[Federal Register: April 25, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 80)]
[Notices]
[Page 20380-20383]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr25ap03-37]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
Record of Decision To Establish a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
Initial Defensive Operations Capability at Fort Greely, AK
AGENCY: Missile Defense Agency, Department of Defense.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is issuing this Record of
Decision (ROD) to establish an Initial Defensive Operations (IDO)
capability at Fort Greely, Alaska. The Fort Greely IDO is a capability
of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element within the broader
conceptual Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Fort Greely IDO
components will consist of up to 40 silos, equipped with Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) missiles, In-Flight Interceptor Communications System
(IFICS) Data Terminals (IDT), and support facilities and
infrastructure. These IDO components and their support facilities at
Fort Greely are a subset of the preferred alternative for a GBI site in
the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) (July 2000), which evaluated the environmental effects
of deploying up to 100 GBI missiles with related facilities and
infrastructure at alternative sites in Alaska (AK) and North Dakota
(ND).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the NMD
Deployment EIS or this ROD contact: Ms. Julia Elliot, U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command, Attn: SMDC-EN-V, P.O. Box 1500,
Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3801, (256) 955-4822. Public reading copies
of the Final EIS and the ROD are available for review at the public
libraries within the communities near proposed activities and at the
MDA Internet site: http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/nmd.html.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The MDA is issuing this ROD to establish an IDO capability at Fort
Greely, AK. The Fort Greely IDO is a capability of the GMD element
within the broader conceptual BMDS. The Fort Greely IDO components will
consist of up to 40 silos, equipped with GBI missiles, IDTs, and
support facilities and infrastructure at the existing Validation of
Operational Concept (VOC) Test Site. These IDO components and their
support facilities at Fort Greely are a subset of the preferred
alternative for a GBI site in the NMD Deployment EIS (July 2000), which
evaluated the environmental effects of deploying up to 100 GBI missiles
with related facilities and infrastructure at alternative sites in AK
and ND. Specific sites for the IDTs, as well as additional support
infrastructure and security measures and Command and Control, Battle
Management, and Communications facilities at Fort Greely, were further
evaluated in the VOC Environmental Assessment (EA) (March 2002) and VOC
Supplemental EA (January 2003).
The Fort Greely IDO components, when combined with existing GMD
test assets, early warning radars, satellites, communications networks,
and command and control facilities, will provide a capability to
protect the United States from a limited ballistic missile attack.
Additional GMD flight test assets, including a Sea-Based Test X-Band
Radar (SBX) to be located in the Pacific region, are being evaluated in
the GMD Extended Test Range (ETR) EIS. These assets, if selected and
integrated into the test architecture, would complement the Fort Greely
components and enhance the IDO capability.
As a separate action to be supported by independent National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis, existing silos and other
facilities and infrastructure at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) may
be modified to accommodate GBIs. These proposed components, when
combined with the existing GMD ETR test assets, would provide an IDO
capability at VAFB that could be used independently of the Fort Greely
IDO components and would provide additional protection for the United
States (U.S.).
This decision is based on the President's determination that there
is a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. The Secretary of Defense and
MDA's Director have further determined that establishment of the IDO
capability at Fort Greely, supported by existing test assets, is the
best way to counter that threat initially. Other factors considered in
reaching this decision to establish IDO components at Fort Greely, AK,
include cost, technical maturity of the GMD element, and strategic arms
reduction objectives.
This ROD has been prepared pursuant to the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing the NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-
1508), DoD Instruction 4715.9, and the applicable service environmental
regulations that implement these laws and regulations. The U.S. Air
Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration
participated as cooperating agencies in preparing the NMD Deployment
EIS. The Proposed Action described in the EIS was to deploy a NMD
System at several locations consisting of GBIs, Battle Management
Command and Control (BMC2), an X-Band Radar (XBR), IDTs, satellite
detection system, Early Warning Radar (EWRs), and fiber optic cable
(FOC).
Since the NMD Deployment EIS was completed, several events related
to this ROD have occurred. In September 2000, President Clinton
determined that the deployment decision should be deferred and more
robust testing be conducted to gain greater confidence in the missile
defense technologies under development.
On January 2, 2002, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization was
administratively re-aligned as MDA, with the objective of developing an
integrated BMDS. The NMD system was renamed the GMD element, with the
focus on more realistic testing. Two types of testing, ground testing
of operational components and flight-testing of the GBI, were planned
as independent parts of a GMD test bed.
To evaluate construction and ground testing of potential
operational components in a realistic environment, as well as specific
siting for IDTs and FOC, and communication lines not
[[Page 20381]]
evaluated in the NMD Deployment EIS, the MDA prepared the VOC EA. Based
on its Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) from the analysis in
the VOC EA, the MDA decided to construct the VOC GBI test site at Fort
Greely. MDA subsequently prepared the Supplemental VOC EA and resulting
FONSI to evaluate security and other upgrades at the designated VOC GBI
test site at Fort Greely. Concurrently, MDA began preparation of the
ETR EIS to examine the effects of more realistic GBI flight-testing in
the Pacific region.
On December 17, 2002, following a number of flight test successes,
President Bush announced plans to build and field an IDO capability,
building on the capabilities of existing and planned test components.
This ROD implements that decision, with the main focus of this initial
capability at the Fort Greely GBI VOC test site. An additional IDO
capability at VAFB has been proposed, which could be used independently
of the Fort Greely components. It would provide more protection for the
U.S. as the BMDS develops and matures. Development of an IDO capability
at VAFB was not part of the NMD Deployment EIS and would require
additional NEPA analysis. That capability is not included in this ROD.
The NMD Deployment EIS preferred alternative examined the effects
of deploying up to 100 GBI missiles and related facilities and
infrastructure at Fort Greely. This ROD implements a limited subset of
that alternative. Under this ROD, the Fort Greely portion of the GMD
IDO capability selectively integrates existing and planned assets into
a system that would provide a limited, operational missile defense
capability as a first step to a more robust, future GMD deployment
described and analyzed in the NMD Deployment EIS. As such, this ROD
implements actions that are within the scope of the activities analyzed
in the NMD Deployment EIS. The following existing and planned BMDS
assets would be fielded and/or integrated to make up the Fort Greely
GMD IDO capability:
[sbull] Six silos and GBI missiles, BMC2, Defense Satellite
Communication System (DSCS), one IDT, support facilities and
infrastructure, and FOC at Fort Greely, AK, which are part of the GMD
VOC test bed currently under construction.
[sbull] Up to forty missile silos, equipped with GBI missiles, one
additional IDT, supporting facilities (including backup power plant),
infrastructure, and FOC communication links at Fort Greely, AK. MDA
currently plans only a maximum of 20 GBI missiles at Fort Greely, but
this ROD documents a total of 40 silos equipped with GBI missiles in
order to provide maximum flexibility for maintenance and future
operational needs.
[sbull] Upgrades to the EWRs at Beale AFB, CA and the Cobra Dane
radar at Eareckson Air Station (AS) Shemya AK, and an IDT, DSCS, BMC2
and FOC at Eareckson AS, that are part of the GMD VOC test bed
currently under construction.
[sbull] Existing GMD BMC2 nodes throughout the U.S., which are a
part of the GMD VOC test bed. These nodes include Cheyenne Mountain
Complex, CO; Shriever AFB, CO; and Peterson AFB, CO.
NEPA Process
The Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS for the deployment of
the NMD system was published in the Federal Register on November 17,
1998, initiating the public scoping process. Public scoping meetings
were held in December 1998 in communities perceived to be affected by
the NMD system. The Notice of Availability (NOA) of the NMD Deployment
Draft EIS was published in the Federal Register on October 1, 1999.
This initiated a public review and comment period for the Draft EIS.
Seven public hearings were held from October 26 through November 9,
1999 in the same locations as the public scoping meetings.
Subsequently, a supplement to the Draft EIS was prepared to evaluate
the potential impacts of upgrading existing EWRs for use by the NMD
system. A public hearing was held in Bourne, MA, for the Supplement.
Comments on the Draft EIS and the Supplement to the Draft EIS were
considered in the preparation of the Final EIS. The NOA for the Final
EIS was published in the Federal Register on 21 July 2000, initiating
an additional 30-day comment period. Comments were considered in the
decision process, culminating in this ROD.
Alternatives Considered
No-Action Alternative
As required by the CEQ regulations, the NMD Deployment EIS
evaluated a No-action Alternative. Under this alternative, the GMD
deployment decision would be deferred, while development and testing of
GMD technologies and architectures would continue. Since they are a
subset of the proposed action, the activities that are described in
this ROD would not be implemented under the No-action Alternative. Non-
GMD activities currently occurring or planned at potential fielding
sites would continue.
Proposed Action
The proposed action analyzed in the NMD Deployment EIS was to field
a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear missile defense system with a land and
space-based detection system capable of responding to limited strategic
ballistic missile threats to the U.S. The NMD system analyzed in the
Deployment EIS consisted of GBIs, BMC2, XBR, IDTs, satellite detection
system, EWRs, and FOC. The initial space-based detection capability
would be the existing Defense Support Program early-warning satellites
to be replaced by Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites
currently being developed by the U.S. Air Force. Since the NMD
Deployment EIS was completed, the NMD system architecture has evolved
into the BMDS multi-layered approach that does not distinguish between
national and theater threats. The BMDS consists of the same components,
at the same preferred locations, as the NMD system analyzed in the NMD
Deployment EIS. As noted, this ROD implements a subset of the
activities in the proposed action described above.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
The NMD Deployment EIS analyzed the environment in terms of 15
resource areas including: air quality, airspace, biological resources,
cultural resources, geology and soils, hazardous materials and wastes,
health and safety, land use and aesthetics, noise, socioeconomics,
transportation, utilities, water resources, environmental justice, and
subsistence. Each resource area with a foreseeable impact at the
respective alternative sites was addressed in the EIS. The analysis in
the EIS was commensurate with the importance of the potential impacts.
Where it was determined through initial evaluation that no impacts
would occur to resources at certain sites, these resources were not
analyzed in the EIS. The potential for cumulative impacts was also
evaluated in the EIS.
No-Action Alternative--Environmental Impacts
Under the No-action Alternative described in the EIS, only the
locations and environmental resources discussed below were anticipated
to have environmental impacts from continued ongoing operations.
Eielson AFB. There would be potential impacts in the areas of land
use and noise from continued U.S. Air Force operations. The presence of
residential units in the community of Moose Creek within the Clear and
[[Page 20382]]
Approach Zones at the end of the runway is considered an incompatible
land use. Low density housing in the community of Moose Creek is
subjected to noise levels that exceed the recommended day-night level
of 65 decibels. The local government, Eielson AFB, and the community of
Moose Creek are working to minimize future noise impacts.
Fort Greely. There would be impacts to geology and soils,
socioeconomics, and water resources from continued activities at Fort
Greely. These impacts could include some soil damage from vehicles,
weapons, and fires. Some soil erosion with net soil loss and water
quality impacts would occur near training activities. Localized long-
term damage to permafrost could occur as a result of ground training
and fire damage from training. The Army has developed mitigation
measures to minimize these impacts. Training maneuvers, if conducted
repeatedly in the same area, could result in cumulative impacts to
water resources. The Army has implemented measures to minimize impacts
to water resources.
Yukon Training Area. Impacts to geology and soils and water
resources would be similar to those described for Fort Greely.
Preferred Alternative--Environmental Impacts
The Preferred Alternative identified in the NMD Deployment EIS was
to deploy up to 100 GBI missiles in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, to
include supporting infrastructure and components with an XBR at
Eareckson AS, Shemya, Alaska, and to upgrade existing EWRs. No
locations for IDTs were identified in the EIS, but several IDT sites
were subsequently evaluated in the GMD VOC EA. Environmental impacts
expected to result from a deployment decision are summarized below.
Building and fielding of an IDO capability at Fort Greely, as a subset
of activities evaluated in the EIS, would have the same as or
incrementally fewer impacts than those described in the EIS.
Fort Greely, Alaska. This was the preferred GBI siting alternative
in the Final EIS and is the selected site for up to 40 GBI silos, BMC2,
1 additional IDT, supporting facilities (including backup power) and
infrastructure, and FOC. The EIS concluded that deployment of the GBI
at Fort Greely could result in impacts to health, safety, and
socioeconomics. In the unlikely event of a liquid propellant leak from
the GBI system, hazardous propellant gases could extend beyond the base
boundary. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
Permissible Exposure Limit for nitrogen tetroxide could be exceeded up
to 760 meters (2,493 feet) from the source of the leak, affecting less
than 14 hectares (35 acres) of undeveloped land outside the base
boundary and would not affect the Fort Greely Cantonment area. Exposure
at these levels in the open-air conditions would be mildly irritating
to the eyes and nose and could induce coughing. Given the small
quantities of liquid propellant, multiple safety systems in system
design, and the presence of an emergency response team, the overall
risk to public health and safety would be low. Mutual aid agreements
with local fire departments would need to be updated to inform them of
the additional hazards and safety considerations of GBI deployment. To
reduce the potential for forest fires affecting the GBI element site,
the fire protection status for the proposed area would need to be
changed from Full Protection to Critical Protection. Critical
Protection status would give the highest level of fire fighting
provided by the Bureau of Land Management Alaska Fire Service. The U.S.
Army would need to coordinate this revision with the Alaska Fire
Service. It is anticipated that construction and operation of the GBI
element at Fort Greely would provide an economic benefit to the
surrounding regions, partially offsetting the loss of jobs at the base
as a result of previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) cutbacks.
Upgraded Early Warning Radars
Under the Preferred Alternative in the EIS, the EWRs at Beale AFB,
CA; Clear AFS, AK; and Cape Cod AFS, MA would be upgraded. The VOC EA
analyzed upgrades to the Beale EWR, with similar upgrades to the Cobra
Dane radar at Eareckson AS. The upgrades would involve replacement of
electronic hardware and computer software. The radiated peak and
average power, radar antenna patterns, and operating bands of the
radars would remain unchanged from current operations. Consequently,
the public exposure to radio frequency radiation from the UEWRs over a
30-minute averaging period would be similar to that from the existing
early warning radars and would be well within the most applicable
criteria, the American National Standards Institute/Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers standard. The U.S. Air Force is in
the process of preparing a supplement to their Atmospheric Interceptor
Technology Program Environmental Assessment, 1979 to address
maintenance and sustainment of operations for the early warning radars.
Alternatives Not Selected--Environmental Impacts
Several alternative locations for deployment of GBIs in the NMD
Deployment EIS are not selected at this time. In addition, this ROD
does not include a decision concerning construction or operation of an
XBR. Potential environmental impacts at those sites not selected for
IDO fielding of GBIs are summarized below. As with the preferred
alternative, fielding of an IDO capability at any of these sites would
have similar or incrementally fewer impacts than those described in the
EIS.
GBI and BMC2 Locations
Clear AFS, Alaska. Deployment of the GBI at this location could
result in impacts to biological resources, geology and soils, health
and safety, and socioeconomics. Construction activities could cause
impacts to approximately 2.7 hectares (6.6 acres) of wetlands under the
GBI Alternative Site A or 55 hectares (135 acres) under the GBI
Alternative Site B. The wetland permitting process would be coordinated
with appropriate Federal and state agencies and would entail review of
proposed activities and development of mitigation measures. There would
be the potential to impact permafrost during construction on Clear AFS.
Prior to final design and construction, a comprehensive geotechnical
investigation would be conducted to determine the exact nature of the
soils and ground-water levels in the area. The site layout would be
adjusted to minimize any impacts in the unlikely event that unstable
permafrost were encountered. Depending on the ground-water levels,
missile silos might be slightly elevated to avoid water incursion
during construction and operations. The potential health hazard from
liquid propellant leaks at the GBI Alternative Site B would be similar
to that at Fort Greely. However, OSHA exposure limits for nitrogen
tetroxide could affect up to 122 hectares (302 acres) of undeveloped
land outside of the base boundary and the on-base administrative and
housing areas. It is anticipated that construction and operation of the
GBI element at Clear AFS would provide an economic benefit to the
surrounding regions.
Yukon Training Area (Fort Wainwright)/Eielson AFB, Alaska.
Deployment of the GBI at this location could result in impacts to
biological resources, cultural resources, geology and soils, and
socioeconomics. Construction activities could impact approximately 46
hectares (113 acres) of
[[Page 20383]]
wetlands. Potential impacts to these wetlands and mitigation measures
would be similar to those described for Clear AFS. An archaeological
site (Site FAI 157) is located approximately 262 meters (860 feet) west
of the GBI site. If avoidance of this site were not feasible, adverse
affects could be mitigated through data recovery. Building 3425 at
Eielson AFB (a Cold War era warehouse) may be eligible for listing in
the National Register of Historic Places and could be affected by
modifications from the GBI deployment. Appropriate mitigation measures
would be developed in consultation with the Alaska State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO). Best Management Practices would be used to
reduce the potential for soil erosion at the GBI site. Geotechnical
investigations at the proposed site indicate the presence of permafrost
on north facing slopes. Permafrost areas would be avoided if possible.
It is anticipated that construction and operation of the GBI element at
this location would provide an economic benefit to the surrounding
regions.
Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. Deployment of the GBI at this
location could result in impacts to biological resources, geology and
soils, health and safety, and socioeconomics. Construction activities
could affect approximately 5 hectares (12 acres) of wetlands at the
Ordnance Training-5 (OT-5) area site. The wetland permitting process
would be coordinated with appropriate Federal and state agencies and
would entail review of proposed activities and development of
mitigation measures. Best Management Practices would be implemented to
minimize wind erosion of soils during construction. The potential for
health hazards from liquid propellant leaks and reporting requirements
would be similar to that at Fort Greely. OSHA exposure limits for
nitrogen tetroxide could be exceeded on up to 306 hectares (757 acres)
outside of the base, including two residential units, three commercial
units, and two churches, and on the alert apron and portions of the
administration area on base. Given the small quantities of liquid
propellant, multiple safety systems in system design, and the presence
of an emergency response team, the overall risk to public health and
safety would be low. Mutual aid agreements with local fire departments
would need to be updated to inform them of the additional hazards and
safety considerations of GBI deployment. It is anticipated that
construction and operation of the GBI element at this location would
provide an economic benefit to the surrounding regions.
Mitigation Measures and Monitoring
The applicable mitigation measures specified for each of the sites
selected to build and field an IDO capability at Fort Greely will be
implemented as part of the GMD IDO action. A Mitigation Monitoring Plan
has been developed to assist in tracking and implementing these
mitigation measures. With the implementation of the mitigation
measures, all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm
from fielding of the GMD IDO at Fort Greely, AK considered in this ROD
have been adopted.
Environmentally Preferred Alternative
The environmentally preferred alternative in the EIS is the No-
action Alternative (not proceeding with GMD deployment) since there
would be no construction and operation of GMD elements at any of the
potential deployment sites. With the action in this ROD to field an IDO
capability at Fort Greely, the No-action Alternative remains the
environmentally preferred alternative. Continuation of current site
operations at these locations would result in few additional
environmental impacts.
Under the Proposed Action in the EIS, Fort Greely, AK is the
environmentally preferred location for deployment of GBIs, with
supporting facilities (including a backup power plant) and
infrastructure, IDTs, and FOC. No sensitive habitats or wetlands would
be affected; construction of the silos would not impact groundwater or
permafrost; and Fort Greely is remote from any major population
centers. Fort Greely remains the environmentally preferred alternative
to field an IDO capability with up to 40 GBIs.
Conclusion
In accordance with NEPA, MDA has considered the information
contained within the NMD Deployment EIS in deciding to field the GMD
IDO capability as described above. The decision is to build and field
up to 40 GBI silos, BMC2, 1 additional IDT, supporting facilities
(including backup power plant), infrastructure, and FOC at Fort Greely,
AK.
Dated: April 21, 2003.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 03-10212 Filed 4-24-03; 8:45 am]
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