[Federal Register: July 12, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 132)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 40165-40167]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr12jy05-21]
[[Page 40165]]
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Part IV
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 21, 91, 121, 125, and 129
FAA Policy Statement: Safety--A Shared Responsibility--New Direction
for Addressing Airworthiness Issues for Transport Airplanes; Fuel Tank
Safety Compliance Extension and Aging Airplane Program Update; Final
Rules
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 21
[Docket No. FAA-2004-17681]
FAA Policy Statement: Safety--A Shared Responsibility--New
Direction for Addressing Airworthiness Issues for Transport Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Policy statement.
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SUMMARY: This document sets forth the Federal Aviation Administration's
(FAA) policy concerning the shared responsibility between design
approval holders (DAHs) and operators in achieving certain types of
safety objectives. It also provides guidance on the use of DAH
requirements to support these safety objectives. This policy statement
is intended to further clarify when and how the FAA will use DAH
requirements in the future to address certain airworthiness issues for
transport airplanes.
DATES: This policy is effective July 12, 2005.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dionne Krebs, FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, ANM-110, 1601 Lind Avenue,
SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone: (425) 227-2250; fax:
(425) 227-1320; e-mail: Dionne.Krebs@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
As the FAA looks toward the future, we see a need for a new
regulatory approach to addressing airworthiness issues in the existing
fleet of transport airplanes. As the fleet ages and new designs become
more technologically advanced, resolving emerging safety issues has
become more complex. This complexity is compounded by the large number
of airplanes in the existing fleet, with their many variations in
configuration, and the varying kinds of operations authorized under the
FAA's operational and flight rules. We are also finding that new
technologies are now available, in some cases, to address safety issues
that in the past could not be practically resolved.
In our effort to be more effective, we have reviewed our regulatory
approach, as well as the performance of the affected aviation industry,
in achieving national safety objectives. When the FAA determines that
the level of safety for the existing fleet is unacceptable, we have two
alternative courses of action:
For those safety concerns related to a specific type of
airplane model, the FAA declares an unsafe condition and requires
actions through an airworthiness directive (AD) to achieve an
acceptable level of safety.
When establishing a new safety standard of general
applicability (e.g., all air carrier operations, large transport
airplanes), the FAA issues general rulemaking that applies to future
new designs, new production, the existing fleet (retrofit), or a
combination of these, as appropriate.
We consider these two alternatives to be complementary tools. The
appropriate alternative depends on the nature and extent of the safety
issue. In either case, the FAA assesses the impact and solicits public
comment on our proposed actions (except in emergency situations) before
implementation.
When general rulemaking has been necessary to address fleet-wide
safety issues, our practice has been to issue rules requiring action by
the airplane operator. That practice relied on voluntary support from
the design approval holders (DAH) to provide data and documents needed
to support operator compliance. This approach has generally been
successful. DAHs and operators have recognized they have a shared
responsibility on certain safety issues, as reflected in the numerous
rulemaking advisory committee recommendations transmitted to the FAA
that affect continued airworthiness. However, this recognition did not
necessarily ensure that information required by operators, such as
service bulletins or maintenance or inspection procedures, would be
provided in a timely manner.
On occasion, adopting airworthiness requirements only through
operational rules has imposed an inappropriate burden on operators. In
those cases, the expected support from the DAHs was not timely or
consistent. Consequently some operators were unable to comply with the
operational rule by the compliance deadline, or incurred substantial
unexpected costs to comply. For example, in the program to reinforce
flight deck doors, most operators had substantially less than the one
year, that we originally anticipated as necessary, to modify their
fleet. In the class D to class C cargo compartment conversion program,
one type certificate holder did not develop the necessary modifications
on time for operator compliance. Also, during this program a number of
operators experienced frequent failures of modification parts, a lack
of parts and a lack of technical support from several holders of
supplemental type certificates.
The FAA concludes that, to achieve our safety objectives, DAHs and
operators must have a shared responsibility on certain safety issues
affecting the existing fleet. We also conclude, from reviews such as
the Commercial Airplane Certification Process Study (March 2002), that
we need to facilitate more effective communication of safety
information between DAHs and operators. As both technology and
airworthiness issues become more complex, certain fleet-wide safety
issues require that the FAA take a new approach to facilitate their
timely resolution. This new regulatory approach involves implementing
complementary requirements for DAHs and operators, when appropriate.
This approach was summarized in the Fuel Tank Safety Rule Compliance
Extension and Aging Airplane Program Update published in the Federal
Register on July 30, 2004 (69 FR 45936). We are publishing a document
addressing the comments from that notice in this issue of the Federal
Register.
Policy Statement
Based on our evaluation of more effective regulatory approaches for
certain types of safety initiatives and the comments received from the
Aging Airplane Program Update (July 30, 2004), the FAA has concluded
that we need to adopt a regulatory approach recognizing the shared
responsibility between DAHs and operators.\1\ When we decide that
general rulemaking is needed to address an airworthiness issue, and
believe the safety objective can only be fully achieved if the DAHs
provide operators with the necessary information in a timely manner, we
will propose requirements for the affected DAHs to provide that
information by a certain date.
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\1\ This policy will not affect the FAA's process for
determining when and under what circumstance it is appropriate to
issue ADs.
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In applying this policy, we will consider the following factors
when determining if DAH requirements are needed to support the safety
objective:
The complexity of developing data and documents to address
the safety issue: \2\ Type design data analysis is necessary for the
timely, efficient development of necessary data and documents.
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\2\ This consideration will also address the potential for a
readily identifiable third party to develop the complex data and
documents in time to achieve compliance.
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The need for FAA-approved service instructions to be
available in a timely manner: We need to be confident that when the
required data and documents are provided, they will be acceptable,
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are available on time, and can be readily implemented by the operators
to comply on large fleets of airplanes.
Whether a number of different types of transport airplanes
need similar safety improvements: Because the safety issue is common to
many airplanes, we need to ensure that technical requirements and
compliance process are consistent to ensure required safety level can
be achieved equitably.
The safety objective needs to be maintained for the
operational life of the airplane: We need to ensure that future design
changes do not degrade the achieved level of safety in the fleet.
Additional factors relevant to the safety objective being
addressed: There may be other factors that are unique to a particular
safety concern that we also need to consider.
When the FAA takes this regulatory approach to implementing actions
necessary for safety through complementary operational and DAH
requirements, we will:
Publish a notice of proposed rulemaking for public
comment.
Provide the rationale for adopting requirements for both
the operators and DAHs.
Identify the affected airplane models and types of
operations.
Define the specific information that must be developed and
made available.
Provide technical information in the rule when it is
necessary for compliance.
Identify processes and procedures for implementation of
safety related actions.
Specify the appropriate compliance times to allow for all
of the design, certification, and implementation activity to occur.
Consider the economic impacts to all affected parties and
ensure that the safety benefits are sufficient to warrant the costs.
Publish the proposed guidance materials associated with
the safety initiatives concurrently with the rulemaking proposals, or
as soon after as possible. This will enable industry to evaluate all of
the related materials as soon as they are available and provide
comprehensive comments to the FAA. For any materials that are not
available during the comment period on the NPRM, we will provide a
separate comment period for the proposed guidance.
Identify training requirements.
Seek information from industry to gain a full
understanding of these considerations when developing our proposal.
This policy is based on the need to ensure there are acceptable
data and documents available in a timely manner to support operator
compliance with the related operational rules. The FAA understands that
in some cases where airplane modifications are required, third parties
may be able to offer engineering support for compliance with the
operational rules. However, the FAA believes that requirements for DAHs
may still be necessary because DAHs have all of the original data
(analysis, models, test results, service experience, etc.) necessary to
evaluate their current designs and develop modifications or programs
that will enable them to show compliance in a timely way. In addition,
these rules may also include production cut-in requirements, so DAHs
would have to develop designs to comply with those requirements anyway.
This policy builds on current regulations (14 CFR 21.50 and 21.99)
that require DAHs to ``make available'' certain service information
that is necessary to maintain the airworthiness of airplanes. The FAA
understands that data and documents, such as airplane maintenance
manuals, structural repair manuals, service bulletins, etc., and
support are part of some purchase contracts between DAHs and operators.
In each case, the DAH would be required to ``make available'' the
service information developed under a DAH requirement. Since current
business relationships are structured to comply with this existing
long-standing requirement, we do not anticipate any disruption in these
relationships as a result of the DAH requirements. The requirement to
``make available'' does not preclude the DAH from charging for these
data and documents.
In adopting this policy, we do not intend to limit the flexibility
that a DAH has to contract with a third party to provide a means of
compliance with a DAH requirement. This type of business arrangement
has been used by DAHs to provide customer support for modifications
associated with both required and voluntary configuration changes. If a
DAH does rely on third parties, the DAH would still remain fully
responsible for ultimate compliance with the requirement.
Under this policy, we will continue to the hold the affected
operators responsible for implementing actions necessary for safety. In
the event the DAH no longer exists and, therefore, cannot provide the
required support, the operator still has the responsibility for
complying with the operational rule on time. The operator must work to
contract with a party capable of providing the needed support, or
potentially remove airplanes from service.
Under this policy, we would not make DAHs responsible for
addressing safety problems related to airplane configurations for which
they are not the design approval holder. They would not be expected to
provide data and documents related to modifications developed by third
parties or operator-developed repairs and alterations. However, they
may be required to provide guidance on how to assess the effects of
those kinds of changes on the DAH's design.
Regulations applying this policy will contain additional features
that will help ensure that the required safety related actions are
acceptable and available on time for implementation by the operator. A
requirement for compliance planning by the DAHs will be an integral
part of this new approach to ensure that the DAH and the FAA have a
common understanding of how the DAH intends to comply. The FAA is
committed to assuring the proposed requirements of this new approach
are complied with so that the safety objectives are achieved on time.
This approach will also promote the development of consistent and
standardized safety related actions.
As previously discussed, this policy statement is the cumulative
result of past experience and in-depth reviews of past efforts to
ensure the safety of the fleet through the certification and continued
airworthiness processes. The FAA concludes that, under the
circumstances described above, this new regulatory approach is
necessary for safety and provides an efficient and cost effective
strategy for addressing complex airworthiness issues in the future.
Issued in Washington, DC on July 6, 2005.
Nicholas A. Sabatini,
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety.
[FR Doc. 05-13670 Filed 7-11-05; 8:45 am]
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