility has been reduced, a
bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
13. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means
to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding
system) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are
submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility
will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which
there are no new valid bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction
open. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 50 be
provided with five activity rule waivers that may be used at the
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
14. For Auction No. 50, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice
or by announcement during the auction, it may delay, suspend, or cancel
the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle,
evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity,
administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason that
affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In such
cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is
solely within its discretion, and its use is not intended to be a
substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply their
activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
Bidding Procedures
A. Round Structure
15. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 50 over the Internet.
Telephonic Bidding will also be available. As a contingency, the FCC
Wide Area Network will be available as well. The telephone number
through which the backup FCC Wide Area Network may be accessed will be
announced in a later public notice. Full information regarding how to
establish such a connection, and related charges, will be provided in
the public notice announcing details of auction procedures.
16. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the
auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The
simultaneous multiple round format will consist of sequential bidding
rounds, each followed by the release of round results. Details
regarding the location and format of round results will be included in
the same public notice.
17. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in
order to
[[Page 72420]]
foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders'
need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. The
Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for the bidding
rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, depending
upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau seeks
comment on this proposal.
B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
18. The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe
methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum
opening bid when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the
Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is
not in the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the
Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a
minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each
auction.
19. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate
the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioner often has the
discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the
reserve price to be the same amount.
20. In light of the Balanced Budget Act's requirements, the Bureau
proposes to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 50. The
Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized in other
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
21. Specifically, for Auction No. 50, the Commission proposes the
following license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening
bids:
$.00001 *kHz* License Area Population with a minimum of $500 per
license.
22. The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in
Auction No. 50 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 50
Comment Public Notice. Comment is sought on this proposal.
23. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will
result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not reasonable
amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should
explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening
bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, the
Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the amount of
spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of
technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service
areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other
relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of
the narrowband PCS spectrum. Alternatively, comment is sought on
whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest
would be served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.
C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments
24. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Automated
Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for
each license.
25. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the Automated
Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for that license
for the following round, as described. The difference between the
minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each license will
define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each
license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing high bid
plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated using
multiple bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount equals the
standing high bid plus two times the bid increment, the third bid
amount equals the standing high bid plus three times the bid increment,
etc.).
26. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. The additional bid amounts for licenses that have not yet received
a bid will be calculated differently, as explained.
27. For Auction No. 50, the Bureau proposes to calculate minimum
acceptable bids by using a smoothing methodology, as it has done in
several other auctions. The smoothing formula calculates minimum
acceptable bids by first calculating a percentage increment, not to be
confused with the bid increment. The percentage increment for each
license is based on bidding activity on that license in all prior
rounds; therefore, a license which has received many bids throughout
the auction will have a higher percentage increment than a license
which has received few bids.
28. The calculation of the percentage increment used to determine
the minimum acceptable bids for each license for the next round is made
at the end of each round. The computation is based on an activity
index, which is a weighted average of the number of bids in that round
and the activity index from the prior round. The current activity index
is equal to a weighting factor times the number of new bids received on
the license in that round plus one minus the weighting factor times the
activity index from the prior round. The percentage increment is then
calculated as the smaller of (a) a minimum percentage increment
multiplied by one plus the activity index and (b) a specified maximum
percentage increment. The Commission will initially set the weighting
factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and the
maximum percentage increment at 0.2 (20%). Hence, at these initial
settings, the percentage increment will fluctuate between 10% and 20%
depending upon the number of bids for the license.
Equations
Ai = (C * Bi) + ((1-C) * Ai-1)
Ii+1 = smaller of ((1 -- Ai) * N) and M
Xi+1 = Ii+1 * Yi
Where,
Ai = activity index for the current round (round i)
C = Activity weight factor
Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)
Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1),
A0) is 0
Ii+1 = percentage increment for the next rouond (round i+1)
N = minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor
M = maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling
Xi=1 = dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment
Yi = high bid from the current round
29. Under the smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received
on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in the
following round will be the high bid from the current round plus the
dollar amount associated with the percentage increment, with the result
rounded to the nearest thousand if it is over then thousand or to the
nearest hundred if it is under then thousand.
[[Page 72421]]
Examples
License 1
C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2
Round 1 (2 New Bids, High Bid = $1,000,000)
i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the
smoothing formula:
A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1
I2 = The smaller of ((1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the
maximum percentage increment)
ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 2 (using I2):
X2 = 0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000
III. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000.
Round 2 (3 New Bids, High Bid = $2,000,000)
i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the
smoothing formula:
A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2
I3 = The smaller of ((1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the
maximum percentage increment )
ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 3 (using I3):
X3 = 0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000
iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000.
Round 3 (1 New Bid, High Bid = $2,400,000)
i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the
smoothing formula:
A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 *2) = 1.5
I4 = The smaller of ((1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the
maximum percentage increment)
ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 4 (using I4):
X4 = 0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000
iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000.
30. As stated, until a bid has been placed on a license, the
minimum acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum
opening bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the
difference between the minimum opening bid times on plus the minimum
percentage increment, rounded as described, and the minimum opening
bid. That is, I = (minimum opening bid)(1 + N) {rounded{time} -
(minimum opening bid). Therefore, when N equals 0.1, the first
additional bid amount will be approximately ten percent higher than the
minimum opening bid; the second, twenty percent; the third, thirty
percent; etc.
31. In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has
been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second
highest bid received for the license. the additional bid amounts are
calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times
one plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second
highest bid.
32. The bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
acceptable bids and bid increments if it determines that circumstances
so dictate. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
D. High Bids
33. At the end of a bidding round, the high bids will be determined
based on the highest gross bid amount received for each license. In the
event of identical high bids on a license in a given round (i.e., tied
bids), the Bureau proposes to use a random number generator to select a
high bid from among the tied bids. The remaining bidders, as well as
the high bidder, will be able to submit a higher bid in a subsequent
round. If no bidder submits a higher bid in a subsequent round, the
high bid from the previous round will win the license. If any bids are
received on the license in a subsequent round, the high bid will again
be determined by the highest gross bid amount received for the license.
34. A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid
on the same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from
a previous round is sometimes referred to as a ``standing high bid.''
Bidders are reminded that standing high bids confer activity credit.
E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal
35. For Auction No. 50, the Bureau proposes the following bid
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding
period, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that
round. By removing selected bids in the bidding system, a bidder may
effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
36. A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous
rounds using the withdraw function in the bidding system. A high bidder
that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject
to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules. The
Bureau seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal
procedures.
37. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 63 FR 770 (January 7,
1998), the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the
course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some
instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The
Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit
the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission
stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion,
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal
procedures.
38. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each
bidder in Auction No. 50 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more
than two rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to
withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The
two rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high
bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals
are utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal
payment provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
F. Stopping Rule
39. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before
or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction
within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 50, the Bureau proposes to
employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping
rule means that all licenses remain open until bidding closes
simultaneously on all licenses.
40. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the
first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive waivers, or
withdrawals are received. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise,
bidding will remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every
license.
41. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to
exercise any of
[[Page 72422]]
the following options during Auction No. 50:
i. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule.
The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses
after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver,
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing
a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would
not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau
further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be
used at any time or only in stage three of the auction.
ii. Keep the auction open even if no new acceptable bids or
proactive waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are
withdrawn. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder
had submitted a proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will
apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity will either
lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver.
iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least
one of a specified preceding number of rounds.
42. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain
circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is proceeding
very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of
time. Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt
to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the
number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the
minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there
is still a high level of bidding activity. The Bureau seeks comment on
these proposals.
Conclusion
43. Comments are due on or before December 9, 2002, and reply
comments are due on or before December 16, 2002. Because of the
disruption of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the
Bureau requires that all comments and reply comments be filed
electronically. Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic
mail to the following address: auction50@fcc.gov. The electronic mail
containing the comments or reply comments must include a subject or
captain referring to Auction No. 30 Comments. The Bureau requests that
parties format any attachments to electronic mail as Adobe[reg]
Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word documents. Copied of comments
and reply comments will be available for public inspection during
regular business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room CY-A257,
445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554.
44. In addition, the Bureau requests that commenters fax a courtesy
copy of their comments and reply comments to the attention of Kathryn
Garland at (717) 338-2850.
45. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the
substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than one or two sentence description of the views and
arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to
oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose
proceedings are set forth in Sec. 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.
Federal Communication Commission.
Margaret Wiener,
Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 02-30899 Filed 12-3-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-M