[Federal Register: November 30, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 229)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 71760-71772]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr30no05-7]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM02-12-001; Order No. 2006-A]
Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures; Order on Rehearing
Issued November 22, 2005.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Order on rehearing.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) grants
rehearing in part, denies rehearing in part, and clarifies certain
determinations in Order No. 2006. Order No. 2006 requires all public
utilities that own, control, or operate facilities for transmitting
electric energy in interstate commerce to file revised open access
transmission tariffs containing standard small generator
interconnection procedures and a standard small generator
interconnection agreement, and to provide interconnection service under
them to small generating facilities of no more than 20 megawatts.
[[Page 71761]]
EFFECTIVE DATE: December 30, 2005.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kumar Agarwal (Technical Information), Office of Markets, Tariffs and
Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8923.
Kirk F. Randall (Technical Information), Office of Markets, Tariffs and
Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8092.
Patrick Rooney (Technical Information), Office of Market, Tariffs and
Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6205.
Cordelia M. Shepherd (Technical Information), Office of Markets,
Tariffs and Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8898.
Abraham Silverman (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6444.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Nora Mead
Brownell, and Suedeen G. Kelly.
I. Introduction
1. Under Federal Power Act (FPA) sections 205 and 206,\1\ on May
12, 2005, the Commission issued a Final Rule, Order No. 2006,\2\
requiring all public utilities that own, control, or operate facilities
used for transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce \3\ to
have on file standard procedures and a standard agreement for
interconnecting Small Generating Facilities capable of producing no
more than 20 megawatts (MW) of power (Small Generators) with their
Transmission Systems.\4\ Order No. 2006 requires that all public
utilities subject to it modify their open access transmission tariffs
(OATTs) to include the SGIP and SGIA.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 16 U.S.C. 824d and 824e (2000). Section 205(b) states that
``[n]o public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or
sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or
grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any
person to any undue preference or disadvantage. * * *'' In addition,
section 206(a) states that ``[w]henever the Commission * * * shall
find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed,
charged or collected by any public utility for any transmission or
sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any
rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge,
or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or
preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable
rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice or contract
to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by
order.''
\2\ Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2006, 70 FR 34190 (Jun. 13,
2005), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles, Vol. III, ]
31,180, at 31,406-31,551 (2005).
\3\ A public utility is a utility that owns, controls, or
operates facilities used for transmitting electric energy in
interstate commerce, as defined by the FPA. 16 U.S.C. 824(e) (2000).
A non-public utility that seeks voluntary compliance with the
reciprocity condition of an open access transmission tariff may
satisfy that condition by adopting these procedures and agreement.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 establishes new FPA section 211A,
which gives the Commission the option to require an unregulated
transmitting utility to provide transmission service. Energy Policy
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, Sec. 1231, 119 Stat. 594, 955 (2005).
The Commission has not yet taken action under section 211A, but it
is seeking comment on this new authority in Docket No. RM05-25-000,
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission
Services, Notice of Inquiry, 70 FR 55796 (Sep. 23, 2005), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 35,553 at P 34-36 (2005).
\4\ Capitalized terms used in this order have the meanings
specified in the Glossaries of Terms or the text of the pro forma
Small Generator Interconnection Procedures (SGIP) or the pro forma
Small Generator Interconnection Agreement (SGIA). Small Generating
Facility means the device for which the Interconnection Customer
(the owner or operator of the Small Generating Facility) has
requested interconnection. The utility with which the Small
Generating Facility is interconnecting is the Transmission Provider.
A Small Generating Facility is a device used for the production of
electricity having a capacity of no more than 20 MW. The
interconnection process begins when the Interconnection Customer
submits an application for interconnection (Interconnection Request)
to the Transmission Provider.
\5\ The documents adopted in Order No. 2006 for inclusion in a
Transmission Provider's OATT are called the SGIP and SGIA.
Provisions of the SGIP are referred to as ``sections'' and those of
the SGIA are referred to as ``articles.'' Comparable documents for
generators larger than 20 MW in size were developed in Order No.
2003 (see fn. 13) and are referred to as the LGIP and LGIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. In this order, we grant rehearing in part, deny rehearing in
part, and clarify certain determinations in Order No. 2006. As the
Commission noted in that order, adoption of the SGIP and SGIA will
reduce interconnection time and costs for Interconnection Customers and
Transmission Providers, preserve reliability, increase energy supply
where needed, lower wholesale prices for customers by increasing the
number and types of new generation that will compete in the wholesale
electricity market, facilitate development of non-polluting alternative
energy sources, and help remedy undue discrimination, as FPA sections
205 and 206 require.\6\ At its core, Order No. 2006 ensures that
generators independent of Transmission Providers and generators
affiliated with Transmission Providers are offered interconnection
service on comparable terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 16 U.S.C. 824d and 824e (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Procedural Issues
3. The Commission received nine timely requests for rehearing or
for clarification of Order No. 2006. SoCal Edison also submitted a
letter to the Commission noting typographical errors it had identified
in the SGIP and SGIA. Certain of those errors are included in Appendix
B. AWEA \7\ filed a request for rehearing on October 25, 2005. Under
FPA section 313(a),\8\ requests for rehearing of a Commission order
were due within thirty days after issuance of Order No. 2006, i.e., no
later than June 13, 2005. Because the 30-day rehearing deadline is
statutorily based, it cannot be extended. Therefore, we reject all
requests for rehearing filed after June 13, 2005 as a matter of law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Appendix A for a listing of petitioner acronyms.
\8\ 16 U.S.C. 8251(a) (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Since Order No. 2006 was issued on May 12, 2005, the Commission
has received a number of compliance filings by various Transmission
Providers. In the course of evaluating those filings and review of the
SGIP and SGIA, we have noted a number of typographical errors and minor
clarifications.\9\ These revisions, and those to the SGIP and SGIA
ordered herein, are enumerated in Appendix B. The revised SGIP and the
SGIA, containing these revisions in Microsoft Word format, will be
available on the Commission's Web site, http://www.ferc.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ In addition to typographical errors and errata, we are
adding a statement in the Interconnection Request that documentation
of site control must accompany the Interconnection Request, per SGIP
section 1.5. We also: (1) Clarify in various SGIA articles that use
the term ``Affected System'' that there may be more than one
Affected System, or none; (2) clarify in SGIA article 1.3 that the
purchase or delivery of power and other services that the
Interconnection Customer may require will be covered under separate
agreements, if any; (3) clarify in SGIA articles 1.6, 5.2.1.1, and
5.3 that there may be more than one system operator for the
Transmission Provider's Transmission System; and (4) clarify in SGIA
article 12.2 that the SGIA may also be amended pursuant to article
12.12. Finally, the term Good Utility Practice is used and defined
in the SGIA. It is also used in the SGIP, but the definition of this
term was inadvertently omitted from the Glossary of Terms in that
document. We are amending the SGIP to include that definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Discussion
5. In Order No. 2006, the Commission adopted the Small Generator
Interconnection Procedures document (SGIP), which describes how the
Interconnection Customer's Interconnection Request (i.e., application)
is to be evaluated. The SGIP includes three alternative procedures for
evaluating a proposed Interconnection Request, based on the size of the
Small Generating Facility. One is the four-step Study Process. The
[[Page 71762]]
four steps are the scoping meeting, the feasibility study, the system
impact study, and the facilities study. The SGIP also includes a Fast
Track Process that uses technical screens to evaluate a certified Small
Generating Facility no larger than 2 MW and a 10 kW Inverter Process
that uses the same technical screens to evaluate a certified inverter-
based Small Generating Facility no larger than 10 kW.\10\ These
procedures are described in more detail below and are depicted in flow
chart form in Appendices B, C, and D to Order No. 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Order No. 2006 at P 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. In Order No. 2006, the Commission also adopted the Small
Generator Interconnection Agreement (SGIA), which is executed after the
Interconnection Request has been successfully reviewed under the
provisions in the SGIP. The SGIA (sometimes called the interconnection
agreement or Agreement) describes the legal relationships of the
Parties,\11\ including who pays for equipment modifications to the
Transmission Provider's electric system to accommodate the
interconnection.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Parties are the Transmission Provider, Transmission
Owner, Interconnection Customer or any combination of the above.
SGIP Attachment 1.
\12\ Order No. 2006 at P 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Issues Related to Both the Small Generator Interconnection
Procedures and the Small Generator Interconnection Agreement
7. Disputes (SGIP Section 4.2 and SGIA Article 10)--Order No. 2006
requires the Parties to attempt in good faith to resolve all disputes
and invites them to contact the Commission's Dispute Resolution Service
for assistance in mediating disputes. The provision also requires the
Parties to share the cost of any neutral third parties retained to help
resolve the dispute.
Rehearing Request
8. Small Generator Coalition contends that requiring the Parties to
split the costs of any dispute resolution disadvantages the
Interconnection Customer because the Transmission Provider is likely to
have significantly more resources than does the Interconnection
Customer. Instead, the neutral party providing the dispute resolution
service should be permitted to assign costs to each Party and to
apportion greater cost responsibilities to a Party presenting frivolous
or non-substantive arguments.
Commission Conclusion
9. We are sensitive to concerns about the costs of resolving
disputes, and Order No. 2006 does not mandate that the Parties use a
particular process to settle their disputes. Instead, it provides
alternative sources of dispute resolution services that are available
to the Parties at little cost, such as the Commission's own Dispute
Resolution Service, and encourages the Parties to use any state
regulatory resources that may be available. By broadening the
Commission's approach to dispute resolution and giving the Parties the
flexibility to choose alternative dispute resolution services, Order
No. 2006 gives the Parties the ability to limit costs and the problems
Small Generator Coalition describes. Regarding frivolous or non-
substantive arguments, the SGIA already requires the Parties to operate
in good faith. Should one Party operate in bad faith by advancing
frivolous arguments, the other Party may raise the issue with the
Commission.
10. Definition of Transmission Provider--The SGIP and SGIA define
``Transmission Provider'' to include both the Transmission Provider and
the Transmission Owner where they are different entities. This often
occurs in RTOs or ISOs where the entity operating the Transmission
System is independent of the entities that actually own the
Transmission System. This is consistent with the approach taken for
Large Generating Facilities in Order No. 2003.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures, Order No. 2003, 68 FR 49845 (Aug. 19, 2003), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ] 31,146 (2003) (Order No. 2003), order on reh'g, Order No.
2003-A, 69 FR 15932 (Mar. 26, 2004), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,160
(2004) (Order No. 2003-A), order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-B, 70 FR
265 (Jan. 4, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,171 (2005) (Order No.
2003-B), order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-C, 70 FR 37661 (Jun. 30,
2005), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,190 (2005) (Order No. 2003-C). See
also Notice Clarifying Compliance Procedures, 106 FERC ] 61,009
(2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Request for Rehearing
11. MSAT asks the Commission to distinguish more clearly the roles
of the Transmission Provider and the Transmission Owner. It argues that
the lack of clarity is confusing and could slow down the
interconnection process.
Commission Conclusion
12. The definition of the term ``Transmission Provider'' in Order
No. 2006 is the same as in Order No. 2003.\14\ Further defining the
relationship between the Transmission Provider and the Transmission
Owner would restrict unnecessarily the flexibility that independent
Transmission Providers and their stakeholders now have to apportion
responsibilities between the Transmission Provider and the Transmission
Owner. Allowing flexibility permits the entities in each region to
customize the SGIP and SGIA, under the variations permitted to
independent entities, to best meet their unique needs. Thus, we deny
MSAT's request for rehearing and encourage it to work with the Midwest
ISO during the compliance process on apportioning responsibilities
between the various entities.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Order No. 2003 at P 909.
\15\ MSAT points out that P 349 of Order No. 2006 inadvertently
refers to ``Transmission Operators'' instead of ``Transmission
Owners.'' MSAT is correct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Issues Related to the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures
13. Fast Track Process and 10 kW Inverter Process Screens (SGIP
Section 2.2.1)--SGIP section 2.2.1 specifies technical screens that are
used to evaluate proposed interconnections of certified \16\ Small
Generating Facilities under the Fast Track Process and the 10 kW
Inverter Process.\17\ Section 2.2.1.2 provides that, to successfully
pass the screen, the aggregated generation, including the proposed
Small Generating Facility, on a radial distribution circuit shall not
exceed 15 percent of the line section \18\ annual peak load as most
recently measured at the substation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Under Order No. 2006, a Small Generating Facility equipment
package is considered certified if it has been submitted, tested,
and listed by a nationally recognized testing and certification
laboratory. SGIP Attachments 3 and 4.
\17\ The Fast Track Process for evaluating an Interconnection
Request for a certified Small Generating Facility no larger than 2
MW includes technical screens, a customer options meeting, and an
optional supplemental review. Order No. 2006 at P 45. The 10 kW
Inverter Process is available to evaluate the interconnection of a
certified inverter-based generator no larger than 10 kW. The all-in-
one 10 kW Inverter Process document includes a simplified
application form, interconnection procedures, and a brief set of
terms and conditions (akin to an interconnection agreement). Order
No. 2006 at P 46 and P 394-405, Appendix D, and SGIP Attachment 5.
\18\ A line section is that portion of a Transmission Provider's
electric system connected to a customer bounded by automatic
sectionalizing devices or the end of the distribution line. SGIP
section 2.2.1.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rehearing Request
14. Southern Company proposes revising section 2.2.1.2 to permit
measurement at the substation ``or applicable automatic sectionalizing
device.'' It claims this is simply a ministerial change that permits
the peak load to be measured at the automatic sectionalizing device,
which may not be located at the substation.
[[Page 71763]]
Commission Conclusion
15. SGIP section 2.2.1.2 is a critical component of the screens,
which were debated at great length in the stakeholder process.\19\
Southern Company's proposed revision, raised here for the first time on
rehearing, could lead to case-by-case disputes as to where the
measurement should be made. The resulting delays in the interconnection
process could adversely affect both the Transmission Provider and the
Interconnection Customer. Accordingly, we deny Southern Company's
request for rehearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ In the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) issued
in this proceeding, and published in the Federal Register on August
26, 2002 (67 FR 54749), the Commission initiated a collaborative
process where members of the public, electric industry participants,
and federal and state agencies (collectively, stakeholders) were
invited to draft proposed generator interconnection procedures and
agreement documents. The stakeholders, called Joint Commenters in
Order No. 2006, filed consensus documents in response to the ANOPR
and also in response to a Commission invitation for supplemental
comments. See Order No. 2006 at P 16-25 for a narrative history of
this proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Scoping Meeting (SGIP Section 3.2)--The first step of the four-
step SGIP Study Process for evaluating a proposed interconnection is
the scoping meeting. SGIP section 3.2 requires the Transmission
Provider and the Interconnection Customer to hold the scoping meeting
within ten Business Days after the Interconnection Request is deemed
complete. At the scoping meeting, the Parties discuss the proposed
interconnection and review any existing studies that could aid in its
evaluation. Order No. 2006 also requires that any scoping meeting
between the Transmission Provider and an affiliate be announced
publicly and transcribed, with the transcripts made available for a
period of three years.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Order No. 2006 at P 184.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rehearing Request
17. Southern Company argues that the special treatment afforded an
affiliate of the Transmission Provider is discriminatory because it
does not apply to other competitors. This puts the affiliate at a
competitive disadvantage. The Commission is treating similarly situated
entities differently, according to Southern Company, and the
requirement should therefore be eliminated.
Commission Conclusion
18. The treatment of affiliates in Order No. 2006 is identical to
the requirement for Large Generating Facilities, which the Commission
addressed in Order No. 2003-B.\21\ The Commission there explained,
among other things, that an affiliated Interconnection Customer and one
that is not an affiliate of the Transmission Provider are not similarly
situated. There is no need to address this issue further here. We deny
Southern Company's request for rehearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Order No. 2003-B at P 137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Study Deadlines, Study Cost Responsibility, and Restudies (SGIP
Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5)--The SGIP Study Process includes three
standard engineering analyses that evaluate the proposed
interconnection: The feasibility study, the system impact study, and
the facilities study.\22\ The interconnection study agreements (SGIP
Attachments 6, 7, and 8) require the Transmission Provider to complete
the feasibility study within 30 Business Days of signing the
feasibility study agreement, the distribution system impact study
within 30 Business Days and the transmission system impact study within
45 Business Days of signing the system impact study agreement, and the
facilities study within 30 Business Days of signing the facilities
study agreement. The Interconnection Customer is responsible for paying
the Transmission Provider's actual costs for performing these studies.
The SGIP does not contain a provision for restudy should system
conditions change after a study is complete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The feasibility study is a preliminary technical assessment
of the proposed interconnection. The system impact study is a more
detailed assessment of the effect the interconnection would have on
the Transmission Provider's electric system and Affected Systems.
The facilities study determines what modifications to the
Transmission Provider's electric system are needed, including the
detailed costs and scheduled completion dates for these
modifications. Order No. 2006 at P 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rehearing Requests
20. Southern Company asserts that the SGIP does not give the
Transmission Provider enough time to perform the interconnection
studies, especially if it must evaluate Interconnection Requests for
numerous generators at one time.
21. Small Generator Coalition argues that the Interconnection
Customer should pay for the feasibility study only if the study shows
harm to the Transmission Provider's electric system; otherwise, the
Transmission Provider should pay for the study. Without this allocation
of cost responsibility, the Interconnection Customer could be subject
to unneeded feasibility studies and excessive cost responsibility.
22. SoCal Edison seeks clarification that the Transmission Provider
may restudy when a higher-queued Interconnection Customer drops out of
the queue \23\ or when system conditions change. Southern Company
argues that the SGIP should allow restudy when the size of the
generator or the generator's queue position changes. It notes that the
LGIP permits restudy for Large Generating Facilities, and argues that
the Commission has not provided a strong rationale for permitting a
restudy for a 21 MW generator under the LGIP, but not for a similarly
situated 19 MW generator under the SGIP. It asserts that a restudy
could benefit the Interconnection Customer at times and, in any event,
that the Transmission Provider should be able to perform a restudy when
necessary to accurately reflect the system conditions and to maintain
the safety and reliability of the electric system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Each Interconnection Request is assigned a Queue Position
that is based upon the date and time of receipt of the valid
Interconnection Request by the Transmission Provider. The Queue
Position determines the order of performing interconnection studies,
if required, and the Interconnection Customer's cost responsibility
for any Upgrades to the Transmission Provider's electric system.
Order No. 2006 at P 176.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission Conclusion
23. Southern Company repeats the same arguments the Commission
rejected in Order No. 2006. There, the Commission stated that the SGIP
deadlines strike a balance between giving the Transmission Provider
enough time to complete the studies and ensuring that the Small
Generating Facility can be interconnected within a reasonable time.\24\
We see no reason to change that position here. We also note that the
deadlines were developed with both Interconnection Customer and
Transmission Provider stakeholder input, and thus represent a balancing
of their diverse interests. Furthermore, if a far greater than normal
number of Interconnection Requests temporarily overwhelms the
Transmission Provider's resources for processing Interconnection
Requests, the Parties can work under SGIP section 4.1 to set a new
deadline and log the reasons for the change in the records the
Transmission Provider maintains under SGIP section 4.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Order No. 2006 at P 192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. Small Generator Coalition repeats its earlier argument that the
Transmission Provider should pay for the feasibility study only if the
study shows no adverse impact, and the Interconnection Customer should
pay if it does. The Commission rejected this argument in Order No. 2006
and we deny this request for those same reasons.\25\ To repeat, the
[[Page 71764]]
Interconnection Customer should pay for all interconnection studies,
regardless of the conclusions reached.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Id. at P 187.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. Finally, there is no reason to reverse the prohibition in Order
No. 2006 against the restudy of Small Generating Facility
interconnections.\26\ The very purpose of the SGIP and SGIA is to
expedite interconnections of Small Generating Facilities by removing
unnecessary delays wherever possible. If the SGIP timelines are
respected and Small Generators are interconnected promptly, there
should be no need for restudy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Id. at P 193.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. System Impact Study (SGIP Section 3.4)--In Order No. 2006, the
Commission ruled that the Interconnection Request should be evaluated
in the system impact study based on the Small Generating Facility's
maximum rated capacity because using anything less than the maximum
rated capacity would not ensure that proper protective equipment is
designed and installed, and the safety and reliability of the
Transmission Provider's electric system could be jeopardized.
Rehearing Request
27. Small Generator Coalition argues that using the maximum rated
capacity of the Small Generating Facility is appropriate for the fault
study, but not for the power flow analysis.\27\ This is because the
Small Generating Facility usually has a dedicated load that it will
serve, and it will never send the full amount of power that it is
capable of generating to the Transmission Provider's electric system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ The fault study (also called a short circuit analysis) and
power flow analysis are performed in the course of the system impact
study. SGIP Attachment 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission Conclusion
28. The Commission examined the issue of evaluating the Small
Generating Facility using less than its maximum rated capacity at great
length in Order No. 2006.\28\ The Commission rejected arguments made by
commenters that the evaluation should be based on less that the Small
Generating Facility's maximum rated capacity, including Small Generator
Coalition's proposed set of tests that could be used to determine
whether these kinds of configurations jeopardize safety and
reliability. Small Generator Coalition does not convince us to change
that decision here and we, accordingly, deny rehearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Order No. 2006 at P 79-86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. Tender of the Interconnection Agreement (SGIP Sections 3.5 and
4.8)--SGIP section 3.5.7 directs the Transmission Provider to present
the Interconnection Customer with an executable SGIA no later than five
Business Days after the facilities study is complete and the
Interconnection Customer agrees to pay for the Interconnection
Facilities and Upgrades \29\ identified in the facilities study. Under
SGIP section 4.8, the Interconnection Customer has 30 Business Days to
execute and return the SGIA to the Transmission Provider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Interconnection Facilities include all facilities and
equipment between the Small Generating Facility and the Point of
Interconnection, including any modification, additions or upgrades
that are necessary to physically and electrically interconnect the
Small Generating Facility with the Transmission Provider's
Transmission System. Upgrades are the required additions and
modifications to the Transmission Provider's Transmission System at
or beyond the Point of Interconnection. SGIP Attachment 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rehearing Request
30. SoCal Edison complains that five Business Days to prepare,
review, and transmit an executable interconnection agreement to the
Interconnection Customer is not enough time. According to SoCal Edison,
there is no rationale for giving the Interconnection Customer six times
as much time to sign and return the agreement as the Transmission
Provider has to prepare it. It proposes that the Transmission Provider
be given 20 Business Days to tender the executable SGIA to the
Interconnection Customer.
31. SoCal Edison also complains that SGIP section 3.5.7 has no
deadline for the Interconnection Customer to agree to pay for the
Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades. It notes that the
Transmission Provider may not tender the executable SGIA to the
Interconnection Customer until the latter so agrees. According to SoCal
Edison, the Interconnection Customer could withhold agreeing to pay for
the Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades and keep its place
in the queue indefinitely at the expense of lower-queued generators.
SoCal Edison suggests that the Interconnection Customer be given 15
Business Days to (1) agree to pay for the Interconnection Facilities
and Upgrades, (2) withdraw the Interconnection Request, or (3) ask the
Transmission Provider to tender an unexecuted interconnection agreement
with the Commission. In the alternative, the Commission should clarify
that the Transmission Provider may develop consistent and
nondiscriminatory internal policies to prevent stalling on the part of
the Interconnection Customer.
Commission Conclusion
32. We deny SoCal Edison's request to give the Transmission
Provider additional time to tender an executable SGIA to the
Interconnection Customer. It offers no explanation why a Transmission
Provider cannot meet the deadline. In addition, the SGIA is a
standardized document that only requires Attachments 2 through 6 to be
completed before it is tendered to the Interconnection Customer. The
information required in those attachments is readily available, being
contained in the Interconnection Request and the recently-completed
interconnection studies.
33. We also decline to establish a deadline for the Interconnection
Customer to agree to pay for the Interconnection Facilities and Network
Upgrades, withdraw its Interconnection Request, or ask that the
unexecuted SGIA be filed with the Commission. While the Interconnection
Customer could purposefully withhold its agreement to pay for the
facilities as SoCal Edison hypothesizes, it is in the Interconnection
Customer's best interests to get its project up and running as soon as
possible. However, more importantly, once the facilities study is
complete and the costs of the Interconnection Facilities and Upgrades
are known, the Interconnection Customer needs time to evaluate the
study results and finalize any necessary financing arrangements.
Nonetheless, we expect the Parties to act in good faith during this
phase of the interconnection process. If either Party believes that the
interconnection process is not moving forward within a reasonable time
during this waiting period, it may initiate dispute resolution or file
a complaint with the Commission. In addition, the Transmission Provider
may file the interconnection agreement in unexecuted form with the
Commission, explaining that it was unable to obtain the Interconnection
Customer's agreement to pay for the Interconnection Facilities and
Upgrades.
C. Issues Related to the Small Generator Interconnection Agreement
34. Reactive Power (SGIA Article 1.8)--SGIA article 1.8.1 requires
that, unless the Transmission Provider has established different
requirements that apply to all similarly situated generators in the
control area on a comparable basis, the Small Generating Facility shall
be designed to maintain a composite power delivery at continuous rated
power output at the Point of Interconnection at a power factor within
the range of 0.95 leading to 0.95 lagging.
[[Page 71765]]
The requirement that Small Generating Facilities be designed to meet
this reactive power requirement does not apply to wind generators.
Rehearing Requests
35. NRECA states that exempting wind generators from the SGIA's
reactive power requirement inappropriately shifts the burden of
preserving the reliability of the electric system to the Transmission
Provider. It notes that Order No. 661 \30\ imposes the same reactive
power requirements on wind powered Large Generating Facilities as
conventional Large Generating Facilities, if the Transmission Provider
demonstrates that reactive power capability is necessary. NRECA argues
that the provisions of Order No. 661 should also apply to Small
Generating Facilities. Unless the SGIA is so revised, the reactive
power requirement does not apply to a 19 MW wind generator subject to
the SGIA, whereas a slightly larger 21 MW wind generator subject to the
Order No. 661 does have such a requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Interconnection for Wind Energy, Order No. 661, 70 FR 34993
(Jun. 16, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,186 (2005) (Order No.
661), reh'g pending.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. SoCal Edison also argues that wind powered Small Generating
Facilities should have to supply reactive power. It argues that the
Commission failed to consider (1) the aggregate reactive power effects
of many wind-powered Small Generating Facilities interconnected in one
area (e.g., a ``wind farm'') and (2) the effect a wind powered Small
Generating Facility may have on a distribution system, which consists
of low voltage lines.
Commission Conclusion
37. SGIA article 1.8.1 does not endanger reliability or shift the
burden of preserving the reliability of the electric system from the
Interconnection Customer to the Transmission Provider. This provision
only addresses whether the Small Generating Facility itself must be
designed to provide reactive power within a certain band. As noted in
Order No. 661, ``conventional generators inherently provide reactive
power, whereas most induction-type generators used by wind plants
currently can only provide reactive power through the addition of
external devices.'' \31\ Since conventional generators can normally
provide reactive power as a matter of course, article 1.8.1 does not
impose any additional requirements on them. However, since wind-powered
Small Generating Facilities usually cannot provide reactive power,
article 1.8.1 does not impose this additional burden on them. This is
consistent with the approach taken by the Commission in Order No. 661
for Large Generating Facilities.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Order No. 661 at n. 27.
\32\ Id. at P 50-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. The provisions of SGIA article 1.8.1 notwithstanding, the SGIP
still requires the Interconnection Customer to mitigate any adverse
safety and reliability effects its Small Generating Facility may have
on the Transmission Provider's Transmission System. The Small
Generating Facility (whether wind-powered or not) must still pass
either the SGIP's Study Process or technical screens before
interconnecting. If additional facilities are needed to safely
interconnect the Small Generating Facility with the Transmission
Provider's electric system, whether due to safety or reliability
(including reactive power) reasons, the Transmission Provider shall
identify them and assign costs as specified in SGIA articles 4 and 5.
This clarification responds to SoCal Edison's and NRECA's concerns.
39. Equipment Testing and Inspection (SGIA Article 2.1)--Under SGIA
article 2.1, the Interconnection Customer shall test its Small
Generating Facility and Interconnection Facilities before
interconnection. The Transmission Provider may, at its own expense,
send qualified personnel to observe the testing.
Rehearing Request
40. Southern Company claims that the Transmission Provider must be
allowed to witness the testing of the Generating Facility and
Interconnection Facilities, and argues that the Interconnection
Customer should reimburse the Transmission Provider for its cost of
witnessing testing; otherwise, those expenses will be subsidized by the
Transmission Provider's other customers.
Commission Conclusion
41. The SGIA provides that the Transmission Provider and the
Interconnection Customer shall each be responsible for their own staff,
equipment, and other costs associated with testing. The witnessing of
testing is at the option of the Transmission Provider. While Southern
Company may routinely witness such tests in its system, other
Transmission Providers may review test reports at minimal cost without
being actually present for the testing itself. We conclude that the
witnessing of testing, if deemed necessary, is a routine responsibility
of the Transmission Provider, and as such is an appropriate cost to be
borne by all users of the Transmission System.\33\ We deny Southern
Company's request for rehearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See also Order No. 2003-A at P 291.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
42. Authorization Required Prior to Parallel Operation (SGIA
Article 2.2)--SGIA article 2.2 requires the Interconnection Customer to
follow all applicable parallel operation requirements before operating
its Small Generating Facility in parallel with the Transmission
Provider's Transmission System. The Transmission Provider is to list
all parallel operating requirements in SGIA Attachment 5 and notify the
Interconnection Customer of any changes to those requirements as soon
as they are known. This provision also requires the Transmission
Provider to give the Interconnection Customer written approval before
the Small Generating Facility may begin parallel operations.
Rehearing Request
43. Southern Company argues that the standards for parallel
operation should be contained in the SGIA. Also, the Transmission
Provider should not have to authorize the Small Generating Facility to
begin operations without assurance that the Interconnection Customer
has actually met those requirements. Southern Company notes that SGIA
article 2.2.2 requires only that the Interconnection Customer notify
the Transmission Provider that it has complied with the parallel
operation requirements. It argues that the Transmission Provider should
be allowed to reasonably confirm for itself that all the requirements
have been met before it has to authorize operations.
Commission Conclusion
44. We agree with Southern Company that all parallel operation
requirements should be listed in the SGIA when practicable, and article
2.2.1 already states that the Transmission Provider ``shall use
Reasonable Efforts to list applicable parallel operation requirements
in Attachment 5 of this Agreement.'' Moreover, SGIA Attachment 5
specifies that the Transmission Provider ``shall also provide
requirements that must be met by the Interconnection Customer prior to
initiating parallel operation with the Transmission Provider's
Transmission System.'' We believe that the SGIA already addresses
Southern Company's concerns.
45. Southern Company also argues that having the Interconnection
Customer notify the Transmission
[[Page 71766]]
Provider that its Small Generating Facility complies with the parallel
operation requirements is inadequate; Southern Company wants to be able
to independently confirm that the requirements have been met. We do not
find that necessary. If the Transmission Provider has complied with the
SGIA, Attachment 5 should contain the applicable parallel operation
requirements, and they are thus clearly known to all Parties. The
Interconnection Customer's statement that it has complied is
sufficient. Once notified, the Transmission Provider shall not
unreasonably withhold, condition, or delay authorization for the Small
Generating Facility to operate in parallel.
46. Termination (SGIA Article 3.3)--SGIA article 3.3.3 provides
that upon termination of the SGIA, the Small Generating Facility shall
be disconnected from the Transmission Provider's Transmission System.
It also provides that neither Party is relieved of its liabilities and
obligations, owed or continuing at the time of the termination.
Rehearing Request
47. Southern Company argues that the SGIA should allow the
Transmission Provider to permanently disconnect the Small Generating
Facility if there is a termination. The Interconnection Customer should
also be held responsible for all reasonable expenses the Transmission
Provider incurs when permanently disconnecting the Small Generating
Facility.
Commission Conclusion
48. SGIA article 3.3.3 already allows the Transmission Provider to
permanently disconnect the Small Generating Facility upon termination.
This provision also states that termination does not relieve either
Party of liabilities and obligations upon termination. However,
Southern Company's petition highlights an oversight in the drafting of
article 3.3. Accordingly, we are including a provision, consistent with
article 2.5 of the LGIA, that provides that all disconnection costs are
to be borne by the terminating Party, unless the termination results
from the non-terminating Party's Default of the SGIA, or the non-
terminating Party otherwise is responsible for the disconnection costs
under the SGIA. This provision precludes cost recovery when the
Transmission Provider causes the agreement to be terminated, because in
those instances it may be appropriate for the Transmission Provider to
bear some or all of the costs of disconnection. This responds to
Southern Company's concern.
49. Temporary Disconnection--Reconnection (SGIA Article 3.4.6)--
SGIA article 3.4.6 requires the Parties to cooperate with one another
to restore the Small Generating Facility, the Interconnection
Facilities, and the Transmission Provider's Transmission System to
normal operation as soon as reasonably practicable following a
temporary disconnection.
Rehearing Request
50. Southern Company argues that this provision should state that
the Small Generating Facility only has to be reconnected once the
problem causing the disconnection has been fixed.
Commission Conclusion
51. The SGIA requires the Parties to cooperate to restore the Small
Generating Facility, as well as other facilities, to normal operation
as soon as reasonably practicable. We do not see the provision as
ambiguous. To clarify, however, the Transmission Provider is required
to reconnect the Small Generating Facility after a temporary
disconnection as soon as it can be reconnected safely and reliably
consistent with system conditions and Good Utility Practice.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ SGIA article 1.5.3 already requires the Transmission
Provider to construct, operate, and maintain its Transmission System
and Interconnection Facilities in accordance with the SGIA and with
Good Utility Practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
52. Cost Responsibility (SGIA Articles 4 and 5)--Order No. 2006
adopts the same cost responsibility policy for Small Generator
interconnections as the Commission did for Large Generator
interconnections in Order No. 2003. Under that policy, the costs of
Interconnection Facilities and Distribution Upgrades are directly
assigned to the Interconnection Customer. In addition, if the
Transmission Provider is a non-independent entity, such as a vertically
integrated utility, the Interconnection Customer initially funds the
cost of any required Network Upgrades (i.e., Upgrades to the
Transmission System at or beyond the Point of Interconnection) and it
is then reimbursed for this upfront payment by the Transmission
Provider. However, we expect that, for most interconnections of Small
Generating Facilities, there will be no Network Upgrades. This policy
grants greater flexibility in assigning cost responsibility if the
Transmission Provider is an independent entity such as an RTO or ISO.
Rehearing Requests
53. North Carolina Commission states that the Commission erred by
requiring a non-independent Transmission Provider to ``socialize''
Network Upgrades while allowing an RTO or ISO to use participant
funding. The Commission should adopt a ``but for'' policy for both
independent and non-independent Transmission Providers to ensure that
the costs of Upgrades and expansions that are necessary to support new
loads or demands on the Transmission Provider's Transmission System are
borne by those causing the Upgrade or expansion to be undertaken. It
asks that participant funding, including the use of a ``but for''
approach, not be limited to only RTOs or ISOs. North Carolina
Commission states that, if the Commission is concerned that the cost
allocation decisions of a non-independent entity could be unfair or
subjective, any unfairness or subjectivity can be cured by the
opportunity for review of the allocation process and its results by an
independent third party, such as the Commission, without the
involvement of an RTO or ISO.
54. Southern Company raises a number of issues that the Commission
has addressed in other proceedings. Specifically, Southern Company
states as follows: the ``at or beyond'' test has been vacated by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals \35\ and the Commission has failed to
justify its change in policy; the Commission's cost responsibility
policy results in cost socialization and thus violates the system-wide
benefit test, cost causation principles and the Energy Policy Act of
1992, and it will cause inefficiencies in generator siting and
transmission system expansion, contrary to Commission precedent and the
Energy Policy Act of 1992; unused transmission credits should not be
subject to refund after twenty years; the Interconnection Customer
should receive transmission credits only when transmission service is
taken from the Small Generating Facility itself; the Interconnection
Customer should not receive transmission credits for tax gross-up or
other tax-related payments; the Interconnection Customer should not be
entitled to receive interest on the costs of Network Upgrades; the
Commission's ``higher of'' policy does not prevent native load
customers from subsidizing the Interconnection Customer; an Affected
System \36\ should
[[Page 71767]]
not have to provide credits when there is no system benefit; and Order
No. 2006 unlawfully discriminates against Transmission Providers and
their customers that are not part of an RTO or ISO. Also, Southern
Company argues that, to protect other customers and to place the
Interconnection Customer appropriately at risk if the Small Generating
Facility does not achieve commercial operation or retires early, the
Interconnection Customer should be responsible for all operation,
maintenance, and other expenses associated with the facilities that are
required to accommodate the interconnection. At a minimum, the
Interconnection Customer should pay the operation and maintenance
expenses associated with these facilities until their costs of
construction are reflected in transmission rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Entergy Services, Inc. v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1240, 1252 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
\36\ An Affected System is an electric system other than the
Transmission Provider's Transmission System that may be affected by
the proposed interconnection. SGIP Attachment 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
55. Small Generator Coalition asks the Commission to provide that
an Interconnection Customer willing to interconnect its Small
Generating Facility ahead of a higher-queued applicant may do so
without paying system upgrade costs until the higher-queued applicant's
interconnection actually makes the system upgrades necessary. The Final
Rule should not let the Transmission Provider demand system upgrade
costs from the Interconnection Customer when the interconnection is
made based on a prior claim to system transfer capacity by a generator
that is higher in the queue. Small Generator Coalition also asks the
Commission to provide that when the facilities study identifies the
Upgrades needed to interconnect the Small Generating Facility, the
Transmission Provider must agree to a not-to-exceed estimate of those
costs, subject if necessary to an inflation adjustment, so that the
Interconnection Customer will have financial certainty for its project.
This keeps the Transmission Provider from using its leverage to extract
unreasonable payments when the Upgrades are not constructed until years
after the actual interconnection.
56. Small Generator Coalition also says that an Interconnection
Customer interconnecting its Small Generating Facility with the
Transmission Provider's Distribution System should have the same
protection against paying for Upgrades that benefit others that it
would have if it interconnected with the Transmission System. The costs
of Upgrades should be assigned based on the benefits from those
Upgrades, regardless of whether the portion of the system on which the
Upgrades are made is deemed to be transmission or distribution. Small
Generator Coalition argues that, as with Network Upgrades, Distribution
Upgrades may offer benefits to other customers or to the Transmission
Provider's electric system.
57. SoCal Edison notes that, in Order No. 2003-B, the Commission
held: ``In the case of an Affected System that is jointly owned, it is
the responsibility of the Affected System Operator to provide the
credits and seek reimbursement for any amounts that it believes it is
owed by the other owners.'' \37\ SoCal Edison states that it sought
rehearing on this point in the Large Generator Interconnection
proceeding. Although the Commission did not directly address this issue
in Order No. 2006, SoCal Edison seeks clarification that the Commission
did not intend that the operator of a jointly-owned Affected System
must pay transmission credits for the portions of the facilities that
it does not own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Order No. 2003-B at P 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission Conclusion
58. The Commission addressed North Carolina Commission's arguments
in Order Nos. 2003 and 2003-A.\38\ In the latter order, the Commission
explained that it is not unduly discriminatory to let an independent
Transmission Provider propose innovative cost recovery methods while
requiring a non-independent Transmission Provider to continue to adhere
to the Commission's traditional cost responsibility policy. This
different treatment is fair because the two types of Transmission
Provider are not similarly situated. As the Commission explained, when
implemented by an independent Transmission Provider that does not have
an incentive to discourage new generation by competitors, new cost
recovery methods such as participant funding can yield efficient
competitive results. However, because of their inherent subjectivity,
new approaches such as participant funding could allow a non-
independent Transmission Provider to frustrate the development of new
generating facilities that could compete with its own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Order No. 2003 at P 695-703 and Order No. 2003-A at P 587
and 691-697.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
59. The Commission addressed all of the issues raised by Southern
Company in the Large Generator Interconnection proceeding and will not
repeat those conclusions here.\39\ We also note that the Commission
recently clarified its policy on using the ``at or beyond'' test to
determine cost responsibility for Interconnection Facilities and
Network Upgrades.\40\ Finally, the Commission addressed the recovery of
operation and maintenance (O&M) and related expenses in Order Nos.
2003-A and 2006.\41\ In the latter order, the Commission noted that the
Transmission Provider may propose, under FPA section 205,\42\ a rate to
recover from the Interconnection Customer an appropriate share of O&M
costs associated with Interconnection Facilities and Distribution
Upgrades. However, it has long been the Commission's policy that O&M
costs associated with Network Upgrades shall not be directly assigned
to the Interconnection Customer, because Network Upgrades are part of
the integrated transmission system from which all transmission users
benefit.\43\ Although Southern Company describes scenarios where native
load and other transmission customers could be placed at risk for the
recovery of these costs, such scenarios are unlikely. And, even if they
do occur, the cost to native load and other transmission customers
would be de minimis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See, in general, Order No. 2003 at P 683-750, Order No.
2003-A at P 341 and P 566-697, Order No. 2003-B at P 15-57 and P
103-105, and Order No. 2003-C at P 6-27.
\40\ Nevada Power Company, Order on Rehearing, 113 FERC ] 61,007
(2005).
\41\ See Order No. 2003-A at P 424 and Order No. 2006 at P 453-
454.
\42\ 16 U.S.C. 824d (2000); see also 18 CFR 35.12 (2005).
\43\ Order No. 2006 at P 453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
60. North Carolina Commission also contends that the
Interconnection Customer is protected from unfair conduct because it
has recourse to the Commission. However, as the Commission stated in
Order No. 2003-A,\44\ the availability of evidentiary proceedings,
case-by-case adjudication of Interconnection Requests, or other
procedures does not ensure that interconnections are completed in a
timely manner by non-independent Transmission Providers. Administrative
review of complex technical matters is costly and time-consuming. In
today's competitive power market environment, allowing a Transmission
Provider that is also a competitor in the wholesale power market to use
the administrative process to delay competitive entry, or to propose
subjective and potentially discriminatory policies, is unacceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Order No. 2003-A at P 694.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
61. Small Generator Coalition seeks assurance that an
Interconnection Customer willing to interconnect its Small Generating
Facility ahead of a higher-queued applicant may do so without paying
system upgrade costs until the higher-queued applicant's
interconnection actually makes the
[[Page 71768]]
system upgrades necessary. The Commission addressed this issue in Order
No. 2003-A.\45\ Consistent with that ruling, the procedure will operate
as follows. If the lower-queued Interconnection Customer chooses an in-
service date for its Small Generating Facility that is earlier than
that of the higher-queued Interconnection Customer, the former must be
allowed to proceed using the capacity earmarked for the latter, when
possible. When the higher-queued Interconnection Customer is ready to
proceed, required Network Upgrades would have to be built, and at that
time the lower-queued Interconnection Customer would have to pay its
share of the costs. The period during which the lower-queued
Interconnection Customer receives transmission credits from the
Transmission Provider also begins at the same time. However, if the
higher-queued Interconnection Customer ultimately drops out of the
queue, then some of the Network Upgrades would not have to be built.
This would eliminate, at least in part, the need for funding by the
lower-queued Interconnection Customer and for subsequent payment of
transmission credits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Id. at P 621-622.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
62. Small Generator Coalition also proposes that the Transmission
Provider commit to a not-to-exceed estimate of Upgrade costs. We deny
this request. A basic tenet of the Commission's policy for the recovery
of interconnection costs is that the Interconnection Customer pays the
actual costs of Interconnection Facilities and Distribution Upgrades
and initially funds the cost of Network Upgrades. However, we recognize
that postponing the construction of Upgrades, and the possibility that
a generator higher in the queue could drop out, can create uncertainty
for the Interconnection Customer. Therefore, as in the Large Generator
Interconnection proceeding,\46\ we are directing the Transmission
Provider to tell the Interconnection Customer its maximum possible
funding exposure when the Transmission Provider tenders the SGIA. That
estimate shall include the costs of Upgrades that are reasonably
allocable to the Interconnection Customer at the time the estimate is
made, and the costs of any Upgrades not yet constructed that were
assumed in the interconnection studies for the Interconnection Customer
but are, at the time of the estimate, an obligation of an entity other
than the Interconnection Customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Id. at P 320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
63. Small Generator Coalition argues that Distribution Upgrades may
offer benefits to other customers or to the Transmission Provider's
electric system that should be reflected by a contribution from other
customers or the Transmission Provider toward the costs of the
Upgrades. We disagree for several reasons. First, as stated in Order
No. 2003, distribution facilities typically deliver electricity to
particular localities, and do not serve a bulk delivery service for the
entire system, as is the case for transmission facilities.\47\ Second,
implementing a more complicated cost allocation policy for Distribution
Upgrades would only slow interconnection while providing little
financial benefit to the Interconnection Customer. Third, commenters
suggest no reason why Small Generating Facilities and Large Generating
Facilities should be treated differently on this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Order No. 2003 at P 697.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
64. In response to SoCal Edison's request, we clarify that the
operator of a jointly-owned Affected System does not have to pay
credits for the portion of the facilities that it does not own. The
Commission addressed this issue in Order No. 2003-C,\48\ where it
stated that the operator's responsibility for flowing through
transmission credits and reimbursing the Interconnection Customer for
its upfront payment does not extend beyond the Affected System
operator's normal duties as a tariff administrator. We note, of course,
that this responsibility extends only to the operator and owners of a
jointly-owned system that (1) are subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction and (2) have financial responsibility under their own
Commission-regulated tariffs to provide transmission credits and final
reimbursement to the Interconnection Customer for the upfront payments
they have received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Order No. 2003-C at P 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
65. Billing and Payment Procedures and Final Accounting (SGIA
Article 6.1)--SGIA article 6.1.2 requires the Transmission Provider to
give the Interconnection Customer a final accounting report of the
actual construction costs of the Interconnection Facilities and
Upgrades within three months of their completion.
Rehearing Request
66. SoCal Edison argues that the Transmission Provider should have
at least six months (and preferably 12 months) to prepare the final
accounting report because some vendors do not supply invoices until
several months after the work is completed. LGIA article 12.2, in
contrast, gives the Transmission Provider six months to prepare a final
cost accounting for a Large Generating Facility. SoCal Edison contends
that the final accounting deadline for all size projects should be the
same.
Commission Conclusion
67. SGIA article 6.1 requires the Transmission Provider to bill the
Interconnection Customer on a monthly basis as costs are incurred, or
as otherwise agreed to by the Parties, and the Interconnection Customer
has 30 calendar days to pay the bill. SoCal Edison does not claim that
it cannot process vendor invoices on a monthly basis, and we see no
reason why the final accounting should be especially difficult.
However, we do recognize that a vendor may, infrequently, cause the
final accounting report to be delayed. As with all other actions under
the SGIA, we expect the Transmission Provider to use Reasonable Efforts
to obtain timely invoices from its vendors. When the delay is outside
the Transmission Provider's control, however, the Parties may develop a
revised schedule for that portion of the final accounting that is still
outstanding. Thus, there is no need to extend the deadline for
submitting all final accounting reports to accommodate the occasional
delay.
68. Financial Security Arrangements (SGIA Article 6.3)--SGIA
article 6.3 requires the Interconnection Customer to provide the
Transmission Provider with appropriate financial security before the
Transmission Provider begins construction. Such security for payment
shall be in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of constructing,
designing, procuring, and installing the applicable portion of the
Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities and Upgrades and
shall be reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis for payments made to the
Transmission Provider under the SGIA during its term.
Rehearing Request
69. Southern Company requests that SGIA article 6.3 specify that
the Interconnection Customer not just provide security, but maintain it
for the duration of the Interconnection Agreement. Additionally, the
SGIA should not require the Transmission Provider to reduce the
required security until 90 days after the Transmission Provider
receives payment. This, Southern Company argues, ``is necessary to
reflect the commercial reality that payments have not really been
`made' to the transmission provider * * * until such time as such
[[Page 71769]]
payments are no longer subject to being set aside under the Bankruptcy
Code.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Southern Company at 56-57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission Conclusion
70. SGIA article 6.3.2 states that any letter of credit or surety
bond provided by the Interconnection Customer ``specify a reasonable
expiration date.'' Thus, Southern Company's concern that the
Interconnection Customer would not have to maintain the security is
misplaced, as the article requires that ``sufficient'' security be
maintained for a ``reasonable'' period of time.\50\ Article 6.3
requires that the security provided by the Interconnection Customer be
reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis for payment made to the
Transmission Provider. The Interconnection Customer does not have to
provide security over the life of the SGIA (which automatically renews
itself indefinitely); instead, the Interconnection Customer need only
provide security until it pays off its obligations to the Transmission
Provider.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See also Order No. 2003-B at P 125.
\51\ See Order No. 2003 at P 592-600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
71. We are also not convinced that the Transmission Provider should
be able to delay reducing the Interconnection Customer's security to
avoid the risk posed by a bankruptcy court deciding that a payment to
the Transmission Provider was ``preferential'' or otherwise improper.
The risk to the Transmission Provider is outweighed by the additional
burden placed on the Interconnection Customer.
72. Assignment (SGIA Article 7.1)--SGIA article 7.1 allows either
Party to assign the SGIA to a third party after giving the non-
assigning Party notice and opportunity to object. Additionally, article
7.1.1 allows assignment without the consent of the non-assigning Party
if the assignee has a higher credit rating and the legal authority and
operational ability to carry out the interconnection.
Request for Rehearing
73. Southern Company proposes that the Interconnection Customer be
allowed to assign the SGIA as collateral only with the written consent
of the Transmission Provider. Otherwise, an assignee or purchaser in
foreclosure could assume the rights under the agreement without also
assuming the obligations. Southern Company also argues that without
approval by the Transmission Provider, the assignee would not have to
cure any existing defaults. It urges limiting assignment to ``eligible
customers'' who can carry out the Interconnection Customer's
obligations under the SGIA.
74. Southern Company argues that the Transmission Provider should
be indemnified by the Interconnection Customer and the Interconnection
Customer's assignee for any costs or expenses associated with the
assignment.
75. Southern Company also requests clarification of the conditions
under which the Transmission Provider must recognize foreclosure rights
and assignments, including the possibility of multiple assignments. It
notes that the Uniform Commercial Code does not cover such a situation.
The SGIA should specify that the Transmission Provider ``not hav[e]
received a contrary court order or notice of an unresolved contrary
claim'' before being required to accept an assignment. It also asks
that the Transmission Provider be able to stop cooperating with the
assignee if the Transmission Provider receives a contrary court order
or notice of unresolved claim.
76. Finally, Southern Company proposes that the SGIA require the
Interconnection Customer to promptly notify the Transmission Provider
of any assignment.
Commission Conclusion
77. Southern Company argues that the Interconnection Customer
should obtain the Transmission Provider's consent before assigning its
rights under the SGIA as security. As explained in Order No. 2003-A for
Large Generating Facilities, such assignments are permitted to allow
the Interconnection Customer to better secure financing because the
Transmission Provider faces little to no risk from an assignment to an
affiliate having an equal or superior credit rating.\52\ And, Southern
Company has not convinced us that the rules governing assignments of
interconnection agreements should be stricter for Small Generating
Facilities than for Large Generating Facilities. In addition, SGIA
article 7.1 states that the assignee is responsible for meeting the
same financial, credit, and insurance obligations as the
Interconnection Customer. We reject Southern Company's request that
assignments be limited to ``eligible customers'' because SGIA article
7.1 already requires that an assignee have the ``legal authority and
operational ability'' to carry out the interconnection agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ See Order No. 2003-A at P 672-675.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
78. As to Southern Company's issue of competing assignments or
court orders regarding the assignment, the SGIA specifies that the laws
of the state in which the Point of Interconnection is located govern,
so any contractual dispute regarding foreclosure or assignment is to be
settled under state contract law.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ See SGIA article 12.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
79. Finally, Southern Company notes that SGIA article 7.1 does not
require the assigning Party to notify the other Party of an assignment
under certain circumstances. We agree that the assigning Party should
notify the other Party of any assignment and are so revising SGIA
article 7.1.1. This provision is also consistent with LGIA article
19.1.
80. Insurance (SGIA Article 8)--SGIA article 8.1 requires the
Interconnection Customer to obtain and maintain enough general
liability insurance to insure against all reasonably foreseeable direct
liabilities, given the type of equipment being used.
Rehearing Requests
81. Southern Company argues that the Interconnection Customer
should have to maintain reasonable amounts of general liability,
hazard, employer's liability, and worker's compensation insurance. It
notes that several states where it operates do not require that
businesses maintain such types of insurance.
82. Small Generator Coalition points out that section 7.0 of the 10
kW Inverter-Based Terms and Conditions Document,\54\ which requires the
Parties to maintain commercially reasonable amounts of insurance, is
inconsistent with Order No. 2006.\55\ That order states that the
Parties will follow all applicable insurance requirements imposed by
the state where the Point of Interconnection is located.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ The agreement is contained in Attachment 5 to the SGIP.
\55\ Order No. 2006 at P 334.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission Conclusion
83. The SGIA's insurance requirements are sufficient to protect the
interests of the Transmission Provider. General liability insurance is
the broadest type of insurance and supplements any insurance that may
be mandated by state law. Additionally, not all types of insurance are
required for all Small Generating Facilities. For instance, some
facilities may not have any employees and, thus, not require certain
types of insurance such as worker's compensation. Finally, we agree
that section 7.0 of the 10 kW Inverter-Based Interconnection Agreement
is inconsistent with Order No. 2006, and are amending that provision
accordingly.
[[Page 71770]]
84. Generator Balancing Requirements--The SGIA does not include a
separate generator balancing service provision.
Comment
85. Southern Company argues that the SGIA should contain a
generating balancing service provision. In the alternative, the
Commission should clarify that the Transmission Provider may require
the Interconnection Customer to enter into a generator balancing
service agreement that is separate from the SGIA.
Commission Conclusion
86. We are not including a generator balancing provision in the
SGIA for the reasons set forth in Order Nos. 2003-B and 2006.\56\ There
is no need to repeat those conclusions here. However, the Transmission
Provider may include a provision for generator balancing service
arrangements in individual interconnection agreements. Such provisions
should be tailored to the Parties' specific standards and
circumstances, and are subject to Commission approval. Regarding
Southern Company's alternative request, we clarify that the
Transmission Provider may incorporate an Interconnection Customer's
balancing service arrangement in a separate agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Order No. 2003-B at P 74-75 and Order No. 2006 at P 390.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Other Significant Issues
87. Commission Jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act--The
Commission's assertion of jurisdiction in Order No. 2006 is identical
to the jurisdiction asserted in Order Nos. 2003 and 888.\57\ Order No.
2006 applies to interconnections with a Transmission Provider's
facilities that are subject to the Transmission Provider's OATT at the
time the interconnection is requested and that are for the purpose of
facilitating a jurisdictional wholesale sale of electricity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,036 (1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, 62 FR 12274 (Mar.
14, 1997), FERC Stats. & Regs. & 31,048 (1997), order on reh'g,
Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ] 61,248 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No.
888-C, 82 FERC ] 61,046 (1998), aff'd in part sub nom. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(TAPS v. FERC), aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requests for Rehearing
88. Several petitioners \58\ argue that the Commission is
improperly asserting jurisdiction over ``local distribution''
facilities in violation of the FPA. They point to both Detroit Edison
\59\ and FPA section 201 for support. Con Edison and CT DPUC argue that
since their states have rules for interconnecting small generators with
distribution systems, there is no need for federal standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ E.g., Con Edison, CT DPUC, NARUC, North Carolina
Commission, NRECA, and Southern Company.
\59\ Detroit Edison v. FERC, 343 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Detroit Edison).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
89. NARUC argues that it is not always clear whether a particular
facility is covered by an OATT and that a Transmission Provider's
accounting system may not so indicate. NARUC notes that costs for
distribution facilities are generally recovered under the OATT on a
rolled-in basis. It fears that this may lead the Commission to find
that all of a Transmission Provider's distribution facilities are
covered by the OATT. NARUC claims that merely including a facility in
an OATT does not give the Commission jurisdiction over that
facility.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ NARUC cites Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 404
F.3d 459, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Columbia), where the court held that
voluntarily including a particular facility in a tariff does not
automatically give the Commission jurisdiction over that facility
that it would not otherwise have.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
90. Con Edison asserts that Order No. 2006 impermissibly bases
jurisdiction on the ``intent'' of a generator, rather than its actions.
Because jurisdiction can change based on the use of a facility or the
generator's intent, the Parties would not know whether Order No. 2006
applies until after the fact. Con Edison poses a hypothetical case
where a generator intending to sell at wholesale interconnects with a
previously state jurisdictional line under state rules. A second
generator interconnecting with the same line, but not seeking to sell
power at wholesale, would be obliged to interconnect under the
Commission's rules. Thus, Con Edison contends, the generator seeking to
sell at wholesale interconnects under state law, while the generator
seeking to sell at retail would be forced to interconnect under federal
law. Similarly, if the first generator decides not to sell at
wholesale, the second generator would have to interconnect under state
rules, even if it intends to sell at wholesale.
91. Con Edison, NARUC, NRECA, and Southern Company also assert that
Order No. 2006 contradicts the ``seven factor test'' laid out in Order
No. 888 for distinguishing transmission facilities from local
distribution facilities. NRECA argues that jurisdiction over a
wholesale transaction does not confer jurisdiction over the local
distribution facility itself or over an interconnection with such a
facility.
92. Southern Company argues that section FPA 201(a) limits the
Commission's jurisdiction to matters ``which are not subject to
regulation by the States.'' \61\ Since several states have promulgated
rules governing interconnection with local distribution facilities,
Southern Company argues that the Commission cannot do likewise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ 16 U.S.C. 824(a) (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
93. Conversely, Small Generator Coalition and SoCal Edison argue
that the Commission should exercise jurisdiction over all
interconnections for selling power at wholesale and should not limit
application of this rule to facilities covered by an OATT at the time
interconnection service is requested. Small Generator Coalition argues
that the Commission's jurisdiction over a wholesale sale includes
jurisdiction over the interconnection necessary to facilitate the sale.
It proposes that the Commission clarify that if the Transmission
Provider has an OATT, all interconnections made to sell power at
wholesale are subject to Commission jurisdiction, whether or not the
specific facility being interconnected with is jurisdictional or not.
Otherwise, Small Generator Coalition argues, the Transmission Provider
has unfettered discretion to determine which distribution facilities
are covered by its OATT at the time interconnection service is
requested.
Commission Conclusion
94. The Commission's assertion of jurisdiction in Order No. 2006 is
identical to the jurisdiction asserted in Order Nos. 2003 and 888.
There is no intent to expand the jurisdiction of the Commission
in any way; if a facility is not already subject to Commission
jurisdiction at the time interconnection is requested, the Final
Rule will not apply. Thus, only facilities that already are subject
to the Transmission Provider's OATT are covered by this rule.[\62\]
\62\ Order No. 2006 at P 481 (quoting Order No. 2003-A at P
700).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
95. Since the Commission issued Order No. 2006 in May 2005, the
third rehearing of the Large Generator Interconnection final rule,
Order No. 2003-C, was issued. That order further discussed the
Commission's jurisdiction over generator interconnections.\63\ Because
the Commission has addressed
[[Page 71771]]
the scope of its jurisdiction in several orders addressing
interconnection, we need not repeat that discussion here. However,
petitioners raise other issues for the first time that we do address
here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ See Order No. 2003-C at P 51-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
96. Several petitioners suggest that the Commission's exercise of
jurisdiction is contrary to the seven factor test laid out in Order No.
888 to differentiate transmission facilities from local distribution
facilities. Petitioners misapply the seven factor test. As the
Commission has explained, ``[t]he discussion of transmission and
[local] distribution classification (and the use of the seven factor
test) in Order No. 888 was in the context of unbundled retail
transmission service [and] determining which facilities were for the
local distribution segment of unbundled retail services.'' \64\
Contrary to what petitioners suggest, the seven factor test does not
apply to circumstances in which the wholesale sale may trigger
Commission jurisdiction over an interconnection, or is intended for
application in every dispute involving the scope of federal and state
jurisdiction.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Ameren Services Co., 103 FERC ] 61,121 at P 26 (2003); see
also Order No. 888 at 31,771, 31,783-85 and Order No. 888-A at
30,342.
\65\ TAPS v. FERC, 225 F.3d at 695. (``[U]nder Order 888, when a
public utility is engaged in wholesale transmission, FERC has
jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the facility; but when the
public utility is engaged in unbundled retail transmission, the
facts and circumstances [i.e., the seven factor test] will determine
whether the facilities are subject to FERC or state jurisdiction.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
97. NARUC also argues that it may be unclear whether a particular
facility is covered by an OATT. In addressing a similar comment in
Order No. 2003-A, the Commission noted that ``in most cases, there will
be no controversy about whether a facility is under the OATT [and] the
Transmission Provider [shall] make this information available to the
Interconnection Customer during the Scoping Meeting or earlier.'' \66\
Should a disagreement arise over the proper classification of a
facility, the Parties may bring the matter to the Commission's
attention.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ See Order No. 2003-A at P 712.
\67\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
98. NARUC cites Columbia to support its argument that a facility is
not subject to Commission jurisdiction simply because it is covered by
an OATT. While we agree that Columbia concludes that a tariff cannot
confer jurisdiction that is not granted by statute,\68\ this holding
does not require a different conclusion on the applicability of Order
No. 2006. The Commission presumes that a facility available for open
access service under an OATT serves a Commission-jurisdictional
transmission or delivery function. If the Interconnection Customer
seeks to interconnect with a facility that is available for service
under an OATT but that is not required to be under the OATT at the time
the Interconnection Request is submitted, Order No. 2006 does not
apply. We expect that such circumstances will be rare and leave it to
the Parties to bring disagreements about the status of a particular
facility to the Commission for resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ 404 F.3d at 461.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
99. Con Edison is correct that an Interconnection Customer
interconnecting its generator with an electric facility used
exclusively to make retail sales, but not currently available for
transmission service under an OATT, will do so under state
interconnection rules. It does not matter whether the Interconnection
Customer intends to sell power at wholesale or retail. However, Con
Edison appears to misunderstand what would happen if the
Interconnection Customer seeks to interconnect with a facility carrying
both energy sold at wholesale and energy sold at retail and plans to
sell power only at retail. In that case, because there is no wholesale
sale involved, the interconnection would be subject to the state's
rules.
100. Qualifying Facilities--In Order No. 2006, the Commission
stated that it would exercise jurisdiction over all qualifying
facilities (QFs) \69\ in the same manner, regardless of size, as
discussed in Order No. 2003.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ A QF may be either a qualifying small power production
facility or a qualifying cogeneration facility under the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). 16 U.S.C. 824a-3
(2000).
\70\ See Order No. 2003 at P 813-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requests for Rehearing
101. NARUC, supported by Con Edison, argues that the Commission's
assertion of jurisdiction over a QF selling power to an entity other
than the host utility is overly broad in that it extends jurisdiction
over QFs selling power, at wholesale or retail, to someone other than
the host utility. Instead, the Commission should clarify that a QF not
selling at wholesale (other than to the host utility) should
interconnect under state law.
Commission Conclusion
102. NARUC is correct that a QF selling at retail is not eligible
to interconnect under either Order No. 2003 or Order No. 2006. Under
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,\71\ such
interconnections are governed by state law.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ 16 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. (2000).
\72\ See Order No. 2003 at P 813-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
103. Relationship of Order No. 2006 to State Interconnection
Programs--While Order No. 2006 attempted to harmonize its provisions
with existing state programs, the Commission declined to formally
recognize these programs in Order No. 2006.
Rehearing Requests
104. CT DPUC, NARUC, and North Carolina Commission ask the
Commission to grandfather both existing and future state-run
interconnection rules. CT DPUC points to the extensive efforts in
several states to develop and encourage the interconnection of small
generators. It argues that Order No. 2006 could be read as superseding
Connecticut's own small generator interconnection rules. NARUC and the
North Carolina Commission express similar concerns and argue that Order
No. 2006 will encourage forum-shopping and inefficient siting
decisions. They also ask the Commission to clarify that existing
interconnections accomplished under state rules are grandfathered.
Finally, the Commission should grant deference to future state
interconnection rules.
Commission Conclusion
105. Order No. 2006 in no way affects rules adopted by the states
for the interconnection of generators with state-jurisdictional
facilities. We expect that the vast majority of small generator
interconnections will be with state jurisdictional facilities. The
Commission encourages development of state interconnection programs,
and interconnections with state jurisdictional facilities continue to
be governed by state law. However, if an Interconnection Customer seeks
to interconnection with a facility under federal jurisdiction, a state
program cannot displace federal rules for interconnections.
Furthermore, the Commission has attempted to minimize the inconstancies
between federal and state interconnection rules by adopting many of the
provisions suggested by NARUC and other state bodies, and encouraging
the states to consider using the streamlined SGIP and SGIA for their
own use. Finally, we emphasize that Order No. 2006 and this order do
not affect any existing interconnection agreements, whether they were
entered into under state or federal law.
106. Creation of a Safe Harbor for Non-jurisdictional Utilities--In
Order No. 2006, the Commission did not
[[Page 71772]]
create a safe harbor for non-jurisdictional utilities that wish to
interconnect new generation without jeopardizing their non-
jurisdictional status.
Request for Rehearing
107. NRECA repeats here the same request it made in the Large
Generator Interconnection proceeding that the Commission create a safe
harbor to allow non-jurisdictional utilities to avoid the sometimes
cumbersome process of interconnecting new generators under FPA sections
210, 211, and 212. NRECA also points out that many cooperatives are not
``transmitting utilities'' as defined in the FPA and that section 211
only applies to interconnections with ``transmitting utilities.''
Specifically, NRECA asks the Commission to clarify that a cooperative
may settle a section 211 case and agree to provide wheeling services
without that settlement being considered a ``voluntary'' service
offering.
Commission Conclusion
108. As the Commission stated in Order No. 2006, FPA section 211
already allows a non-public utility to safeguard its non-jurisdictional
status. We see no need to create a second method of doing the same
thing. NRECA also asks whether a cooperative may settle a section 211
case and agree to provide wheeling services without that settlement
being considered a ``voluntary'' service offering. That issue is
outside the scope of this rulemaking. In this rulemaking proceeding,
the Commission is acting under its FPA section 205 authority, and does
not address obligations under sections 210, 211, or 212.
IV. Information Collection Statement
109. Order No. 2006 contains information collection requirements
for which the Commission obtained approval from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB Control Number for this collection
of information is 1902-0203. This order denies most rehearing requests,
clarifies the provisions of Order No. 2006, and grants rehearing on
only three minor issues. This order does not make substantive
modifications to the Commission's information collection requirements
and, accordingly, OMB approval for this order is not necessary.
However, the Commission will send a copy of this order to OMB for
informational purposes.
V. Document Availability
110. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in
the Federal Register, interested persons may obtain this document from
the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours
(8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern Time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A,
Washington, DC. This document is also available electronically from the
Commission's eLibrary system (http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp
) in PDF and Microsoft Word format. To access this document
in eLibrary, type ``RM02- 12-'' in the docket number field and specify
a date range that includes this document's issuance date. User
assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's website
during normal business hours from the Commission's Help Line at 202-
502-8222 or the Public Reference Room at 202-502-8371 Press 0, TTY 202-
502-8659. E-Mail the Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
VI. Effective Date
111. Changes to Order No. 2006 made in this Order on Rehearing will
become effective on December 30, 2005.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35
Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
By the Commission.
Magalie R. Salas,
Secretary.
The Appendices will not be published in the Federal Register or
the Code of Federal Regulations.
[FR Doc. 05-23461 Filed 11-29-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P