[Federal Register: May 20, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 98)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 29049-29054]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr20my04-2]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2001-NM-291-AD; Amendment 39-13640; AD 2004-10-10]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -
800, and -900 Series Airplanes Equipped With Certain Honeywell Start
Converter Units
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900
series airplanes equipped with certain Honeywell start converter units
(SCU). This amendment requires replacement of the SCU of the auxiliary
power unit (APU) located in the electrical and electronics (E/E)
compartment with a new or modified SCU. This action is necessary to
prevent overheating of the electrical connector of the SCU, which could
create an ignition source and possible fire in the E/E compartment and
cause damage to certain electrical wire bundles on the E2-2 shelf. Such
damage could result in loss of power from the APU generator, failure of
electrically powered airplane systems, and consequent reduction in the
ability of the flight crew to control the airplane in certain adverse
operating conditions. This action is intended to address the identified
unsafe condition.
DATES: Effective June 24, 2004.
ADDRESSES: Information pertaining to this amendment may be examined at
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane
Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen S. Oshiro, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-
4056; telephone (425) 917-6480; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -
700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes equipped with certain
Honeywell start converter units (SCU) was published in the Federal
Register on August 9, 2002 (67 FR
[[Page 29050]]
51785). That action proposed to require replacement of certain SCUs
with new, improved SCUs. The SCUs would be required to be replaced
according to the Boeing 737-600/700/800/900 Aircraft Maintenance Manual
(AMM) (the AMM includes procedures for Model 737-700C series
airplanes).
Comments
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
Requests To Extend the Compliance Time
Several commenters request that the compliance time of 18 months
specified in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) be extended. The
following justifications were provided by several commenters in support
of their request to extend the compliance time from the proposed 18
months to compliance times ranging from 36 to 60 months.
One commenter states that, rather than specifying new replacement
SCUs as described in the ``Cost Impact'' section of the NPRM, the SCUs
should be described as ``modified.'' The commenter indicates that the
time for rotation of an SCU through the modification program ranges
from 40 to 45 days. The commenter expresses concern that the SCU
manufacturer may not be able to support the proposed 18-month
compliance time for all affected airplanes. For these reasons, the
commenter requests that the FAA review any proprietary failure analysis
of the airplane manufacturer to support a request for extension of the
compliance time to 42 months.
One commenter states that it has two spare SCUs to be used in its
replacement program, and that 54 airplanes of its fleet of 77 Model
737-800 series airplanes would require replacement. The commenter
indicates that in order to meet the proposed 18-month compliance time,
an additional two SCUs would have to be purchased at a cost of
$420,000. The commenter requests that, to prevent such an expense, the
compliance time be extended to 36 months.
One commenter estimates that the time from shipment of a discrepant
SCU to the SCU manufacturer for modification and acquisition of the
modified part would be 45 days. The operator states that it would need
the compliance time extended to 42 months in order to replace all 42 of
its SCUs.
Another commenter states that it would need the compliance time
extended from 18 months due to the large number of SCUs that it will
have to modify. Additionally, the commenter states that it would need
the compliance time extended because of the effect the large worldwide
volume of SCUs will have on the SCU manufacturer's turnaround times.
Therefore, the commenter prefers that the compliance time be extended
to 60 months, if possible, but adds that it would be acceptable to
extend the compliance time to 36 months.
Additional Requests and Reasons for Extending the Compliance Time
One commenter states that the service history of the Model 737-600,
-700, and -800 series airplanes has shown that, in most cases, typical
maintenance and operating procedures have limited the damage caused by
failed electromagnetic interference (EMI) filter capacitors to the
capacitors themselves. The commenter states that burning of the wire
harness appears to occur only in conjunction with a high number of
auxiliary power unit (APU) restart attempts with an illuminated APU
fault light. The commenter states further that, of the six incidents
that were reported as of the date of its comment submittal, only one
resulted in burning the wire harness. That incident was discovered on
an airplane that was being introduced into a domestic operator's fleet
after having been operated by a non-U.S. airline. The commenter
suspects that the SCU connector failure on that airplane was the result
of being mishandled possibly by nonqualified personnel as evidenced by
the 12 to 20 APU restart attempts made with an illuminated APU fault
light.
One commenter, the SCU manufacturer, also states that the risk of
an SCU connector overheat event that progresses to the point where
aircraft wiring is damaged is considerably reduced if repeated APU
start attempts are not made. The commenter also advises that it has
issued a service information letter (SIL) that provides operators of
the affected airplanes with direction regarding this issue. The
commenter further states that, although the SIL is not an alternative
method of compliance with the AD, it does provide additional protection
against the identified unsafe condition. The commenter further states
that the two events that occurred since the issuance of the service
letter (August 16, 2000) were of reduced severity and no damage to the
airplane wiring was recorded.
Another commenter, the airplane manufacturer, contends that, even
in a worst case scenario, the risk to the fleet is minimal because the
wiring damage does not present a hazard to the airplane or occupants.
The commenter advises that an analysis was done for each system that
could be affected and it was found that sufficient redundancy exists
such that all potential combinations of lost functionality were
extremely improbable. The commenter further advises that, since the SCU
automatically removes power for this condition within 300 milliseconds,
which limits smoke emission, the hazard presented by smoke or the smell
of burning wires is minimized. Also, the wiring is self extinguishing
and will not propagate fire and there are no flammable materials in the
area. The commenter further notes that the electrical/electronic (E/E)
bay is visually inspected per the zonal inspection program every 18
months or 4,000 flight cycles, whichever occurs first, for obvious
unsatisfactory conditions, damage, failures, irregularities and/or
discrepancies. In addition, the commenter specifies that the smoke
clearing procedure can be used to eliminate any accumulated smoke and/
or fumes.
Another commenter requests that the FAA review any failure analysis
and extend the compliance time from 18 to 42 months.
The FAA agrees with the commenters' requests to extend the
compliance time. However, we do not agree with certain commenters'
justification for extending the compliance time solely on the basis of
the potential disruption or negative impact on operator flight and
maintenance schedules, or on other non-safety related aspects of
airline operations. Those commenters did not address the impact that
the requested increases in compliance time would have on airplane
safety, or describe compensatory factors that would mitigate the
increased exposure of the fleet to the potential unsafe condition as
the result of a lengthened compliance time.
In addition, we reviewed the manufacturer's electrical power system
safety assessment (which includes a failure analysis) for Boeing Model
737-600, -700, and -800 series airplanes. However, based on that
review, we have determined that the safety assessment does not address
all of the specific concerns that prompted the initiation of this AD.
We do agree that the compliance time may be extended based on the
capability of the SCU manufacturer to perform the SCU modifications,
the updated information provided by the airplane manufacturer regarding
the number of SCU failures to date, the number of SCUs that have yet to
receive the corrective modifications, and the rate at
[[Page 29051]]
which the SCU manufacturer is currently able to perform the
modifications.
Therefore, we have determined that the compliance time may be
extended from 18 months to 36 months. We consider a 36-month compliance
time will provide an acceptable level of safety, yet will allow
operators sufficient time to process the remaining 514 unmodified in-
service and spare SCUs through the SCU manufacturer's modification
program without undue disruption of airline operations. We have revised
paragraph (a) of the final rule accordingly.
Request To Revise Paragraph (a) of the NPRM
One commenter requests that the FAA remove reference to the
issuance date of Chapter 49-41-61 of the AMM specified in paragraph (a)
of the NPRM. The commenter notes that by specifying a particular
issuance date, operators are required to use that specific revision of
the AMM. The commenter states that if the specific date was removed,
operators could perform the replacement of the SCU per the latest
revision of Chapter 49-41-61.
We do not agree that reference to the particular issuance date of
Chapter 49-41-61 should be removed. In this case, that particular date
is the specific revision of the chapter that we have reviewed and
determined to be an appropriate source of service information for
accomplishing the replacement of the SCU of the APU. To allow operators
to use future revisions of Chapter 49-41-61, either we must revise the
AD to reference specific later revisions, or operators must request
approval to use later revisions as an alternative method of compliance
with this AD under the provisions of paragraph (b) of this AD. Since
the issuance of the NPRM, we have reviewed the current revision of
Chapter 49-41-61, dated October 10, 2003, and have determined that it
is also an acceptable source of service information. We have revised
paragraph (a) of the final rule to specify that replacing the SCU of
the APU must be accomplished per a method approved by the Manager,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. However, we have also
specified that Chapter 49-41-61, dated June 5, 1998, or dated October
10, 2003, is an approved method for the accomplishment of the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this final rule.
Request To Revise Paragraph (b) of the NPRM
Two commenters request that the compliance time specified in
paragraph (b) of the NPRM be revised to match the compliance time
specified in paragraph (a) of the NPRM for replacement of the affected
SCUs. The commenters state that it is unrealistic to specify that, ``as
of the effective date of the AD, no person shall install on any
airplane * * *,'' due to the turnaround time to remove, modify, and
install the SCUs (discussed in comments previously).
We acknowledge that, because of a possible delay in modifying the
SCUs, the compliance time of the ``spares'' paragraph (b) in the NPRM
is unrealistic. We consider that a condition could occur where
operators remove the SCUs for modification and no modified spares are
available for installation, effectively, grounding the airplane.
Generally, the purpose of the ``spares'' paragraph is to ensure that
unmodified or identified ``unsafe'' parts are not installed/reinstalled
on airplanes, and specifically, prior to the compliance time specified
for modification in paragraph (a) of the final rule. Therefore, there
is no reason to include a ``spares'' paragraph in this AD with a
compliance time that is identical to the threshold compliance time
required by paragraph (a) of this AD. We have determined that, in this
case, removal of the prohibition to install certain SCU part numbers as
of the effective date of the AD is warranted, and we have removed
paragraph (b) from the final rule and reidentified subsequent
paragraphs accordingly.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM
One commenter states that, given the proven service experience of
the Model 737 (NG) series airplanes and the limited number of burnt
harnesses (one) reported, continuing to upgrade the SCUs at the normal
attrition rate will provide an adequate level of safety. We infer that
the commenter is requesting that we withdraw the NPRM.
We do not agree. We consider the SCU connector failures to be a
safety issue of sufficient significance to warrant the removal,
modification, and replacement of the SCUs via regulatory requirement
rather than by relying on passive means such as attrition. Such
reliance on attrition does not ensure that the affected airplanes will
receive appropriately modified SCUs in a timely manner, or at all.
Request To Revise the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
One commenter suggests that flight safety can be best preserved by
amending the AFM to limit the number of start attempts with a
consecutive fault illumination to a total of three including two
restarts. The commenter states that requiring such an AFM limitation
would be a more immediate action than waiting for the 18-month
compliance time to replace/modify the SCUs, and would ensure that a
burning harness would not occur in flight. The commenter notes that the
Non-Normal Procedures Section of the Model 737 series airplane AFM
currently allows restart attempts five minutes after the APU switch is
placed in the ``OFF'' position and the APU fault light extinguishes.
We do not agree that adding a requirement to revise the AFM is
appropriate at this time. An AFM limitation might reduce the short-term
likelihood of filter capacitor failures, however, the limitation would
be difficult to define since the number of repetitive start attempts
after which the filter capacitors have been degraded to the point of
failure has not been conclusively determined. Furthermore, an AFM
limitation would not address long-term exposure of the fleet to the
potential unsafe condition, since the cumulative effects of non-
consecutive APU restart attempts on the filter capacitors also has not
been determined. No change to the final rule is necessary.
Request To Clarify the ``Airworthiness Directives'' Heading
One commenter, the SCU manufacturer, requests that the
``Airworthiness Directives'' heading be revised. The commenter suggests
that the heading be revised to add the word ``certain,'' as follows:
``Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800,
and -900 Series Airplanes Equipped'' with ``Certain'' Honeywell Start
Converter Units.'' The commenter explains that adding the word
``certain,'' clarifies that not ``all'' SCU part numbers are affected
on the applicable airplanes.
We agree with the commenter's request and have revised the heading
accordingly.
Request To Revise Wording Describing the Action To Replace
One commenter, the SCU manufacturer, requests that the wording
describing the replacement of the SCU with ``a new, improved SCU'' be
revised to read, ``a modified SCU.'' The commenter indicates that, by
specifying
[[Page 29052]]
``a modified SCU,'' operators would not be mislead into thinking that
the SCU manufacturer would replace the existing SCU at no charge to the
operators with SCUs that may be manufactured with technological
advances over and above the SCUs specified in the NPRM.
We understand the commenter's position and agree that clarification
is necessary. Since certain ``new'' production SCU part numbers
incorporate design features that preclude the unsafe condition, we
consider those ``new'' SCU part numbers to be acceptable replacements,
and the table titled ``SCU Part Numbers'' of the final rule identifies
the SCU part numbers that are acceptable as replacements. Therefore, we
have revised the ``Summary'' section of the final rule to specify that
replacement shall be with ``a new or modified SCU.'' Since the wording
specified in the ``Supplementary Information'' section of the NPRM that
discussed replacement with ``a new, improved SCU'' does not reappear in
the final rule, it is not necessary to revise the final rule further in
this regard.
Request To Revise the ``Discussion'' Section of the NPRM
One commenter, the SCU manufacturer, requests that the
``Discussion'' section of the NPRM be revised to specify the number of
incidents and APU operating hours. The commenter suggests that the FAA
state that there have been six reported incidents of SCU ARINC
connector overheating in approximately 5 million APU operating hours
(to September 6, 2002), and that two of these events showed visual
damage to adjacent electrical wire bundles on certain Boeing Model 737-
700 and -800 series airplanes. The commenter states that such revision
of the ``Discussion'' section is necessary to minimize the possibility
of misunderstanding the scope of the issue.
We do not agree that the ``Discussion'' section of the NPRM should
be revised. We acknowledge that the number of incidents of SCU
connector failure that resulted in the APU generator failures might
provide additional useful background information. However, we note that
we have recently received updated information from the airplane
manufacturer regarding additional SCU connector failure events. In
fact, as of October 3, 2003, the total number of SCU connector failure
events had risen from six (as reported by the commenter) to ten. The
number of events in which heat damage propagated to electrical wiring
external to the SCU also increased from two to three. As discussed
previously, the ``Discussion'' section does not reappear in the final
rule. Therefore, no change to the final rule is necessary in this
regard.
Request To Add a Note to ``Discussion'' Section
The same commenter, the SCU manufacturer, requests that a note be
added at the end of the ``Discussion'' section of the NPRM to specify
that during the investigation it was recognized that the extent of heat
damage resulting from the event is proportional to the number of
restarting attempts performed with an already failed unit. The
commenter advises that Honeywell Service Information Letter (SIL) SIL
49-C-139 was issued to instruct the operator to recognize the fault
indication and cease further starting attempts until troubleshooting
can be performed. The commenter also states that events that occurred
after the issue of SIL (2 events) were of reduced severity, and no
damage to aircraft wiring was recorded. The commenter contends that
observing the procedures described in the SIL effectively limits the
extent of overheat damage.
We do not agree that the ``Discussion'' section of the NPRM should
be revised per the commenter. No data has been submitted to the FAA to
support the statement that the extent of heat damage resulting from an
event is proportional to the number of restart attempts with an already
failed unit. We do acknowledge, however, potential safety benefits of
recognizing SCU failure indications in conjunction with terminating
subsequent APU start attempts until appropriate maintenance and
troubleshooting has been performed, as recommended in the above
referenced Honeywell SIL. We consider that implementation of the
procedures described in the Honeywell SIL until replacement of the SCUs
may reduce the likelihood of SCU connector failures during the
compliance period. As discussed previously, the ``Discussion'' section
does not reappear in the final rule. Therefore, no change is necessary
to the final rule in this regard.
Request To Revise Estimated Number of Affected Airplanes
One commenter, the SCU manufacturer, requests that the estimated
number of airplanes currently affected by the NPRM be revised. The
commenter states that it has completed modification of 198 SCU units
since it submitted the original estimate of affected airplanes.
We agree that the estimated number of affected airplanes can be
reduced. We also received updated information from the airplane
manufacturer that confirmed a reduction of the number of affected
airplanes. Therefore, we have revised the Cost Impact section of the
final rule accordingly. See ``Editorial Change to Labor Rate Estimate''
paragraph below for other changes to the Cost Impact paragraph of this
final rule.
Request To Revise SCU Part Numbers Specified in Paragraph (a) of the
NPRM
One commenter, the SCU manufacturer, requests that the second
column of the table in paragraph (a) of the NPRM be removed and
replaced with certain other ``acceptable'' replacement part numbers.
The commenter states that the table in paragraph (a) of the NPRM could
be misleading by indicating that affected part numbers can only be
replaced with the corresponding number in the right column. The
commenter further states that listing the acceptable part numbers
separately would clarify the requirement and indicate all acceptable
SCU part numbers that may be installed on the airplane.
We agree that clarification is necessary. Based on information
received from the airplane manufacturer, we have determined that SCUs
having part numbers 1151858-241 (of any series) are not interchangeable
with SCUs having part numbers 1152426-245 (of any series) or 1152466-
250 (of any series). However, all SCUs having part numbers 1152426-245
and 1152466-250 of any series are interchangeable. Therefore, to
prevent confusion regarding the selection of appropriate replacement
SCUs, the table in paragraph (a) of the final rule has been revised to
illustrate this clarification.
Conclusion
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously
described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of
the AD.
Changes to 14 CFR Part 39/Effect on the AD
On July 10, 2002, the FAA issued a new version of 14 CFR part 39
(67 FR 47997, July 22, 2002), which governs the FAA's airworthiness
directives system. The regulation now includes material that relates to
altered products, special flight permits, and alternative methods
[[Page 29053]]
of compliance. However, for clarity and consistency in this final rule,
we have retained the language of the NPRM regarding that material.
Editorial Change to Labor Rate Estimate
After the NPRM was issued, we reviewed the figures we use to
calculate the labor rate to do the required actions. To account for
various inflationary costs in the airline industry, we find it
appropriate to increase the labor rate used in these calculations from
$60 per work hour to $65 per work hour. The economic impact
information, below, has been revised to reflect this increase in the
specified hourly labor rate.
Cost Impact
There are approximately 403 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 250 airplanes of U.S. registry
will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 4 work
hours per airplane to accomplish the required actions, and that the
average labor rate is $65 per work hour. Required parts will be
provided by the parts manufacturer at no cost to operators. Based on
these figures, the cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated
to be $65,000, or $260 per airplane.
The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that
no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD
action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
2004-10-10 Boeing: Amendment 39-13640. Docket 2001-NM-291-AD.
Applicability: Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series
airplanes; certificated in any category; equipped with start
converter units (SCUs) having Honeywell part number (P/N) 1151858-
241, Series 1 through 9 inclusive, or P/N 1152426-245, Series 1
through 6 inclusive.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent overheating of the electrical connector of the SCU,
which could create an ignition source and possible fire in the
electrical and electronics (E/E) compartment and cause damage to
certain electrical wire bundles on the E2-2 shelf, accomplish the
following:
Replacement
(a) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD:
Replace the SCU of the auxiliary power unit located in the E/E
compartment per a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA. Boeing 737-600/700/800/900
Maintenance Manual, Chapter 49-41-61, dated June 5, 1998; and
Aircraft Maintenance Manual, Chapter 49-41-61, dated October 10,
2003, are approved methods of compliance with the requirements of
this paragraph. Replace the applicable SCU listed in the ``Existing
Honeywell P/N'' column below, with the corresponding SCU listed in
the ``Replacement Honeywell P/N'' column below, as follows:
SCU Part Numbers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing Honeywell P/N Replacement Honeywell P/N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1151858-241, of any series 1 through 9 1151858-241, series 10 or
inclusive. 1151858-241, series 11 or
1151858-241, series 12.
1152426-245, of any series 1 through 6 1152426-245, series 7 or
inclusive. 1152426-245, series 8 or
1152466-250, series 1 or
1152466-250, series 2 or
1152466-250, series 3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA. Operators shall
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, Seattle ACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Seattle ACO.
Special Flight Permits
(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
Sec. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Effective Date
(d) This amendment becomes effective on June 24, 2004.
[[Page 29054]]
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 10, 2004.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 04-11287 Filed 5-19-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P