[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 183 (Monday, September 22, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55076-55079]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-23959]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, DP03-003
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Denial of petition for a defect investigation.
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SUMMARY: This notice describes the reasons for denying a petition
(DP03-003) submitted to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. 30162, requesting that
the agency conduct a ``Petition Analysis * * * specific to problems of
Vehicle Speed Control linkages which results [sic] in sudden,
unexpected excessive acceleration even though there is no pressure
applied to the accelerator pedal.''
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob Young, Office of Defects
Investigation (ODI), NHTSA; 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590. Telephone: (202) 366-4806.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In a petition dated April 25, 2003, Mr.
Peter Boddaert requested NHTSA to conduct a Petition Analysis
``covering Lexus cars, model years 1997 to 2000, model series 300 &
400.'' Mr. Boddaert, made this request after experiencing at least
three events involving alleged unintended engine speed increase in his
model year (MY) 1999 Lexus LS 400. The third of these resulted in a
crash when his vehicle rear-ended another stopped at a traffic light.
According to the petitioner, his Lexus was inspected by multiple
dealers, and no mechanical
[[Page 55077]]
cause was ever identified that would explain what happened in any of
the three incidents.
In support of his petition, Mr. Boddaert cites a number of consumer
complaints in NHTSA's database concerning ``vehicle speed control'' in
the subject vehicles. Included among the thirty-six reports he cites is
one involving a Lexus that ``collided with five other cars in the space
of one half mile before it could be stopped.''
NHTSA has reviewed the material cited by the petitioner. The
results of this review and our analysis of the petition's merit is set
forth in the DP03-003 Petition Analysis Report, published in its
entirety as an appendix to this notice.
For the reasons presented in the petition analysis report, there is
no reasonable possibility that an order concerning the notification and
remedy of a safety-related defect would be issued as a result of
granting Mr. Boddaert's petition. Therefore, in view of the need to
allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish
the agency's safety mission, the petition is denied.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at CFR
1.50 and 501.8.
Issued on: September 15, 2003.
Kathleen C. DeMeter,
Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
Appendix--Petition Analysis--DP03-003
1.0 Introduction
On May 13, 2003 the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) received an April 25, 2003 letter from Mr.
Peter Boddaert asking the agency to conduct a ``petition analysis''
of 1997 through 2000 model year (MY) Lexus 300 and 400 series
vehicles (subject vehicles) for ``problems of Vehicle Speed Control
linkages which results [sic] in sudden, unexpected excessive
[vehicle] acceleration even though there is no pressure applied to
the accelerator pedal.'' In support of his petition, Mr. Boddaert
cites consumer complaints he found on NHTSA's Web site concerning
``vehicle speed control'' in the subject vehicles. Included among
these reports is one involving a Lexus that ``collided with five
other cars in the space of one half mile before it could be
stopped.''
The petitioner contends that, of the 271 Lexus-related
complaints in NHTSA's consumer complaint database, 36 (13%) have
been coded by the agency as relating to ``vehicle speed control.''
According to the petitioner, this report frequency indicates there
is a ``significant'' safety concern with the subject Lexus vehicles.
To buttress his claim, the petitioner relates his own experience
as follows:
In my own case, I own [owned, he has since traded for another
vehicle] a 1999 Lexus LS400 and have experienced this problem at
least three times. The first time was reported to NHTSA on ODI
[complaint] 760680. The most recent occurrence was on
Friday April 17th in the state of Virginia when, without warning and
without me touching the accelerator pedal the car accelerated
forward rear ending the car ahead of me. For this I received a
police citation. On the previous occasions when this has happened
the car has been to the Lexus dealer for inspection. Each time the
dealer says they cannot replicate the problem and can find nothing
wrong. From all the other ODI reports, the response from the dealer
is the same.
In analyzing the petitioner's allegations and preparing a
response, we:
[sbull] Reviewed the petitioner's April 25, 2003 letter and two
other complaints he filed with the agency on April 14, 2003 and
April 28, 2003, both concerning unintended engine speed increase in
his MY 1999 LS 400.\1\
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\1\ In the first complaint (ODI 760680), he alleges
``Engine revs to extremely high rpm (-5000) with no throttle input
from driver.'' In the second complaint (ODI 10017631), he
simply reports ``The vehicle experienced sudden acceleration.''
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[sbull] Reviewed a report documenting NHTSA's study of sudden
acceleration. ``An Examination of Sudden Acceleration'' was
published in January 1989 and is available from the National
Technical Information Service; Springfield, VA 22161, as report
number DOT-HS-807-367.
[sbull] Reviewed two NHTSA reports (MF99-002 and MF99-002-
Supplemental) concerning a fatal sudden acceleration crash occurring
in Minneapolis, MN on December 4, 1998.
[sbull] Reviewed information gathered and analyzed during
NHTSA's assessment of petition DP99-004 (Sudden Acceleration, MY
1988 Lincoln Town Car).
[sbull] Reviewed information gathered and analyzed during
NHTSA's assessment of petition DP02-005 (Sudden Acceleration, MY
1991-95 Jeep Cherokee/Grand Cherokee).
[sbull] Reviewed information gathered and analyzed during
NHTSA's Preliminary Evaluation, PE02-035 (Brake/Acceleration Pedal
Separation-- Ford Taurus/Sable MY 2000-2001).
[sbull] Reviewed our consumer complaint database for ``sudden
acceleration'' and/or ``vehicle speed control'' related reports
received through July 9, 2003 concerning Lexus, Cadillac, and
Lincoln vehicles.
[sbull] Reviewed vehicle manufacturer information provided to us
during various sudden acceleration investigations.
[sbull] Inspected a MY 1999 Lexus LS 400 to assess the operation
of its various engine and brake control systems and their interface
with the driver.
[sbull] Obtained vehicle production quantity information from
Wards.
[sbull] Reviewed various Lexus vehicle service manuals.
[sbull] Reviewed various Lexus vehicle owner manuals.
2.0 The Issue of Sudden Acceleration
2.1 ``Sudden Acceleration (SA)''
The term ``sudden acceleration'' (SA) has been used (and
misused) to describe vehicle events involving any unintended speed
increase. However, the term properly refers to an ``unintended,
unexpected, high-power acceleration from a stationary position or a
very low initial speed accompanied by an apparent loss of braking
effectiveness.''\2\ The definition includes ``braking
effectiveness'' because operators experiencing a SA incident
typically allege they were pressing on the brake pedal and the
vehicle would not stop. ``Sudden acceleration'' does not describe
unintended events that begin after vehicles have reached intended
roadway speeds.
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\2\ John Pollard and E. Donald Sussman, An Examination of Sudden
Acceleration (Cambridge, MA.: NHTSA, 1989, DOT-HS-807-367), v.
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2.2 The NHTSA Study
On March 7, 1989, NHTSA released a report, authored by John
Pollard and E. Donald Sussman, titled ``An Examination of Sudden
Acceleration,'' documenting the agency's efforts (the ``Study'') to
determine what was causing a relatively large number of crashes in
certain model vehicles due to apparent unintended (and substantial)
engine power increase and alleged simultaneous loss of braking
effectiveness. Typically, these events began while the vehicle was
stationary, shortly after the driver had first entered it. They
frequently ended in a crash. While the phenomenon affected all
automatic transmission-equipped cars sold in the U.S., some had
notably higher occurrence rates, with the Audi 5000 eclipsing them
all.\3\ The issue of ``runaway'' Audi 5000s had been the subject of
NHTSA defect investigations and safety recalls, class action
lawsuits, considerable media coverage, and public controversy.
Internationally, other governments investigated the phenomenon
during roughly the same time period.\4\
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\3\ The sudden acceleration report rate for 1978 through 1987
Audi 5000's was 586/100,000.
\4\ Transport Canada issued a report entitled ``Investigation of
Sudden Acceleration Incidents'' in December 1988, concluding driver
error caused the phenomenon. The Japanese Ministry of Transport
released a report, ``An Investigation on Sudden Starting and/or
Acceleration of Vehicles with Automatic Transmissions,'' in April
1989, which concluded that there was no common mechanical cause for
sudden acceleration.
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To help resolve the issue and thoroughly explore topics not
fully investigated previously, NHTSA Administrator Diane Steed
ordered an independent review of SA in October 1987 (the ``Study'').
The Transportation Systems Center (TSC) of Cambridge, Massachusetts
was commissioned by NHTSA to study SA and identify the factors that
cause and/or contribute to its occurrence. Ten different make/model/
year vehicles--all with cruise control--were selected for particular
scrutiny. Not all of the vehicles had unusually high SA incident
rates; some were chosen based on their use of certain design
approaches seen throughout the industry. In this way, the Study's
sample was reasonably representative of the United States' automatic
transmission-equipped vehicle population as a whole.
TSC collected literature, individual case documentation, and
data for each of the selected vehicles. Many drivers involved in an
alleged sudden acceleration incident were
[[Page 55078]]
interviewed. TSC studied and tested the vehicles' fuel, cruise
control, and braking systems.\5\ The vehicles' driving controls were
evaluated for both location within the cabin and operation. After
gathering the information, TSC convened a panel (the ``Panel'') of
independent experts in various disciplines \6\ to review the data
and make recommendations.
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\5\ In some instances, the testing was performed by NHTSA's
Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC).
\6\ The curriculum vitae of all the panelists is included in
Appendix A to the Report. The panel was highly credentialed,
including Dr. John B. Haywood, professor of Mechanical Engineering
at M.I.T. and Director of its Sloan Automotive Laboratory, and Dr.
Phillip B. Sampson, Hunt Professor of Psychology, Tufts University.
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At the conclusion of TSC's effort, comprising thousands of
person-hours gathering data, comprehensively testing vehicles
including their systems and equipment, interviewing owners and
drivers, and inspecting crash scenes and the vehicles involved, a
report was released with the following conclusion: ``For a sudden
acceleration incident in which there is no evidence of throttle
sticking or cruise control malfunction, the inescapable conclusion
is that these definitely involve the driver inadvertently pressing
the accelerator instead of, or in addition to, the brake pedal.''\7\
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\7\ Pollard and Sussman, 49.
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3.0 The ODI Consumer Complaint Database
3.1 ``Vehicle Speed Control''
With NHTSA's recent roll-out of the ARTEMIS consumer complaint
repository, all owner complaints that may involve a sudden
acceleration event are coded (or in the case of reports pre-dating
the roll-out, re-coded) as ``Vehicle Speed Control'' related
(component code 180). These complaints form a subset of all
complaints where a problem related to vehicle (i.e., engine) speed
control was alleged (including, for example, some stalling
complaints). Where a specific component is identified, the complaint
is more descriptively coded as either: a. the accelerator pedal
(component code 181); b. throttle linkages (component code 182); c.
throttle cable(s) (component code 183); d. throttle return springs
(component code 184); or e. the cruise control system (component
code 185). In his petition, Mr. Boddaert requested that we conduct a
petition analysis related to ``Vehicle Speed Control-linkages,''
component code 182. Our review of the NHTSA consumer complaints
database found seven linkage-related complaints for MY 1997-2000
Lexus vehicles and sixty complaints if all six Vehicle Speed Control
coding categories are included. On July 10, 2003, we discussed this
issue with the petitioner and advised him that we planned to expand
the petition's scope to include all six Vehicle Speed Control
categories.
3.2 Lexus and its Peers
To determine whether incidents involving alleged sudden
acceleration and/or vehicle speed control malfunctions are more
frequently reported to NHTSA by Lexus owners, we compared the
reporting frequency for Lexus, Cadillac, and Lincoln vehicles, as
these represent a significant portion of the luxury car and SUV
market. In each instance, we searched the NHTSA complaint database
for all reports filed under component code 180 through 185 for
vehicles where the ``make'' is Lexus, Cadillac, or Lincoln and the
model year is 1997 through 2000. This search revealed a total of 182
reports.
3.3 Report Frequency
Of the 182 reports found in the search described above, 60
relate to Lexus vehicles, 57 involve Cadillacs, and 65 concern
Lincolns. We then normalized this data to account for differences in
vehicle production quantities. Here are the results:
Table 1.--Vehicle Speed Control Report Rate/100K for Lexus and Peers
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Make No. of complaints Production Rate/100K
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Lexus....................................................... 60 599,983 10.0
Cadillac.................................................... 57 650,449 8.7
Lincoln..................................................... 65 610,340 10.6
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Based on this analysis, there is no evidence that Lexus vehicles
are experiencing vehicle speed control-related problems more
frequently than their peers. However, to further assess the Lexus
field experience, we conducted the analysis originally requested by
the petitioner; i.e., we limited the complaint count to only those
complaints related to Vehicle Speed Control-linkages. Here are those
results:
Table 2.--Vehicle Speed Control-linkages Report Rate/100K for Lexus and Peers
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Make No. of complaints Production Rate/100K
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Lexus....................................................... 7 599,983 1.2
Cadillac.................................................... 5 650,449 .76
Lincoln..................................................... 11 610,340 1.8
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Again, the results fail to establish the existence of a defect
trend related to Lexus vehicle speed control problems and/or sudden
acceleration incidents reported to NHTSA.
4.0 Conclusion
The information gathered does not indicate that Lexus vehicles
are over-represented in the NHTSA database for consumer complaints
concerning sudden acceleration and/or problems with vehicle speed
control.
Based on the foregoing analysis, there is no reasonable
possibility that an order concerning the notification and remedy of
a safety-related defect would be issued as a result of granting Mr.
Boddaert's petition. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and
prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's
safety mission, the petition is denied.
References
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Toyota Motor Corporation. 1999 Repair Manual, Volumes 1 and 2.
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Toyota Motor Corporation. 1999 Lexus Owner's Manual, LS400.
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the Design and Use of Automobiles. London: Taylor and Francis, 1991.
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NHTSA, October 22, 2002.
[FR Doc. 03-23959 Filed 9-18-03; 12:01 pm]
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