[Federal Register: August 3, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 148)]
[Notices]
[Page 44593-44598]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr03au05-85]
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ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter
Registration Lists
AGENCY: United States Election Assistance Commission.
ACTION: Notice; publication of final Voluntary Guidance on the
Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is publishing
its final voluntary guidance on Section 303(a) of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA was enacted to set standards for the
administration of Federal elections. Included in these standards is a
requirement that each State develop and maintain a single, statewide
list of registered voters. The voluntary guidance published here by the
EAC will assist the States in understanding, interpreting and
implementing HAVA's standards regarding statewide voter registration
lists.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gavin S. Gilmour, Associate General
Counsel, Washington, DC, (202) 566-3100, Fax: (202) 566-1392.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background. HAVA mandates that the EAC draft
and publish voluntary guidance to assist States in implementing the
HAVA requirements for computerized statewide voter registration lists.
(42 U.S.C. 15501(b)). To meet its obligation, the EAC gathered
information and sought input from experts and stakeholders.
Specifically, the EAC held public meetings, receiving testimony from
State election officials whose States had implemented statewide voter
registration lists. Additionally, the EAC, assisted by the National
Academies, convened a two-day working group of State and local election
officials. The working group received technical assistance from
technology experts invited by the academies and representatives of the
country's motor vehicle administrators.
Following this research and information gathering, the EAC drafted
its Proposed Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter
Registration Lists. This proposed voluntary guidance was published with
a request for public comment on April 18, 2005. (70 FR 20114). The
public comment period was open until 5 p.m. e.d.t. on May 25, 2005. All
comments received were considered in the drafting of this final
guidance.
Discussion of Comments. The EAC received 310 comments from the
public. The overwhelming majority of these comments came from public
interest groups or their members (221 comments in all). The EAC
received 14 comments from State and local officials. Finally, 75 of the
comments the EAC received were either not relevant to the subject
matter, broad in nature or otherwise provided no specific
recommendation.
The comments received from public interest groups were generally
consistent in content, focusing primarily on what they perceived were
missing from the guidelines. These groups focused on the need to
provide additional information and guidance to States. They recommended
that the guidance be expanded to provide States direction on (1) list
verification and maintenance processes and protocols, (2)
implementation of policies to protect registrants against removal from
registration lists in error, (3) coordination with voter registration
agencies, (4) security procedures to both prevent unauthorized access
and protect database information and (5) database features such as
public access portals and election management. The comments from State
and local officials were more diverse. Most of the comments focused
upon the types of databases that meet HAVA requirements. While the
comments differed and often conflicted in their conclusions, as a whole
they made it clear that further guidance on database structure and
operation was desired. A number of comments from State and local
officials also expressed concern over definitions with the guidance,
fearing that they were absent, overly broad or might otherwise conflict
with definitions under State law. Finally, a few State and local
officials shared the concerns articulated by the public interest groups
regarding security (specifically, limiting database access).
The EAC reviewed and considered each of the comments presented. In
doing so, it also gathered additional information and performed
research regarding the suggestions. The EAC's commitment to public
participation is evident in the final version of the voluntary
guidelines. The guidelines have been enhanced in a number of areas in
response to conscientious public comment. The document has been
reorganized to improve readability. Definitions for ``statewide voter
registration list'' and ``chief State election official'' have been
added. Similarly, the definition of ``local election official'' has
been clarified. Additional guidance was added regarding (1) the
creation of stricter standards by States; (2) election officials'
responsibility to track voter history; (3) security requirements
[[Page 44594]]
(including provisions on technological security; access protocols;
transactional record keeping and system backup, recovery and
restoration); (4) records retention and (5) public access portals.
Similarly, many existing guidelines were enhanced in response to public
comment. Previous guidance on coordinating statewide voter registration
lists with other State, local and Federal databases was expanded.
Further guidance was added on (1) voter registration coordination, (2)
registration verification coordination; and (3) registration list
maintenance. Finally, guidance on the types of databases that meet HAVA
requirements has been amended to provide clearer direction to States.
Voluntary Guidance on the Implementation of Statewide Voter
Registration Lists
I. Introduction
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires the Chief
Election Official in each State to implement a ``single, uniform,
official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter
registration list.'' That list is to be ``defined, maintained, and
administered at the State level'' and must contain the ``name and
registration information of every legally registered voter in the
State.''
Congress mandated that the United States Election Assistance
Commission (EAC) issue voluntary guidance to assist the States in
implementing the provisions of HAVA relating to statewide voter
registration list requirements. While it is the responsibility of the
EAC to interpret and issue guidance on HAVA, civil enforcement of the
statute is expressly assigned to the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ).
The following interpretative guidance clarifies the meaning of
certain portions of Section 303(a) of HAVA (42 U.S.C. 15483(a)).
Specifically, this guidance serves to assist States in their efforts to
develop and implement a single, uniform, official, centralized,
interactive computerized statewide voter registration list. Moreover,
the guidance also serves to encourage State and local election
officials to work together to define and assume their appropriate
responsibilities for meeting this HAVA requirement, and engage other
relevant stakeholders in this process.
II. Scope and Definitions
A. Is this guidance regarding statewide voter registration lists or
section 303(a) of HAVA mandatory?
No. The guidance issued here by the EAC is voluntary. This means
that States can choose to adopt this guidance to assist in the
implementation of HAVA's requirements for a statewide voter
registration list or create their own policies. However, to the extent
the policies below reiterate HAVA mandates, such requirements are not
voluntary but are statutorily required.
B. What is a computerized statewide voter registration list?
A computerized statewide voter registration list is a single,
uniform, centralized, interactive computerized voter registration list
that is technically and functionally able to perform tasks described in
Sections 303(a)(1)(A)(i) through 303(a)(1)(A)(viii) of HAVA. In
essence, it is the one official list of lawfully registered voters
within a State for all elections for Federal office and the only lawful
source of Federal registration information for poll books or precinct
registers on Election Day. The list must be centrally managed at the
State level in a uniform and non-discriminatory manner. The list must
be computerized and technically capable of providing immediate
electronic access to appropriate State and local election officials;
assigning unique identifiers; affording local officials expedited entry
of voter registration information; allowing voter registration
information to be verified with other State, local and Federal
agencies; providing a means for list maintenance; tracking appropriate
voting history; and ensuring appropriate system security.
C. Who would benefit from this guidance?
This guidance is targeted to assist the States and local
governments in fulfilling their requirements under Section 303(a) of
HAVA. This guidance may help election officials understand HAVA's
establishment of a single, uniform statewide voter registration list
and the responsibilities that HAVA places on all election officials to
assure that the names and information contained in the statewide voter
registration list are accurate, secure and complete.
D. To whom is section 303(a) of HAVA applicable?
The provisions of Section 303(a) apply to all States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and
the United States Virgin Islands except those that on or after date of
enactment of HAVA had no requirement for registration of voters with
respect to elections for Federal office. Currently, only North Dakota
has no voter registration requirement.
E. Does this guidance in any way alter, interpret, or affect the
requirements of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993?
No. Nothing in this guidance should be construed to alter,
interpret or effect, in any way whatsoever, the requirements of the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), including requirements
and timeframes with respect to the administration of voter registration
and/or the process States must follow in removing names of registrants
from the voting rolls.
F. Who is a local election official?
For the purposes of this guidance, a local election official is a
public employee who has, as a primary duty, the responsibility for
collecting and processing voter registration information for Federal
elections or otherwise maintaining voter registration information
pursuant to State mandates and the requirements of HAVA.
G. Who is the chief state election official?
The chief State election official is the highest ranking State
official who has, as a primary duty, the responsibility to ensure the
lawful administration of voter registration in Federal elections.
Ultimately, it is the State's responsibility to determine the identity
of this official. Each State should have previously identified their
chief State election official as required by the NVRA (42 U.S.C. Sec.
1973gg-8).
H. Who is responsible for implementing the provisions of section 303(a)
of HAVA?
The State, through the State's Chief Election Official, is
responsible for ensuring that the State has a single, uniform,
official, centralized, interactive computerized Statewide voter
registration list. This official is also responsible for defining,
maintaining and administering this list. However, local election
officials also have certain responsibilities outlined in Section 303(a)
of HAVA, particularly with regard to entering voter registration
information into the statewide voter registration list on an expedited
basis. Local election officials may also be required to perform list
maintenance activities pursuant to State mandates.
[[Page 44595]]
I. Will the EAC provide additional guidance on computerized statewide
voter registration lists?
Yes. The EAC and a working group of State and local election
officials will continue to explore technical issues related to the
maintenance and upgrade of these database systems, with assistance from
the National Academies. The EAC also plans to work with public interest
groups to help ensure these guidelines serve all Americans. Additional
guidance and/or best practices regarding statewide voter registration
lists will be developed.
III. Guidance on Statewide Voter Registration Lists
A. May a State create policies for Statewide Voter Registration lists
that go beyond HAVA's requirements?
Yes. Under Sections 304 and 305 of HAVA, the details of
implementing Statewide Voter Registration Lists have been left to the
States. HAVA requirements are minimum requirements. States are free to
establish policies that provide stricter standards as long as such
standards are not inconsistent with HAVA or other Federal Laws. States
must ensure that their additional policies are indeed stricter than
HAVA and do not create impermissible standards that fall below the
statute's minimum requirements. In this way, a stricter standard, in
terms of a provision that protects voter access, would be a standard
that further enhances or expands such access. Similarly, a stricter
standard, in terms of a provision that protects the integrity and
security of the voting process, would be a standard that furthers that
goal.
B. What types of databases meet the requirements of HAVA to generate a
single, uniform voter registration list?
HAVA requires a State to define, maintain and administer one
official and uniform statewide voter registration list. This
computerized list must be accessible by local election officials for
purposes of conducting voter registration and voting in an election for
Federal office. Generally, in order to meet HAVA's computerized list
requirement, the State must define and have immediate, real-time access
to all the data that serves as the State's official voter registration
list. Moreover, the State must be able to control access to this data
and perform HAVA mandated action on the information (such as
coordinating with other databases for the purpose of performing voter
registration verification and list maintenance). Finally, local
election officials must have immediate access to this official list.
While HAVA requires that both State and local election officials have
immediate access to the voter registration list, ultimately the State
must direct the degree of access and control any one official or class
of officials have over the list's data.
A State database hosted on a single, central platform (e.g.,
mainframe and/or client servers) and connected to terminals housed at
the local level (often referred to as a ``top down'' system) is most
closely akin to the requirements of HAVA. However, other database
systems may also meet the single, uniform list requirement as long as
they function consistent with the general rule stated, above.
For example, a State database that gathers or uploads its
information from local voter registration databases to form the
statewide voter registration list (often referred to as a ``bottom up''
system) may serve to meet the single, uniform list requirement. This is
a true as long as the State database, the data and the data flow are
defined, maintained, and administered by the State. Thus, the State
database must house the only official list of registered voters;
establish interactive and compatible software and user protocols that
allow each local jurisdiction to seamlessly transfer data to and from
the State; require local databases to routinely upload or
electronically send registration information to the State; and ensure
that the data that forms the official voter registration list is
regularly downloaded or otherwise sent electronically to local
officials so that they may have immediate access to the entire official
list. It is important to understand that in a ``bottom up'' system the
official statewide voter registration list is that list hosted on the
State's database and downloaded to local jurisdictions. The list
remains static until the State electronically provides the next,
updated version. Registration information held solely in a local
database is not a part of the official registration list until it is
electronically sent to the State and added to the official list. States
must require local information to be uploaded and the official
statewide voter registration list to be downloaded on a regular basis.
In this way, both State and local election officials will have
immediate, real time access to the statewide voter registration list.
C. How frequently must the statewide voter registration list be
synchronized with any local databases to assure that the statewide
voter registration list is the single source for the names and
registration information of all legally registered voters in the State?
If a statewide voter registration list is not hosted on a single,
centralized platform, States must ensure that all information contained
on local, satellite databases is uploaded (synchronized) into the
statewide voter registration database routinely, such that the State
database can be viewed as the sole, official list of registered voters.
Similarly, States must assure that the data comprising the official
list (maintained by the State database) is downloaded or sent
electronically to local systems on a regular basis so that local
officials may have immediate access to the official list. At a minimum,
the statewide voter registration list should be synchronized with local
voter registration databases at least once every 24 hours to assure
that the statewide voter registration list contains the names and
registration information for all legally registered voters in the
State. In the same way, the State must electronically send or download
the appropriate information in its database to local election officials
at least every 24 hours, so that they have immediate electronic access
to the official voter registration list.
D. How should the statewide voter registration list be coordinated with
other agencies?
In order to ensure the completeness and accuracy of statewide voter
registration lists, HAVA requires timely coordination between various
Federal, State and local agencies. Generally, there are three forms of
coordination required under HAVA: Coordination with voter registration
agencies, coordination to verify voter registration information (e.g.,
motor vehicle authorities and Social Security Administration), and
coordination necessary to perform list maintenance (e.g., death and
felony records).
1. Voter registration agencies. HAVA makes accurate and complete
voter registration lists a priority. States must coordinate the
statewide voter registration list with other State agency databases
that collect, correct or update voter registration information. These
agencies must include State motor vehicle agencies and voter
registration agencies as defined by NVRA (i.e., State public assistance
and disability agencies). Proper coordination with these databases is
essential for ensuring
[[Page 44596]]
that statewide voter registration lists are complete. As such, the
chief State election official shall:
a. Establish policies and provide adequate support to local
election officials to ensure that registration applications or other
registration information is entered into the State voter registration
list on an expedited basis. (See HAVA Section 303(a)(1)(A)(vii)). This
responsibility includes the obligation to create requirements that
ensure election officials will receive registration information from
voter registration agencies promptly; and
b. Establish policies that ensure information will be coordinated
accurately, securely and efficiently. The EAC recommends that voter
registration information be transmitted electronically. Further, to the
greatest extent allowed by State law and available technologies, this
electronic transfer between statewide voter registration lists State
motor vehicle agencies and voter registration agencies should be
accomplished through direct, secure, interactive and integrated
connections.
2. Verification of voter registration. Generally, Section 303(a) of
HAVA requires that registration applications include either a valid
driver's license number or, if none, the last four digits of a social
security number.\1\ States are prohibited from accepting or processing
registration applications that do not have this information (with the
exception of individuals who do not possess either identification).
Moreover, HAVA requires States to match information received on voter
registration forms against driver's license and social security
databases for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the information
received from all new voter registrants. Under Section 303(b), such
validation provides an exemption to the voter identification
requirement for first-time registrants by mail if the information
matches. States must take steps to ensure that this matching or
verification process is accomplished promptly and performed in a
uniform and non-discriminatory manner. Ultimately, States are required
to determine if the information provided in a registration application
meets the above verification requirements pursuant to State law. States
must take great care in formulating these policies, taking into
consideration the different ways databases may record information and
the possibility of errors within the database. Consistent with this
task, States should:
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\1\ Some States may require use of a registration applicant's
full Social Security Number pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 15483(A)(5)(D).
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a. Create matching or verification protocols to ensure that
properly filed registration applications from eligible voters are not
rejected due to a database error or inflexible database coordination or
matching rules. States must have a documented plan that specifies how
election officials will identify and deal with a variety of outcomes
that may result from the matching process (such as a mismatch, partial
match, multiple match or failed match). States should avoid proffering
protocols that automatically reject all registration applications that
do not result in a perfect match with a verification database, as such
procedures may be impractical, unrealistic and result in the rejection
of a large number of eligible voters.
b. Use additional databases (beyond drivers' license and social
security databases) to assist in the verification process, when such
use would be effective and efficient. When the outcome of the
verification process is unclear or suspect, use of other databases may
help identify data errors and allow for appropriate corrections to be
made to a database.
c. Make every effort to ensure that a voter registration
application is not rejected as unverifiable until the State has given
the individual an opportunity to correct the information at issue and
attempted to validate the accuracy of the government information
contained in its databases. This does not mean that States should
accept or add unverified registration applications to the statewide
list. Rather, it means only that election officials should make certain
efforts before an application is determined to be unverifiable and
finally rejected. The EAC recommends that in the event a State
determines that the information provided in a registration application
does not match the information contained in an verification databases,
States contact the individual in order to: (1) Inform him or her of the
disparity; (2) provide a meaningful opportunity for the applicant to
respond or provide the correct information and (3) explain the
consequences of failing to reply. In the event the voter registration
applicant informs election officials that the information provided to
the application was correct, steps should be taken to ensure that the
information contained in the verification databases was accurate.
d. Ensure that the coordination of information in the verification
process is accurate and efficient. Verification of voter registration
information shall be accomplished through electronic transmission.
Further, in the greatest extent allowed by State law and available
technologies, this electronic transfer between stateside voter
registration lists and coordinating, verification databases should be
accomplished through direct, secure, interactive and integrated
connections.
e. When the verification process indicates the possible commission
of an election crime (such as the submission of false registration
information), such matters should be timely forwarded to local, State
and Federal law enforcement authorities for investigation.
3. List maintenance: HAVA requires that election officials perform
computerized list maintenance in order to remove duplicate names and
the names of ineligible voters. HAVA specifically requires coordination
with State death and felony record databases to meet this requirement.
States should also coordinate with relevant federal databases, such as
the U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address and Social Security
Death Index databases, as well as criminal conviction records from U.S.
Attorneys and the U.S. District Courts. It is essential that States
regularly coordinate with these databases to ensure their statewide
voter registration lists are current and accurate. In meeting this
goal, chief State election officials shall:
a. Ensure State procedures for removing names from the statewide
voter registration list are consistent with the provisions of the NVRA
(42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6). The NVRA contains certain requirements regarding
the removal of names from official voter rolls. It requires States to
conduct a program that removes individuals from voting registration
lists who have died or changed residence (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(a)(4)).
These requirements include the notification of individuals (in certain
circumstances such as a change of residence) prior to their removal
from the list (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(d) & (e)). It also requires the
removal of individuals who have moved outside of a given registration
jurisdiction, have been sent proper notice, have failed to respond to
such notice and have not voted in two consecutive general elections for
Federal office (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(d)(1)(B)). The statute additional
requires election officials to complete any systematic programs to
remove ineligible voters not later than 90 days before a Federal
election (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-6(c)(2)).
b. Create ``provisions'' that include ``[s]afeguards to ensure that
eligible voters are not removed in error from the official list of
eligible voters.'' (HAVA
[[Page 44597]]
Section 303(a)(4)). HAVA requires States to create procedures that
recognize the fallibility of databases and ensure that only ineligible
voters are removed from a statewide voter registration list. States
shall create procedures and requirements to ensure that:
(i.) The removal process and list maintenance program is
transparent, non-discriminatory and uniform. To this end, the EAC
recommends that States perform list maintenance regularly and over the
list as a whole. In any event, States should avoid the appearance of
impropriety associated with performing maintenance on limited
geographical jurisdictions unless a specific need has been identified
in a particular jurisdiction.
(ii.) All databases used to determine an individual's voting
eligibility (e.g., agency records on felony and death) or otherwise
maintain that statewide voter registration list are accurate, up-to-
date and secure. Moreover, States may rely conclusively on such
databases only to the extent they provide all the information necessary
to determine voter eligibility. To the extent coordination with a given
database is not dispositive of a voter's eligibility, States must
consult additional sources or databases before taking action. For
example, if a State maintains felony records and records on the
restoration of voting rights in different databases, both must be
consulted during the maintenance process.
(iii.) Adequate safeguards are created to ensure that properly
registered and otherwise eligible voters are not removed from the
statewide voter registration list in error. As such, the EAC recommends
that when information on a coordinating database matches only in part
with data contained on a statewide voter registration list or there are
otherwise indications that some data may be unclear, incomplete or
untrustworthy; election officials should coordinate with other State
databases. This should be done in order to verify data and ensure the
information contained on the statewide voter registration list and the
coordinating database are accurate and refer to the same individual.
States should make efforts to correct databases when necessary.
The EAC further recommends that States contact individuals prior to
removing their names from the statewide voter registration list. This
will allow the public to serve as a further check in the maintenance
process. In the event a State has identified a name on the voter list
that it believes is either a duplicate name or an ineligible voter,
election officials should contact the individual. Such contact should
inform the individual (1) That the official intends to remove them from
the registration list, (2) the basis for their removal (i.e.,
ineligibility factor or duplicate name), (3) how and to whom they may
respond if they believe the basis for the removal is unfounded and (4)
the timeframe they have to respond. While contacting the registrant
often provides him or her added protection against being mistakenly
removed from the registration list, in some circumstances it may be
unnecessary. Where contacting the registrant is not required by the
NVRA, election officials may consider foregoing the step if it is clear
that no further information is required to correctly determine a
registrant's voting eligibility. In such cases, election officials are
obligated to assess the accuracy and completeness of any information
that will serve as the basis for removal of a name from the voter
registration list. Officials must be confident that no additional
safeguards are needed to protect the registrant. For example, if
election officials identify duplicate voter registration entries and
all information contained in the entries is complete and identical, the
State may reasonably determine that contacting the registrant is
unnecessary.
c. Establish policies that ensure information will be coordinated
accurately and efficiently. The EAC recommends that the coordination
necessary to perform list maintenance be accomplished through
electronic transmission. Further, to the greatest extent allowed by
State law and available technologies, this electronic transfer between
statewide voter registration lists and coordinating maintenance
databases should be accomplished through direct, secure, interactive
and integrated connections.
E. Must states track a registrant's voting and registration history?
Yes. While a registrant's voting and registration history are not
specifically mandated to be a part of the statewide voter registration
list, the tracking of this information is required in order to meet
NVRA and HAVA requirements regarding the removal of names from voter
rolls and voter identification requirements. This voter-specific
information must be accessible and available to the appropriate
election officials so these provisions may be timely met. The most
efficient and effective means to track voter and registration history
information is through a State's statewide voter registration list. As
such, the EAC recommends that databases housing statewide voter
registration lists should be capable of tracking the following
information in order to comply with NVRA and HAVA:
1. Registration by mail. States must track whether an individual
registered to vote by mail, as registering in this way triggers Federal
identification requirements. 42 U.S.C. 15483(b)(1).
2. Voting history. States must also track an individual's voting
history. This is necessary to:
a. Meet NVRA requirements regarding the removal of names from voter
rolls. Under the NVRA, if a registrant has moved from a registration
jurisdiction, failed to respond to required NVRA notice, and failed to
vote in two consecutive Federal general elections, the person's name
may be removed from the list of eligible voters. (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6)
b. Meet HAVA identification requirements. Under HAVA, individuals
who register by mail and have not previously voted in an election for
Federal office are subject to Federal identification requirements. (42
U.S.C. 15483(b)(1)(B))
3. Identification and verification information for first time
voters who register by mail. States must track whether first-time
voters who registered by mail provided appropriate identification
(i.e., a copy of a valid photo identification or current utility bill)
or verification information (i.e., verified driver's license number or
last four digits of a social security number \2\) in their registration
applications under 42 U.S.C. 15483(b)(3)(A) & (B), sufficient to exempt
him or her from HAVA's voter identification requirements (42 U.S.C.
15483(b)(2)). If such registrants failed to provide this identification
or verification information during the registration process, they will
be required to present it in person, at the polls. This should also be
tracked by election officials.
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\2\ Some States may require use of a registration applicant's
full Social Security Number pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec.
15483(a)(5)(D).
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4. Individuals entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). (42
U.S.C. 1973ff-1 et seq). States must identify registrants who are
entitled to cast an absentee ballot under UOCAVA as they are exempt
from HAVA's 42 U.S.C. 15483(b)(2) identification requirements.
Furthermore, UOCAVA, as amended by HAVA, requires States to report to
the EAC the individual and combined numbers of absentee ballots
transmitted to uniformed services voters and
[[Page 44598]]
overseas citizens, as well as the individual and combined number of
such ballots returned and cast by such voters. (42 U.S.C. 1973ff-1(c))
5. Individuals entitled to vote otherwise than in person under the
Voter Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (42 U.S.C.
1973ee-1(b)(2)(B)(ii)) or any other Federal law. States must identify
registrants who are entitled to cast an absentee ballot under such
statutes as they are exempt from HAVA's 42 U.S.C. 15483(b)(2)
identification requirements.
F. What obligations do election officials have concerning the security
of the statewide voter registration list?
HAVA makes election officials responsible for ensuring that
statewide voter registration lists are accurate, complete and
technologically secure.
1. Technological Security. HAVA requires election officials to
provide adequate, technological database security for statewide voter
registration lists that prevent unauthorized access. Such computerized
security must be designed to prevent unauthorized users from altering
the list or accessing private or otherwise protected information
contained on the list. Access may be controlled through a variety of
tools including network or system-level utilities and database
applications (such as passwords and ``masked'' data elements). Special
care must be taken to ensure that voter registration databases are
protected when linked to outside systems for the purposes of
coordination.
2. Access Protocols. Election officials must also create clear
policies and protocols to make statewide voter registration lists
secure. These protocols must identify appropriate classes of authorized
users and clearly delineate the members of each class, when they have
access, what data they have access to and what level of access each
class holds. It is essential to security that the authority to remove a
name from the voter registration list be properly limited and
documented. Access protocols should also provide physical security
requirements to further limit unauthorized access to a system.
3. Transactional Recordkeeping. The EAC recommends that systems
housing statewide voter registration lists have the capability to track
and record transactions which add or remove names or otherwise alter
information contained in the voter registration list. This includes
documenting the identity of the individuals who initiate such
transactions. This capacity will allow the system to be audited,
providing a means to hold authorized users accountable for their
actions. Such accountability can serve as an important security measure
by deterring unlawful or inappropriate use of the statewide voter
registration list.
4. Backup, Recovery and Restoration Capabilities. Due to the
important nature of the information stored on the statewide voter
registration list, State election officials must ensure that the
systems storing the list have adequate backup, recovery and restoration
capabilities. These capabilities must be routinely tested. Officials
must be confident that the system is properly backed up and that the
data may be timely and accurately recovered and restored when needed.
Further, the EAC recommends that statewide voter registration list
backups occur regularly on an automated basis and that the backup
system be housed in a physical location separate from the primary
database. Moreover, backup systems should be protected by technological
security to the same degree as primary systems.
G. Do record retention requirementsaapply to statewide voter
registration databases?
Yes. States must adhere to all State and Federal law (e.g. 42
U.S.C. 1974 and 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(i)) applicable to voter registration
document retention. Such requirements must be applied to all records
contained in or produced by statewide voter registration databases.
H. Should the public be granted access to their information on the
computerized statewide voter registration list?
While not required by HAVA, the EAC encourages States to set-up
accessible, secure means by which members of the public may verify
their registration status and records. This type of public access could
provide many benefits, it would serve to (1) enhance openness and voter
confidence in the registration system, (2) encourage self-
identification of database errors and duplication and (3) decrease
instances of multiple registration as a result of an individual's
inability to recall registration status.
Further, States could use public access portals to provide other
information to voters, such as the location of their proper polling
place, important election dates and contact information for
registration queries and updates. However, any public access portal
must be protected with strong security measures to prevent unauthorized
access.
Thomas R. Wilkey,
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
[FR Doc. 05-15336 Filed 8-2-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6820-KF-M