[Federal Register: May 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 98)]
[Notices]
[Page 29497-29510]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr23my05-52]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[Report No. AUC-05-61-B (Auction No. 61); DA 05-1047]
Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Licenses Auction,
Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments
and Other Auction Procedures
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures and minimum opening
bids for the upcoming auction of licenses of Automated Maritime
Telecommunications System (AMTS) spectrum. This document is intended to
familiarize prospective bidders with the procedures and minimum opening
bids for this auction.
DATES: Auction No. 61 is scheduled to begin on August 3, 2005.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Auctions and Spectrum Access Division,
WTB: For legal questions: Howard Davenport at (202) 418-0660. For
general auction questions: Debbie Smith, Roy Knowles or Barbara Sibert
at (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions: Public Safety and
Critical Infrastructure Division, WTB: Jeff Tobias or James Shaffer at
(202) 418-0680. Media Contact: Lauren Patrich at (202) 418-7944.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 61
Procedures Public Notice released on April 21, 2005. The complete text
of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice, including attachments,
as well as related Commission documents, are available for public
inspection and coping during regular business hours at the FCC
Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room
CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 61 Procedures Public
Notice and related Commission documents may also be purchased from the
Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc.
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC
20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may
contact BCPI
[[Page 29498]]
at its Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. The Auction No. 61 Procedures
Public Notice and related documents are also available on the Internet
at the Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/61/.
I. General Information
A. Introduction
1. The Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice announces the
procedures and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of
licenses of Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS)
spectrum, scheduled for August 3, 2005 (Auction No. 61). On February 2,
2005, in accordance with Section 309(j)(4) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau)
released a public notice seeking comment on reserve prices or minimum
opening bids and the procedures to be used in Auction No. 61. The
Bureau received two comments, one reply comment, and a response to the
reply comment in response to the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice,
70 FR 7270, February 11, 2005.
i. Background of Proceeding
2. The Maritime Services provide for the unique distress,
operational and personal communication needs of vessels at sea and on
inland waterways. AMTS is a maritime service that was established in
1981 as an alternative to VHF public coast service (VPCS). In the
Public Coast Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice, 62 FR
40281, July 28, 1997, the Commission described AMTS as a specialized
system of public coast stations providing integrated and interconnected
marine voice and data communications, somewhat like a cellular phone
system, for tugs, barges, and other commercial vessels on waterways.
3. Section 309(j)(2) of the Communications Act formerly stated that
mutually exclusive applications for initial licenses or construction
permits were auctionable if the principal use of the spectrum was for
subscriber-based services, and competitive bidding would promote the
expressed objectives of the Communications Act. The Commission
concluded that the public coast service, including VPCS, high seas, and
AMTS public coast stations, was a Commercial Mobile Radio Service
(CMRS) and subsequently decided that mutually exclusive applications
for public coast station licenses would be resolved through competitive
bidding.
4. On August 5, 1997, after release of the Public Coast Second
Report and Order and Second Further Notice, President Clinton signed
into law the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (``Balanced Budget Act''),
which expanded the Commission's auction authority by amending Section
309(j) of the Communications Act to provide that all mutually exclusive
applications for initial licenses or construction permits shall be
auctioned, with certain exceptions not applicable here.
5. In the Public Coast Second Report and Order and Second Further
Notice, the Commission adopted AMTS rules that permit service on land,
so long as marine-originating communications receive priority. In the
Public Coast Second Memorandum Opinion and Order and Fifth Report and
Order, 67 FR 48560, July 25, 2002, the Commission adopted a geographic
licensing system for AMTS with service areas (AMTSAs) based upon
maritime VPCS areas (VPCSA), with the modification that the inland
VPCSAs would be consolidated into a single, inland geographic service
area. The Commission announced that it would conduct an auction to
resolve mutually exclusive applications for AMTS licenses.
Additionally, the Commission concluded that the general competitive
bidding rules, and the rules regarding the participation of small
businesses in auctions that were applied to the auction of VPC
licenses, should be used for auctioning AMTS licenses.
6. On February 2, 2005, the Bureau released the Auction No. 61
Comment Public Notice announcing that Auction No. 61 will commence on
August 3, 2005, setting forth a complete list of licenses for Auction
No. 61, and seeking comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bid
amounts and other auction procedures.
ii. Licenses To Be Auctioned
7. Auction No. 61 will offer ten licenses in the AMTS Service in
the 217/219 MHz bands. Licenses will be offered in each of 10 AMTSAs
where available. These licenses remained unsold in Auction No. 57,
which closed on September 15, 2004. For Auction No. 61, licenses are
not available in each spectrum block in every market. A complete list
of the licenses available in Auction No. 61 and their descriptions is
included in Attachment A of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice
at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/61/.
8. The following table contains the AMTS block/frequency bands
cross-reference list for Auction No. 61:
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Geographic area Number of
Block Frequency bands (MHz) Total bandwidth Pairing type licenses
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A............................... 217.5-218.0/219.5-220.0................... 1 MHz............ 2 x 500 kHz............. AMTSA............ 9
B............................... 217.0-217.5/219.0-219.5................... 1 MHz............ 2 x 500 kHz............. AMTSA............ 1
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Note: The above table displays the band edges of spectrum blocks
A and B using the twenty 25 kHz channels that comprise each block as
listed in 47 CFR 80.385(a)(2). It should be noted that pursuant to
47 CFR 80.481, licensees are not required to use 25 kHz
channelization and may choose any channelization scheme; however,
regardless of the channelization scheme used, emissions at these
band edges must be attenuated within the limitation that would be
required under 47 CFR 80.211 if the licensee were using 25 kHz
channels.
B. Rules and Disclaimers
i. Relevant Authority
9. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly
with the Commission's rules, particularly those relating to the AMTS
service contained in Title 47, Part 80, of the Code of Federal
Regulations, and those relating to application and auction procedures,
contained in Title 47, Part 1, of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Prospective applicants must also be thoroughly familiar with the
procedures, terms and conditions (collectively, terms) contained in the
Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice; the Auction No. 61 Comment
Public Notice; Public Coast Second Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Fifth Report and Order; and the Public Coast Fourth Report and Order
and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making (as well as prior and
subsequent Commission proceedings regarding competitive bidding
procedures, application requirements, and obligations of Commission
licensees).
10. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders,
[[Page 29499]]
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or
supplement the information contained in the Bureau's public notices at
any time, and will issue public notices to convey any new or
supplemental information to applicants. It is the responsibility of all
applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with all
public notices pertaining to this auction.
ii. Prohibition of Collusion
11. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, Sec.
1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibits applicants for any of the
same geographic license areas from communicating with each other during
the auction about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless such
applicants have identified each other on their FCC Form 175
applications as parties with whom they have entered into agreements
under Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii). Thus, applicants for any of the same
geographic license areas must affirmatively avoid all discussions with
each other that affect, or in their reasonable assessment have the
potential to affect, bidding or bidding strategy. This prohibition
begins at the short-form application filing deadline and ends at the
down payment deadline after the auction. This prohibition applies to
all applicants regardless of whether such applicants become qualified
bidders or actually bid. For purposes of this prohibition, Sec.
1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines applicant as including all controlling
interests in the entity submitting an application to participate in the
auction, as well as all holders of partnership and other ownership
interests and any stock interest amounting to 10 percent or more of the
entity, or outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of the entity
submitting a short-form application, and all officers and directors of
that entity.
12. Applicants for licenses in any of the same geographic license
areas are encouraged not to use the same individual as an authorized
bidder. A violation of the anti-collusion rule could occur if an
individual acts as the authorized bidder for two or more competing
applicants, and conveys information concerning the substance of bids or
bidding strategies between the applicants he or she is authorized to
represent in the auction. A violation could similarly occur if the
authorized bidders are different individuals employed by the same
organization (e.g., law firm or consulting firm). In such a case, at a
minimum, applicants should certify on their applications that
precautionary steps have been taken to prevent communication between
authorized bidders and that applicants and their bidding agents will
comply with the anti-collusion rule. However, the Bureau cautions that
merely filing a certifying statement as part of an application will not
outweigh specific evidence that collusive behavior has occurred, nor
will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when warranted.
13. The Commission's anti-collusion rule allows applicants to form
certain agreements during the auction, provided the applicants have not
applied for licenses covering any of the same geographic areas. In
addition, applicants that apply to bid for all markets will be
precluded from communicating with all other applicants until after the
down payment deadline. However, all applicants may enter into bidding
agreements before filing their FCC Form 175, as long as they disclose
the existence of the agreement(s) in their Form 175. If parties agree
in principle on all material terms prior to the short-form filing
deadline, those parties must be identified on the short-form
application pursuant to Sec. 1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not
been reduced to writing. If the parties have not agreed in principle by
the filing deadline, an applicant would not include the names of those
parties on its application, and may not continue negotiations. By
signing their FCC Form 175 short-form applications, applicants are
certifying their compliance with Sec. 1.2105(c).
14. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that
application. Thus, Sec. 1.65 requires auction applicants that engage
in communications of bids or bidding strategies that result in a
bidding agreement, arrangement or understanding not already identified
on their short-form applications to promptly disclose any such
agreement, arrangement or understanding to the Commission by amending
their pending applications. In addition, Sec. 1.2105(c)(6) requires
all auction applicants to report prohibited discussions or disclosures
regarding bids or bidding strategy to the Commission in writing
immediately but in no case later than five business days after the
communication occurs, even if the communication does not result in an
agreement or understanding regarding bids or bidding strategy that must
be reported under Sec. 1.65.
15. Applicants that are winning bidders will be required to
disclose in their long-form applications the specific terms,
conditions, and parties involved in all bidding consortia, joint
ventures, partnerships, and other arrangements entered into relating to
the competitive bidding process. Any applicant found to have violated
the anti-collusion rule may be subject to sanctions, including
forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment or full bid amount, and
may be prohibited from participating in future auctions. In addition,
applicants are reminded that they are subject to the antitrust laws,
which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the
marketplace. If an applicant is found to have violated the antitrust
laws in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding
process, it may be subject to forfeiture of its upfront payment, down
payment, or full bid amount and may be prohibited from participating in
future auctions.
16. A summary listing of documents issued by the Bureau addressing
the application of the anti-collusion rule may be found in Attachment E
of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice.
iii. Interference Protection
17. Incumbent AMTS site-based licensees are entitled to co-channel
protection by AMTS geographic area licensees. Among other licensing and
technical rules, AMTS geographic area licensees will be required to
afford interference protection to incumbent systems, on a fixed
separation basis as provided in Sec. 80.385(b)(1). Geographic area
licensees must also provide co-channel interference protection to other
geographic area licensees in accordance with Sec. Sec. 80.479(b) and
80.70(a) of the Commission's rules.
18. Incumbents will be prohibited from renewing, transferring,
assigning, or modifying their licenses in any manner that extends their
system's service area or results in their acquiring additional
frequencies, unless there is consent from each affected geographic area
licensee. If an incumbent fails to construct, discontinues operations,
or otherwise has its license terminated, the spectrum covered by the
incumbent's authorization will automatically revert to the geographic
area licensee.
19. In addition, AMTS licensees that cause interference to
television reception or to the U.S. Navy Space Surveillance System
(SPASUR) system must cure the problem or discontinue operations.
[[Page 29500]]
iv. Coordination Requirements
20. AMTS geographic area licensees may place stations anywhere
within their service areas to serve vessels or units on land, so long
as incumbent operations are protected, marine-originating traffic is
given priority and certain major waterways are served. However,
geographic area licensees must individually license any base station
that requires an Environmental Assessment pursuant to Sec. 1.1307 of
the Commission's Rules or international coordination, or would affect
the radio frequency quiet zones described in Sec. 80.21 of the
Commission's rules, or would require broadcaster notification and an
engineering study described in Sec. 80.215(h) of the Commission's
rules.
21. AMTS licensees must obtain written consent from all affected
licensees prior to using AMTS frequencies for mobile-to-mobile
communications.
v. Due Diligence
22. The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the
use of this spectrum for particular services. Applicants should be
aware that a Commission auction represents an opportunity to become a
Commission licensee in this service, subject to certain conditions and
regulations. A Commission auction does not constitute an endorsement by
the Commission of any particular services, technologies or products,
nor does a Commission license constitute a guarantee of business
success. Applicants should perform their individual due diligence
before proceeding as they would with any new business venture.
23. Applicants are reminded that there are a number of incumbent
licensees already licensed and operating on frequencies that will be
subject to the upcoming auction, such as AMTS Station licensees. Such
incumbents must be protected from harmful interference by AMTS Station
geographic area licensees in accordance with the Commission's rules.
These limitations may restrict the ability of such AMTS geographic area
licensees to use certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or
provide service to certain areas in their geographic license areas. The
Bureau therefore cautions potential applicants in formulating their
bidding strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which AMTS
frequencies are occupied by incumbents.
24. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make
use of licenses available in Auction No. 61.
25. In establishing the AMTS service, the Commission considered the
potential for interference to television reception, particularly
Channels 13 and 10. Consequently, geographic licensees will be required
to file individual applications for authority to operate a new AMTS
transmitter within 169 kilometers (105 miles) of a Channel 13
television station or 129 kilometers (80 miles) of a Channel 10
television station, or with an antenna height greater than 61 meters
(200 feet) above ground. Such applications must include an engineering
study showing how harmful interference to television reception will be
avoided, and the applicant must notify each television station that may
be affected so that the broadcaster can comment on the proposed
construction. Moreover, any AMTS licensee that causes such interference
must cure the problem or cease operations. AMTS licensees are permitted
to construct ``fill-in'' sites without filing individual applications,
but such sites are fully subject to the requirement that AMTS stations
cause no harmful interference to television reception, and must
discontinue operations if unable to meet this requirement.
26. In addition, AMTS operations must not cause harmful
interference to the United States Navy's SPASUR which operates in the
216.880-217.080 MHz band. Also, law enforcement tracking operations are
currently authorized on a primary basis in certain markets in AMTSAs 3,
4, 6, 9 and 10 on a frequency in block A. These operations are
scheduled to be converted to non-AMTS frequencies by 2007. It is the
responsibility of bidders to be aware of these and all other technical
or regulatory matters affecting the spectrum licenses available in this
auction.
27. With respect to the geographic boundaries for AMTSAs, the
Commission defined the AMTSA boundaries to include ``the adjacent
waters under the jurisdiction of the United States.'' Regarding the
boundary between AMTSA 3, which includes the west coast of Florida, and
AMTSA 4, which includes the Gulf of Mexico EA-like area, the Bureau
hereby clarifys that, for AMTSA 3, the boundary extends only to the
limit of the U.S. territorial waters in the Gulf (12-nautical mile
limit); and the boundary for AMTSA 4 extends from the 12-nautical mile
line outward to the broadest geographic limits consistent with
international agreements.
28. To date, no existing agreements between the United States and
Mexico or Canada restrict AMTS channel availability in the Mexican and
Canadian border areas. Licensees will, however, be subject to any
future agreements regarding international assignments and coordination
of such channels; and it is the responsibility of applicants to be
familiar with all relevant governing international agreements; and that
such agreements and amendments thereto may affect the use, utility or
value of the spectrum at issue.
29. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future
applications (including those for modification), petitions for
rulemaking, requests for special temporary authority, waiver requests,
petitions to deny, petitions for reconsideration, informal oppositions,
and applications for review before the Commission may relate to
particular applicants or incumbent licensees or the licenses available
in Auction No. 61. In addition, pending and future judicial proceedings
may relate to particular applicants or incumbent licensees, or the
licenses available in Auction No. 61. Prospective bidders are
responsible for assessing the likelihood of the various possible
outcomes, and considering their potential impact on spectrum licenses
available in this auction.
30. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and
consider all proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being
auctioned. The Bureau notes that resolution of such matters could have
an impact on the availability of spectrum for Auction No. 61. In
addition, although the Commission may continue to act on various
pending applications, informal objections, petitions, and other
requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may not be
resolved by the time of the auction.
31. Applicants may obtain information about incumbent licenses that
may have an effect on availability of licenses in Auction No. 61
through the Bureau's licensing databases on the World Wide Web at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls. Applicants may query the database online
and download a copy of their search results if desired. Detailed
instructions on using License Search (including frequency searches and
the GeoSearch capability) and downloading query results are available
online by selecting the ``?'' button at the upper right-hand corner of
the License Search screen. Applicants should direct questions regarding
the search capabilities to the FCC ULS/Technical Support hotline at
(877) 480-3201,
[[Page 29501]]
option two. Potential bidders may research the Media Bureau's licensing
database on the Internet in order to determine the location of Channel
13 or Channel 10 television stations. Television station information is
contained in the Media Bureau's TVQ TV Database and may be researched
on the Internet at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/video/tvq.html.
32. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding
the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any
third party databases, including, for example, court docketing systems.
To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, applicants
may obtain or verify such information from independent sources or
assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases.
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into the database.
33. Potential applicants are strongly encouraged to physically
inspect any sites located in, or near, the service area for which they
plan to bid, and also to familiarize themselves with the environmental
assessment obligations described in section I.B.7.
vi. Bidder Alerts
34. As is the case with many business investment opportunities,
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction No. 61 to
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors.
35. Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes is
available from the FTC at (202) 326-2222 and from the SEC at (202) 942-
7040. Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment
schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Fraud
Information Center at (800) 876-7060. Consumers who have concerns about
specific proposals regarding Auction No. 61 may also call the FCC
Consumer Center at (888) CALL-FCC ((888) 225-5322).
vii. National Environmental Policy Act Requirements
36. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding the
National Environmental Policy Act (``NEPA''). The construction of a
wireless antenna facility is a federal action and the licensee must
comply with the Commission's NEPA rules for each such facility.
C. Auction Specifics
i. Auction Date
37. The auction will begin on Wednesday, August 3, 2005, as
announced in the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice. With respect to
commenters seeking a delay of the start of Auction No. 61, for reasons
explained in the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice, the Bureau
does not believe it would be in the public interest to do so.
ii. Auction Title
38. Auction No. 61--AMTS.
iii. Bidding Methodology
39. The bidding methodology for Auction No. 61 will be simultaneous
multiple round bidding. The Commission will conduct this auction over
the Internet using the FCC's Integrated Spectrum Auction system
(``ISAS'' or ``FCC Auction System''), and telephonic bidding will be
available as well. Qualified bidders are permitted to bid
telephonically or electronically.
iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
ISAS Orientation Session April 21, 2005
Auction Seminar May 25, 2005
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens May 25, 2005;
12 p.m. ET
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline June 9,
2005; 6 p.m. ET
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer) July 8, 2005; 6 p.m. ET
Mock Auction August 1, 2005
Auction Begins August 3, 2005
v. Requirements for Participation
40. Those wishing to participate in the auction must:
Submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175)
electronically by 6 p.m. eastern time (ET), June 9, 2005.
Submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance
Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by 6 p.m. ET, July 8, 2005.
Comply with all provisions outlined in the Auction No. 61
Procedures Public Notice.
vi. General Contact Information
General Auction Information:
General Auction Questions.......... FCC Auctions Hotline (888) 225-
Seminar Registration............... 5322, option two; or (717) 338-
2888, Hours of service: 8
a.m.--5:30 p.m. ET, Monday
through Friday.
Auction Legal Information:
Auction Rules, Policies, Auctions and Spectrum Access
Regulations. Division, (202) 418-0660.
Licensing Information:
Rules, Policies, Regulations....... Public Safety and Critical
Licensing Issues................... Infrastructure Division, (202)
Due Diligence...................... 418-0680.
Incumbency Issues..................
Technical Support:
Electronic Filing.................. FCC Auctions Technical Support
FCC Auction System................. Hotline (877) 480-3201, option
nine; or (202) 414-1250 (202)
414-1255 (TTY), Hours of
service: 8 a.m.--6 p.m. ET,
Monday through Friday.
Payment Information:
Wire Transfers..................... FCC Auctions Accounting Branch,
Refunds............................ (202) 418-0578 (202) 418-2843
(Fax).
Telephonic Bidding..................... Will be furnished only to
qualified bidders.
FCC Copy Contractor:
Additional Copies of Commission Best Copy and Printing, Inc.,
Documents. 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-
B402 Washington, DC 20554,
(800) 378-3160 http://www.bcpiweb.com
Information--FCC Forms........... Lauren Patrich (202) 418-7944,
(800) 418-3676 (outside
Washington, DC), (202) 418-
3676 (in the Washington area),
http://www.fcc.gov/
formpage.html.
FCC Internet Sites..................... http://www.fcc.gov http://wireless.fcc.gov/
auctions
http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls.
[[Page 29502]]
II. Short-Form (FCC Form 175) Filing Requirements
41. Guidelines for completion of the short-form (FCC Form 175) are
set forth in Attachment C of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public
Notice. Applicants to participate in Auction No. 61 must file FCC Form
175 electronically by 6 p.m. ET on June 9, 2005. All applicants must
certify on their FCC Form 175 applications under penalty of perjury
that they are legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified
to hold a license.
A. Preferences for Small Businesses and Others
i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
42. In the Public Coast Third Report and Order and Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 63 FR 40059, July 27, 1998, the Commission adopted
bidding credits to promote and facilitate the participation of small
businesses in auctions of public coast licenses. A bidding credit
represents the amount by which a bidder's winning bids are discounted.
The size of the bidding credit depends on the average of the aggregated
annual gross revenues for each of the preceding three years of the
bidder, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates
of its controlling interests.
43. For Auction No. 61 bidding credits will be available to small
businesses and very small businesses, or consortia thereof, as follows:
A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues
that do not exceed $3 million for the preceding three years (``very
small business'') will receive a 35 percent discount on its winning
bids.
A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues
that exceed $3 million and do not exceed $15 million for the preceding
three years (``small business'') will receive a 25 percent discount on
its winning bids.
44. Bidding credits are not cumulative; a qualifying applicant
receives the 35 percent or 25 percent bidding credit on its winning
bid, but only one credit per license.
45. Applicants should note that they will be required to provide
information regarding revenues attributable to the applicant and
related parties on their FCC Form 175 short-form applications to
establish that they satisfy the eligibility requirements to qualify as
a small business or very small business (or consortia of a small
business or very small business) for this auction. See Bidding Credit
Revenue Disclosures section, in Attachment C of the Auction No. 61
Procedures Public Notice.
ii. Installment Payments
46. Installment payment plans will not be available in Auction No.
61.
B. License Selection
47. In Auction No. 61, applicants must select the licenses on which
they want to bid from the ``Eligible Licenses'' list. The applicant may
select all the licenses in the list (by using the SELECT ALL option) or
select and add individual licenses from the list. Be advised that there
is no opportunity to change license selection after the short-form
filing deadline. It is critically important that you confirm your
license selection because the FCC Auction System will not accept bids
on licenses that an applicant has not selected on its FCC Form 175.
C. Consortia and Joint Bidding Arrangements
48. Applicants will be required to indicate on their applications
whether they have entered into any explicit or implicit agreements,
arrangements or understandings of any kind with any parties, other than
those identified, regarding the amount of their bids, bidding
strategies, or the particular licenses on which they will or will not
bid. Applicants will also be required to identify on their short-form
applications any parties with whom they have entered into any
consortium arrangements, joint ventures, partnerships or other
agreements or understandings that relate in any way to the licenses
being auctioned, including any agreements relating to post-auction
market structure. If an applicant has had discussions, but has not
reached a joint bidding agreement by the short-form deadline, it would
not include the names of parties to the discussions on its applications
and may not continue such discussions with applicants for any of the
same geographic license areas after the deadline.
49. A party holding a non-controlling, attributable interest in one
applicant will be permitted to acquire an ownership interest in, form a
consortium with, or enter into a joint bidding arrangement with other
applicants for licenses in the same geographic license area provided
that (i) the attributable interest holder certifies that it has not and
will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or bidding
strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds an
attributable interest, or with which it has formed a consortium or
entered into a joint bidding arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements do
not result in a change in control of any of the applicants. While the
anti-collusion rules do not prohibit non-auction related business
negotiations among auction applicants, applicants are reminded that
certain discussions or exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject
matters because they may convey pricing information and bidding
strategies.
D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements
50. All applicants must comply with the uniform Part 1 ownership
disclosure standards and provide information required by Sec. 1.2105
and 1.2112 of the Commission's rules. Specifically, in completing FCC
Form 175, applicants will be required to fully disclose information on
the real party or parties-in-interest and ownership structure of the
bidding entity. The ownership disclosure standards for the short form
are set forth in Sec. 1.2112 of the Commission's rules.
E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures
51. Entities applying to bid as small businesses or very small
businesses (or consortia of small businesses or very small businesses)
will be required to disclose on their FCC Form 175 short-form
applications the gross revenues for the preceding three years of each
of the following: (1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its
controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of its controlling
interests. Certification that the average annual gross revenues for the
preceding three years do not exceed the applicable limit is not
sufficient. In order to comply with disclosure requirements for bidding
credit eligibility, an applicant must provide separately for itself,
its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests, the gross revenues for each of the preceding
three years. If the applicant is applying as a consortium of small
businesses or very small businesses, this information must be provided
for each consortium member.
52. Controlling interest standard. The Commission uses a
``controlling interest'' standard for attributing to auction applicants
the gross revenues of their investors and affiliates in determining
small business eligibility for future auctions. The Commission has
modified its rules governing the attribution of gross revenues for
purposes of determining small business eligibility. These changes
included exempting the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural
telephone cooperative's officers and directors from attribution to the
applicant if certain specified conditions are met. The Commission also
clarified that in calculating an applicant's gross
[[Page 29503]]
revenues under the controlling interest standard, the personal net
worth, including personal income, of its officers and directors will
not be attributed to the applicant.
53. Control. The term ``control'' includes both de facto and de
jure control of the applicant. Typically, ownership of at least 50.1
percent of an entity's voting stock evidences de jure control. De facto
control is determined on a case-by-case basis. The following are some
common indicia of de facto control:
The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of
the board of directors or management committee;
The entity has authority to appoint, promote, demote, and
fire senior executives that control the day-to-day activities of the
licensee; or
The entity plays an integral role in management decisions.
54. Attribution for small business and very small business
eligibility. In determining which entities qualify as small businesses
or very small businesses, the Commission will consider the gross
revenues of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests,
and the affiliates of its controlling interests. The Commission does
not impose specific equity requirements on controlling interest
holders. Once the principals or entities with a controlling interest
are determined, only the revenues of those principals or entities, the
affiliates of those principals or entities, and the applicant and its
affiliates will be counted in determining small business eligibility.
55. A consortium of small businesses or very small businesses is a
``conglomerate organization formed as a joint venture between or among
mutually independent business firms,'' each of which individually must
satisfy one of the definitions of small business or very small business
in Sec. Sec. 1.2110(f), 80.1252. Thus, each consortium member must
disclose its gross revenues along with those of its affiliates, its
controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests.
The Bureau notes that although the gross revenues of the consortium
members will not be aggregated for purposes of determining eligibility
for small business or very small business, this information must be
provided to ensure that each individual consortium member qualifies for
any bidding credit awarded to the consortium.
F. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters
56. Each applicant must indicate on its FCC Form 175 application
under penalty of perjury whether or not the applicant, its affiliates,
its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling
interests, as defined by Sec. 1.2110, have ever been in default on any
Commission licenses or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt
owed to any Federal agency. In addition, each applicant must certify on
its FCC Form 175 application under penalty of perjury that the
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the
affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by Sec. 1.2110, is
not in default on any payment for Commission licenses (including down
payments) and that it is not delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any
Federal agency. Prospective applicants are reminded that submission of
a false certification to the Commission is a serious matter that may
result in severe penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license
revocations, exclusion from participation in future auctions, and/or
criminal prosecution.
57. Former defaulters--i.e., applicants, including their
attributable interest holders, that in the past have defaulted on any
Commission licenses or been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any
Federal agency, but that have since remedied all such defaults and
cured all of their outstanding non-tax delinquencies--are eligible to
bid in Auction No. 61, provided that they are otherwise qualified.
However, as discussed infra in Section III.E.3, former defaulters are
required to pay upfront payments that are fifty percent more than the
normal upfront payment amounts.
58. Current defaulters--i.e., applicants, including their
attributable interest holders, that are in default on any payment for
Commission licenses (including down payments) or are delinquent on any
non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency--are not eligible to bid in
Auction No. 61.
G. Other Information
59. Applicants owned by minorities or women, as defined in Sec.
1.2110(c)(2), may identify themselves in filling out their FCC Form 175
short-form application regarding this status. This applicant status
information is collected for statistical purposes only and assists the
Commission in monitoring the participation of ``designated entities''
in its auctions.
H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175)
60. After the short-form filing deadline (6 p.m. ET June 9, 2005),
applicants may make only minor changes to their applications.
Applicants will not be permitted to make major modifications to their
applications (e.g., change their license selections, change the
certifying official, change control of the applicant, or change bidding
credit eligibility). Permissible minor changes include, for example,
deletion and addition of authorized bidders (to a maximum of three) and
addresses and phone numbers of the applicants and their contact
persons. Applicants must press the SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction
System for the changes to be submitted and considered by the
Commission. After the revised application has been submitted, a
confirmation page will be displayed that states the submission time and
date, along with a unique file number. In addition, applicants should
submit a letter, briefly summarizing the changes, by electronic mail to
the attention of Margaret Wiener, Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access
Division, at the following address: auction61@fcc.gov. The electronic
mail summarizing the changes must include a subject or caption
referring to Auction No. 61 and the name of the applicant. The Bureau
requests that parties format any attachments to electronic mail as
Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word documents.
I. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications (FCC Form
175)
61. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that
application. Amendments reporting substantial changes of possible
decisional significance in information contained in FCC Form 175
applications will not be accepted and may in some instances result in
the dismissal of the FCC Form 175 application.
III. Pre-Auction Procedures
A. Auction Seminar--May 25, 2005
62. On Wednesday, May 25, 2005, the Commission will sponsor a
seminar for parties interested in participating in Auction No. 61 at
the Federal Communications Commission, located at 445 12th Street, SW.,
Washington, DC. The seminar will provide attendees with information
about pre-auction procedures, completing FCC Form 175, auction conduct,
the FCC Auction System, auction rules, and the AMTS service rules.
[[Page 29504]]
63. For individuals who are unable to attend, Audio/Video of this
seminar will be available via webcast from the FCC's Audio/Video Events
page at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/.
B. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)--Due June 9, 2005
64. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants must
first submit an FCC Form 175 application. This application must be
submitted electronically and received at the Commission no later than 6
p.m. ET on June 9, 2005. Late applications will not be accepted. There
is no application fee required when filing an FCC Form 175. However, to
be eligible to bid, an applicant must submit an upfront payment. See
Section III.E, below.
C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections
65. After the deadline for filing the FCC Form 175 applications has
passed, the FCC will process all timely submitted applications to
determine which are acceptable for filing, and subsequently will issue
a public notice identifying: (1) Those applications accepted for
filing; (2) those applications rejected; and (3) those applications
which have minor defects that may be corrected, and the deadline for
resubmitting such corrected applications.
D. Upfront Payments--Due July 8, 2005
66. In order to be eligible to bid in the auction, applicants must
submit an upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice Form
(FCC Form 159). After completing the FCC Form 175, filers will have
access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 that can be printed
and faxed to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. All upfront payments must
be received at Mellon Bank by 6 p.m. ET on July 8, 2005.
i. Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer
67. Wire transfer payments must be received by 6 p.m. ET on July 8,
2005. To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss
arrangements (including bank closing schedules) with their banker
several days before they plan to make the wire transfer, and allow
sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed before
the deadline.
68. Applicants must fax a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to
Mellon Bank at (412) 209-6045 at least one hour before placing the
order for the wire transfer (but on the same business day). On the
cover sheet of the fax, write ``Wire Transfer--Auction Payment for
Auction Event No. 61.'' In order to meet the Commission's upfront
payment deadline, an applicant's payment must be credited to the
Commission's account by the deadline. Applicants are responsible for
obtaining confirmation from their financial institution that Mellon
Bank has timely received their upfront payment and deposited it in the
proper account.
Please note that:
All payments must be made in U.S. dollars.
All payments must be made by wire transfer.
Upfront payments for Auction No. 61 go to a lockbox number
different from the lockboxes used in previous FCC auctions, and
different from the lockbox number to be used for post-auction payments.
Failure to deliver the upfront payment by the July 8,
2005, deadline will result in dismissal of the application and
disqualification from participation in the auction.
ii. Amount of Upfront Payment
69. In 47 CFR Part 1, 62 FR 13540, March 21, 1997, the Commission
delegated to the Bureau the authority and discretion to determine
appropriate upfront payment(s) for each auction. In addition, in 47 CFR
Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 65 FR 52323, August 29, 2000, the
Commission ordered that former defaulters, i.e., applicants that have
ever been in default on any Commission license or have ever been
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, be required
to pay upfront payments 50 percent greater than non-former defaulters.
For purposes of this calculation, the ``applicant'' includes the
applicant itself, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and
affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by Sec. 1.2110 of
the Commission's rules.
70. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment would determine a
bidder's initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding
units on which a bidder may place bids. In order to bid on a license,
otherwise qualified bidders that applied for that license on Form 175
must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number
of bidding units assigned to that license. At a minimum, therefore, an
applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to establish
eligibility to bid on at least one of the licenses applied for on Form
175, or else the applicant will not be eligible to participate in the
auction. An applicant does not have to make an upfront payment to cover
all licenses for which the applicant has applied on Form 175, but
rather to cover the maximum number of bidding units that are associated
with licenses on which the bidder wishes to place bids and hold
provisionally winning bids at any given time.
71. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed upfront payments on a license-by-license basis using a formula
based on bandwidth and the license area population: $0.005 * MHz *
License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per license.
72. The specific upfront payments and bidding units for each
license are set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 61 Procedures
Public Notice.
73. In calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should
determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to
be active on (bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any
single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that number
of bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant
should add together the upfront payments for all licenses on which it
seeks to bid in any given round. Applicants should check their
calculations carefully, as there is no provision for increasing a
bidder's eligibility after the upfront payment deadline.
Example: Upfront Payments and Bidding Flexibility
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bidding Upfront
Market number Block Market name units payment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMTSA001............................... A................. Northern Atlantic........ 184,000 $184,000
AMTSA006............................... A................. Southern Pacific......... 170,000 170,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 29505]]
74. Former defaulters should calculate their upfront payment for
all licenses by multiplying the number of bidding units on which they
wish to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number of bidding
units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will divide the
upfront payment received by 1.5 and round the result up to the nearest
bidding unit. If a former defaulter fails to submit a sufficient
upfront payment to establish eligibility to bid on at least one of the
licenses applied for on its Form 175, the applicant will not be
eligible to participate in the auction.
iii. Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of
Upfront Payments
75. The Commission will use wire transfers for all Auction No. 61
refunds. To ensure that refunds of upfront payments are processed in an
expeditious manner, the Commission is requesting that all pertinent
information as listed below be supplied to the FCC. Applicants can
provide the information electronically during the initial short-form
filing window after the form has been submitted. Wire Transfer
Instructions can also be manually faxed to the FCC, Financial
Operations Center, Auctions Accounting Group, ATTN: Gail Glasser, at
(202) 418-2843. All refunds will be returned to the payer of record as
identified on the FCC Form 159 unless the payer submits written
authorization instructing otherwise. For additional information, please
call Gail Glasser at (202) 418-0578.
E. Auction Registration
76. Approximately ten days before the auction, the FCC will issue a
public notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction.
Qualified bidders are those applicants whose FCC Form 175 applications
have been accepted for filing and have timely submitted upfront
payments sufficient to make them eligible to bid on at least one of the
licenses for which they applied.
77. All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the
auction. Registration materials will be distributed prior to the
auction by overnight mail. The mailing will be sent only to the contact
person at the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will
include the SecureID cards which will be required to place bids (or
access the FCC Auction System) and the telephonic bidding phone number.
78. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration mailing
will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified bidder that
has not received this mailing by noon on Thursday, July 28, 2005,
should contact the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2888. Receipt of this
registration mailing is critical to participating in the auction, and
each applicant is responsible for ensuring it has received all of the
registration material.
79. Qualified bidders should note that lost SecurID cards can be
replaced only by appearing in person at the FCC headquarters, located
at 445 12th St., SW., Washington, DC 20554. Only an authorized
representative or certifying official, as designated on an applicant's
FCC Form 175, may appear in person with two forms of identification
(one of which must be a photo identification) in order to receive
replacements. Qualified bidders requiring replacements must call
technical support prior to arriving at the FCC.
F. Remote Electronic Bidding
80. The Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet, and
telephonic bidding will be available as well. Qualified bidders are
permitted to bid telephonically or electronically. Each applicant
should indicate its bidding preference `` electronic or telephonic--on
the FCC Form 175. In either case, each authorized bidder must have its
own SecurID card, which the FCC will provide at no charge. Each
applicant with one authorized bidder will be issued two SecurID cards,
while applicants with two or three authorized bidders will be issued
three cards. For security purposes, the SecurID cards, the telephonic
bidding phone number, and the Integrated Spectrum Auctions System
(ISAS) Bidder's Guide are only mailed to the contact person at the
contact address listed on the FCC Form 175. Please note that each
SecurID card is tailored to a specific auction; therefore, SecurID
cards issued for other auctions or obtained from a source other than
the FCC will not work for Auction No. 61.
81. Please note that the SecurID cards can be recycled, and the
Bureau encourages bidders to return the cards to the FCC. The Bureau
will provide pre-addressed envelopes that bidders may use to return the
cards once the auction is over.
G. Mock Auction
82. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a mock
auction on Monday, August 1, 2005. The mock auction will enable
applicants to become familiar with the FCC Auction System prior to the
auction. Participation by all bidders is strongly recommended. Details
will be announced by public notice.
IV. Auction Event
83. The first round of bidding for Auction No. 61 will begin on
Wednesday, August 3, 2005. The initial bidding schedule will be
announced in a public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is
released approximately 10 days before the start of the auction.
A. Auction Structure
i. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction
84. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed to award all licenses in Auction No. 61 in a simultaneous
multiple round auction. In a simultaneous multiple round auction, all
licenses are available during the entire auction, and bids are accepted
on any license until the auction concludes. The Bureau concludes that
it is operationally feasible and appropriate to auction the AMTS
licenses through a simultaneous multiple round auction. Unless
otherwise announced, bids will be accepted on all licenses in each
round of the auction. This approach, the Bureau believes, allows
bidders to take advantage of synergies that exist among licenses and is
administratively efficient.
ii. Eligibility and Activity Rules
85. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder
would determine the initial (maximum) eligibility (as measured in
bidding units) for each bidder. The Bureau received no comments on this
issue.
86. For Auction No. 61 the Bureau adopts this proposal. The amount
of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder determines initial bidding
eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may
place bids. Note again that each license is assigned a specific number
of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in Attachment A of
the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice on a bidding unit per
dollar basis. Bidding units for a given license do not change as prices
rise during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is not attributed
to specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any
combination of licenses as long as the total number of bidding units
associated with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility.
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can only remain
the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount,
an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units it
[[Page 29506]]
may wish to bid on (or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any
single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total
number of bidding units. The total upfront payment does not affect the
total dollar amount a bidder may bid on any given license.
87. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction.
88. A bidder's activity level in a round is the sum of the bidding
units associated with licenses on which the bidder is active. A bidder
is considered active on a license in the current round if it is either
the provisionally winning bidder at the end of the previous bidding
round and does not withdraw the provisionally winning bid in the
current round, or if it submits a bid in the current round (see
``Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increment Amounts'' in Section
IV.B.3, below). The minimum required activity is expressed as a
percentage of the bidder's current eligibility, and increases by stage
as the auction progresses. Because these procedures have proven
successful in maintaining the pace of previous auctions (as set forth
under ``Auction Stages'' in Section IV.A.3 and ``Stage Transitions'' in
Section IV.A.4, below), the Bureau adopts them for Auction No. 61.
iii. Auction Stages
89. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed to conduct the auction in two stages and employ an activity
rule. The Bureau received no comments on this proposal.
90. The Bureau adopts its proposals for the activity rules and
stages. Below are the activity levels for each stage of the auction.
The Bureau reserves the discretion to further alter the activity
percentages before and/or during the auction.
Stage One: During the first stage of the auction, a bidder desiring
to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be required to be
active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current
bidding eligibility in each bidding round. Failure to maintain the
required activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity
rule waiver is used). During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the
next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round
activity (the sum of bidding units of the bidder's provisionally
winning bids and bids during the current round) by five-fourths (5/4).
Stage Two: During the second stage of the auction, a bidder
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be
active on 90 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to
maintain the required activity level will result in a reduction in the
bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an
activity rule waiver is used). During Stage Two, reduced eligibility
for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's
current round activity (the sum of bidding units of the bidder's
provisionally winning bids and bids during the current round) by ten-
ninths (10/9).
Caution: Since activity requirements increase in Stage Two,
bidders must carefully check their activity during the bidding
period of the first round following a stage transition to ensure
that they are meeting the increased activity requirement. This is
especially critical for bidders that have provisionally winning bids
and do not plan to submit new bids. In past auctions, some bidders
have inadvertently lost bidding eligibility or used an activity rule
waiver because they did not re-verify their activity status at stage
transitions. Bidders may check their activity against the required
activity level by either logging in to the FCC Auction System or by
accessing the ``Bidder Summaries'' on the public results page.
91. Because the foregoing procedures have proven successful in
maintaining proper pace in previous auctions, the Bureau adopts them
for Auction No. 61.
iv. Stage Transitions
92. Thus, the auction will start in Stage One and will generally
advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when, in
each of three consecutive rounds of bidding, the provisionally winning
bids have been placed on 20 percent or less of the licenses being
auctioned (as measured in bidding units). In addition, the Bureau will
retain the discretion to regulate the pace of the auction by
announcement. This determination will be based on a variety of measures
of bidder activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity
level, the percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on
which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage
increase in revenue. The Commission believes that these stage
transition rules, having proven successful in prior auctions, are
appropriate for use in Auction No. 61.
v. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
93. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed that each bidder in the auction would be provided three
activity rule waivers. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any
round during the course of the auction. The Bureau received no comments
on this issue.
94. Based upon the Bureau's experience in previous auctions, the
Bureau adopts its proposal that each bidder be provided three activity
rule waivers. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any round
during the course of the auction. Use of an activity rule waiver
preserves the bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's
activity in the current round being below the required minimum activity
level. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding
and not to a particular license. Activity rule waivers can be either
applied proactively by the bidder (known as a ``proactive waiver'') or
applied automatically by the FCC Auction System (known as an
``automatic waiver'') and are principally a mechanism for auction
participants to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in the event that
exigent circumstances prevent them from placing a bid in a particular
round. The Bureau is satisfied that its practice of providing three
waivers over the course of the auction provides a sufficient number of
waivers and flexibility to the bidders, while safeguarding the
integrity of the auction.
95. The FCC Auction System assumes that bidders with insufficient
activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if available)
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will
automatically apply a waiver at the end of any round where a bidder's
activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) There are no
activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder overrides the
automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby
meeting the minimum requirements. If a bidder has no waivers remaining
and does not satisfy the required activity level, the eligibility will
be permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from further
bidding in the auction.
96. A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must
affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the
bidding round by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function in the FCC
Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently
reduced to
[[Page 29507]]
bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as described
in ``Auction Stages'' (see Section IV.A.3 above). Once eligibility has
been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding
eligibility.
97. Finally, a bidder may apply an activity rule waiver proactively
as a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder
proactively applies an activity waiver (using the ``apply waiver''
function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which no
bids or withdrawals are submitted, the auction will remain open and the
bidder's eligibility will be preserved. However, an automatic waiver
applied by the FCC Auction System in a round in which there are no new
bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction open. Note: Applying a
waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted that
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
vi. Auction Stopping Rules
98. For Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposed to employ a
simultaneous stopping rule approach. The Bureau also sought comment on
a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified
version of the stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses
after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, places a
withdrawal, or submits any new bids on any license on which it is not
the provisionally winning bidder.
99. The Bureau further proposed retaining the discretion to keep
the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers are submitted
and no previous provisionally winning bids are withdrawn in a round. In
this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had applied a
waiver.
100. In addition, the Bureau proposed that it reserve the right to
declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) and the auction will close.
101. The Bureau proposed to exercise these options only in
circumstances such as where the auction is proceeding very slowly,
where there is minimal overall bidding activity or where it appears
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of
time. Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt
to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the
number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the
minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there
is still a high level of bidding activity.
102. The Bureau received no comments concerning the auction
stopping rules; therefore the Bureau adopts the above proposals.
Auction No. 61 will begin under the simultaneous stopping rule
approach, and the Bureau will retain the discretion to invoke the other
versions of the stopping rule.
vii. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
103. Because the Bureau's approach to notification of delay during
an auction has proven effective in resolving exigent circumstances in
previous auctions, the Bureau adopts its proposed auction cancellation
rules. By public notice or by announcement during the auction, the
Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of
natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security
breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity,
or for any other reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct
of competitive bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole
discretion, may elect to resume the auction starting from the beginning
of the current round, resume the auction starting from some previous
round, or cancel the auction in its entirety. Network interruption may
cause the Bureau to delay or suspend the auction. The Bureau emphasize
that exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion of the
Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for situations
in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers.
B. Bidding Procedures
i. Round Structure
104. The initial schedule of bidding rounds will be announced in
the public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is released
approximately 10 days before the start of the auction. Each bidding
round is followed by the release of round results. Multiple bidding
rounds may be conducted in a given day. Details regarding round results
formats and locations will also be included in the qualified bidders
public notice.
105. The FCC has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order
to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day,
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors.
ii. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
106. Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable
reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid established
when applications for FCC licenses are subject to auction (i.e.,
because they are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission determines
that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in the public
interest. Consistent with this mandate, the Commission directed the
Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or
reserve price prior to the start of each auction. Among other factors,
the Bureau must consider the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels
of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the
size of the geographic service areas, the extent of interference with
other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors that could have an
impact on the spectrum being auctioned. The Commission concluded that
the Bureau should have the discretion to employ either or both of these
mechanisms for future auctions.
107. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 61 and to
retain discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. Specifically, for
Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposed the following license-by-license
basis using a formula based on bandwidth and license area population:
$0.005 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per
license.
108. In the alternative, the Bureau sought comment on whether,
consistent with the Sec. 309(j), the public interest would be served
by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.
109. The Bureau adopts its proposal. The minimum opening bid
amounts the Bureau adopts for Auction No. 61 are reducible at the
discretion of the Bureau. The Bureau emphasize, however, that such
discretion will be exercised, if at all, sparingly and early in the
auction, i.e., before bidders lose all waivers and begin to lose
substantial eligibility. During the course of the auction, the Bureau
will not entertain requests to reduce the minimum opening bid amount on
specific licenses.
110. The specific minimum opening bid amounts for each license
available in Auction No. 61 are set forth in Attachment A of the
Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice.
[[Page 29508]]
iii. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increment Amounts
111. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed to use a minimum acceptable bid increment of five percent.
This means that the minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be
approximately five percent greater than the provisionally winning bid
amount for the license. The minimum acceptable bid amount will be
calculated by multiplying the provisionally winning bid amount times
one plus the minimum acceptable bid percentage--e.g., if the minimum
acceptable bid percentage is 5 percent, the minimum acceptable bid
amount calculation is (provisionally winning bid amount) * (1 + 0.05),
rounded or (provisionally winning bid amount) * (1.05), rounded. The
Bureau will round the result using the Bureau's standard rounding
procedures. The Bureau further proposed to retain the discretion to
change the minimum acceptable bid amounts and bid increments amounts if
it determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau received no
comment on this issue. The Bureau will begin the auction with a minimum
acceptable bid percentage of 5%.
112. In each round, each eligible bidder will be able to place a
bid on a particular license for which it applied in any of nine
different amounts. The FCC Auction System will list the nine acceptable
bid amounts for each license. Until a bid has been placed on a license,
the minimum acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its
minimum opening bid amount.
113. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each license consist of
the minimum acceptable bid amount and eight other bid amounts based on
the bid increment percentage. The first additional acceptable bid
amount, above the minimum acceptable bid amount, equals the minimum
acceptable bid amount times one plus the bid increment percentage,
rounded--e.g., if the bid increment percentage is 5 percent, then the
next bid amount will equal (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05,
rounded, the second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum
acceptable bid amount times one plus two times the bid increment
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10,
rounded; the third additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum
acceptable bid amount times one plus three times the bid increment
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.15,
rounded, etc. The Bureau will begin the auction with a bid increment
percentage of 5%. Note that the bid increment percentage need not be
the same as the minimum acceptable bid percentage.
114. In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning
bid amount has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will
equal the amount of the second highest bid amount received for the
license. The additional bid amounts above the minimum acceptable bid
amount are calculated using the bid increment percentage as described
in the previous paragraph.
115. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, and the
bid increment percentage if it determines that circumstances so
dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Auction
System. The Bureau may also use its discretion to adjust the minimum
bid increment amount without prior notice if circumstances warrant.
iv. Provisionally Winning Bids
116. At the end of each bidding round, a provisionally winning bid
amount will be determined based on the highest bid amount received for
each license. A high bid from a previous round is referred to as a
``provisionally winning bid.'' A ``provisionally winning bid'' will
remain the provisionally winning bid until there is a higher bid on the
same license at the close of a subsequent round. Bidders are reminded
that provisionally winning bids are counted as activity for purposes of
the activity rule.
117. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
proposed to use a random number generator to select a provisionally
winning bid in the event of identical high bid amounts being submitted
on a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids). No comments were
received on this proposal. Therefore, the Bureau adopts its proposal. A
Sybase[reg] SQL pseudo-random number generator based on the L'Ecuyer
algorithms will be used to assign a random number to each bid. The tied
bid having the highest random number will become the provisionally
winning bid. Eligible bidders, including the provisionally winning
bidder, will be able to submit a higher bid in a subsequent round. If
no bidder submits a higher bid in subsequent rounds, the provisionally
winning bid from the previous round will win the license, unless that
provisionally winning bid was withdrawn. If any bids are received on
the license in a subsequent round, the provisionally winning bid will
once again be determined based on the highest bid amount received for
the license.
v. Bidding
118. During a round, a bidder may submit bids for as many licenses
as it wishes (subject to its eligibility), withdraw provisionally
winning bids from previous bidding rounds, remove bids placed in the
same bidding round, or permanently reduce eligibility. Bidders also
have the option of making multiple submissions and withdrawals in each
round. If a bidder submits multiple bids for a single license in the
same round, the system takes the last bid entered as that bidder's bid
for the round. Bidders should note that the bidding units associated
with licenses for which the bidder has removed or withdrawn its bid do
not count towards the bidder's activity at the close of the round.
119. Please note that all bidding will take place remotely either
through the FCC Auction System or by telephonic bidding. (Telephonic
bid assistants are required to use a script when entering bids placed
by telephone. Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow
sufficient time to bid by placing their calls well in advance of the
close of a round. Normally, five to ten minutes are necessary to
complete a telephonic bid submission). There will be no on-site bidding
during Auction No. 61.
120. A bidder's ability to bid on specific licenses in the first
round of the auction is determined by two factors: (1) the licenses
applied for on FCC Form 175 and (2) the upfront payment amount
deposited. The bid submission screens will allow bidders to submit bids
on only those licenses for which the bidder applied on its FCC Form
175.
121. In order to access the bidding function of the FCC Auction
System, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the
password generated by the SecurID card and a personal identification
number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are strongly encouraged to
print a ``round summary'' for each round after they have completed all
of their activity for that round.
122. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on
a given license in any of nine different amounts. For each license, the
FCC Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts
in a drop-down box. Bidders may use the drop-down box to select from
among the nine bid amounts. The FCC Auction System also includes an
``upload'' function that allows bidders to upload text files containing
bid information.
[[Page 29509]]
123. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its minimum
opening bid amount. Once there is a provisionally winning bid on a
license, the FCC Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid
amount for that license for the following round, as described in
Section IV.B.3.
124. Finally, bidders are cautioned to select their bid amounts
carefully because, as explained in the following section, bidders that
withdraw a provisionally winning bid from a previous round, even if the
bid was mistakenly or erroneously made, are subject to bid withdrawal
payments.
vi. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
125. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Commission
proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. With respect to bid
withdrawals, the Commission proposed limiting each bidder to
withdrawals in no more than one round during the course of the auction.
The round in which withdrawals are used would be at the bidder's
discretion. The Bureau received no comments on this issue.
126. Procedures. Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has
the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the
``remove bids'' function in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may
effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal
payments. Removing a bid will affect a bidder's activity for the round
in which it is removed, i.e., a bid that is removed does not count
toward bidding activity. These procedures will enhance bidder
flexibility during the auction, and therefore the Bureau adopts them
for Auction No. 61.
127. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
However, in later rounds, a bidder may withdraw provisionally winning
bids from previous rounds using the ``withdraw bids'' function in the
FCC Auction System (assuming that the bidder has not reached its
withdrawal limit). A provisionally winning bidder that withdraws its
provisionally winning bid from a previous round during the auction is
subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g).
Note: Once a withdrawal is submitted during a round, that withdrawal
cannot be unsubmitted.
128. In previous auctions, the Bureau had detected bidder conduct
that, arguably, may have constituted strategic bidding through the use
of bid withdrawals. While the Commission continues to recognize the
important role that bid withdrawals play in an auction, i.e., reducing
risk associated with efforts to secure various licenses in combination,
the Commission concludes that, for Auction No. 61, adoption of a limit
on the use of withdrawals to one round per bidder is appropriate. By
doing so the Bureau believes that it strikes a reasonable compromise
that will allow bidders to use withdrawals. The Commission's decision
on this issue is based upon the Bureau's experience in prior auctions,
particularly the PCS D, E and F block and 800 MHz SMR auctions, and is
in no way a reflection of the Bureau's view regarding the likelihood of
any speculation or ``gaming'' in this auction.
129. The Bureau will therefore limit the number of rounds in which
bidders may place withdrawals to one round. The round will be at the
bidder's discretion and there will be no limit on the number of bids
that may be withdrawn in the round. Withdrawals during the auction will
be subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 CFR
1.2104(g). Bidders should note that abuse of the Commission's bid
withdrawal procedures could result in the denial of the ability to bid
on a market.
130. If a provisionally winning bid is withdrawn, the minimum
acceptable bid amount will equal the amount of the second highest bid
received for the license, which may be less than, or in the case of
tied bids, equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid. To set the
additional bid amounts, the second highest bid amount also will be used
in place of the provisionally winning bid in the formula used to
calculate bid increment amounts. The Commission will serve as a ``place
holder'' provisionally winning bidder on the license until a new bid is
submitted on that license.
131. Calculation. Generally, the Commission imposes payments on
bidders that withdraw high bids during the course of an auction. If a
bidder withdraws its bid and there is no higher bid in the same or
subsequent auction(s), the bidder that withdrew its bid is responsible
for the difference between its withdrawn bid and the provisionally
winning bid in the same or subsequent auction(s). In the case of
multiple bid withdrawals on a single license, within the same or
subsequent auctions(s), the payment for each bid withdrawal will be
calculated based on the sequence of bid withdrawals and the amounts
withdrawn. No withdrawal payment will be assessed for a withdrawn bid
if either the subsequent winning bid or any of the intervening
subsequent withdrawn bids, in either the same or subsequent
auctions(s), equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a bidder that
withdraws a bid will not be responsible for any withdrawal payments if
there is a subsequent higher bid in the same or subsequent auction(s).
This policy allows bidders most efficiently to allocate their resources
as well as to evaluate their bidding strategies and business plans
during an auction while, at the same time, maintaining the integrity of
the auction process. The Bureau retains the discretion to scrutinize
multiple bid withdrawals on a single license for evidence of anti-
competitive strategic behavior and take appropriate action when deemed
necessary.
132. Section 1.2104(g)(1) of the rules sets forth the payment
obligations of a bidder that withdraws a high bid on a license during
the course of an auction, and provides for the assessment of interim
bid withdrawal payments. As amended, Sec. 1.2104(g)(1) provides that
in instances in which bids have been withdrawn on a license that is not
won in the same auction, the Commission will assess an interim
withdrawal payment equal to 3 percent of the amount of the withdrawn
bids. The 3 percent interim payment will be applied toward any final
bid withdrawal payment that will be assessed after subsequent auction
of the license. Assessing an interim bid withdrawal payment ensures
that the Commission receives a minimal withdrawal payment pending
assessment of any final withdrawal payment. Section 1.2104(g) provides
specific examples showing application of the bid withdrawal payment
rule.
vii. Round Results
133. Bids placed during a round will not be made public until the
conclusion of that bidding period. After a round closes, the Bureau
will compile reports of all bids placed, bids withdrawn, current
provisionally winning bids, new minimum acceptable bid amounts, and
bidder eligibility status (bidding eligibility and activity rule
waivers), and post the reports for public access. Reports reflecting
bidders' identities for Auction No. 61 will be available before and
during the auction. Thus, bidders will know in advance of this auction
the identities of the bidders against which they are bidding.
viii. Auction Announcements
134. The FCC will use auction announcements to announce items such
as schedule changes and stage transitions. All FCC auction
announcements will be available by
[[Page 29510]]
clicking a link in the FCC Auction System.
V. Post-Auction Procedures
A. Down Payments and Withdrawn Bid Payments
135. After bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a public
notice declaring the auction closed and identifying winning bidders,
down payments, final payments, and any withdrawn bid payments due.
136. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing
notice, each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition
to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money on deposit
with the Commission for Auction No. 61 to 20 percent of the net amount
of its winning bids (gross bids less any applicable small business, or
very small business bidding credits). In addition, by the same
deadline, all bidders must pay any bid withdrawal payments due under 47
CFR 1.2104(g), as discussed in ``Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal,''
Section IV.B.6. (Upfront payments are applied first to satisfy any
withdrawn bid liability, before being applied toward down payments.)
B. Final Payments
137. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of
the net amount of its winning bids within 10 business days after the
deadline for submitting down payments.
C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)
138. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing
notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed
long-form application (FCC Form 601) for each license won through
Auction No. 61. Winning bidders that are small businesses or very small
businesses must demonstrate their eligibility for small business or
very small business bidding credits. See 47 CFR 1.2112(b).
D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)
139. At the time it submits its long-form application (FCC Form
601), each winning bidder also must comply with the ownership reporting
requirements as set forth in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112. An
ownership disclosure record was automatically created in the Universal
Licensing System (ULS) for any applicant that submitted an FCC Form
175. However, winning bidders will be required to review and confirm
that it is complete and accurate as of the date of filing Form 601.
Further instructions will be provided to auction winning bidders at the
close of the auction.
E. Tribal Land Bidding Credit
140. A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy
facilities and provide services to federally recognized tribal lands
that are unserved by any telecommunications carrier or that have a
wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85 percent is eligible to
receive a tribal land bidding credit as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and
1.2110(f). A tribal land bidding credit is in addition to, and separate
from, any other bidding credit for which a winning bidder may qualify.
F. Default and Disqualification
141. Any high bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the
close of the auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise
disqualified) will be subject to the payments described in 47 CFR
1.2104(g)(2). In such event the Commission may re-auction the license
or offer it to the next highest bidder (in descending order) at its
final bid. In addition, if a default or disqualification involves gross
misconduct, misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, the
Commission may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to
bid in future auctions, and may take any other action that it deems
necessary, including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing
licenses held by the applicant.
G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance
142. All applicants that submit upfront payments but are not
winning bidders for a license in Auction No. 61 may be entitled to a
refund of their remaining upfront payment balance after the conclusion
of the auction. No refund will be made unless there are excess funds on
deposit from the applicant after any applicable bid withdrawal payments
have been paid. All refunds will be returned to the payer of record, as
identified on the FCC Form 159, unless the payer submits written
authorization instructing otherwise.
143. Bidders that drop out of the auction completely may be
eligible for a refund of their upfront payments before the close of the
auction. Qualified bidders that have exhausted all of their activity
rule waivers, have no remaining bidding eligibility, and have not
withdrawn a provisionally winning bid during the auction must submit a
written refund request. If you have completed the refund instructions
electronically, then only a written request for the refund is
necessary. If not, the request must also include wire transfer
instructions, Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) and FCC Registration
Number (FRN). Send refund requests to: Federal Communications
Commission, Financial Operations Center, Auctions Accounting Group,
Gail Glasser, 445 12th Street, SW., Room 1-C864, Washington, DC 20554.
144. Bidders are encouraged to file their refund information
electronically using the Refund Information icon in the FCC Form 175,
but bidders can also fax their information to the Auctions Accounting
Group at (202) 418-2843. Once the information has been approved, a
refund will be sent to the party identified in the refund information.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 05-10230 Filed 5-20-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P