[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 9 (Tuesday, January 14, 2003)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 1932-1940]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-581]



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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 25



Design Standards for Fuselage Doors on Transport Category Airplanes; 
Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 14, 2003 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2003-14193; Notice No. 03-01]
RIN 2120-AH34


Design Standards for Fuselage Doors on Transport Category 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes to amend 
the design standards for fuselage doors, hatches, and exits on 
transport category airplanes. This action would improve door integrity 
by providing design criteria that would ensure that doors remain secure 
under all circumstances that service experience has shown can happen. 
Adopting this proposal also would relieve a certification burden on 
industry by eliminating regulatory differences between the 
airworthiness standards and related guidance material of the United 
States and Europe.

DATES: Send your comments on or before April 14, 2003.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA-
2003-14193 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two 
copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that the 
FAA received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. 
You also may submit comments through the Internet to: http://dms.dot.gov.
    You may review the public docket containing comments to proposed 
regulations in person in the Dockets Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets Office is 
on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department of 
Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review public 
dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gardlin, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Airframe/Cabin Safety Branch (ANM-115), Transport 
Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 
SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2136; facsimile 
(425) 227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

How Do I Submit Comments to This NPRM?

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also 
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written 
documents.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public 
inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to 
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section 
of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the 
Internet at the web address in the ADDRESSES section.
    Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we 
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider 
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments 
we receive.
    If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard 
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the 
postcard and mail it to you.

How Can I Obtain a Copy of This NPRM?

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm.cfm?nav=nprm; or
    (3) Accessing the Federal Register's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Be sure 
to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number of 
this rulemaking.

Background

What Prompted this Proposed Rule?

    Following a major accident in 1974, which involved the opening of a 
fuselage door on a transport category airplane during flight, the FAA 
amended the applicable safety standards to provide a higher level of 
safety for fuselage doors. In 1980, the FAA issued amendment 25-54 to 
Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 25 (45 FR 60172, 
September 11, 1980). The objective of this amendment was to provide a 
level of safety in doors that would be consistent with the level of 
safety required for other critical systems on the airplane, such as 
primary flight controls. This was achieved by:
    [sbull] Requiring redundancy and fail-safe features in the door 
operating systems, and
    [sbull] Providing protection from anticipated human errors.
    In 1989, another wide-body transport category airplane lost a lower 
lobe cargo door during flight, along with a portion of fuselage 
structure above the door. Because of this accident and other similar 
accidents, the Air Transport Association (ATA) of America formed an 
industry task force to review door designs on transport category 
airplanes. This group was chartered to review the design and operation 
of doors on the current fleet of transport airplanes, and to recommend 
actions that would prevent any further unintended opening of outward 
opening doors. The group also reviewed relevant current regulations and 
advisory material, and provided recommendations to the FAA for 
necessary rule changes. The ATA submitted its recommendations to the 
FAA in a report entitled, ``ATA Cargo Door Task Force Final Report,'' 
dated May 15, 1991.

What NTSB Safety Recommendations are Related to this Proposed Rule?

    As a result of its investigation of the airplane accidents 
associated with fuselage doors opening during flight, the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also issued several Safety 
Recommendations concerning doors on transport category airplanes. The 
NTSB asked the FAA to consider the following recommendations:
    Safety Recommendation A-89-092: ``Issue an airworthiness directive 
to require that the manual drive units and electrical actuators for the 
Boeing 747 cargo doors have torque-limiting devices

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to ensure the lock sectors, modified in accordance with the 
requirements of Airworthiness Directive (AD)-88-12-04 [amendment 39-
5934 (53 FR 18079, May 20, 1988)], cannot be overridden during 
mechanical or electrical operation of the latch cams.''
    Safety Recommendation A-89-093: ``Issue an airworthiness directive 
for non-plug cargo doors on all transport category airplanes requiring 
the installation of positive indicators to ground personnel and flight 
crews confirming the actual position of both the latch cams and locks, 
independently.''
    Safety Recommendation A-89-094: ``Require that fail-safe design 
considerations for non-plug cargo doors on present and future transport 
category airplanes account for conceivable human errors, in addition to 
electrical and mechanical malfunctions.''
    Safety Recommendation A-92-21: ``Require that the electrical 
actuating system for non-plug cargo doors on transport category 
aircraft provide for the removal of all electrical power from circuits 
on the door after closure (except for any indicating circuit power 
necessary to provide positive indication that the door is properly 
latched and locked) to eliminate the possibility of uncommanded 
actuator movements caused by wiring short circuits.''
    The FAA responded to these Safety Recommendations by issuing 
various airworthiness directives, applicable to the current fleet of 
transport category airplanes, and requiring relevant modifications and 
inspections of the fuselage doors.
    Subsequent to the conclusion of the harmonization activity (as 
discussed below) that led to this proposal, the FAA received an 
additional safety recommendation from the NTSB, A-02-020. The NTSB 
recommends that the FAA ``Require all newly certificated transport 
category airplanes [to] have a system for each emergency exit door to 
relieve pressure so that they can only be opened on the ground after a 
safe differential pressure level is attained.'' We have not yet 
determined the appropriate course of action with regard to this 
recommendation, and no regulatory action is being proposed at this 
time. However, we solicit comments on this recommendation and, if 
appropriate, will develop a supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
to propose an additional provision addressing this issue.

What Are the Relevant Airworthiness Standards in the United States?

    In the United States, the airworthiness standards for type 
certification of transport category airplanes are contained in Title 
14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 25. Manufacturers of 
transport category airplanes must show that each airplane they produce 
of a different type design complies with the appropriate part 25 
standards. These standards apply to:
    [sbull] Airplanes manufactured within the U.S. for use by U.S.-
registered operators, and
    [sbull] Airplanes manufactured in other countries and imported to 
the U.S. under a bilateral airworthiness agreement.

What Are the Relevant Airworthiness Standards in Europe?

    In Europe, the airworthiness standards for type certification of 
transport category airplanes are contained in Joint Aviation 
Requirements (JAR)-25, which are based on part 25. These were developed 
by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of Europe to provide a common 
set of airworthiness standards within the European aviation community. 
Twenty-three European countries accept airplanes type certificated to 
the JAR-25 standards, including airplanes manufactured in the U.S. that 
are type certificated to JAR-25 standards for export to Europe.

What Is ``Harmonization'' and How Did It Start?

    Although part 25 and JAR-25 are very similar, they are not 
identical in every respect. When airplanes are type certificated to 
both sets of standards, the differences between part 25 and JAR-25 can 
result in substantial additional costs to manufacturers and operators. 
These additional costs, however, frequently do not bring about an 
increase in safety. In many cases, part 25 and JAR-25 may contain 
different requirements to accomplish the same safety intent. 
Consequently, manufacturers are usually burdened with meeting the 
requirements of both sets of standards, although the level of safety is 
not increased correspondingly.
    Recognizing that a common set of standards would not only benefit 
the aviation industry economically, but also maintain the necessary 
high level of safety, the FAA and the JAA began an effort in 1988 to 
``harmonize'' their respective aviation standards. The goal of the 
harmonization effort is to ensure that:
    [sbull] Where possible, standards do not require domestic and 
foreign parties to manufacture or operate to different standards for 
each country involved; and
    [sbull] The standards adopted are mutually acceptable to the FAA 
and the foreign aviation authorities.
    The FAA and JAA have identified a number of significant regulatory 
differences (SRD) between the wording of part 25 and JAR-25. Both the 
FAA and the JAA consider ``harmonization'' of the two sets of standards 
a high priority.

What Is ARAC and What Role Does It Play in Harmonization?

    After initiating the first steps towards harmonization, the FAA and 
JAA soon realized that traditional methods of rulemaking and 
accommodating different administrative procedures was neither 
sufficient nor adequate to make appreciable progress towards fulfilling 
the goal of harmonization. The FAA identified the Aviation Rulemaking 
Advisory Committee (ARAC) as an ideal vehicle for assisting in 
resolving harmonization issues, and, in 1992, the FAA tasked ARAC to 
undertake the entire harmonization effort.
    The FAA had formally established ARAC in 1991 (56 FR 2190, January 
22, 1991), to provide advice and recommendations concerning the full 
range of the FAA's safety-related rulemaking activity. The FAA sought 
this advice to develop better rules in less overall time and using 
fewer FAA resources than previously needed. The committee provides the 
FAA firsthand information and insight from interested parties regarding 
potential new rules or revisions of existing rules.
    There are 74 member organizations on the committee, representing a 
wide range of interests within the aviation community. Meetings of the 
committee are open to the public, except as authorized by section 10(d) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
    The ARAC establishes working groups to develop recommendations for 
resolving specific airworthiness issues. Tasks assigned to working 
groups are published in the Federal Register. Although working group 
meetings are not generally open to the public, the FAA solicits 
participation in working groups from interested members of the public 
who possess knowledge or experience in the task areas. Working groups 
report directly to the ARAC, and the ARAC must accept a working group 
proposal before ARAC presents the proposal to the FAA as an advisory 
committee recommendation.
    The activities of the ARAC will not, however, circumvent the public 
rulemaking procedures; nor is the FAA limited to the rule language 
``recommended'' by ARAC. If the FAA accepts an ARAC recommendation, the

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agency proceeds with the normal public rulemaking procedures. Any ARAC 
participation in a rulemaking package is fully disclosed in the public 
docket.
    Under this program, the FAA provides ARAC with an opportunity to 
review, discuss, and comment on the FAA's draft NPRM. In the case of 
this rulemaking, ARAC concurred with the draft NPRM, without changes.

Discussion of the Proposal

What Is the General Scope of the Proposal?

    The scope of this proposal is to revise and reorganize the existing 
rules in 14 CFR part 25 to provide the following:
    1. Clarification of the existing design requirements for doors.
    2. Definitive criteria for the door design requirements that are 
covered in the existing rules by general text.
    3. Additional fail-safe requirements and detailed door design 
requirements, based on the recommendations of the NTSB and the ATA, and 
on current industry practice.

What Definitions Apply to the Proposed Rule?

    To understand the rest of this proposal, the following definitions 
are helpful:
    A latch is a movable mechanical element that, when engaged, 
prevents the door from opening.
    A lock is a mechanical element that monitors the latch position 
and, when engaged, prevents the latch from becoming disengaged.
    Latched means the latches are fully engaged with their structural 
counterparts and held in position by the latch operating mechanism.
    Locked means the locks are fully engaged.
    Latching mechanism includes the latch operating mechanism and the 
latches.
    Locking mechanism includes the lock operating mechanism and the 
locks.
    Closed means the door has been placed within the doorframe in such 
a position that the latches can be operated to the ``latched'' 
condition.
    Fully closed means the door is placed within the doorframe in the 
position that it will occupy when the latches are in the latched 
condition.

What Are the Specific Proposed Changes?

    This action proposes changes mainly to Sec.  25.783, ``Doors.'' 
First, the title of Sec.  25.783 would be changed from the current 
``Doors'' to ``Fuselage doors'' to more accurately reflect the 
applicability of this revised section. The term ``doors,'' as used in 
this proposed revision of Sec.  25.783, would also include hatches, 
openable windows, access panels, covers, etc., on the exterior of the 
fuselage that do not require the use of tools to open or close. This 
also would include each door or hatch through a pressure bulkhead, 
including any bulkhead that is specifically designed to function as a 
secondary pressure bulkhead under the prescribed failure conditions of 
14 CFR part 25.
    Other specific changes to Sec.  25.783 are as follows:
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(a)
    The format and portions of the text of paragraph (a) would be 
totally revised. The proposed text would describe the types of doors to 
which this section of the regulations is applicable, and would clarify 
the fact that the requirements apply to the unpressurized portions of 
flight as well as to pressurized flight.
    Proposed paragraph (a) also would provide the general design 
requirements for doors. These general design requirements are not 
substantively different from the requirements contained in existing 
Sec.  25.783. A reference to the locking requirements in Sec.  25.607 
(``Fasteners'') would be included in paragraph (a). Experience has 
shown that it is advisable to add this reference to ensure that these 
requirements are not overlooked during the door design process. One 
provision of this proposed requirement, which is new, would require the 
removal of all power that could initiate the unlatching and unlocking 
of the door during flight. It is based on NTSB Safety Recommendation A-
92-21, discussed previously.
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(b)
    Paragraph (b) would be revised to require safeguards against both 
inadvertent and deliberate opening of doors during flight. It would 
clarify the existing requirement that doors must be prevented from 
opening inadvertently (that is, not deliberately, and without 
forethought, consideration, or consultation) by people on board the 
airplane during flight. The intent of this requirement is to protect 
both the passenger and the airplane from hazards resulting from the 
unintentional actions by persons on board.
    In addition, the proposal would make it clear that the door must be 
safeguarded against the deliberate opening during flight by persons on 
board. The proposed text requires that the possibility of deliberate 
opening be minimized. The intent of this requirement is that, for doors 
in pressurized compartments, it should not be possible to open the 
doors after takeoff, when the compartment is pressured to a significant 
level. (During approach, takeoff, and landing when compartment 
differential pressure is lower, intentional opening may be possible; 
however, during these short phases of the flight, all passengers are 
expected to be seated with seat belts fastened. The exposure to 
deliberate opening would therefore be minimized.) Further guidance on 
this subject is given in draft Advisory Circular 25.783-1X, discussed 
later in this document.
    Further, for doors that can be opened under significant cabin 
pressure, or for doors in non-pressurized airplanes, the use of an 
auxiliary securing means, such as speed-activated or barometrically-
activated devices, may be necessary. Paragraph (b) would require that, 
if auxiliary devices are used, they must be designed so no single 
failure or malfunction could prevent more than one exit from opening. 
Past interpretations of existing paragraph (f) have resulted in this 
type of design requirement being applied to type certification 
projects.
Proposed Changes to 25.783(c)
    Paragraph (c) would restate the existing requirements of paragraph 
(f) for a provision to prevent the airplane from becoming pressurized 
if the door is not fully closed, latched, and locked. The current 
requirement states:
    External doors must have provisions to prevent the initiation of 
pressurization of the airplane to an unsafe level if the door is not 
fully closed and locked * * *''
    However, this proposal would remove the phrase, ``the initiation 
of'' from this text because it is inconsistent and confusing with 
regard to a common method of preventing pressurization that employs 
vent doors. Mechanical vent doors allow the pressurization system to 
initiate and a small amount of pressure may exist as the air flows 
through the vents. The revised text would correct this inconsistency. 
It also would allow for certain types of doors that:
    [sbull] Can safely and reliably act as their own venting mechanism 
when not fully closed and latched; or
    [sbull] Would automatically close and latch, as appropriate to the 
door design, before an unsafe level of pressure is reached.
    For these doors without an independent means, the assessment for a 
safe and reliable closing would include consideration of single 
failures and adverse conditions, such as debris in the doorway.

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    Paragraph (c)(1) would provide a definitive criterion for the 
reliability level of the pressurization prevention system and would 
read: ``The provision must be designed to function after any single 
failure, or after any combination of failures not shown to be extremely 
improbable.'' This criterion is consistent with:
    [sbull] The interpretation of the general text of the existing 
rule, and
    [sbull] The current industry practice for new designs.
    The FAA does not intend that the proposed criterion impose a new 
level of reliability for mechanical vent systems that is more stringent 
than that established by typical fail-safe designs. However, it would 
provide a definitive criterion for use in evaluating these vent systems 
or other systems that may interconnect with the airplane's 
pressurization system. A means for preventing pressurization that 
functions with a high degree of reliability despite operator and 
flightcrew errors would be consistent with NTSB Safety Recommendation 
A-89-094, described previously, which recommends fail-safe features 
that account for conceivable human errors.
    Paragraph (c)(2) would exempt certain doors that meet the 
requirements of proposed paragraph (h) from the requirement to have a 
separate means to prevent pressurization. Generally such doors would 
have to either remain open, so that pressurization cannot take place, 
or must close and latch as pressurization takes place. Under this 
provision, these doors would have to be shown not to create a hazardous 
condition, assuming single failures in the latching mechanism as well 
as jams due to failures or debris. This would have to be shown from 
every possible position during the pressurization process. This 
proposal formalizes and standardizes previous equivalent level of 
safety findings made under the provisions of Sec.  21.21(b)(1).
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(d)
    Paragraph (d) would provide requirements for the detail design and 
fail-safe features of latching and locking mechanisms. Advisory 
Circular (AC) 25.783-1 ``Fuselage Doors, Hatches, and Exits,'' dated 
December 10, 1986, currently recommends some of these design features; 
the proposed rule would make these features mandatory.
    The detail design requirements for latches and locks contained in 
this proposal are consistent with current industry practice, as applied 
to doors whose initial movement is not inward. However, the 
applicability of the proposed requirement would be extended to any 
door, regardless of the direction of initial movement.
    Paragraph (d) also would require the latching mechanism to be 
designed to eliminate forces that would drive the latches to the open 
position. However, the FAA recognizes there still may be ratcheting 
forces that could progressively move the latches to the unlatched 
position. Therefore, the rule also would require the latching system to 
be designed such that the latches are positively secured without regard 
to the position of the locks.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(3)(iii) contains the requirement for a fail-
safe criterion for the locking system that would apply only to outward 
opening doors while under pressure. Since all the locks are usually 
designed as a single locking system, it is possible that single 
failures in the locking system could result in the unlocking of several 
or all the latches. Although the latches would continue to be held in 
the latched position by the latch system securing means, the FAA has 
determined that, for the most critical designs, during pressurized 
flight, single failures in the locking system should not unlock more 
latches than are needed to restrain the door.
    Proposed paragraphs (d)(5) and (6) contain detail requirements for 
the lock elements and locking system to ensure that they will restrain 
the latches under anticipated loading conditions, and to ensure that 
the locks cannot be engaged unless the door is properly latched. 
Experience has shown these features to be fundamental to the design of 
a safe door.
    Finally, proposed paragraph (d)(7) would exclude the requirement 
for a locking system from any door for which unlatching was not a 
hazard. In that case, a locking mechanism would not add to the safety 
of the door, since unlatching (which is what a locking mechanism is 
supposed to prevent) does not create a hazardous condition.
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(e)
    Paragraph (e) would require warning, caution, and advisory 
indications for doors. These requirements for indication are similar to 
the current provisions for indication of door status in this section, 
but provide added features consistent with NTSB and ATA 
recommendations. The prescribed ``improbable'' level for an erroneous 
indication that the door is fully closed, latched, and locked is 
proposed to be the same as the requirement of existing paragraph (e). 
However, the applicability would be extended to each door, if 
unlatching of the door in flight could be a hazard.
    Paragraph (e) also would require an aural warning before takeoff 
for any door that is not fully closed, latched, and locked if opening 
of the door would not allow safe flight. The FAA has determined that 
this requirement is necessary, based on service history, including the 
crash of an airplane shortly after takeoff as a result of aerodynamic 
interference from an open cargo door. This system should function in a 
manner similar to the takeoff configuration warning systems required by 
Sec.  25.703 (``Takeoff warning system'').
    Paragraph (e) also would require that there be a positive means to 
display indications and signals to the door operator. This proposed 
requirement is consistent with NTSB Safety Recommendation A-89-093, 
discussed previously.
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(f)
    This proposal would revise paragraph (f) to require a provision for 
direct visual inspections to determine that the door is fully closed, 
latched, and locked. The specific location and quantity of the viewing 
means would depend on the specific design, but might not require a 
viewing means for each lock, provided that the number of visual 
indicators provided would not give a false indication. This proposed 
requirement is similar to that of the existing paragraph (b), which 
requires a means for direct visual inspection of the locking mechanism. 
However, this proposal would extend the requirements to apply to any 
door, irrespective of the direction of initial movement, if the 
unlatched door could be a safety hazard.
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(g)
    This proposal would revise paragraph (g) to provide relief from 
certain requirements of the current rule that are applicable to access 
panels not subject to pressurization and for which opening would be 
inconsequential to safety. In addition, the proposal would provide 
relief from certain of the current requirements applicable to:
    [sbull] Maintenance doors that are not a safety hazard if opened; 
and
    [sbull] Removable emergency exits, because they are not used in 
normal operation and therefore not subjected to the same level of human 
error, abuse, and damage as other doors and hatches.
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(h)
    Paragraph (h) would prescribe detail design features that a door 
would need to have if it were to be considered as a door that is ``not 
a hazard'' when this phrase is used in other paragraphs of Sec.  
25.783. This paragraph effectively defines the criteria under which a 
door

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could become a potential hazard. The criteria include hazards due to 
decompression, aerodynamic interference, interaction with other systems 
or structure (for example, through the door departing the airplane and 
impacting an engine or control surface). For the purposes of this 
determination, opening by persons is treated separately from the 
tendency of the door to remain closed when under pressure. However, 
both are considerations that must be satisfied to determine that the 
door is not a hazard.
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(i)
    The current requirements of paragraph (i) that apply to the design 
of air stairs (integral stair installed in a passenger entry door that 
is qualified as a passenger emergency exit) would be removed from 
existing Sec.  25.783 and added in Sec.  25.810 (``Emergency egress 
assist means and escape routes'') as a new paragraph (e), without 
change in text. The FAA considers that manufacturers, applicants, and 
others seeking compliance with rules would be better served by having 
these requirements located in the same section of the rules where other 
related requirements are found.
Proposed Changes to Sec.  25.783(j)
    The special requirement for lavatory doors contained in current 
paragraph (j) would be removed and placed in a new Sec.  25.820 
(``Lavatory doors''), with only minor editorial changes in text. The 
FAA considers that less confusion will be caused, and the regulated 
public will be better served, if all requirements about this particular 
subject are located in one separate place.
Other Proposed Changes
    Several other provisions currently in Sec.  25.783 would be 
deleted, since they duplicate the requirements applicable to emergency 
exit design that are contained in, or would be moved without 
substantive change to, other sections of part 25. The FAA considers 
that less confusion would be caused, and that the regulated public 
would be better served, if all requirements concerning a particular 
subject are located in one place. The FAA proposes the following 
specific changes:
    Sec.  25.809(b) (``Emergency exit arrangement''):
    This paragraph would be revised by adding a new paragraph (b)(3) to 
require that each emergency exit must be capable of being opened, when 
there is no fuselage deformation, ``even though persons may be crowded 
against the door on the inside of the airplane.'' This specific 
requirement is currently a part of Sec.  25.783(b), but is more 
appropriate as part of the emergency exit arrangement requirements of 
Sec.  25.809.
    Sec.  25.809(c):
    This paragraph would be revised to include the requirement that the 
means of opening emergency exits also must be marked so it can be 
readily located and operated, even in darkness. This requirement is 
currently located in Sec.  25.783(b), but is more appropriate as part 
of the emergency exit arrangement requirements of Sec.  25.809.
    Sec.  25.809(f):
    This paragraph would be revised to require that the external door 
be located where persons using it will not be endangered by the 
propellers when appropriate operating procedures are used. This 
requirement currently is found in Sec.  25.783(d), but is more 
applicable to the emergency exit arrangement requirements of Sec.  
25.809. Existing Sec.  25.809(f) is redundant with the requirements for 
locking mechanisms contained in Sec.  25.783.
    In addition, the FAA is also proposing to correct an error in the 
current regulations as follows:
    Sec.  25.807 (``Emergency exits''):
    Existing Sec.  25.783 requires that passenger entry doors also meet 
the airworthiness standards required for emergency exits. In addition, 
the current JAR 25.807, issued by the European JAA, requires that 
certain other fuselage doors, as well as passenger entry doors, meet 
the same standards as emergency exits. Before the adoption of Amendment 
25-88 (61 FR 57956, November 8, 1996), part 25 also contained a 
requirement similar to that of JAR 25.807; however, that requirement 
was unintentionally omitted when Amendment 25-88 was adopted. This 
proposed rule would correct this discrepancy by setting forth this 
requirement in a revised Sec.  25.807(h), and by revising Sec.  25.783 
to refer to that section.
    Specifically, the proposed Sec.  25.807(h) would be revised to 
refer to ``other exits'' that must meet the applicable emergency exit 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  25.809 through 25.812. Those exits include:
    [sbull] Each emergency exit in the passenger compartment in excess 
of the minimum number of required emergency exits;
    [sbull] Floor-level doors or exits that are accessible from the 
passenger compartment and larger than a Type II exit, but less than 46 
inches wide; and
    [sbull] Other ventral or tail cone passenger exits.
    This provision is intended to address doors or other means of 
egress accessible from the passenger cabin. The width limit of 46 
inches was derived from cargo doors that have been installed in smaller 
transport category airplanes. That is, cargo doors are not required to 
be exits. However, this provision does not relieve any emergency exit 
for which passenger credit is received from any of the applicable 
requirements.

Is Existing FAA Advisory Material Adequate?

    The FAA also proposes to revise AC 25.783-1. The revised AC would 
describe an acceptable means, but not the only means, for complying 
with the proposed revised regulations described in this NPRM. The AC 
would provide guidance for showing compliance with structural and 
functional safety standards for doors and their operating systems. The 
availability of the proposed AC revision for public comment will be 
announced in the Federal Register in the near future.

What Regulatory Analyses and Assessments Has the FAA Conducted?

Regulatory Evaluation Summary
    Proposed changes to Federal regulations must undergo several 
economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each 
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies 
to analyze the economic effect of regulatory changes on small entities. 
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. section 2531-2533) prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, this Trade Act also requires the consideration of 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. And fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation).
    The FAA has determined that this proposal has minimal costs, and 
that it is neither ``a significant regulatory action'' as defined in 
Executive Order 12866, nor ``significant'' as defined in DOT's 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. Further, this proposed rule

[[Page 1937]]

would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities, would reduce barriers to international trade, and would 
not impose an Unfunded Mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, 
or on the private sector.
    The DOT Order 2100.5 prescribes policies and procedures for 
simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. If it is 
determined that the expected impact is so minimal that the proposed 
rule does not warrant a full evaluation, a statement to that effect and 
the basis for it is included in the proposed regulation. Accordingly, 
the FAA has determined that the expected impact of this proposed rule 
is so minimal that the proposed rule does not warrant a full 
evaluation. We provide the basis for this determination as follows.
    Currently, airplane manufacturers must satisfy both part 25 and the 
European JAR-25 standards to certificate transport category aircraft in 
both the United States and Europe. Meeting two sets of certification 
requirements raises the cost of developing a new transport category 
airplane often with no increase in safety. In the interest of fostering 
international trade, lowering the cost of aircraft development, and 
making the certification process more efficient, the FAA, JAA, and 
aircraft manufacturers have been working to create, to the maximum 
possible extent, a single set of certification requirements accepted in 
both the United States and Europe. As explained in detail previously, 
these efforts are referred to as ``harmonization.''
    The proposed rule would amend the current fuselage door standard 
contained in 14 CFR part 25 with a new improved door standard. This new 
standard would set forth, as a regulatory requirement, some of the 
existing technical guidance criteria that have been determined to be 
necessary for safety but which, up to this point, have not been 
included in the regulations. In addition, the proposed rule addresses 
recommendations from the NTSB and the Air Transport Association (ATA) 
task force on doors.
    If adopted, the proposal would harmonize the FAA and JAA 
requirements for fuselage doors. Adopting this proposal would also 
relieve a certification burden on industry by eliminating regulatory 
differences between the airworthiness standards and related guidance 
material of the United States and Europe.
Costs of the Proposed Rule
    The FAA identified only one section, 25.783(b), of the proposed 
rule where manufacturers indicated that a measurable cost would exist. 
For the other proposed changes, the FAA has not made specific cost 
estimates but has provided qualitative cost indications.
    1. Paragraph 25.783(a) is descriptive and has no expected cost.
    2. Paragraph 25.783(b) relates to opening by persons. The 
requirement to consider deliberate opening is new, but is expected to 
be accommodated in existing design practices for all but one United 
States manufacturer. (Requirements regarding inadvertent opening are 
not new). One manufacturer would incur an estimated cost of $0.75 
million, which would include the requirements for the prevention of 
intentional opening of the doors.
    3. Paragraph 25.783(c) covers means to prevent pressurization. The 
requirement to consider single failures in the pressurization-inhibit 
system is new, but is believed to be industry practice. Thus, there is 
likely to be very little, if any, cost for a new design. The provision 
to permit certain doors to forego this system is actually cost-
relieving, and could result in a minor cost reduction in some cases.
    4. Paragraph 25.783(d) covers latching and locking. Most of these 
changes are the incorporation of recommendations currently contained in 
an advisory circular. The vast majority of airplanes already comply, 
and basic design practice is to comply with these requirements. 
Therefore, these requirements, while new, should have minimal cost 
impact. The requirement for each latch to have a lock, which must 
monitor the latch position, is a formalization of existing practice. 
The requirement to eliminate forces in the latching mechanism that 
could load the locks is new, and may not be complied with in all cases 
currently . The FAA believes that these costs are minimal.
    5. Paragraph 25.783(e) covers warning, caution, and advisory 
indications. The reliability of the door indication system would be 
required to be higher for all doors. This would have only a small cost 
impact, as would the requirement for an aural warning for certain 
doors, and the requirement to provide an indication to the door 
operator.
    6. Paragraph 25.783(f) contains the visual inspection provision 
requirement. The requirement for direct visual inspection is extended 
to more door types, and may add costs in some cases.
    7. Paragraph 25.783(g) deals with certain maintenance doors, 
removable emergency exits, and access panels. The current rule does not 
provide the relief that the proposed rule does, although the AC has 
indicated that relief is possible. This provision could reduce costs in 
some cases.
    8. Paragraph 25.783(h) covers doors that are not a hazard and is 
intended to provide relief for certain doors, so it could reduce costs.
    9. Paragraphs 25.783(i), 25.783(j), 25.809(b), 25.809(c), and 
25.809(f) move text to another section.
    10. Paragraph 25.807 simply corrects an unintended deletion.
Summary of Benefit and Cost Considerations
    The proposed rule is expected to:
    [sbull] Maintain or provide a slight increase in the level of 
safety,
    [sbull] Have only a relatively small effect on costs when compared 
to current industry practice, and
    [sbull] Provide some cost savings to manufacturers by avoiding 
duplicative testing and reporting that could result from the existence 
of differing requirements under the current standards.
    This rule would codify existing guidance, standard industry 
practice, and industry recommendations for the design standards for 
fuselage doors, which would prevent a reoccurrence of the 1974 
accident. The FAA believes that the cost savings from a single 
certification requirement exceed the minimal additional compliance 
cost. The FAA therefore considers that the proposed rule would be cost-
beneficial. This is reinforced by industry's support for the proposal. 
We invite comments on the effects of this proposed regulation. We would 
particularly appreciate relevant quantitative data relating to any 
additional costs (or reductions in costs) believed likely to result 
from the proposed rule. The costs of interest are the increases or 
decreases, compared to costs associated with what is believed likely to 
be industry practice in the absence of the proposed rule.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, 50 U.S.C. 601-612, as 
amended, establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that 
agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objective of the rule and 
of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational 
requirements to the scale of the business, organizations, and 
governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.'' To achieve that 
principle,

[[Page 1938]]

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and consider flexible regulatory 
proposals and to explain the rationale for their actions. The Act 
covers a wide range of small entities, including businesses and 
governments.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. If the determination is that the rule will, the Agency 
must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    If, however, an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the 
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis 
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing 
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    The FAA considers that this proposed rule would not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities for two 
reasons:
    First, the proposed rule is expected to provide relief from some 
regulatory costs. The proposed rule would require that manufacturers of 
transport category aircraft meet a single certification requirement, 
rather than different standards for the United States and Europe. 
Manufacturers of the affected airplanes are believed to already meet 
most standards that would be required by the proposed rule, or expect 
to meet most of these standards.
    Second, all affected U.S. transport-aircraft category manufacturers 
exceed the Small Business Administration small-entity criterion of 
1,500 employees for aircraft manufacturers, as published by the Small 
Business Administration in 13 CFR part 121, Small Business Size 
Regulations; Size Standards, (65 FR 53533, September 5, 2000). The 
current U.S. part 25 airplane manufacturers include: Boeing, Cessna 
Aircraft, Gulfstream Aerospace, Learjet (owned by Bombardier), Lockheed 
Martin, McDonnell Douglas (a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Boeing 
Company), Raytheon Aircraft, and Sabreliner Corporation. All of these 
manufacturers have more than 1,500 employees and therefore do not 
qualify as small entities.
    Since there are no affected small entity manufacturers of the 
airplanes covered by the proposed rule, the FAA certifies that this 
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
International Trade Impact Assessment
    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate 
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary 
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international 
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. 
standards.
    In accordance with the above statute, the FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this proposed rule and has determined that it would 
reduce trade barriers by narrowing the differences between U.S. 
standards and European international standards.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), 
codified in 2 U.S.C. 1532-1538, enacted as Public Law 104-4 on March 
22, 1995, requires each Federal agency, to the extent permitted by law, 
to prepare a written assessment of the effects of any Federal mandate 
in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in the expenditure 
by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for 
inflation) in any one year.
    This proposed rule does not contain a Federal intergovernmental or 
private sector mandate that exceeds $100 million in any year; 
therefore, the requirements of the Act do not apply.

What Other Assessments Has the FAA Conducted?

Executive Order 13132, Federalism
    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. We therefore determined that this notice of proposed 
rulemaking would not have federalism implications.
Paperwork Reduction Act
    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. We have determined that there 
are no new information collection requirements associated with this 
proposed rule.
International Compatibility
    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is the FAA's policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. We have 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to this proposed regulation.
Environmental Analysis
    FAA Order 1050.1D defines the FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental impact statement. In accordance with the FAA Order 
1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this proposed rulemaking action 
qualifies for a categorical exclusion.
Energy Impact
    The energy impact of the proposed rule has been assessed in 
accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and 
Public Law 94-163, as amended (43 U.S.C. 6362), and the FAA Order 
1053.1. It has been determined that it is not a major regulatory action 
under the provisions of the EPCA.
Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in Title 
14 of the CFR in a manner affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to 
consider the extent to which Alaska is not served by transportation 
modes other than aviation, and to establish such regulatory 
distinctions as he or she considers appropriate. Because this proposed 
rule would apply to the certification of future designs of transport 
category airplanes and their subsequent operation, it could, if 
adopted, affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. The FAA therefore 
specifically requests comments on whether there is justification for 
applying the proposed rule differently to intrastate operations in 
Alaska.
Plain Language
    In response to the June 1, 1998, Presidential memorandum regarding 
the issue of plain language, the FAA re-examined the writing style 
currently used in the development of regulations. The memorandum 
requires Federal agencies to communicate clearly with the public. We 
are interested in your comments on whether the style of this

[[Page 1939]]

document is clear, and in any other suggestions you might have to 
improve the clarity of FAA communications that affect you. You can get 
more information about the Presidential memorandum and the plain 
language initiative at http://www.plainlanguage.gov.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Recording and recordkeeping 
requirements.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend part 25 of Title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

    1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, and 44704.

    2. Section 25.783 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  25.783  Fuselage doors.

    (a) General. This section applies to fuselage doors, which includes 
all doors, hatches, openable windows, access panels, covers, etc., on 
the exterior of the fuselage that do not require the use of tools to 
open or close. This also applies to each door or hatch through a 
pressure bulkhead, including any bulkhead that is specifically designed 
to function as a secondary bulkhead under the prescribed failure 
conditions of part 25. These doors must meet the requirements of this 
section, taking into account both pressurized and unpressurized flight, 
and must be designed as follows:
    (1) Each door must have means to safeguard against opening in 
flight as a result of mechanical failure, or failure of each single 
structural element.
    (2) Each door that could be a hazard if it unlatches must be 
designed so that opening during pressurized and unpressurized flight 
from the fully closed, latched, and locked condition is extremely 
improbable. This must be shown by safety analysis.
    (3) Each element of each door operating system must be designed or, 
where impracticable, distinctively and permanently marked, to minimize 
the probability of incorrect assembly and adjustment that could result 
in a malfunction.
    (4) All sources of power that could initiate unlocking or 
unlatching of each door must be automatically isolated from the 
latching and locking systems prior to flight and it must not be 
possible to restore power to the door during flight.
    (5) Each removable bolt, screw, nut, pin, or other removable 
fastener must meet the locking requirements of Sec.  25.607.
    (6) Certain doors, as specified by Sec.  25.807(h), must also meet 
the applicable requirements of Sec. Sec.  25.809 through 25.812 for 
emergency exits.
    (b) Opening by persons. There must be a means to safeguard each 
door against opening during flight due to inadvertent action by 
persons. In addition, design precautions must be taken to minimize the 
possibility for a person to open a door intentionally during flight. If 
these precautions include the use of auxiliary devices, those devices 
and their controlling systems must be designed so that:
    (1) no single failure will prevent more than one exit from being 
opened, and
    (2) failures that would prevent opening of the exit after landing 
are improbable.
    (c) Pressurization prevention means. There must be a provision to 
prevent pressurization of the airplane to an unsafe level if any door 
subject to pressurization is not fully closed, latched, and locked.
    (1) The provision must be designed to function after any single 
failure, or after any combination of failures not shown to be extremely 
improbable.
    (2) Doors that meet the conditions described in paragraph (h) of 
this section are not required to have a dedicated pressurization 
prevention means if, from every possible position of the door, it will 
remain open to the extent that it prevents pressurization or safely 
close and latch as pressurization takes place. This must also be shown 
with each single failure and malfunction, except that:
    (i) with failures or malfunctions in the latching mechanism, it 
need not latch after closing, and
    (ii) with jamming as a result of mechanical failure or blocking 
debris, the door need not close and latch if it can be shown that the 
pressurization loads on the jammed door or mechanism would not result 
in an unsafe condition.
    (d) Latching and locking. The latching and locking mechanisms must 
be designed as follows:
    (1) There must be a provision to latch each door.
    (2) The latches and their operating mechanism must be designed so 
that, under all airplane flight and ground loading conditions, with the 
door latched, there is no force or torque tending to unlatch the 
latches. In addition, the latching system must include a means to 
secure the latches in the latched position. This means must be 
independent of the locking system.
    (3) Each door subject to pressurization, and for which the initial 
opening movement is not inward, must--
    (i) have an individual lock for each latch,
    (ii) have the lock located as close as practicable to the latch, 
and
    (iii) be designed so that, during pressurized flight, no single 
failure in the locking system would prevent the locks from restraining 
the latches as necessary to secure the door.
    (4) Each door for which the initial opening movement is inward, and 
unlatching of the door could result in a hazard, must have a locking 
means to prevent the latches from becoming disengaged. The locking 
means must ensure sufficient latching to prevent opening of the door 
even with a single failure of the latching mechanism.
    (5) It must not be possible to position the lock in the locked 
position if the latch and the latching mechanism are not in the latched 
position.
    (6) It must not be possible to unlatch the latches with the locks 
in the locked position. Locks must be designed to withstand the limit 
loads resulting from--
    (i) the maximum operator effort when the latches are operated 
manually;
    (ii) the powered latch actuators, if installed; and
    (iii) the relative motion between the latch and the structural 
counterpart.
    (7) Each door for which unlatching would not result in a hazard is 
not required to have a locking mechanism meeting the requirements of 
paragraphs (d)(3) through (d)(6) of this section.
    (e) Warning, caution, and advisory indications. Doors must be 
provided with the following indications:
    (1) There must be a positive means to indicate at the door 
operator's station for each door that all required operations to close, 
latch, and lock the door have been completed.
    (2) There must be a positive means clearly visible from the 
operator station for each door to indicate if the door is not fully 
closed, latched, and locked for each door that could be a hazard if 
unlatched.
    (3) There must be a visual means on the flight deck to signal the 
pilots if any door is not fully closed, latched, and locked. The means 
must be designed such that any failure or combination of failures that 
would result in an erroneous closed, latched, and locked indication is 
improbable for--

[[Page 1940]]

    (i) each door that is subject to pressurization and for which the 
initial opening movement is not inward, or
    (ii) each door that could be a hazard if unlatched.
    (4) There must be an aural warning to the pilots prior to or during 
the initial portion of takeoff roll if any door is not fully closed, 
latched, and locked, and its opening would prevent a safe takeoff and 
return to landing.
    (f) Visual inspection provision. Each door for which unlatching 
could be a hazard must have a provision for direct visual inspection to 
determine, without ambiguity, if the door is fully closed, latched, and 
locked. The provision must be permanent and discernible under 
operational lighting conditions, or by means of a flashlight or 
equivalent light source.
    (g) Certain maintenance doors, removable emergency exits, and 
access panels. Some doors not normally opened except for maintenance 
purposes or emergency evacuation and some access panels need not comply 
with certain paragraphs of this section as follows:
    (1) Access panels that are not subject to cabin pressurization and 
would not be a hazard if open during flight need not comply with 
paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section, but must have a means to 
prevent inadvertent opening during flight.
    (2) Inward-opening removable emergency exits that are not normally 
removed, except for maintenance purposes or emergency evacuation, and 
flight deck-openable windows need not comply with paragraphs (c) and 
(f) of this section.
    (3) Maintenance doors that meet the conditions of paragraph (h) of 
this section, and for which a placard is provided limiting use to 
maintenance access, need not comply with paragraphs (c) and (f) of this 
section.
    (h) Doors that are not a hazard. For the purposes of this section, 
a door is considered not to be a hazard in the unlatched condition 
during flight, provided it can be shown to meet all of the following 
conditions:
    (1) Doors in pressurized compartments would remain in the fully 
closed position if not restrained by the latches when subject to a 
pressure greater than \1/2\ psi. Opening by persons, either 
inadvertently or intentionally, need not be considered in making this 
determination.
    (2) The door would remain inside the airplane or remain attached to 
the airplane if it opens either in pressurized or unpressurized 
portions of the flight. This determination must include the 
consideration of inadvertent and intentional opening by persons during 
either pressurized or unpressurized portions of the flight.
    (3) The disengagement of the latches during flight would not allow 
depressurization of the cabin to an unsafe level. This safety 
assessment must include the physiological effects on the occupants.
    (4) The open door during flight would not create aerodynamic 
interference that could preclude safe flight and landing.
    (5) The airplane would meet the structural design requirements with 
the door open. This assessment must include the aeroelastic stability 
requirements of Sec.  25.629, as well as the strength requirements of 
this subpart.
    (6) The unlatching or opening of the door must not preclude safe 
flight and landing as a result of interaction with other systems or 
structures.
    3. Amend Sec.  25.807 by revising paragraph (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.807  Emergency exits.

* * * * *
    (h) Other exits. The following exits also must meet the applicable 
emergency exit requirements of Sec. Sec.  25.809 through 25.812, and 
must be readily accessible:
    (1) Each emergency exit in the passenger compartment in excess of 
the minimum number of required emergency exits.
    (2) Any other floor-level door or exit that is accessible from the 
passenger compartment and is as large or larger than a Type II exit, 
but less than 46 inches wide.
    (3) Any other ventral or tail cone passenger exit.
* * * * *
    4. Amend Sec.  25.809 by adding a new paragraph (b)(3) and by 
revising paragraphs (c) and (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.809  Emergency exit arrangement.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Even though persons may be crowded against the door on the 
inside of the airplane.
    (c) The means of opening emergency exits must be simple and 
obvious; may not require exceptional effort; and must be arranged and 
marked so that it can be readily located and operated, even in 
darkness. Internal exit-opening means involving sequence operations 
(such as operation of two handles or latches, or the release of safety 
catches) may be used for flightcrew emergency exits if it can be 
reasonably established that these means are simple and obvious to 
crewmembers trained in their use.
* * * * *
    (f) Each door must be located where persons using them will not be 
endangered by the propellers when appropriate operating procedures are 
used.
* * * * *
    5. Amend Sec.  25.810 by adding a new paragraph (e) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  25.810  Emergency egress assist means and escape routes.

* * * * *
    (e) If an integral stair is installed in a passenger entry door 
that is qualified as a passenger emergency exit, the stair must be 
designed so that, under the following conditions, the effectiveness of 
passenger emergency egress will not be impaired:
    (1) The door, integral stair, and operating mechanism have been 
subjected to the inertia forces specified in Sec.  25.561(b)(3), acting 
separately relative to the surrounding structure.
    (2) The airplane is in the normal ground attitude and in each of 
the attitudes corresponding to collapse of one or more legs of the 
landing gear.
* * * * *
    6. Add a new Sec.  25.820 to read as follows:


Sec.  25.820  Lavatory doors.

    All lavatory doors must be designed to preclude anyone from 
becoming trapped inside the lavatory. If a locking mechanism is 
installed, it must be capable of being unlocked from the outside 
without the aid of special tools.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 20, 2002.
Vi L. Lipski,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 03-581 Filed 1-13-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P