[Federal Register: March 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 59)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 16037-16077]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr29mr05-37]
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Part III
Department of Defense
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Office of the Secretary
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32 CFR Part 184
Contractors' Safety for Ammunition and Explosives; Proposed Rule
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
32 CFR Part 184
RIN 0790-AH76
[DoD 4145.26-M]
Contractors' Safety for Ammunition and Explosives
AGENCY: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
ACTION: Proposed rule for comment.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Defense (DoD) is codifying its revised
explosives safety standards for ammunition and explosives (A&E) work
performed under DoD contracts. This proposed rule is necessary to
minimize the potential for mishaps that could interrupt DoD operations,
delay project completion dates, adversely impact DoD production base or
capability, damage or destroy DoD-owned material/equipment, cause
injury to DoD personnel, or endanger the general public. The benefits
of this proposed rule in terms of the protection of the public and
ensuring contract performance are expected to balance its potential
cost or administrative impacts. Only provisions related to conventional
AE operations have been included in this proposed rule. No attempt was
made to encompass general industrial safety, occupational health
concerns, chemical warfare agents, radiation, or over-the-road
transportation requirements, because these are either the
responsibility of other regulatory agencies (for example DOT, DOL/OSHA,
or NRC) or may be addressed elsewhere in the contract by the procuring
activity. Budgetary effects of this proposed rule are minimal since
existing DoD Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement coverage already
requires compliance with safety requirements in AE solicitations and
contracts. Finally, because this proposed rule is needed to minimize
the potential for AE mishaps that could adversely impact DoD and the
public, timely publication in the Federal Register is important.
DATES: Comments are to be received not later than May 31, 2005.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Jerry M. Ward, Director, Engineer
Technical Programs Division, DDESB, telephone (703) 325-2525, fax:
(703) 325-6227; e-mail: Jerry.Ward@DDESB.OSD.mil.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to the authority vested in the
Secretary of Defense in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 172, DoD Directive
6055.9 established the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board as
a joint activity of the Department of Defense subject to the direction,
authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. The majority of the
standards impacting upon the public were adopted prior to the enactment
of the Administrative Procedure Act. This proposed rule is intended to
ensure public awareness of the extent of the explosives safety
standards as well as offer the public an opportunity to comment on the
standards. The information addresses the HCSDS sometimes furnished with
solicitations or contracts to provide an insight into potentially
hazardous characteristics of the materials involved in the production
of the item addressed in the solicitation. Contractors retain the
ultimate responsibility for assuring the safety of their personnel and
establishment. Information provided by the HCSDS is derived from other
sources. Verification of such data as shipping and storage hazard
division and storage compatibility group information must be done
through the DoD Joint Hazard Classification System (JHCS) or Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations.
These classifications pertain to AE packaged for transportation or
storage. Such hazard classification information may not be valid when
applied to the hazards associated with manufacturing or loading
processes. For such processes, the materials and processes must be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Sources of information to support
this analysis are available from service research and development
organizations through contract channels and other sources.
Executive Order 12866
This proposed rule does not:
(1) Have an annual effect of the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or state, local, or tribal governments.
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency.
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlement, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
this Executive Order.
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b))
Regulatory Flexibility Act. It has been certified that this
proposed rule, if promulgated, shall be exempt from the requirements
under 5 U.S.C. 601-612. This proposed rule does not have a significant
economic impact on small entities as defined in the Act.
Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 (Sec. 202, Pub. L. 104-4)
This proposed regulatory action does not contain a Federal mandate
that will result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in aggregate, or by the private sector of $100 million or
more in any one year.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)
Paperwork Reduction Act. The proposed rule imposes no obligatory
information requirements beyond internal Department of Defense needs.
Federalism (Executive Order 13132)
This proposed regulatory action does not have federalism
implications, as set forth in Executive Order 13132. It will not have
substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
Section 202, Public Law 104-4, ``Unfunded Mandates Reform Act''
It has been determined that this rule does not involve a Federal
mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more and that such rulemaking will not significantly or
uniquely affect small governments.
List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 184
Ammunition and explosives, DoD contractors.
Accordingly, 32 CFR part 184 is proposed to be added to read as
follows:
PART 184--DOD CONTRACTORS' SAFETY MANUAL
Sec.
184.1 Introduction.
184.2 Mishap investigation and reporting.
184.3 General safety requirements.
184.4 Quantity-distance and siting.
184.5 Hazard classification, storage principles, and compatibility
groups.
184.6 Electrical safety requirements for AE facilities.
184.7 Manufacturing and processing propellants.
184.8 Safety requirements for manufacturing and processing
pyrotechnics.
184.9 Storage of ammunition and explosives.
184.10 Fire protection.
184.11 Risk identification and management.
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184.12 AE building design and layout.
184.13 Safety requirements for specific AE and AE operations.
184.14 Test and testing requirements.
184.15 Collection and destruction requirements for AE.
184.16 Construction and siting criteria.
Appendix A to 32 CFR Part 184--Glossary
Authority: 10 U.S.C. 172.
Sec. 184.1 Introduction.
(a) Purpose. This part provides safety requirements, guidance and
information to minimize potential mishaps which could interrupt
Department of Defense (DoD) operations, delay production, damage DoD
property, cause injury to DoD personnel, or endanger the public during
contract work or services involving ammunition and explosives (AE). The
part contains the minimum contractual safety requirements to support
the objectives of DoD. These requirements are not a complete safety
program and this part does not relieve a contractor from complying with
Federal, State and local laws and regulations.
(b) Applicability. These safety requirements apply to contractors
performing AE work or AE services on DoD contracts, subcontracts,
purchase orders, or other procurement methods. The requirements also
apply to non-DoD contractor operations to the extent necessary to
protect DoD work or services.
(c) Mandatory and advisory requirements. The part uses the term
``shall'', or an affirmative statement, to indicate mandatory
requirements. The terms ``should'' and ``may'' are advisory. When
advisory provisions are not met, adverse consequences might develop and
become proximate causes of AE mishaps.
(d) Compliance with mandatory requirements. (1) The Department of
Defense requires compliance with mandatory provisions of this part and
applicable portions of DoD 6055.9-STD.\1\ Siting criteria for AE are
provided in quantity distance (Q-D) standards contained in Chapter 9 of
DoD 6055.9-STD. In order to provide consistent and current information
to all DoD AE contractors, Q-D requirements of DoD 6055.9-STD are
incorporated by reference in paragraph C317.
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\1\ Copies may be obtained via Internet at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives
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(2) Waivers. Procuring contracting officers (PCO) may grant
contract-specific waivers to mandatory provisions of this part.
Rationale for waiver of DoD pre-award safety surveys must be documented
and provided to the cognizant ACO for transmittal to the cognizant DoD
Component explosives safety office for their records. Military or
commercial ammunition and explosives shall not be procured unless their
use is authorized by the cognizant DoD Component explosives safety
approval authority. Methods of addressing non-compliance with mandatory
requirements and requests for waivers are different during the pre- and
post-award phases of a contract.
(3) In the pre-award phase, the PCO will request a DoD pre-award
safety survey to help determine contractor capability. During pre-award
surveys, noncompliance with mandatory safety requirements normally
results in a recommendation of ``no award.'' Any noncompliance should
be resolved during the pre-award survey. Contractors may choose to
correct the deficiencies immediately, may offer a letter of intent to
correct the deficiencies (which will become binding upon award of
contract), or may request that the PCO accept specifically identified
existing conditions of facilities (contract-specific waiver).
(4) In the post-award phase, the contractor has 30 days from the
date of notification by the administrative contracting officer (ACO) to
correct the noncompliance and inform the ACO of the corrective actions
taken. The contracting officer may direct a different time period for
the correction of any noncompliance. If the contractor refuses or fails
to correct any noncompliance within the time period specified by the
ACO, the Government has the right to direct the contractor to cease
performance on all or part of affected contracts. When the contractor
cannot comply with the mandatory safety requirements of the contract,
the contractor will develop and submit a request for a waiver through
the ACO to the PCO for the final determination. The request will
contain complete information concerning the requirements violated,
actions planned to minimize the hazard, and a proposed date for
correction of the deficiency.
(e) Pre-award safety survey. DoD safety personnel conduct pre-award
surveys to evaluate each prospective contractor's ability to comply
with contract safety requirements. The pre-award safety survey is also
an opportunity for the contractor to request clarification of any
safety requirement or other AE issue that may affect the contractor's
ability to comply. During pre-award surveys, the contractor shall
provide the following:
(1) Site plans conforming to paragraphs (h)(5)(i) through
(h)(5)(iv) of this section for proposed facilities to be used in
contract performance.
(2) Evidence of implementation of a safety program containing at
least mandatory requirements described in Sec. 184.3.
(3) General description of proposed contract facilities, including
size, building layouts, construction details, and fire resistive
capabilities.
(4) Fire prevention program and available firefighting resources
including local agreements or other documentation demonstrating
coordination.
(5) Copies of required licenses and permits or demonstration of the
ability to obtain approvals necessary to support the proposed contract.
(6) A safety history including mishap experience, safety survey or
audit reports by insurance carriers or Federal, State, and local
authorities, and any variances, exemptions or waivers of safety or fire
protection requirements issued by Federal, state or local authorities.
(7) Details of proposed operations and equipment to include process
flow narrative/diagram, proposed facility or equipment changes, hazard
analysis, and proposed procedures for all phases of AE operations.
(8) Subcontractor information. (i) Identification of all
subcontractors proposed for the AE work.
(ii) Methods used to evaluate capability of subcontractor to comply
with the requirements of this part.
(iii) Methods used to manage subcontractor compliance.
(f) Preoperational safety survey. The DoD reserves the right to
conduct a preoperational survey after contract award of new items with
limited contractor experience, after major new construction or major
modifications, or after an AE mishap. When these situations occur, the
contractor shall notify the ACO, sufficiently in advance, to provide
the Department of Defense the opportunity to schedule and perform a
preoperational survey.
(g) Post-award contractor responsibilities. The contractor shall:
(1) Comply with the requirements of this part and any other safety
requirements contained within the contract.
(2) Develop and implement a demonstrable safety program, including
operational procedures, intended to prevent AE-related mishaps.
(3) Designate qualified individuals to administer and implement
this safety program.
(4) Prepare, and keep available for review, all hazard analyses
used to justify alternative methods of hazards control that differ from
those recommended in this part.
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(5) Provide access to facilities and safety program documentation
to Government safety representatives.
(6) Report and investigate AE mishaps in accordance with Sec.
184.2.
(7) Provide identification and location of subcontractors to the
ACO for notification or approval in accordance with terms of the
contract.
(8) Establish and implement management controls to ensure AE
subcontractors comply with paragraphs (g)(1) through (g)(7) of this
section.
(h) Site and construction plans. (1) Contractors must prepare site
and construction plans for support of the pre-award process, and for
any change in layout or construction potentially affecting Q-D incident
to the contract. Contractors shall also maintain a current site map
depicting Q-D relationships for all AE locations within the facilities.
(2) When the place of performance of the contract is at a DoD-owned
facility, site and construction plans shall be prepared and processed
(content and staffing) in accordance with the requirements of DoD
6055.9-STD, as well as, appropriate military service regulations
contained within the contract.
(3) For contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) facilities,
the contractor shall submit, through the ACO to the PCO, site and
construction plans for all new construction or major modification of
facilities for AE activities and for the facilities that may be exposed
to AE hazards if improperly located. The contractor shall provide
sufficient copies for the review process. The contractor shall not
begin construction or modification of proposed facilities until
receiving site and construction plan approval from the PCO through the
ACO.
(4) Minor new construction, changes, and modifications of existing
AE facilities involving Hazard Class/Division (HC/D) additions and
deletions or that add or remove small portable operating buildings and
magazines may not require formal site plan submission. Minor applies to
all changes that involve only 1.4 HC/D materials. Minor also applies to
changes of other HC/D materials that do not increase the existing
maximum credible event (MCE) for an AE facility or do not extend any
quantity distance arcs beyond existing fragment, inhabited building,
and public traffic route distance arcs for other nearby potential
explosion sites (PES). When the contractor thinks a modification/change
is minor, he shall notify the ACO and request a determination. The ACO
shall make the final determination as to whether a formal site plan
submission is necessary.
(5) Site plans shall comply with the following:
(i) Plans shall include maps and drawings which are legible,
accurate, and of a scale which permits easy determination of essential
details. For general layout of buildings, this is normally a scale of 1
inch to 400 feet (or metric equivalent) or less. Site plans may require
other-scaled drawings, which provide details of construction, structure
relationships within the project area, barricades, or other unique
details. Plans may also include pictures to illustrate details and
videotapes of MCE testing data.
(ii) Maps and drawings shall identify distances between all PESs,
all exposed sites (ESs) within the facility, the facility boundary, any
additional property under contractor control, ESs on adjacent property
when applicable, public railways and highways, power transmission lines
and other utilities.
(iii) Plans shall identify and briefly describe all PESs and all
ESs within any applicable fragmentation distance and/or inhabitable
building distance of a PES. Site plans for major new construction or
modification shall also identify and briefly describe all PESs whose
inhabitable building distance are includes the proposed new or modified
site.
(iv) Plans shall include the maximum net explosive weight(s) (NEW)
and the HC/Ds of all PESs and, when applicable, shall include MCE
information and maximum NEW for each room or bay. Plans shall also
include engineering or test data when substituting construction or
shielding for distance to protect from fragmentation or overpressure.
(v) Plans shall include a topographical map in sufficient detail to
permit evaluation, when the contractor uses natural terrain for
barricading to reduce fragment distance.
(6) Construction plans for proposed facilities shall contain the
information required in paragraphs (h)(5)(i) through (h)(5)(v) of this
section and construction details of dividing walls, venting surfaces,
firewalls, roofs, operational shields, barricades, exits, ventilation
systems and equipment, AE waste disposal systems, lightning protection
systems, grounding systems, processing equipment auxiliary support
structures, and, general materials of construction, as applicable.
Sec. 184.2 Mishap investigation and reporting.
(a) General. This section contains requirements for investigating
and reporting mishaps involving AE.
(b) Reporting criteria. The contractor shall investigate and report
to the ACO and cognizant Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
contract safety specialist all mishaps involving ammunition or
explosives that result in one or more of the following:
(1) One or more fatalities.
(2) One or more lost-work day cases with days away from work as
defined by 29 U.S.C. 651-678.
(3) Five or more non-fatal injuries (with or without lost
workdays).
(4) Damage to government property exceeding $20,000.
(5) Delay in delivery schedule exceeding 24 hours. (This
requirement does not constitute a waiver or amendment of any delivery
schedule required by the contract.).
(6) Contractually required notifications of mishaps other than in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this section; or
(7) Any mishap that may degrade operational or production
capability, or is likely to arouse media interest.
(c) Mishap investigation requirements. Paragraph (e) of this
section contains the elements of information which a basic
investigation shall produce. Based upon the seriousness of the mishap
and impact on munitions or munitions systems involved, the ACO or PCO
may require an additional, more comprehensive investigation. The PCO
retains the right to participate in contractor investigations, or to
perform an independent DoD investigation. In the event the PCO directs
DoD participation, or an independent DoD investigation, the contractor
shall preserve the mishap scene, taking only those actions necessary to
protect life and health, preclude further damage, or prevent access by
unauthorized persons in order to preserve investigative evidence. The
contractor shall obtain the PCO's permission to disturb the evidence,
with the exception of paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Nothing in the
reporting requirements contained in this part relieve the contractor of
making other notifications required by Federal, State, or local
requirements.
(d) Telephone report. The contractor shall report any mishap
described in paragraph (b) of this section by telephone to the ACO and
cognizant DCMA contract safety specialist as soon as practicable, but
not later than three hours after the mishap.
(e) Written report. (1) The contractor shall submit a written
report to the ACO and cognizant DCMA contract safety specialist by the
end of the second business day after mishap occurrence.
(i) Contractor's name and location.
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(ii) Date, local time, and plant facility/location of the mishap.
(iii) Type of mishap (explosion, fire, loss, other).
(iv) Contract, subcontract, or purchase order.
(v) Item nomenclature, hazard classification, lot number.
(vi) Mishap narrative.
(vii) Number of injuries, fatalities, degree of injuries. (viii)
Description of property damage and cost.
(ix) Quantity of energetic material involved (pounds, units,
rounds).
(x) Probable cause(s).
(xi) Corrective action taken or planned.
(xii) Effect on production.
(xiii) Name, title or position, and phone number of person
submitting the report.
(xiv) Remarks.
(2) The contractor shall provide to the ACO supplemental
information to the initial report within 30 days of mishap occurrence.
(f) Special technical mishap investigations and reports. When
warranted by the circumstances of a mishap, the PCO may require a
special technical investigation conducted by DoD personnel. The PCO may
also direct the contractor to conduct a special technical
investigation. In either case, the investigation report shall provide
details such as fragmentation maps, photographs, more detailed
description of events of the mishap, effects on adjacent operations,
structural and equipment damage, Q-D drawings, detailed description of
occurrence and related events, findings and conclusions. If the
contractor performs the special technical mishap investigation, the
contractor shall forward the report through the ACO to the PCO within
60 days of the direction by the PCO to perform the investigation. Upon
determination by the PCO that a DoD investigation is required, the PCO
will immediately advise the contractor.
Sec. 184.3 General safety requirements.
(a) General. This section provides general safety requirements for
all AE operations addressed in this part. When these practices exceed
or differ from local or national codes or requirements, the more
restrictive shall apply.
(b) Personnel and material limits. (1) Control of all locations or
operations presenting real or potential hazards to personnel, property,
or the environment is essential for safety and efficiency. Control
measures include minimizing the number of personnel exposed, minimizing
the duration of the exposure, and minimizing the amount of hazardous
material consistent with safe and efficient operations.
(2) All buildings, cubicles, cells, rooms, and locations containing
AE shall have AE and personnel limits prominently posted. Include
supervisors, production workers, and transient personnel when
determining personnel limits. Posted personnel limits are not required
in storage magazines, magazine areas, or transfer points.
(3) All buildings, cubicles, cells, rooms or locations containing
AE shall have prominently posted limits for the quantities of AE
permitted. The posted limits shall not exceed the quantity stipulated
in the site plan, and shall accurately reflect current process
requirements. Post AE limits in storage magazines when the limit
differs from that for other magazines in the block, or when
circumstances prevent the limit from being readily apparent. It is not
required to express AE limits in units of weight or in the number of
items. Express limits in terms of trays, boxes, racks, or other units
more easily observed and controlled.
(c) Standard operating procedures (SOP). (1) Clearly written
procedures are essential to avoid operator errors and ensure process
control. Therefore, before commencing manufacturing operations
involving AE, qualified personnel shall develop, review, and approve
written procedures.
(2) Preparation. The contractor shall prepare and implement written
procedures which provide clear instructions for safely conducting AE
activities. The use of controlled tests is an acceptable method for
developing and validating SOPs. SOPs shall include the following:
(i) The specific hazards associated with the process.
(ii) Indicators for identifying abnormal process conditions.
(iii) Emergency procedures for abnormal process conditions or other
conditions which could affect the safety of the process.
(iv) Personal protective clothing and equipment required by process
personnel.
(v) Personnel and AE limits.
(vi) Specific tools permitted for use by the process operator.
(vii) The chronological sequence of job steps the operator is to
follow in performing the work.
(viii) Procedures for disposing of any scrap and waste AE.
(3) Dissemination. Personnel involved with AE processes, and
personnel who maintain AE equipment, shall have written operating
procedures readily accessible.
(4) Training. Personnel shall receive appropriate training before
performing work involving exposure to AE. The training shall include
emphasis on the specific safety and health hazards, emergency
operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to
the employee's job tasks. The contractor shall ascertain that each
employee involved in an AE process has received and understood the
training. The contractor shall prepare a record that contains the
identity of the employee, the date of training, and the means used to
verify that the employee understood the training.
(5) Emergency procedures. The contractor shall instruct employees
on procedures to follow in the event of electrical storms, utility or
mechanical failures, equipment failures, process abnormalities, and
other emergencies occurring during the manufacturing, handling, or
processing of AE.
(6) Revalidation. Qualified personnel shall review SOPs on a
regular basis. The managing authority shall change and validate SOPs as
often as necessary to reflect improved methods, equipment
substitutions, facility modifications, or process revisions.
(d) Storage in operating buildings. (1) The contractor may store
limited quantities of hazardous materials, other than AE materials,
which are essential for current operations in an operating building.
(2) The contractor shall store AE materials that exceed minimum
quantity necessary for sustained operations in a service magazine
located no closer than the intraline distance (ILD) (based on the
quantity in the magazine) from the operating building or area. If ILD
distance is not available for a separate service magazine, the
contractor may designate storage locations within the operating
building. Designated storage locations shall preclude immediate
propagation from the operational location to the storage location. The
quantity of AE material in the internal storage location shall not
exceed that needed for one half of a work shift. The contractor should
consider personnel exposure, structural containment afforded, and the
venting ability of the proposed storage location when determining where
to locate a designated storage location. When storage containers
completely contain all fragments, debris, and overpressure, AE material
may be stored without regard to Q-D requirements.
(3) At the end of the workday, personnel should remove all AE
material from processing equipment and store it in an appropriate
magazine or designated storage location. If operationally required,
personnel may store in-process AE materials in the
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building during non-operating hours provided the physical
characteristics and stability of the AE materials are not degraded, and
the AE material would not compromise the safety of the process
equipment or personnel when the process is restarted.
(4) The contractor may use a separate enclosed room or bay in an
operating building specifically adapted for the interim storage of
production items awaiting the results of testing before final pack-out.
The room or bay must afford the equivalent of service magazine distance
protection to other parts of the building, and ILD to other buildings.
Such a room or bay is limited to its defined and designed function and
items, but is not subject to the four-hour supply limitation for the
building or the ultimate pack-out operation.
(e) Housekeeping in hazardous areas.
(1) The contractor shall keep structures containing AE clean and
orderly.
(2) Explosives and explosive dusts shall not accumulate on
structural members, radiators, heating coils, steam, gas, air or water
supply pipes, or electrical fixtures.
(3) Written procedures shall include instructions for the removal
of spilled material.
(4) Floor cleaning methods shall not create an ignition hazard or
alter the conductive ability of floors in AE areas, nor should they
result in an environmental contamination potential.
(5) Cleaning methods for AE processing equipment shall not result
in any foreign material or AE remaining in the equipment.
(f) Precautions for maintenance and repairs to equipment and
buildings. (1) The contractor shall examine and test all new or
repaired AE processing equipment prior to placing the equipment in
service in order to ensure that it is safe to operate.
(2) Before proceeding with maintenance or repairs to AE processing
equipment, contractor personnel shall decontaminate the equipment to
the degree necessary to perform the work safely. The contractor shall
protect maintenance personnel from the effects of a reaction resulting
from AE material in or on other parts of the equipment. Contractor
personnel shall tag AE processing equipment before proceeding with
repairs. The tag shall identify the decontaminated parts of the
equipment, and those parts that contain AE.
(3) The contractor shall have SOPs for maintenance personnel
performing work on AE equipment or performing building maintenance,
repair, or modification activities in AE areas. The SOPs shall include
a provision for inspecting equipment after maintenance work to ensure
no tools or foreign materials remain in AE equipment. The SOPs shall
identify the specific tools required to perform work on equipment which
may contain explosive residues or areas which could have an explosive
atmosphere.
(4) Before performing any building repair, modification or
maintenance activity, the contractor shall ensure the removal of all AE
materials from areas that may pose a hazard. The contractor shall also
ensure the decontamination of all places where AE material could
accumulate, such as, equipment, crevices, vents, ducts, wall cavities,
pipes and fittings.
(g) Operational shields. (1) The purpose of operational shields is
to prevent propagation of AE material from one AE operation or location
to another, protect facilities and equipment, and provide personnel
protection. Shields used for these purposes require an evaluation to
determine their suitability for their intended purpose. All AE
operations and processes require a hazard assessment prior to work
performance to determine the type of hazard involved, the level of risk
associated with the AE material or item, and the corresponding level of
protection required.
(2) The primary hazards that accompany explosions and deflagrations
are blast overpressure, fragmentation (primary and secondary) and
thermal effects. The hazard assessment shall consider these hazards and
the quantity of AE materials, initiation sensitivity, heat output, rate
of burning, potential ignition and initiation sources, protection
capabilities of shields, various types of protective clothing, fire
protection systems, and the acute and chronic health hazards of vapors
and combustion products on exposed personnel.
(3) When the hazard assessment indicates an unacceptable
probability of explosion or deflagration, conduct operations or
processes remotely. When an analysis of the hazard assessment indicates
the hazards associated with an explosion or deflagration are
controllable by using operational shields, the contractor shall design,
install, and use shields which effectively protect personnel from the
hazards. Shields complying with MIL-STD-398 are acceptable protection.
(4) The contractor shall test operational shields under conditions
that simulate the operational environment. AE materials or items used
in the test shall correspond to those that may be involved in a maximum
credible event (MCE), plus 25 percent. The contractor shall maintain
records of the test that demonstrate the shields will function as
planned. Analysis rather than testing of shields may be acceptable on a
case-by-case basis.
(5) When the doors of AE processing equipment function as
operational shields, interlocking devices are required to prevent the
operator from opening the door while the equipment is in operation.
(h) Protective clothing. (1) All AE operations require a hazard
assessment to determine the need for protective clothing and personal
protective equipment. The assessment shall include an evaluation of all
hazards and factors contained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
(2) The contractor shall provide a changing area for employees who
must remove their street clothes to wear protective clothing, such as
explosive plant clothing, anti-contamination clothing, impervious
clothing, and so forth. To avoid exposing personnel not involved in AE
operations to unnecessary risks, employees shall not wear or remove
protective clothing from the premises. Employees shall not wear any
static producing clothing in areas where static electricity is a
hazard.
(3) Explosives plant clothing, generally referred to as powder
uniforms, shall have nonmetallic fasteners and be easily removable.
(4) When sending explosives-contaminated clothing to an off-plant
laundry facility, the contractor is responsible for informing the
laundry of the hazards associated with the contaminants and any special
laundering or disposal requirements.
(i) Material handling equipment. (1) The contractor shall not
refuel gasoline, diesel or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) powered
equipment inside buildings containing AE. Refueling shall take place at
least 100 feet from structures or sites containing AE. Doors and
windows through which vapors may enter the building shall not be open
during refueling. Position refueling vehicles at least 100 feet from
structures or sites containing AE during refueling.
(2) Gasoline-, diesel- or LPG-powered equipment shall not be stored
in buildings, loading docks, or piers containing AE. The contractor
shall store gasoline-, diesel-, and LPG-powered equipment at the
appropriate fire protection distance from buildings containing AE.
(3) Gasoline, diesel, and LPG powered equipment shall have spark
arrestors. The contractor shall perform and document inspections of the
exhaust and electrical systems of the equipment
[[Page 16043]]
as necessary to ensure that the systems are functioning within the
manufacture's specifications. The contractor shall maintain
documentation of the inspections for a period of one year.
(j) Parking of privately owned vehicles. (1) Control of parking of
privately owned vehicles within an AE establishment minimizes fire and
explosion hazards and prevents congestion in an emergency.
(2) Parking lots serving multiple PESs shall not be closer than the
ILD from each PES. Parking lots serving a single PES shall not be
closer than 100 feet to the associated facility to protect it from
vehicle fires, and shall be at least public traffic route distance from
unassociated PESs. Parking lots for administration areas shall be
located at public traffic route distance from all PESs.
(3) Vehicles shall not obstruct access to buildings by emergency
equipment or personnel.
(k) Ignition sources in hazardous areas. The contractor shall not
permit any nonessential ignition sources in operating buildings.
(l) Operational explosives containers. (1) Containers shall be
compatible with the material they contain.
(2) Containers used for intraplant transportation or storage of
process explosives and energetic materials shall not leak. Because of
their fragility and potential for fragmentation, glass containers are
not acceptable.
(m) Intraplant rail transportation. (1) The contractor shall
develop written procedures to ensure safe and efficient rail movement
of AE. The SOPs shall include information covering the inspection of
the engine, car mover, and cars, normal and emergency operating
procedures for the engine and car mover, AE loading and unloading
procedures, and emergency procedures including fire fighting.
(2) Railcars positioned for loading shall have their brakes engaged
to prevent movement. Contractor personnel shall inspect each railcar
before loading to ensure it is suitable to carry the specific AE cargo.
Contractor personnel shall check the cargo to ensure it is stable and
secure, and close the railcar doors before car movement. If using an
engine to move railcars, the contractor shall ensure that personnel
have connected the air brakes of the railcars in sequence to the
engine. If moving a railcar with a car mover the contractor shall
station an individual at the hand brake of the railcar.
(3) A single parked railcar shall have the hand brakes set and the
wheels chocked. When more than one railcar is parked, personnel shall
set hand brakes on enough railcars to ensure the cars will not move.
Personnel shall set hand brakes on the downgrade end of a group of
parked railcars. Do not rely on the automatic air brakes to hold parked
railcars.
(4) Contractor personnel shall avoid rough handling of railcars.
Personnel shall not disconnect railcars containing AE from each other
or a locomotive while in motion. Personnel shall couple railcars gently
in order to avoid damaging the AE cargo or shipping containers.
Disconnected railcars shall not strike railcars containing AE.
(5) The contractor shall maintain all rolling stock used for
intraplant transportation of AE in a safe and good working condition.
(6) Portable transmitters and railroad locomotives equipped with
two-way radios shall not transmit when passing AE operating buildings
where electro-explosive devices are in use. The contractor shall
determine minimum safe distances based on radio frequency and power
output of the transmitter.
(n) Intraplant motor vehicle transportation of AE. (1) The
contractor shall develop written procedures for the safe transportation
of AE in motor vehicles. The SOP shall include procedures for vehicle
inspection, vehicle operation, loading and unloading AE materials, and
emergency procedures, including fire fighting.
(2) The operator responsible for transporting AE material shall
perform a daily inspection of the vehicle before transporting
materials. The operator shall verify that the fire extinguisher is
charged and in working order, there are no fuels or other fluid leaks,
and that brakes, tires, steering, and other equipment are in good
operating condition. Before transporting AE, the operator shall inspect
the cargo compartment to ensure it does not contain any residual AE
material or any object which could present a hazard to the cargo.
(3) When loading or unloading AE, the operator shall shutoff the
vehicle's engine, unless the engine is required to provide power to
equipment for loading or unloading. The operator shall engage the
emergency brake and use wheel chocks when the vehicle could move during
loading or unloading. The operator shall stabilize and ensure the load
is secure to prevent damage to containers or their contents. The
operator shall not transport AE material in the passenger compartment
of the vehicle.
(4) The vehicle operator shall understand and follow established
procedures involving a vehicle fire, breakdown, accident, damaged or
leaking containers, and spilled material.
(5) Transportation containers shall not allow the contents to leak
or spill in transit.
(6) Non-sparking material shall cover the cargo compartment when
transporting AE in containers capable of exposing their contents if
damaged.
(7) Motor vehicles transporting AE within the establishment
boundaries but outside the AE area shall bear at least two placards.
Placards based on the fire division symbols discussed in Sec. 184.10,
``Fire Protection,'' are acceptable. Motor vehicles or equipment with
internal combustion engines, used near explosives scrap, waste, or
items contaminated with explosives shall have exhaust system spark
arresters and carburetor flame arresters (authorized air cleaners).
(8) The contractor shall maintain vehicles and material handling
equipment used to load and transport AE in a safe operating condition.
(9) Batteries and wiring shall be located to prevent contact with
containers of AE material.
(o) Inspection of AE mixing equipment. (1) The contractor shall
establish a preventative maintenance program which includes the
inspection of all AE mixing equipment on a periodic basis. The SOP for
the inspection shall include criteria for inspecting the blades to bowl
clearances, alignment of the blades and bowl, and detection of any
distortion of the blades or bowl. The inspection procedures shall also
include instructions for checking critical drive system components for
wear, damage or misalignment. The procedures shall include criteria for
determining that associated equipment used to control the mixer is
functioning as designed. The contractor shall maintain a record of all
inspections. After performing maintenance of the equipment, the
contractor shall run the equipment under load to ensure it is safe to
operate.
(2) The SOPs for operating mixing equipment shall include
instructions for inspecting specific equipment components before each
use.
(p) Facility requirements. (1) Buildings. The design, construction
techniques, process layout, and siting of AE buildings are important
considerations in explosives safety and directly influence quantity
distance (Q-D) requirements and the degree of exposure to personnel,
equipment, and facilities. Construction features which limit the amount
of explosives involved, attenuate the resulting blast overpressure or
thermal radiation, and reduce the quantity and range of
[[Page 16044]]
hazardous fragments and debris will help to minimize the effects of an
explosion. Incorporating Q-D criteria, when locating an exposed site
(ES) in relation to a potential explosive site (PES), will reduce the
amount of damage and injuries in the event of an incident.
(2) Building exteriors. The contractor should design and erect AE
buildings with the ability to allow for the venting of an internal
explosion without collapsing. The use of lightweight materials in
exterior wall and roof sections designed to vent the effects of an
explosion will help reduce the number of large fragments. Exceptions
from using lightweight materials include earth-covered magazines,
containment type structures, firewalls, substantial dividing walls,
special roof loadings, and walls and roofs used for external
overpressure protection. Non-combustible exterior wall and roof
coverings of operating buildings help prevent the spread of fire from
one area of a building to another and from building to building.
(3) Interior walls, roofs, and ceilings. (i) Non-combustible
material is preferred for the interior surfaces of buildings. The
contractor should treat or cover exposed combustion supporting building
materials with fire retardant material.
(ii) Where hazardous locations exist, interior surfaces shall be
smooth, free from cracks, crevices and openings which may create a
hazardous condition. This is important to prevent the accumulation or
migration of explosive dust and vapors which could result in an
incident. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Standard 70
\2\ provides criteria for determining if a location is hazardous.
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\2\ Obtain NFPA publications from the National Fire Protection
Association at http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/home/index.asp.
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(iii) The contractor should use hard gloss, easily cleanable, paint
on painted surfaces.
(iv) Periodically clean any surface where explosive dust could
accumulate. Establish cleaning schedules on information obtained from
the job hazard analysis.
(v) Do not use suspended ceilings in hazardous locations.
(4) Floors and work surfaces. (i) Locations where exposed
explosives or hazardous concentrations of flammable vapor or gas are
present require non-sparking floors and work surfaces.
(ii) Sec. 184.12 provides requirements for conductive non-sparking
floors and work surfaces.
(iii) Floors and work surfaces require periodic cleaning to prevent
the accumulation of energetic materials. In addition, all conductive
and non-sparking floors and work surfaces require preventative
maintenance to ensure their functional integrity.
(5) Substantial dividing walls. The contractor shall design and
construct substantial dividing walls to prevent simultaneous detonation
of explosives on opposite sides of the wall. The design and
construction shall meet the criteria contained in Army TM 5-1300, Navy
NAVFAC P-397, or Air Force AFR 88-22 (different designations for the
same publication).
(6) Exits and doors. (i) All AE buildings require adequate exits
and doors. NFPA Standard No. 101, ``Life Safety Code,'' provides
information concerning exits and doors.
(ii) NFPA Standard No. 80, ``Standard for Fire Doors, Fire
Windows,'' provides information on the selection and installation of
fire doors and windows.
(iii) No AE hazards shall occupy space between an operator and an
exit.
(7) Safety chutes. Multi-storied locations where rapid egress is
vital and not otherwise possible require safety chutes.
(8) Passageways. (i) Weather-protected passageways and ramps for
travel between buildings or magazines should include features to help
prevent fire from spreading from one building to another. Fireproof
construction materials, fire stops, fire doors, and fire suppression
systems aid in preventing the spread of fire.
(ii) The incorporation of weak sections, openings, or abrupt change
in direction of passageways will aid in the prevention of funneling the
explosion forces from one building to another.
(9) Roads and walkways. (i) Only roads servicing a single magazine
or AE processing building, including its service facilities, may dead
end at the magazine or building.
(ii) Hard surfaced roads and walkways at the entrances to or
between adjacent operating buildings containing AE will help reduce the
amount of foreign material tracked into the building by personnel.
(iii) Avoid a road system which requires personnel to pass through
an AE area when traveling from one area to another.
(10) Windows and skylights. (i) Inhabited building distances do not
protect against glass breakage and the hazards of flying glass.
Buildings separated by inhabited building distance should not have
windows or other glass surfaces exposed to PESs.
(ii) Minimize personnel hazards from glass breakage by means such
as building orientation and/or keeping the number of exposed glass
panels and panel size to a minimum. When window panels are necessary
and risk assessment determines a glass hazard will be present, blast
resistant windows must be used. The framing and/or sash of such panels
must be of sufficient strength to retain the panel in the structure.
(11) Hardware. (i) AE operations and hazardous locations require an
evaluation to determine the safest type of hardware and fasteners to
use in order to reduce the risk of an accidental ignition. Consider
using non-sparking hardware and fasteners if they will meet the design
parameters of the intended application. Depending on the potential
hazard, a locking device or some other installation technique shall
retain the hardware and fasteners securely in place. This will prevent
the hardware and fasteners from becoming loose, entering process
equipment and creating a spark or pinch point.
(ii) The contractor should avoid installing hardware, pipes, ducts,
and other items on blowout panels in order to prevent the materials
from becoming secondary fragments. If it is necessary to install items
on blowout panels, select items made of materials which will not yield
heavy fragments in an explosion.
(12) Ventilation systems. (i) Well-designed ventilation systems
reduce personnel exposures to airborne contaminants and prevent the
accumulation of flammable or explosive concentrations of gases, vapors
or dusts. A local ventilation system, which removes the gases, vapors,
or dusts at the source, is more effective than a general ventilation
system.
(ii) A ventilation system is required in areas of buildings
generating potentially explosive dusts, gases or vapors. Testing,
inspection, and maintenance of ventilation systems used for contaminant
control require documentation.
(iii) Exhaust fans through which combustible dust or flammable
vapor pass shall have nonferrous blades or a casing lined with
nonferrous material. The electrical wiring and equipment of the system
should comply with provisions of NFPA Standard No. 70, ``National
Electrical Code''. Bonding and grounding of the entire system is
required.
(iv) A slight negative pressure is required in rooms where AE
operations generate explosive dust.
(v) NFPA Standard No. 91, ``Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air
Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustible Particulate
Solids,'' provides standards for exhaust systems.
[[Page 16045]]
(13) Steam for processing and heating. (i) Steam used to heat
buildings containing explosives shall not exceed 228 [deg]F (108.9
[deg]C) or have a pressure greater than 5 psi (34.48 kPa).
(ii) Process steam shall not exceed 249.5 [deg]F (120.8 [deg]C), or
exceed 15 psi (103.43 kPa). Steam pressure greater than 15 psi (103.43
kPa) requires procuring contracting officer (PCO) approval.
(iii) The surface temperature of steam and hot water pipes in
contact with combustible materials shall not exceed 160 [deg]F (71
[deg]C). Pipes with an ambient temperature greater than 160 [deg]F (71
[deg]C) shall not contact combustible materials. An insulating pipe
covering capable of reducing the surface temperature of the covering to
160 [deg]F (71 [deg]C) or less is acceptable.
(iv) In AE handling or storage locations where resistance to ground
is high, ground steam and hot water lines where they enter the
building.
(v) When using a reducing valve, consider installing a relief valve
on the low-pressure piping. The throttling action of reducing valves
requires a positive means to prevent the production of superheated
steam.
(14) Tunnels. Tunnels between buildings that contain AE shall
incorporate features that resist the shock wave of an explosion. This
is important in order to minimize the possibility of an explosion in
one building from affecting the operations in the other building. For
further information on tunnels go to DoD 6055.9-STD.\3\
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\3\ See footnote 1 to Sec. 184.1(d)(1).
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(q) Quantity-distance (Q-D) requirements. (1) Minimum Q-D
requirements are contained in DoD 6055.9-STD, DoD Ammunition and
Explosives Safety Standards.
(2) For AE work involving an MCE of 0.25 kg (0.55 lbs) or less of
HD 1.1 materials, the use of the separation distances listed in Table 1
to Sec. 184.3 are acceptable for meeting minimum Q-D requirements.
Table 1 to Sec. 184.3.--Minimum Q-D Requirements for Small Quantities of Hazard Division 1.1 Material
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inhabited building and Public traffic route Intraline and fragment
Net explosive weight fragment distance and fragment distance distance
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 0.003 kg (0.0066 lb)....... 0...................... 0...................... 0.
0.003 kg-0.01 kg (0.0066 lb-0.022 lb) 5 m (16.5 ft).......... 3 m (9.9 ft)........... 2 m (6.6 ft).
0.01 kg-0.25 kg (0.022 lb-0.55 lb)... 15 m (49.5 ft)......... 9 m (29.7 ft).......... 5 m (16.5 ft).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 184.4 Quantity-distance and siting.
Refer to DoD 6055.9, Chapter 9 for guidance.
Sec. 184.5 Hazard classification, storage principles, and
compatibility groups.
Please refer to DoD 6055.9, Chapter 3 for guidance.
Sec. 184.6. Electrical safety requirements for AE facilities.
(a) General. Initiation systems often use the controlled input of
electrical energy to initiate explosive mixtures and compounds, which
start an explosive train. The uncontrolled release of electrical energy
in explosive atmospheres or near explosives and explosive-loaded
articles can result in unintended initiation and serious mishaps.
Electrical energy manifests itself in many forms (e.g., standard
electrical installations, lightning, electrostatic discharge,
electrical testing) and with various intensities which require special
precautions. This chapter contains minimum electrical safety
requirements for existing, new, or modified explosives facilities and
equipment.
(b) Electrical installations. (1) National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Standard No. 70 and this section are minimum
requirements for areas containing explosives. NFPA Standard No. 70 does
not specifically address explosives, but it does establish standards
for the design and installation of electrical equipment and wiring in
atmospheres containing combustible dusts and flammable vapors and
gasses which, in general, are comparably hazardous. NFPA Standard No.
70 (Article 500) defines ``hazardous locations'' according to the
hazard presented by electrical equipment installed in environments
where flammable gases or vapors, combustible dusts or flyings may
exist. The presence of AE may or may not result in rating a particular
location as a ``hazardous location.'' The following exceptions shall be
used by DoD contractors when applying the NFPA Standard No. 70
definitions of Class I, Division 1, and Class II, Division 1 hazardous
locations:
(i) Classify areas containing explosive dusts or explosive
substances which may produce dust capable of suspension in the
atmosphere as Class II, Division 1 hazardous locations.
(ii) Classify areas where explosive sublimation or condensation may
occur as both Class I Division 1 and Class II Division 1 hazardous
locations.
(iii) Exceptions are extraordinarily hazardous explosive
substances, such as nitroglycerin (NG), which require special
consideration, including physical isolation from electric motors,
devices, lighting fixtures and the like.
(2) Multiple classifications. In some potential explosion sites
(PES) (e.g., powder blending with solvents), hazards resulting from
both dusts and flammable vapors may exist. In these cases, it is
necessary for that area to have a dual, or multiple, classification.
Use only electrical equipment listed by Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
or other recognized testing laboratory as suitable for use in all
classes of hazardous locations.
(3) Change of classification. The specific processes performed in
operating buildings and magazines dictate the requirements for
electrical equipment installation. If functions performed in the
facility change, responsible personnel shall inspect, approve, or
reclassify the hazardous locations.
(4) Alternate power source. Facilities shall have an alternate
power source for special processes and operations requiring a
continuous supply of power, whenever the loss of power will result in a
more hazardous condition.
(5) Portable engine-driven generators. The exposed, non-current-
carrying, metallic frame and parts shall be electrically grounded. In
addition, observe the following requirements when supplying power to
magazines or explosives operating facilities.
(i) Place generating units at least 50 ft (15.2 m) from magazines
or hazardous (classified) locations.
(ii) Keep the ground area between and around the generator and the
NFPA Standard No. 70 hazardous (classified) location clear of debris
and other combustible materials.
(iii) The exhaust from the generator shall not impinge on grass or
any other combustible material.
(iv) Position the power cord connecting the generator to the load
to
[[Page 16046]]
prevent trucks or personnel from running over or otherwise damaging the
cord.
(v) Do not use cable-to-cable splices within a magazine, explosive
operating facility, or other NFPA Standard No. 70 hazardous
(classified) location. Use only three-wire, three-prong, approved
service type plugs and connectors.
(vi) Refer to Sec. 184.3(i)(1) for refueling procedures.
(6) Electric supply systems. Electrical and explosives hazards may
mutually exist when PES are in close proximity to electric supply
lines. To protect these hazards from each other, the following
separation requirements shall apply:
(i) Separate overhead service lines from a PES of combustible
construction or a PES in the open by the distance between the poles or
towers supporting the lines, unless an effective means is provided to
ensure that energized lines cannot contact the facility or its
appurtenances if they are severed. Four acceptable alternatives are
cable trays and messenger lines, a ground-fault circuit-interrupter
which causes a disconnecting means to open all ungrounded conductors of
the faulted circuit, weighted triangle line separators or similar
weights which ensure broken lines fall straight down away from PES, and
constructed physical barriers.
(ii) Separate electric distribution lines carrying less than 69 kV,
the tower or poles supporting those lines, and unmanned electrical
substations from PES by public traffic route distance (PTRD).
(iii) Separate electric transmission lines carrying 69 kV or more
and the tower or poles supporting them from PES by:
(A) Inhabited building distance (IBD) if the line in question is
part of a grid system serving a large area off the establishment.
(B) PTRD if loss of the line does not create serious social or
economic hardships. (Note: Base PTRD and IBD on airblast overpressure
only. Fragment distances shall not apply.)
(C) Distances in accordance with paragraph (b)(6)(1) of this
section when the line(s) in question can be interrupted without loss of
power (i.e., other lines or networks exist for rerouting power).
(iv) Avoid locating permanent electric installations in NFPA
Standard No. 70 Class I or Class II hazardous locations. When practical
operating reasons prevent locating permanent electrical installations
outside of hazardous locations, or require the use of portable
electrical equipment (e.g., lighting equipment) in hazardous locations,
contractors shall only install or use electrical equipment approved for
the National Electric Code (NEC) defined ``hazardous location'' and
listed by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or other nationally recognized
testing agencies.
(c) Primary electric supply. The primary electric supply to an
entire explosives area should be arranged to allow cutting off the
supply by remote switches located at one or more central points away
from the area.
(d) Ventilation. Equip exhaust fans, through which combustible dust
or flammable vapor pass, with nonferrous blades, or line the casing
with nonferrous material. Motors shall meet the proper NEC class for
the hazard (NFPA Standard No. 70). Clean and service exhaust systems on
a regular schedule. Bond and ground the entire system.
(e) Lightning protection. When lightning protection systems are
installed, the installation, inspection, and maintenance shall comply
with the NFPA Standard No. 780, at a minimum. Typically, six month
visual tests and 24-month electrical tests of installed systems are
acceptable.
(f) Static electricity and grounding. (1) Two unlike materials (at
least one of which is non-conductive) produce static electricity due to
contact and separation. Contact creates a redistribution of charge
across the area of contact and establishes an attractive force.
Separation of the materials overcomes these attractive forces and sets
up an electrostatic field between the two surfaces. If no conducting
path is available to allow the charges to equalize on the surfaces, the
voltage difference between the surfaces can easily reach several
thousand volts as they separate.
(2) The potential hazard of static electricity arises when an
accumulated electrical charge subsequently discharges as a spark in the
presence of hazardous atmospheres, flammable vapors, dusts, exposed
sensitive explosives, or electro-explosive device (EED). Electrostatic
discharge (ESD) does not present a substantial hazard during the
handling of most bulk explosive substances if the explosives are in
approved containers. It also does not present a hazard near explosives
totally contained and unexposed within loaded articles. It is not
possible to prevent the generation of static electricity entirely.
Elimination of potential ESD hazards requires proper grounding to
dissipate static charges before they accumulate to dangerous levels.
The NFPA, UL and the U.S. Department of Commerce publish detailed
discussions of the hazards of static electricity and ways of reducing
it. Where static spark discharge may be hazardous, NFPA Standard No.
77, shall apply, except as otherwise specified.
(3) Static ground system. A static ground system consists of one or
more electrodes in contact with the earth and a conductor (i.e., metal
wire) bonded to the electrode and routed throughout the protected
facility. The static ground system may use building structural steel
(unless structural steel is used as lightning protection down
conductor), metallic water pipes, ground cones, buried copper plates,
and rods driven into the earth as electrodes. The ground system shall
not use gas, steam, or air lines, dry pipe sprinkler systems, or air
terminals and down conductors of lightning protection systems as earth
electrodes. A static ground system provides a conductive path to earth
from conductive floors, conductive work surfaces, and AE equipment and
allows any generated static charges to dissipate.
(4) Testing equipment grounds. Trained personnel shall test ground
systems after installation, after repairs, and at locally determined
intervals and shall keep all records. Remove all exposed explosive or
hazardous materials from the room or area before testing. The
resistance of the electrode to earth shall not exceed 25 ohms. The
electrical resistance from any point on the conductor to the electrode
shall not exceed 1 ohm. The ground system design shall provide for
interconnecting all ground electrodes of structures equipped with a
lightning protection system.
(5) Grounding of equipment. Contractor maintenance personnel shall
bond all AE equipment (e.g., mixers, grinding mills, screening and
sifting devices, assembly and disassembly machines, conveyors,
elevators, steel work tables, presses, hoppers) to the ground system
wherever ESD presents an ignition hazard. The resistance of the AE
equipment to the grounding system shall not exceed 1 ohm. Trained
personnel shall test this resistance initially at installation and at
least semiannually thereafter, and shall keep all records. Exclude the
resistance of conductive belting when testing for resistance of belt-
driven machinery to the ground system. Bonding straps shall bridge
contact points where oil, paint, or rust could disrupt electrical
continuity. Permanent equipment in contact with conductive floors or
tabletops does not meet the bonding requirement to the ground system.
Maintain compatibility of metallic bonding and grounding cables,
straps, or clamps with the explosives involved in the process.
[[Page 16047]]
(6) Belts. Use conductive belting wherever ESD is an ignition
hazard. The resistance of conductive conveyor belts shall not exceed
one million ohms as measured between two electrodes placed on the belt
and as measured between an electrode placed on the conductive conveyor
belt and an electrode attached to the ground system. Do not use static
combs to drain off static charges generated from belts or pulleys used
in hazardous locations.
(g) Conductive floors, tabletops, and footwear. Contractors shall
use conductive tabletops and, shall use conductive floors and
conductive shoes for grounding personnel at operations involving
exposed explosives with electrostatic sensitivity of 0.1 J or less
(e.g., primer, initiator, detonator, igniter, tracer, and incendiary
mixtures). Bonding wires or straps shall connect the tabletops and
floors to the static ground system. Materials sensitive to initiation
by ESD sparks include lead styphnate, lead azide, mercury fulminate,
tetrazene, diazodinitrophenol, potassium chlorate-lead styphanate
mixtures, igniter compositions, grade B magnesium powder, and exposed
layers of black powder dust. Dust from solid propellants can be ignited
from spark energy, making conductive floors and shoes necessary where
such dust is present. Air and dust mixtures of ammonium picrate,
tetryl, tetrytol, and solid propellants are also sensitive to
initiation by ESD. Testing indicates mixtures of air with vapors from
many flammable liquids (e.g., ethyl ether, ethyl alcohol, ethyl
acetate, acetone, and gasoline) may ignite by ESD from the human body.
Therefore, contractors shall equip areas where personnel might contact
these kinds of explosives or with conductive floors and tabletops,
except when hazard analysis indicates adequate housekeeping, dust
collection, ventilation, or solvent recovery methods eliminate the
ignition hazard.
(1) Unless hazard analyses indicate otherwise, conductive
tabletops, floors, and shoes shall also protect operations involving
the following:
(i) Unpackaged detonators and primers and electro-explosive
devices.
(ii) Electrically initiated items, such as rockets, with exposed
circuit and
(iii) Hazardous materials capable of initiation by ESD from the
human body.
(2) When a hazard remains localized, the contractor may use
conductive mats or runners instead of conductive floors throughout an
entire building or room. These mats and runners shall meet all the
specifications and test requirements that apply to conductive floors.
When justified by hazard analysis, contractors may use conductive wrist
straps in place of conductive floors and shoes for grounding personnel
at small scale and isolated operations. When using wrist straps,
operators shall test wrist straps before each use (whenever removed and
re-worn) and record test results. The resistance of the wrist strap
while the operator is wearing the strap shall fall within a range of
25,000 ohms (minimum) and 1,200,000 ohms (maximum) when measured from
opposite hand to ground. Use test equipment capable of testing
1,200,000 ohms + 10%. (Note: Operators with dry skin may use special
contact creams to decrease the resistance to the required value.)
(3) Conductive floor and tabletop specifications. Conductive floors
and tabletops, made of, or covered with non-sparking materials such as
lead, conductive rubber, or conductive compositions, shall meet the
following requirements:
(i) Provide a continuous electrical path to the static ground
system and the electrical resistance shall not to exceed the limits
specified in paragraph (g)(5)(i) of this section.
(ii) Provide a reasonably smooth surface which is free from cracks.
and
(iii) Maintain compatibility of conductive floor and tabletop
materials with the energetic materials present.
(4) Conductive footwear. Operators shall wear conductive shoes in
areas requiring conductive mats, floors, or runners. Personnel visiting
such areas shall wear conductive shoes, ankle straps, or similar
devices, one on each leg. Prominent markings should identify conductive
shoes to help supervisors ensure personnel compliance. Personnel
required to work on electrical equipment in areas where conductive
floors are installed shall not wear conductive shoes and shall not
begin work until operators remove all AE.
(5) Testing conductive footwear, floors, and tabletops. (i) Test
criteria. The maximum resistance of a body, plus the resistance of the
conductive shoes, plus the resistance of the floor to the ground system
shall not exceed 1 million ohms total. That is, if 500,000 ohms is the
maximum resistance allowed from the floor to the ground system, then
500,000 ohms is the maximum combined resistance allowed for the
person's body plus the resistance of the conductive shoes (i.e.,
500,000 + 500,000 does not exceed 1 million). The contractor can set
the maximum resistance limits for the floor to the ground system and
for the combined resistance of a person's body plus the shoes, as long
as the total resistance does not exceed 1 million ohms.
(ii) To protect against electrocution, the minimum resistance of
the floor to the ground system and the minimum resistance of the
tabletop to the ground system shall exceed 11,000 ohms in areas with
110 volts service and 22,000 ohms in areas with 220 volts service. A
ground fault interrupt (GFI) circuit also meets this requirement.
(iii) Tabletop test criteria. The maximum resistance of conductive
tabletops to the ground system shall not exceed 1 million ohms.
(iv) Conductive footwear. All personnel shall test conductive
footwear daily before use to ensure that the combined resistance of the
person's body and the conductive shoes do not exceed the limit
specified in paragraph (g)(5)(i) of this section. Supervisors shall
keep documentation of all test results, including calibration of test
equipment. The test voltage of the shoe tester shall not exceed 500
volts. The short circuit current across the shoe tester electrodes
(plates) should be limited between 0.5 ma and 2.0 ma. The design of the
test instrument shall include built-in safeguards to prevent the test
subject from experiencing electric shock. Personnel shall not test
shoes in rooms or areas with exposed explosives or flammable gas
mixtures. Personnel shall not wear static generating stockings such as
silk, wool, and synthetics; and shall not use foot powders, which have
a drying action which can increase resistance. Dirt and grit increase
resistance of conductive shoes. Personnel should avoid wearing
conductive shoes outdoors and shall keep shoes clean.
(v) Trained personnel shall test conductive floors and tabletops
upon installation and at least annually thereafter using test equipment
specifically designed for this purpose and shall keep records of all
test results for at least five years. Testing shall proceed only when
the room or area is free from exposed explosives and flammable gas
mixtures. The test procedure shall measure the resistance of the floor
between an electrode attached to the ground system and an electrode
placed at any point on the floor or tabletop and also as measured
between two electrodes placed 3 ft (1 m) apart at any points on the
floor or tabletop. Each electrode shall weigh 5 lb (2.3 kg) and shall
have a dry, flat, circular contact area diameter of 2.5 in (64 mm). The
contact area shall have a surface of aluminum or tin foil which is
0.0005 in to 0.001 in (0.013 mm to 0.025 mm) thick and is backed by a
layer of rubber 0.25 in (6.4 mm) thick. The surface hardness shall
measure between 40 and 60 Shore A when measured by
[[Page 16048]]
a Shore Type A Durometer (see American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) D-2240-68, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) Standard 14 and NFPA Standard No. 99. Make both
electrode-to-electrode and electrode-to-ground system measurements at
five or more locations in each room with at least two of the points in
heavily trafficked areas. If the resistance measurement changes
appreciably with time, record the resistance at the 5-second interval.
To prevent biased measurements, locate the electrodes for both the
electrode-to-electrode and electrode-to-ground measurements a minimum
of 3 ft (1 m) away from an earth ground or other grounded items such as
a door frame, ordnance handling equipment, or any grounded item resting
on a conductive floor. (Note: The size of the floor or tabletop may
make it impractical to conduct five surface resistance (electrode-to-
electrode) or resistance-to-ground measurements and still remain 3 ft
(1 m) away from all grounded items. In such cases, take enough
measurements to ensure adequate testing of all parts of the conductive
surface and document the justification for a reduced number of
electrode-to-electrode or electrode-to-ground measurements in the
grounding system test plan.) Only trained personnel shall operate and
maintain test instruments.
(h) Handling low-energy initiators. Supplement typical precautions,
such as shielding and safety glasses, with the following measures, as
appropriate, when manufacturing, processing, using, or testing low-
energy initiators initiated by 0.1 J of energy or less.
(1) Electrically bond and ground all metal parts of equipment.
(2) Ensure personnel wear clothing which prevents generation of
static electricity. Test conductive shoes with a resistance meter
before entering an area where low-energy initiators are being
processed.
(3) When low-energy initiators are being handled, ground personnel
directly by wrist straps. The acceptable resistance reading, taken once
daily when the operator is wearing the strap, shall be between 250,000
and one million ohms when measured from opposite hand to ground.
Special contact creams may be used to decrease the resistance to the
required value.
(4) Periodically coat glass, acrylic, or polycarbonate materials
required for transparent shielding with an anti-static material to
prevent buildup of static electricity, when static sensitivity is
indicated to be a hazard.
(5) The sounding of a static electricity alarm, installed with the
setting best able to provide ample warning, signals a work stoppage
until the problem has been located and corrective action taken.
(6) Check relative humidity and temperature before starting
operations and throughout the workday where such conditions are used to
mitigate or prevent safety problems (i.e., hydroscopicity or static
control).
(7) Do not paint metal surfaces subjected to rubbing or friction.
If a lubricant is necessary, use a composition which allows the metal's
surface resistance to remain at or below 25 ohms.
(8) Work on or with low-energy initiators only in areas equipped
with conductive floors and table tops. Exceptions may be made when the
initiators are in their original packaging, or are part of a finished
metallic end item affording them complete protection from
electromagnetic or electrostatic energy.
(9) Do not work in the vicinity of actual or potential
electromagnetic or electrostatic fields (e.g., radio transmission,
electrical storms, transformer stations, high voltage transmission
lines, improperly grounded electric circuitry, rotating equipment,
belts, etc.). Establish adequate lightning protection and grounding and
adequate resistances for fixed sources of energy for locations with
low-energy initiator operations. Shield these areas to afford
protection against local mobile radio transmission.
(10) Locate electrical equipment out of the range of an operator
working with a low-energy initiator. With soldering irons, it may be
advisable to ground and limit energy to levels below initiating
thresholds.
(11) When not part of an end item or end item subassembly,
transport initiators only when packed according to the latest packing
specifications for low-energy initiators.
(i) Electrical test equipment. Use the lowest possible power source
for all electrical and electronics test equipment. When possible, use
batteries in lieu of 110 Vac power sources. During testing, do not use
power sources capable of initiating the AE. When test specifications
require using electrical energy at or above the initiating threshold
level of explosive devices, use test chambers or provide shielding
capable of containing all hazards and apply energy remotely. Provide
safeguards against the possibility of human error.
(j) Humidification and ionization. (1) Humidification which
maintains relative humidity above 60 percent effectively prevents
static electricity accumulations and subsequent discharges. This
technique involves pre-operational checks and regular monitoring of the
humidity levels throughout the day. Do not use humidification with
metallic powders unless hazard analysis indicates the powders are not
susceptible to spontaneous ignition in air with 60 percent relative
humidity.
(2) Ionization is electrical neutralization and serves as an
effective method of removing static charges from certain processes and
operations. Methods of application can be found in NFPA Standard 77.
(3) Contractors may use ionization or humidification to augment
their ESD control program but, may not use them in lieu of conductive
floors and footwear (where required).
Sec. 184.7 Manufacturing and processing propellants.
(a) General. (1) These requirements apply to propellant
manufacturing and augment other requirements contained in this part.
(2) The safety precautions for fabrication of propellants,
propellant loaded items, gun ammunition, and rocket motors follow the
generally accepted principles used for many types of explosives and
energetic materials. Solid propellants can be divided into general
categories such as single, double, and triple base, castable composite,
and modified double base composite. (e.g., castable composite
propellant modified with explosive plasticizer such as nitroglycerin).
Liquid propellants include a wide range of liquid fuels, liquid
oxidizers and fuel-oxidizer monopropellants.
(3) Although processing safety considerations for finished
propellant AE and loaded rocket motors are similar, each propellant
type has its own characteristics for processing of raw materials,
intermediate compositions, and final processing. Hazards data for
intermediate and finished propellant can help to define the
requirements that ensure safety in processing. Hazards data includes
initiation thresholds to such stimuli as impact, friction, heat, and
electrostatic discharge for specific processes and handling situations.
In evaluating and properly applying the guidelines of this chapter,
consider the response of the materials in terms of energy input
sensitivity and magnitude of energy release. Follow the general
requirements for manufacturing and processing of pyrotechnics given in
Chapter 8 for safety precautions for ignition system fabrication.
(Note: An exception to this requirement is processing of a
[[Page 16049]]
propellant grain igniter the same as motor propellant until the grain
is mated with the initiator assembly.)
(4) In addition to generally accepted safety precautions for
handling of explosives and other energetic materials, the following
paragraphs provide general guidance pertinent to the manufacturing of
propellants, propellant loaded items, gun ammunition and rocket motors.
(b) Properties of propellants. Knowledge of the properties and
types of propellants is critical to the establishment of proper hazard
controls. Propellants present a wide range of hazard characteristics
even within the various types due to variations in grain size of
ingredients and energy content of additives, both solid and liquid. As
described below, test data is essential for determining the chemical,
physical, physiological and explosive properties and hazards of raw
materials, intermediate compositions, processing aids, and liquid or
solid propellant, both uncured and cured.
(1) Single base propellants. Single base propellants have the
principal explosive ingredient of nitrocellulose. Remaining ingredients
include stabilizers as well as other additives. The mixture is shaped
into tubes, perforated tubes, flakes, etc. by extrusion and cutting.
(2) Double base propellants. Double base propellants contain
nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine (or other liquid nitrate ester) as
the two main ingredients. Remaining ingredients include stabilizers as
well as other additives. This propellant can be extruded/cut or cast
into its final shape.
(3) Triple base propellants. Triple base propellants contain three
main components: nitrocellulose, nitroglycerine (or other liquid nitric
acid ester), and nitroguanidine. This propellant can be extruded, cut
or cast into its final shape.
(4) Composite propellants. Composite propellants consist of finely
divided oxidizers dispersed in fuel matrix with the binder normally
being made of plastic material. Nitrates and perchlorates are commonly
used as oxidizers. Common binders include: hydroxyl terminated
polybutadiene, carboxyl terminated polybutadiene, polybutadiene-
acrylonitrile, polyurethane, polybutadieneacrylic acid, and
polysulfides. This propellant is typically cast into its final shape.
(5) Composite modified double base propellants. Composite modified
double base propellants contain a dispersed phase of finely ground
oxidizer and usually powdered fuel additive. This propellant is
typically cast into its final shape.
(6) Liquid propellants. Liquid propellants include a wide range of
liquid fuels, liquid oxidizers and fuel-oxidizer monopropellants.
(Note: Refer to the DOD 6055.9-STD, 9.6 for more information and
requirements associated with specific liquid propellants.
(c) In-process hazards. (1) During scale up from research and
development of new propellants to an existing manufacturing process,
determine the chemical, physical, physiological, explosive properties,
and hazards of raw materials, intermediate compositions, processing
aids, and liquid or solid propellant, both uncured and cured.
(2) Unless available from other sources, conduct testing to
determine thermal stability, chemical compatibility of ingredients,
exothermic reactions, and sensitivity to ignition or detonation from
friction, impact, and electrostatic discharge. Additionally,
deflagration-to-detonation and card gap test data can be valuable.
Applicable tests are described in TB 700-2, Explosives Hazard
Classification Procedures.
(3) Minimum testing may satisfy the classification requirements for
several in-process operations. For example:
(i) If reliable data exist that indicate that the propellant mixing
operations are H/D 1.1, no testing would be needed to adopt this
classification.
(ii) If testing shows that uncured propellant will detonate, the
casting and curing operations are HD 1.1 hazards.
(iii) If detonation tests show that the cured propellant will
detonate, all operations with cured or curing propellant are HD 1.1
hazards.
(4) Make safety information for all materials used in the
formulation available as required. Train personnel on the hazards
involved in propellant process situations.
(d) Q-D requirements. Operate new manufacturing and support
facilities for processing of propellants and propellant loaded items to
conform to the latest QD requirements for the HD of the propellant in
its in-process condition.
(e) Separation of operations and buildings. (1) Perform propellant
and rocket motor manufacturing and processing in special areas (i.e.,
operating lines) whose boundaries are separated from all other areas
outside the line in accordance with applicable QD criteria. Table 1 to
Sec. 184.7 provides remote control and personnel protection
requirements for certain propellant processing operations.
(2) Generally treat sequential operations on rocket motors as one
process operation in one building.
(3) When the hazard classification of a propellant has not been
established, classify the propellant during site and construction
planning as the most hazardous class/division that might possibly apply
during manufacturing and processing.
(4) Locate safety shelters, lunchrooms, convenience buildings, and
private vehicle parking for personnel working in an operating building
in accordance with applicable QD criteria.
Table 1 to Sec. 184.7.--Control and Personnel Protection Requirements
for Certain Propellant Processing Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Personnel
Operation Remote control protected \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blending and screening of Mandatory......... Mandatory.
ammonium perchlorate.
Blending, screening of nitramines Mandatory \2\..... Mandatory.\2\
and Mandatory perchlorates other
than ammonium.
Grinding, and mechanized drying Mandatory......... Mandatory.
of perchlorates and nitramines.
Grinding, blending, screening, Advisory.......... Advisory.
and mechanized drying of
ammonium nitrates.
Rotating blade propellant mixing. Mandatory......... Mandatory.\4\
Power-driven cutting, machining, Mandatory \3\..... Mandatory.\3\
sawing, planing, drilling, or
other unconfined operations in
which rocket motors or
propellant of Hazard Division
1.1 and 1.3 are involved.\2\
Mandrel break away removal from Mandatory \3\..... Mandatory.\3\
cured propellant.
Pressing, extruding, pelletizing Mandatory......... Mandatory.
or blending.
Casting Propellants.............. Mandatory \3\..... Mandatory.\3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Operating personnel shall be at K24 or in a control room that will
limit overpressure to less than 2.3 psi.
[[Page 16050]]
\2\ Attended screening of wet material may take place if shown
acceptable by hazard analysis.
\3\ Attended operation permitted if shown to be acceptable by hazard
analysis.
\4\ The attended operation may take place when a hazard analysis shows
the MCE to only be fire hazard.
(f) Equipment and facilities. (1) Except as provided for in other
applicable documentation, follow the mandatory requirements of this
part for the design, layout, and operation of facilities and equipment
for propellant operations. Where there is no guidance, govern
operations by the results of hazard tests and analyses (see Sec.
184.12) performed and documented to address specific operations. As
some propellants can be sensitive to initiation by static electricity,
consider bonding and grounding of equipment, tooling, and rocket motor
conductive components along with other means of static elimination and
control. Use conductive work surfaces and floors or floor mats for
assembly of igniters and igniter subassemblies.
(2) Use non-sparking and non-rusting materials, which are
chemically compatible with the propellant material, for equipment,
tooling, and machinery that will come in contact with propellant or
propellant ingredients.
(3) Certain propellant operations involve significant energy input
that enhances the possibility of ignition. Examples are rolling mills,
machining and drilling operations. In these situations, conduct
complete hazard analysis and evaluation prior to starting the
operation.
(4) Special requirements of this part apply to heat-conditioning
equipment.
(5) Exposed radiant surfaces in the form of S-shaped smooth pipe or
fin-type radiators are easy to clean. Other types of radiators are
acceptable, but are less desirable because of cleaning difficulties.
(6) When mechanical ventilating equipment is used in operations
involving potential concentrations of solvent vapors, dusts, and
nitroester vapors, do not locate the electric motor and motor controls
directly in the potentially contaminated air stream. Provide the
ventilation system with a suitable means of collecting condensate.
(7) Design air conditioning and cure oven air-circulating equipment
of the closed system type to prevent contaminated air from contacting
the air motor and controls. Monitor recirculated air to ensure
concentration of vapors and dusts do not reach flammable (or
explosive), or personnel threshold limits. Use dustproof and vaporproof
electric motors and controls. Preferably use air mover blades that are
nonmetallic.
(8) Rigidly fix and stabilize the equipment during mixing to
preclude contact between fixed and movable parts. Design mix bowl lift
mechanisms (i.e., elevators) to assure adequate blade-to-blade and
blade-to-bowl clearances during the complete operation cycle.
(9) Provide positive controls to physically block or stop bowl or
mixer head movement in case of drive mechanism malfunction. Assure
maintenance of blade-to-blade and blade-to-bowl clearance at all times.
(10) Use rigid and strong mix blades and shaft to ensure minimum
flex from viscosity of the mix and speed of the shaft.
(11) Use electrical components of all mixers that meet the
appropriate electrical classification or remotely locate them or shroud
and purge them with inert gas. Design purged systems to provide
automatic warning upon loss of gas pressure.
(12) Equip mixer blade shafts with seals or packing glands that
prevent migration of liquids or solvent vapors into bearings. Avoid
submerged bearings and packing glands. However, if used periodically
test them for contamination and clean them.
(13) Establish a program to detect significant changes in blade/
shaft position relative to mixer head. Check clearances between mix
blades and mixer bowls at regular intervals based on operating time and
experience to make sure the clearance is adequate. Maintain a record of
such checks, mixer blade adjustments, and any damage to the mixer
blades and bowls.
(14) Electrically bond and ground mix bowl, blades, and drive unit.
(15) Inspect blades and other moving parts of new mixers and
replacement parts for old mixers. Inspect (i.e., magnaflux or X-ray)
for cracks, crevices, and other flaws.
(16) Interlock electric service to propellant mixers with fire
protection system controls so that the mixer cannot start when the fire
protection system is inoperative.
(17) Regularly check and maintain all process equipment that
applies energy to in-process propellant for wear and misalignment. Keep
a record of these checks and any maintenance performed for the process
equipment.
(18) Control equipment performing sequential operations on
propellants (e.g., extrusion and cutting) to prevent interference.
(g) In-process quantities and storage. (1) Allow only the quantity
of propellant and loaded subassemblies needed to ensure a safe and
efficient workflow, when conducting operations in an operating
building. Short-term storage of larger quantities in an operating
building is permissible when it is not in use for other operations.
(2) Completed assemblies with or without installed ignition system
may be stored in operating buildings provided there are no other
operations in progress and quantity/distance complies with
requirements.
(3) Production igniters may be stored in designated areas within an
assembly or disassembly facility.
(4) Indoor storage is preferable for all types of explosives and is
mandatory for bulk HE, solid propellants, and pyrotechnics. Give
priority of existing indoor storage to AE requiring the most protection
from the weather (based on the method of packing). Protect propellant
and propellant materials from overheating by exposure to direct
sunlight when in transit or on temporary hold.
(5) Consider the propulsive characteristics and the ignition
probability of AE (e.g., propellant loaded devices, rocket motors,
assist take-off units and missiles) during all logistical phases in
order to obtain as much safety as possible under the circumstances.
Because of the great number of types and sizes of propellant loaded
devices and conditions of assembly encountered, only general safety
guidance is provided in this part. Thus, the contractor should make
every effort to prevent ignition of any units being manufactured,
assembled, disassembled, handled, stored, transported or deployed. Use
approved flight restraining devices (tie-downs) to the maximum extent
possible. When doubt exists as to whether a given AE or configuration
(state of assembly) is propulsive or nonpropulsive, treat the AE as
propulsive until pertinent technical information can be obtained.
(h) Ingredients processing. (1) Weighing, measuring, and handling
raw materials. (i) Electrically ground scales for weighing raw
materials, where needed, to properly protect the operation. This
grounding is especially important where flammable or combustible
materials are involved.
(ii) Provide separate weight or measurement rooms, cubicles, or
areas (dependent upon the quantity and sensitivity of the materials
handled) provided. Separate oxidizer and metallic powder weighing from
each
[[Page 16051]]
other and from other materials by physical barriers rather than
distance.
(iii) It is important that containers, equipment, hand tools, scale
pans, etc., used for weighing processes do not mix with those weighing
or measuring oxidizers and fuels, particularly where distance rather
than physical barriers separates these areas. Use positive measures to
ensure the complete separation of such equipment and tools.
(iv) Do not change the designated use of space and equipment
without a thorough cleaning and inspection to make sure that all traces
of the previous material have been removed, if any possibility exists
that materials are incompatible.
(2) Oxidizer Processing. Solid propellant oxidizing agents are
perchlorates, nitrates, nitroesters, and nitramines used in solid
rocket motor propellants.
(i) Avoid contaminating an oxidizer agent with any metal or
chemical (fuel) which may result in a more sensitive composition.
(ii) Use closed systems as much as possible for dust, humidity, and
tramp material control.
(iii) Use fire-retardant materials to make flexible connections
(socks) in pipes or duct systems that convey oxidizer materials and
dust socks in collectors or hoppers. Only use connection materials that
are chemically compatible with the oxidizers.
(iv) Make the pipes and duct systems electrically continuous. Avoid
threaded joints and fittings in contact with oxidizer. Preferably use
quick clamp neuter end pipe joints.
(v) Use static electricity control measures to dissipate static
charges to an acceptable level if transporting oxidizer by
fluidization.
(3) Oxidizer drying. (i) Establish the safe temperature for drying
each material and do not exceed that temperature at any point in the
drying apparatus or drying room.
(ii) Use thermostatic controls to prevent exceeding the maximum
safe temperature in the drying process. Install and use redundant
temperature controls.
(iii) Do not use electrical heating elements that may contact the
oxidizer or oxidizer dust.
(iv) Hold dust to a minimum in the drying process. Use a dust
collection system if dusting can create a potential hazard.
(v) Exercise care to prevent drying of incompatible materials
simultaneously in the same drying process. Do not dry oxidizers in an
oven, drying room, etc., used for processing flammable or other
incompatible materials until after cleaning and inspection shows it is
free of any residual contamination.
(4) Screening oxidizers. (i) Construct screening equipment so it
cannot subject oxidizer material to pinching, friction, or impact as a
result of metal-to-metal contact. Keep rooms in which screening units
are operated thoroughly clean to eliminate hazardous accumulations of
dust.
(ii) Electrically ground oxidizer screens and bond them to the
receiving vessel.
(5) Blending oxidizers. (i) If blending of oxidizers generates
gases, design and install a suitable means of gas pressure relief into
the blender.
(ii) Electrically bond the blender throughout.
(iii) Construct blending equipment so it cannot subject oxidizer
material to pinching, friction, or impact between metal-to-metal
surfaces.
(iv) When blending ammonium perchlorate using powered mechanical
equipment, protect operating personnel. Use remote controls for
mechanical blending.
(v) When using powered mechanical methods for blending HD 1.1
substances (such as RDX or HMX), use remote controls and personnel
protection (See Note 1 to Table 1 to Sec. 184.7).
(6) Grinding oxidizers. (i) When using impact type mills, provide
sufficient clearance between stationary and moving parts to prevent
metal-to-metal contact. Check clearances as often as needed to ensure
they are adequate. Air purge mill bearings to prevent contamination. Do
not use impact type grinders for HD 1.1 substances.
(ii) Pass oxidizer feed materials through a screen mesh with
openings no greater than the clearance between hammer and plate. Use
the smallest screen mesh size for ammonium nitrate that allows free
flow of the prills. Use magnetic separators if screening is not
possible.
(iii) Use only compatible lubricants in grinding equipment.
(iv) Install and use heat sensing devices for the bearing housing
of grinding and conditioning equipment.
(v) Determine the optimum cleaning cycle and method for grinding
equipment and include them in SOP.
(vi) Provide grinding operations with wet dust collection systems,
where appropriate.
(vii) Thoroughly ground and bond pneumatic grinding operations to
provide for electrostatic charge dissipation.
(7) Preparation of fuel compositions. (i) Determine the sensitivity
characteristics of fuel compositions prior to production mixing
operations.
(ii) Establish compatibility of materials. Develop procedures that
preclude the formation of highly sensitive compositions or hazardous
conditions during processing, such as, dry AP and powdered metal
mixtures.
(iii) Preferably bond equipment, piping, and vessels used in fuel
preparation to form a continuous electrical path with each other and to
building ground. When pouring metallic powder or flammable liquids from
one container to another, bond the containers together prior to the
transfer.
(iv) Minimize the formation and accumulation of dust in all
preparation operations.
(v) Use fume hoods, dust socks, closed systems, and dust/fume
vacuum exhaust hoses, as appropriate, to prevent vapors and dust
getting into the operating areas.
(8) Transfer operations. (i) Transfer finely divided powdered
ingredients by methods that control flow rate and minimize
electrostatic charge generation.
(ii) Before transferring flammable solvents, electrically bond the
transfer and receiving vessels to eliminate electrostatic potential
differences.
(i) Mixing. (1) Secure hardware and associated equipment to prevent
loose items falling into mixers.
(2) Pass liquids and powders to be added to the mix vessels through
a screen or orifice with an opening(s) less than the smallest clearance
in the mixer. You may directly add smaller amounts of material,
provided a positive means exists to ensure the material does not
contain any foreign material.
(3) Use other means such as x-rays to examine materials that you
cannot screen or that are opaque or not easily inspected.
(4) When consistent with the process system and requirements, cover
the mixer bowl after completing charging or mixing to prevent the
accidental introduction of foreign objects into the mixer and to
prevent sunlight impinging directly on the materials in the bowl.
(5) Use only non-sparking devices for hand scrapping the sides and
blades of mixers. Set up controls to prevent accidental introduction of
these and other devices into the mixer.
(6) Account for all loose tools and equipment before starting or
continuing mixing operations.
(7) Do not allow loose objects such as jewelry, pens and coins in
the mixer operating area where accidental introduction into the mixers
might occur. Pocketless coveralls should be used.
[[Page 16052]]
(8) Provide direct and unobstructed routes for personnel egress
from mixer buildings or bays.
(9) Do not attempt to fight propellant fires.
(10) Preferably equip propellant mixers, inside and outside of the
mixing vessel, with a high-speed deluge system.
(j) Casting and curing. (1) Personnel may attend cast operations if
you first conduct a thorough safety review of the operation is
conducted.
(2) Multiple or single production line type casting is permitted.
However, when the survivability of the production facility is critical
or the risk to the program is significant, the PCO may require the
contractor to provide protection that prevents propagation of an
incident from the casting operation to adjacent bells or pits.
(3) Use only smooth cast piping surfaces in contact with
propellant. Use tooling free of cracks, pits crevices, and weld slag
for propellant casting and curing operations. Avoid threaded joints as
much as possible, especially at unions requiring disassembly for
process operation or cleaning.
(4) Do not design or use cast tooling and mandrels that permit
metal-to-metal friction or impact sites.
(5) Design and use propellant flow valves that prevent propellant
pinching or compression between two metal surfaces.
(6) Design and use pressurized casting vessels capable of
withstanding at least twice the maximum allowable working pressure.
(7) Secure lids to pressurized casting vessels so that they will
withstand the rated pressures of the vessels.
(8) Do not exceed the working line pressure of casting vessels.
Install a relief valve downstream of the regulator on pressure lines.
(9) Equip each vessel with a blowout disk (burst diaphragm)
designed to blow out at less than 120% of the vessel's maximum
allowable working pressure. Allow for the release of the potential
rapid rise of pressure in the vessel should the propellant ignite.
(10) When curing or casting propellant under pressure, provide
emergency pressure relief.
(11) Pressurize and depressurize propellant cure operations
remotely.
(12) Physically and electrically disconnect casting vessels from
lifting devices during cast operations.
(k) Extrusion processes. (1) Design solventless extrusion presses
and compression molding equipment to remove air from the propellant
before compaction and extrusion begin. Assure that procedures provide
for checking operation of the vacuum system and for cleaning it of
propellant residue and condensed vapors such as those generated from
nitroglycerin volatilization.
(2) Check ramheads for alignment with the press bore to preclude
metal-to-metal contact. Include flashing removal in the process
procedures.
(3) Provide interlocks to preclude press operation during loading
or other attended operations.
(l) Propellant loaded AE. (1) When performing operations on cured
propellant contained in pressure vessels or rocket motor cases and
there may be a risk of ignition due to energy inputs (e.g., electrical
check of pyrotechnic devices). In such cases, secure the unit in a
fixture capable of withstanding 2.5 times the rated thrust of the
assembly.
(2) Use remote control to apply mechanical force to ``breakaway''
the mandrel or other tooling embedded in propellant. However, see Table
1 to Sec. 184.7 for exceptions.
(3) Avoid moving loaded rocket motors with cores in place. If
loaded motors containing cores must be moved, however, support the core
and motor case by or suspended from a common source or in some manner
locked or tied together to prevent independent movement of either.
(4) When determining the safest method to use, evaluate and
consider the hazard characteristics of individual propellants you will
cut, machine, or contour.
(5) Design propellant machining equipment:
(i) To prevent contact of cutting tools or blades with motor cases
and other metal objects.
(ii) To minimize generation of heat.
(iii) To facilitate removal of dust and chips, and to afford
personnel protection. If there is a possibility that a metal or other
foreign object may be in the propellant, x-ray the motor or grain prior
to machining.
(6) Frequently remove propellant dust, chips and shavings from the
work area during machining and contouring.
(7) Preferably position rocket motors in final assembly process to
permit ready access to all sides of the motor. Keep aisles and exit
doors clear and unobstructed. Install quick release hardware on all
exit doors.
(8) Keep the number of items in the final assembly building at the
minimum consistent with a safe and efficient operation.
(9) Grounding of propellant loaded assemblies in storage is
optional, based on a case-by-case review.
(10) If the process requires removing an igniter-shorting clip,
keep the igniter shorted until immediately before insertion. Minimize
the time that the igniter remains unshorted.
(11) Provide means for controlled dissipation of static electrical
charges during igniter insertion.
(12) Conduct operations that involve electrical continuity
checking/testing of ignition systems installed in rocket motors
according to thoroughly reviewed and approved procedures. Conduct these
checks by remote control with the motor mounted in a test stand
designed to withstand 2.5 times the thrust of the motor.
(m) Disassembly. (1) As much as possible, avoid metal-to-metal
movement and trapping of explosive substance in process equipment or
tooling that require disassembly in a process operation.
(2) Use clean, external clamp fittings on pipe assemblies for
propellant transfer.
(3) Before starting non-routine disassembly of equipment or tooling
(such as that necessary for equipment repair or for securing the
process), evaluate potential hazards of trapped material or process
residuals.
Table 1-1 to Sec. 184.7.--Control and Personnel Protection
Requirements for Certain Propellant Processing Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Personnel
Operation Remote controls protected \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blending and screening of Mandatory......... Mandatory.
ammonium perchlorate.
Blending, screening of nitramines Mandatory \2\..... Mandatory.\2\
and perchlorates other than
ammonium.
Grinding, and mechanized drying Mandatory......... Mandatory.
of perchlorates and nitramines.
Grinding, blending, screening, Advisory.......... Advisory.
and mechanized drying of
ammonium nitrates.
Rotating blade propellant mixing. Mandatory......... Mandatory.\4\
[[Page 16053]]
Power-driven cutting, machining, Mandatory \3\..... Mandatory.\3\
sawing, planing, drilling, or
other unconfined operations in
which rocket motors or
propellant of Hazard Division
1.1 and 1.3 are involved \2\.
Mandrel break away removal from Mandatory \3\..... Mandatory.\3\
cured propellant.
Pressing, extruding, pelletizing Mandatory......... Mandatory.
or blending.
Casting propellants.............. Mandatory \3\..... Mandatory.\3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Operating personnel shall be at K24 or in a control room that will
limit overpressure to less than 2.3 psi.
\2\ Attended screening of wet material may take place if shown
acceptable by hazard analysis.
\3\ Attended operation permitted if shown to be acceptable by hazard
analysis.
\4\ The attended operation may take place when a hazard analysis shows
the maximum credible event (MCE) to only be fire hazard. For guidance
on ENERGETIC (PROPELLANT) LIQUIDS, please refer to DoD 6055.9, Section
9.5.
Sec. 184.8 Safety requirements for manufacturing and processing
pyrotechnics.
(a) General. (1) Pyrotechnics, as well as propellants and
explosives, are chemical mixtures which release large amounts of
energy. The amount of energy released, the speed of reaction, and the
form of the output energy are the characteristics that distinguish
between pyrotechnics and other forms of high-energy (HE) mixtures, and
between types of pyrotechnics. The safety precautions for manufacturing
and processing pyrotechnics parallel those of many types of explosives
and propellants. However, incident mitigation techniques must recognize
the unique characteristics of the particular mixtures, and not rely on
techniques appropriate to other types of explosive substances (e.g.,
HE). Rates of reaction of pyrotechnic mixtures vary greatly, from
mixtures with very low rates of reaction to rates equivalent to high
explosives. Energy output also varies from very low to very great.
Process variables, such as ingredient particle size, can affect
reaction rate and output to the extent that a change in process
variables can negate protective measures. Complicating safety in
pyrotechnics operations is the variety of highly flammable solvents
often used as processing aides.
(2) Pyrotechnics are mixtures of fuels and oxidizers, typically
held together by binders. Pyrotechnics display many different
characteristics, because they are formulated for different purposes.
General categories of pyrotechnics are: initiators (igniters);
illuminants; smokes. gas generators; sound generators; heat producers;
and timing compositions. Each has its own characteristics and attendant
processing requirements.
(b) Properties of pyrotechnic materials and mixtures. Knowledge of
the various pyrotechnic properties is critical to the establishment of
proper hazard controls.
(1) Oxidizers. Oxidizers are oxygen rich substances which decompose
to liberate oxygen gas, or substances which act as oxidizers with
active metal fuels. Typical inorganic oxidizers are nitrates,
chlorates, perchlorates, oxides, chromates, and dichromates. Fluorine
and chlorine, as in hexachloroethane and Teflon (brand of fluorine
containing compound) are examples of organic compounds used as
oxidizers. All oxidizers, if not well controlled, tend to increase the
risk of undesired reactions, particularly in the presence of organic
materials (including wood). Potassium chlorate compositions are
particularly susceptible to accidental ignition. Impurities in process
materials, or introduced by poor process control (e.g., oils,
lubricants) can readily increase the sensitivity of mixtures or result
in ignition. Some oxidizers with trace impurities, or by themselves
(i.e., ammonium perchlorate (AP)), can detonate when subjected to
severe stimuli such as an adjacent explosion or thermal energy. Safety
requires absolute control of oxidizers to prevent contamination,
uncontrolled moisture absorption (many are hydroscopic), fires or
explosions from accidental mixing with fuels.
(2) Fuels. Fuels react with the oxidizers to produce heat and an
oxidized product. It is the proper pairing of the fuel with an
appropriate oxidizer that determines the reaction characteristics, and
the use for the mixtures. Metals, such as magnesium or aluminum, create
high heat or light output. Fuels include an almost unlimited variety of
organic (sugars and red gum) and a more limited variety of inorganic
materials (e.g., sulfur boron, phosphorus, and sulfides). Although
generally more stable than oxidizers, fuels also have unique
characteristics that contribute to risk. These include the liberation
of hydrogen from magnesium and aluminum powders which become wetted.
Again, storage and handling of fuels requires tight process controls
which respect the characteristics of the specific materials and prevent
contamination which may result in a reaction.
(3) Binders. Homogeneity of the mixtures governs the effectiveness
of pyrotechnic compositions. Some pyrotechnics (e.g., black powder) are
self-bound by the manufacturing process to maintain the charcoal,
sulfur, and potassium nitrate in the correct, proportionate, intimate
mixture needed. Other mixtures, because of differences in particle size
or weight of ingredients, require the use of a binder to retain the
homogeneous blend. Other binders include lacquers, epoxies, and a
variety of polymers activated by heat or solvents. Some solvents are
similar in composition to fuels, and the binder may also be a fuel or
burn rate modifier. Some binders are flammable, others require the use
of a highly flammable solvent, and thus the ignition characteristics of
these materials are important risk factors.
(4) Types of pyrotechnic compositions. Pyrotechnic compositions are
usually grouped by the function of the end item. There is no universal
single grouping, but typical major groupings are: heat and delay
compositions (e.g., ignition, delay, heat, and propellant), color and
light compositions, smoke (e.g., obscuring and signal smokes, noise).
The range of sensitivity to initiation and the rate/amount of output
energy varies greatly both within and between groups.
(i) Heat and delay compositions. Pyrotechnic fuzes, electric
matches, first fires, primers, igniters, delay compositions are all
members of this group. The end products must function with very little
stimulus, and thus the mixtures, as well as individual ingredients, are
sensitive to initiation. First fire, igniter and primer mixtures are
generally the most sensitive to initiation stimuli (i.e., heat,
friction, impact, static electricity). (Note: Primer mixes containing
initiating explosives such as lead azide or lead styphnate are properly
classed as explosives.) These
[[Page 16054]]
mixtures often use black powder or potassium chlorate/metal
combinations or potassium chlorate/phosphorous mixtures. This group
also contains mixtures with high heat outputs for such purposes as
document destroyers and welding. These high heat producers are
generally metallic fuels and metallic oxidizers, as in the iron oxide/
aluminum powder formulations for Thermite. Black powder, when used to
launch or expel items is a propellant and is included in this group.
(ii) Color or light producing compositions. There are a wide
variety of mixes and compositions which produce light, color, or both.
Illuminant candles, photoflash, decoy flares all are part of this very
broad category. Many of the compositions, notably the photoflash and
decoy flare compositions, are characterized by very rapid reactions,
and extreme temperature outputs. Both have resulted in fatal accidents.
Metallic fuels are characteristic of the high light (visible, IR)
output mixtures. Output temperatures exceeding 2000 [deg]F (1093
[deg]C) characterize many of the items in this category. Accidental
initiation of large mix batches of some compositions may have a
significant pressurization effect in addition to the heat, with
resultant structural damage.
(iii) Smoke and noise producing compositions. Obscurants, colored
markers, weapons simulators and weapons effects simulators comprise
this category. Smoke compositions are characteristically slow burning
in finished form, but must burn at a temperature high enough to
vaporize the dye compound (usually organic). Chlorates are often the
oxidizer in colored smoke mixes. ``Flash-bang compositions'' used in
weapons simulators and weapons effects simulators are actually
explosives in most instances, and will detonate with adequate stimulus
in unconfined bulk form. ``Flash-bang'' compositions, particularly in
display or commercial fireworks, but also in military items, were the
cause of many injury-producing accidents. Similarly, ``whistle''
compositions are very sensitive to ignition and can detonate.
(c) Process requirements. Pyrotechnic operations, because of the
sensitive nature of the ingredients and compositions, the dangerous
effects of contamination, including cross contamination of oxidizers
and fuels, and the amount of open or exposed ingredients and mixtures,
require stringent housekeeping and cleanliness. Materials control and
cleanliness are mandatory not only to reduce the likelihood of
accidental initiations, but also to minimize the effects of a mishap.
(1) Do not allow ingredient or composition dusts to accumulate,
whether on the exterior work surfaces or the interior of process
equipment and ventilation systems. (Note: Accident investigations
frequently identify dust buildups as the source of initiation when
items are dropped on, or scraped across them.) Dust accumulations also
provide a propagation path, which can follow from initiation to a
significant source of material, causing an accident.
(2) Similarly, where flammable solvents are part of the process,
positive vapor control is mandatory to prevent initiation of a solvent
vapor cloud, which may be injurious in itself, or may be the
propagation path which ignites a mixture. Just as dusts in ventilation
systems may provide a propagation path for an event, solvent vapors in
ventilation systems, hallways, conduits, or pipes may also provide a
propagation path.
(3) As many pyrotechnic ingredients, mixtures or the solvents used
in their production are highly susceptible to initiation by static
electricity, static control systems (i.e., conductive floors/mats,
shoes, wrist straps, grounding of equipment, etc.) are mandatory where
hazard analysis indicates a need for static control.
(4) For all pyrotechnic operations, a documented hazard analysis
and risk assessment is mandatory to validate the layout of operations,
selection of materials and equipment, and process control parameters.
See Sec. 184.11.
(5) Weighing raw materials. Positive means of separation of fuels
and oxidizers is mandatory. The scale of the operation will dictate
whether separate rooms, cubicles, areas, or other means for separation
are required. It is important that equipment (e.g., containers, hand
tools, scale pans, etc.) used for weighing fuels or oxidizers are not
interchanged or shared among incompatible operations, unless thoroughly
cleaned between fuel and oxidizer use, particularly where distance
rather than physical barriers separates these areas. A hazard analysis
shall determine appropriate personnel protective equipment for
personnel weighing or handling exposed oxidizers or fuels.
(6) Drying materials. Drying materials may result in the generation
of flammable vapors or dust which have the potential to create an
explosive atmosphere. The dust settling out of the atmosphere may
increase in sensitivity. Operational hazard analysis must address these
possibilities and the possibility of initiation by over-temperature or
extended heating. Use the minimum temperature necessary for drying
component and pyrotechnic materials. Dust and residue control is very
important in drying operations, as elevated temperatures frequently
results in increased sensitivity of materials. The requirements for
drying apparatus are described in Sec. 184.8.
(7) Mixing and blending. Mixing, blending, and cleanup of
pyrotechnic compositions from equipment apparatus require attention
because of the high potential for mishaps during these operations. As
compositions vary, no single type of mixer or blender can be the
exclusively approved equipment for pyrotechnic mixing and blending
operations.
(i) Select the mixing equipment and methods appropriate for each
composition. Hazard analysis or test shall determine the type of mixer
or blender and batch size. Devices using a tumbling action eliminate
many of the problems associated with rotating blade mixers, plows and
scrapers. Rotating blade type mixers create points where frictional
heat may develop or where accidentally introduced foreign material can
create hot spots through friction or crushing of the composition. Equip
enclosed mixers and blenders with pressure relief, to preclude a
transition from burning to detonation. Minimize personnel exposure when
charging and emptying mixers and blenders. Unless hazard analysis
indicates otherwise, charge, operate and empty mixers and blenders
remotely. Use appropriate interlocks, clutch brakes, and similar
devices to preclude personnel exposure during mixer or blender
operation, and to preclude the movement of mixer or blender parts
during periods when operators are present.
(ii) Mixing and blending operations often present a high risk of
explosion. Facility construction and procedural controls, guided by
hazard analysis or test, must reflect this risk. Prevention of
propagation, protection of production capability and personnel require
separation and isolation of these operations. At least one wall or
equivalent panel area in each bay shall be frangible to provide
pressure relief in case of an incident. Preclude personnel exposure to
pressure relief areas.
(iii) Flammable solvents used in mixing operations present a
potential fire or explosion vapor hazard. When flammable solvents are
used, install ventilation equipment, interlocked to the mixers. Design
interlocks to preclude mixer operation without ventilation. Ventilation
systems must operate in the presence of solvent vapors. Vapor sensors
provide warning
[[Page 16055]]
of flammable vapor levels approaching the lower explosive limit. Design
ventilation systems to prevent propagation of an incident from one bay
to others served by the same system.
(iv) Prohibit direct viewing of blender or mixer operations. Use
remote means such as television or mirrors, or interpose transparent
shields.
(v) Prohibit part mixing, blending or scraping of pyrotechnic
composition.
(vi) The following are the minimum criteria for rotating-blade
mixing operations:
(A) Assure the stability of mixers, and platforms, to prevent
distortion during operation and resultant contact between the bowl and
blade.
(B) Provide positive controls to physically block or stop bowl or
blender head movement in case of malfunction to assure maintenance of
clearances between mixer bowl and blades.
(C) Mixer blades and shaft shall be rigid and structurally strong
to ensure minimum flex from weight of the mix and speed of the shaft.
(D) All mixer electrical components shall meet the appropriate NFPA
Standard No. 70 electrical classification.
(E) The mixer blade shaft shall include adequate and compatible
seals or packing glands to prevent migration of mix or solvent vapor
into bearings. Submerged bearings and packing glands should be avoided.
If used, periodically test packing glands and bearings for
contamination and clean them as necessary.
(F) Establish a maintenance program to monitor wear in the mixer
blade shaft and bearings to avoid excess play. Maintain a record of
such checks, mixer blade adjustments, and any damage to the mixer
blades and bowls. Perform operational checks of blade/plow and bowl
clearances prior to the introduction of materials.
(G) Procedures must exclude dry mixing. Starting the mix with dry
pockets of materials has been the cause of several serious accidents.
Unless adequate amounts of solvent are added in an appropriate sequence
with dry ingredients, pockets of dry mix may remain after solvent
addition.
(H) Interlock power to mixers with fire protection system controls
so that the mixer cannot start when the fire protection system is
inoperative.
(I) Maintain grounding during charging or discharging of mixes.
(J) Maintain torque limits or amperage overload protection.
(K) Maintain appropriate solvent traps for vacuum mixing.
(8) Pressing, extruding, and pelleting. (i) Few pressing,
extruding, or pelleting operations are sufficiently safe to operate
without personnel and facility protective features. Omit protective
features only when documented hazard analysis supports direct personnel
involvement. Use substantial dividing walls, barricades, operational
shields or intraline distance (ILD) to protect personnel from pressing,
extruding or pelleting operations. (Note: ILD alone does not provide
adequate personnel protection. For personnel protection by separation
alone, use public traffic route distance (PTRD).) When it is necessary
to repair, adjust, or otherwise clear a jam on a press or extruder,
remove the pyrotechnic material from the hopper and the bay or press
room before making such repairs or adjustments. Only those adjustments
of ram speed or conveyor speed routinely controlled by the operator may
proceed with material in the bay. Under no circumstances shall repair
or adjustment require the use of tools with pyrotechnic material in the
bay.
(ii) Limit the quantity of composition at the pressing location
behind the barricade to that required for the components undergoing the
pressing operation. Separate all other quantities in the bay to prevent
propagation from an event in the press. The quantity of composition in
the remainder of the building at any one time shall not exceed the
minimum required for a safe, efficient operation.
(iii) Each individual press, extruder, or loading device shall be
located in a separate building, room, or cubicle, and be designed to
limit an incident to that area and protect operators. Tests or a hazard
analysis may be used to demonstrate that multiple operations in a bay
or cubicle do not jeopardize personnel or the facility. Due to the
difficulty in positively excluding propagation to feed hoppers or
similar feeds to the equipment, designs for pressure relief in case of
an incident must include the quantities in such hoppers when present.
(9) Assembly operations. Cleanliness and isolation are important
safety requirements for assembly operations. Keep individual assembly
operations separate from other assembly, mixing, blending, and
consolidation operations. Use separate cubicles, bays, or buildings as
dictated by hazard analysis. To reduce the possibility of accidental
initiation, keep pyrotechnic compositions (including fuels and
oxidizers) in closed or covered containers at all times, except during
physical processing (i.e., requiring access to the material). This is
especially important when materials are accumulating or in transit
between operations. Limit quantities of pyrotechnics, including those
in components to the smallest quantity necessary for safe and efficient
operations.
(10) Granulation, grinding and screening. Operations which reduce
particle size are particularly hazardous due to the energy imparted to
a material with an increasing surface area, including dusts. The
materials are often in their most sensitive form during these
operations.
(i) Remove foreign materials using mechanical or magnetic screening
from compositions reduced in particle size both before and after the
size reduction operation.
(ii) Provide positive personnel protection for the operation of
ball mills, hammer mills, granulators, or screeners. It is highly
desirable to fill and discharge grinding, granulating, and screening
equipment remotely. Hazard analysis may dictate that the cleaning of
such devices also requires operator protection.
(iii) Bond and ground working surfaces, containers, and hand tools.
(11) Transportation. Transport pyrotechnic compositions in closed
containers only. Fabricate individual containers and the transport
vehicle (e.g., handcart, hand truck, etc.) of the lightest materials
compatible with the composition and having the requisite strength. This
minimizes fragment generation if an incident occurs. ``Dead man''
brakes are often desirable on transport vehicles. Transport vehicles
require protection from the weather when loading or unloading. Provide
racks or other support, suited to the size and shape of composition
containers, to stabilize them in transport.
(12) Rebowling. These operations transfer materials, typically
sensitive and in small quantities, from one container to another, to
recover remains of small quantities of materials, or to subdivide large
masses for processing. Rebowling of dry pyrotechnics compositions with
characteristics similar to initiating explosives require operational
shields to protect operators.
(13) Machining of pyrotechnic material. (i) Conduct machining of
pyrotechnic materials remotely.
(ii) Drilling and facing operations must be done to minimize
friction and heat build-up. Hazard analysis should address factors
including feed rate, type of composition and tooling.
(iii) Perform hand trimming and cutting of pyrotechnic candles only
when supported by results of a hazard analysis specific to that
composition and candle configuration.
(iv) Sawing operations require particular care to prevent work from
[[Page 16056]]
plunging into the saw blade, and to ensure chip removal from saw teeth
before subsequent cutting passes. Plunging can occur when thin sections
are force fed into coarse pitch saw blades. To prevent this, the work
feed rate shall be controlled. Chip accumulation in the saw teeth is a
function of the material being sawed, rate of feed, blade speed, tooth
design, and flushing arrangement.
(d) Spill control. Spills of pyrotechnic composition and energetic
ingredients pose potential hazards. Notify the responsible supervisor
before any action to clean or contain the spills. SOP for pyrotechnic
operations shall cover spill cleanup, either as part of the various
operations detailed or as a separate procedure. The procedures shall
specify which actions are to be taken by whom and in what order. The
procedures shall also address recovery of the spilled material and
decontamination of the area.
(e) Management of pyrotechnic scrap and rejects. (1) At regular
intervals, remove all pyrotechnic reject materials and scraps from all
operating areas. Segregate such materials by type and compatibility,
and keep it separate from common wastes. Use positive identification
systems for containers of these materials. Place filled containers at
designated collection points.
(2) To prevent undesired reactions, use special care to preclude
the mixing of water with powdered or finely granulated metals. Plastic
liners for waste containers facilitate cleaning. Liners should be
conductive when contents are subject to initiation by static electrical
discharge.
(f) Cleaning of pyrotechnic processing equipment. (1) Since
pyrotechnic materials are sensitive to friction, impact, or static
discharge, cleaning equipment contaminated with pyrotechnic materials
poses hazards. Because personnel are near the equipment being cleaned,
risks may exceed those of processing. Therefore, cleaning shall receive
the same planning and SOP coverage as production.
(2) Cleaning procedures must satisfy environmental and safety
concerns. The use of flammable solvent solutions for flushing may
require remote control. Minimize the quantity of solvents used. Control
possible run-off from cleaning operations to preclude the spread of
contamination.
(3) Select personal protective equipment based on hazard analysis
and test data. Protective equipment must withstand the maximum credible
event (MCE) when personnel perform cleaning in the vicinity of
equipment and contamination.
(g) Personal protective equipment. (1) Engineering controls remain
the primary and preferred means of providing personnel protection.
Unattended operations, remote controls, substitution of less hazardous
materials, and reduced quantities are all more effective than personal
protective equipment or apparel. Personal protective equipment shall
not be relied upon as the primary means of operator protection.
Operational shields and high-speed deluge systems may offer
supplemental protection. Operators must use only the protective
equipment and apparel prescribed by the SOP, and that apparel or
equipment must be that prescribed by hazard analysis.
(2) The minimum protective apparel for personnel exposed to open
containers of pyrotechnic or energetic raw materials shall consist of
the following:
(i) Cotton socks.
(ii) Conductive-soled safety shoes.
(iii) Flame-retardant coveralls, and
(iv) Hair coverings.
(3) All employees exposed to hazardous quantities of pyrotechnic
compositions shall wear:
(i) Aluminized, thermally protective suit with hood and faceplate.
(ii) Aluminized, thermally protective trousers. and
(iii) Aluminized, thermally protective gloves or equivalent.
(Note: The definition of hazardous quantities will depend on the
composition's energy output and sensitivity (as determined by hazard
analysis or tests) and the nature of the operation.)
(4) Required levels of protective apparel shall be specified in
appropriate SOP steps.
(5) When the protective clothing described in paragraphs (g)(2) and
(g)(3) of this section is required, the design and wearing shall ensure
no exposure of any area of the body. Use appropriate seals or joints to
preclude flame intrusion where apparel items overlap or join. Give
particular attention to possible gaps in coverage provided by the hood
in order to prevent flame or hot gas impingement on the face, head, or
neck. Protection of the employee's throat and lungs may require use of
a self-contained breathing apparatus or supplied-air respirator from
the effects of a fireball.
(h) Reworking pyrotechnic components. (1) Perform all repair,
reassembly, or similar operations on loaded pyrotechnic compositions in
a separate bay used only for that purpose.
(2) Reworking and reusing pyrotechnic material is desirable from
both an economic and environmental basis. However, all rework and reuse
concepts require careful analysis to assure safety. Manage all unused
materials in accordance with local, State and Federal requirement.
(i) Fire protection. When compatible with process materials, use
deluge systems for the protection of mixing and blending operations,
screening, granulation, drying, and pressing or extrusion operations.
Select the response time of the deluge system to minimize the damage to
process equipment and facilities. Hazard analysis of the operation may
dictate other applications.
Sec. 184.9 Storage of ammunition and explosives.
(a) General. A properly sited storage area is mandatory for AE.
Earth-covered magazines (ECM) offer the greatest protection for the
stored AE, and provide some mitigation of fragments and over pressures
from internal explosions. Such magazines are preferred for the storage
of all AE.
(b) Magazine operational regulations. (1) Do not store unpackaged
AE and ammunition components, packing materials, conveyors, skids,
empty boxes, or other such items in magazines containing AE. Limited
dunnage lumber may be stored in the magazines, if it does not block
exits or aisles.
(2) All AE containers shall be marked with a DoD hazard
classification/division, storage compatibility group and item
nomenclature.
(3) While crews are working inside magazines, keep doors unlocked
to permit rapid egress.
(4) Do not store flammable liquids in magazines containing AE,
except as the chemical filler of ammunition, or as a prepackaged
storable liquid propellant.
(c) Stacking. (1) Store AE in original shipping containers or
equivalent. When stacking, group and identify AE according to lots, if
practicable.
(2) Use dunnage to provide ventilation to all parts of the stack.
(3) Maintain aisles between each stack to allow inspection,
inventory, and removal for shipment or surveillance tests. Block
storage configuration is permitted, provided ventilation of stacks
exists. Maintain unobstructed aisles to permit rapid egress.
(4) Avoid more than one light (partially filled) box or pallet per
lot in storage. Stack light units to be readily visible and immediately
accessible. Conspicuously mark incomplete boxes to identify contents
and quantities.
(d) Unpackaged AE items and damaged containers. (1) When necessary,
store unpackaged AE items in separate magazines.
[[Page 16057]]
(2) Do not store damaged containers of AE in a magazine with
serviceable containers of AE. Repair such containers or transfer the
contents to new or serviceable containers. Close and securely fasten
covers on containers of AE allowed in magazines. Close containers that
have been opened before storing them again. Keep stored containers free
from loose dust and grit.
(3) Do not permit loose powder, grains, powder dust, or particles
of explosive substances from broken AE or explosive substance
containers in magazines. In addition, clean up any spilled explosive
substance as soon as possible and suspend all other work in the
magazine until accomplished. (Note: Manage explosive residue as a waste
in accordance with Sec. 184.15.)
(e) Maintenance and repairs to magazines. Perform and document a
hazard analysis, and implement the recommendations resulting to support
the plans for maintenance and repairs of magazines containing AE.
(f) Open storage (outdoors). Do not store AE outdoors.
(g) Storage of bulk initiating explosives. Bulk initiating
explosives must neither be stored dry nor exposed to the direct rays of
the sun. Containers of ample size to hold the double bag of explosives
are used for normal storage. Types of AE range from highly sensitive,
bulk explosive substances (e.g., pyrotechnics, propellants and
explosives) to less sensitive, metal-cased AE (e.g., bombs, torpedoes
and artillery projectiles). For appropriate guidance, refer to DoD
6055.9-STD or industry standards for specific storage requirements
applicable to the various types of AE.
(h) Hazards of long-term storage. (1) AE may deteriorate in
storage. The method of packaging, extremes of temperature and humidity
during storage, the length of time the AE is stored, the nature of the
deterioration, and the explosive substance compositions used are
factors in the rate and criticality of the deterioration. Any
deterioration that decreases the stability of the AE increases the risk
of auto-ignition or a handling mishap due to friction, impact or
electrostatic discharge. The longer that AE remains in storage, the
greater the likelihood that stocks of AE for issue or use will
deteriorate. Older unstable AE material should be tracked, identified
and prioritized in the contractor inventory management programs.
(2) Dispose of unstable AE stock material in accordance with the
procedures and requirements of Sec. 184.15, Collection and Destruction
Requirements for AE. Disposition of unserviceable AE will be under
local procedures based on the latest available technical data. Unstable
AE includes substances with totally depleted stabilizer, misfired
ordnance, explosive devices rendered safe by explosive ordnance
disposal and any similar items. Unstable AE material is incompatible
with all other AE material in storage. When available store different
types of unstable AE material in separate magazines.
(3) Treat AE with unknown stability as unstable. Examples of AE to
treat as unstable include non-stock material, dropped or damaged
material, material in substandard packaging, unidentified material and
material not receipt inspected.
Sec. 184.10 Fire protection.
(a) General. This section provides:
(1) General requirements for developing and implementing AE fire
protection and prevention programs, and
(2) Standard fire fighting hazard identification measures to ensure
a minimum practicable risk in fighting fires involving AE.
(b) Fire plan. (1) A written fire plan shall be prepared which
itemizes the emergency functions of each department or outside agency
and indicates responsible individuals and alternates.
(2) When the contractor has an internal fire department or brigade,
plant officials have the responsibility for firefighting procedures,
training of firefighting personnel, the use and maintenance of
firefighting equipment and vehicles, the provision of water supply and
alarm systems and first aid measures required in firefighting.
(3) Firefighting agreements. Voluntary and mutual agreements with
local municipalities or industrial centers shall include AE
firefighting guidelines (see paragraph (i) of this section). Contractor
officials are responsible for informing the firefighters of AE hazards.
(c) Smoking. Smoking may take place only in safe, specifically
designated and posted ``smoking locations.'' Personnel shall not wear
clothing contaminated with explosives or other dangerous material in
smoking locations.
(d) Hot work permits. A written permit shall be required for the
temporary use of heat-producing equipment or devices when explosives or
highly flammable materials are involved.
(e) Portable fire extinguishers. Hand extinguishers within
buildings can extinguish fires before major damage is done. Portable
equipment may prove similarly valuable outside aboveground magazines
(AGM) and other buildings with AE. Portable fire extinguishers will be
maintained in accordance with NFPA Standard No. 10.
(f) Fire hazard identification system.
(1) The contractor shall establish a fire hazard identification
system. This system shall assess the relative dangers, up to the most
hazardous material stored. The system must include placards on AE
buildings.
(2) One such system is the DoD Fire Identification System, which
consists of six fire divisions (1-6) which correspond to Hazard
Division (HD) 1.1 through HD 1.6. Fire Division 1 indicates the
greatest hazard. The hazard decreases with ascending fire division
numbers from 1 to 4. Fire Divisions 5 and 6 refer to explosion hazards
from less sensitive substances and extremely insensitive articles.
(3) Fire division symbols.
(i) The six fire divisions are indicated by four distinctive
symbols (see Table 1 to Sec. 184.10 and Figure 1 to Sec. 184.10) in
order to be visually recognized by the firefighting personnel from a
distance. The number is shown on each symbol indicating the type of AE
present. Reflecting or luminous symbols should be used. For application
on doors or lockers inside buildings, half-sized symbols may be used.
(ii) The symbols are orange and each number identifying the fire
division is black.
Table 1 to Sec. 184.10--Fire Division Markings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire division Hazard involved Shape
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.................................. Mass detonation................ Octagon.
2.................................. Explosion with fragment hazard. Cross.
3.................................. Mass fire...................... Inverted triangle.
4.................................. Moderate fire.................. Diamond.
5.................................. Mass Explosion (blasting Octagon.
agents).
[[Page 16058]]
6.................................. Nonmass explosion (EIDS Cross.
article).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 16059]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP29MR05.000
(g) NFPA Standard no. 704 standard system for the identification of
the hazards of materials for emergency response. NFPA Standard No. 704
provides a simple, readily recognized and understood system of marking
which many fire departments prefer for response. This system identifies
the hazard and severity of materials and may be used in lieu of the DoD
fire hazard symbols. The system identifies the hazards of a material in
terms of three categories: Health, flammability and stability. This
system indicates the degree of severity by a numerical rating
[[Page 16060]]
which ranges from four (4), indicating severe hazard, to zero (0),
indicating minimal hazard. The system is based on relative rather than
absolute values. For assignment of hazards, see NFPA Standard No. 49
and NFPA Standard No. 325.\4\ Figure 2 to Sec. 184.10 through Figure 4
to Sec. 184.10. present an overview of the NFPA marking system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ NFPA Standard No. 704, NFPA Standard No. 49 and NFPA
Standard No. 325 are all contained in ``Fire Protection Guide to
Hazardous Materials,'' 2001 Edition, ISBN 087765435,
available at http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/home/index.asp.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP29MR05.001
[[Page 16061]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP29MR05.002
(h) Firefighting procedures. (1) General. (i) Firefighters of AE
fires must have a thorough knowledge of the specific reactions of AE
exposed to heat or to fire. The firefighting forces and other essential
personnel shall be briefed before approaching the scene of the fire.
They shall be informed of the known hazards and conditions existing at
the scene of the fire before proceeding to its location.
(ii) Fire involving AE shall be fought according to the appropriate
response for hazard or fire division and the stage of the fire.
(iii) All fires starting in the vicinity of AE should be reported
and should be fought immediately with all available means. However, if
the fire involves explosive substance, is supplying heat to them, or if
the fire is so large that it cannot be extinguished with the equipment
at hand, the personnel involved shall evacuate and seek safety.
[[Page 16062]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP29MR05.003
(iv) Emergency withdrawal distances for non-essential personnel are
intended for application in emergency situations only and not facility
siting. Emergency withdrawal distances depend on fire involvement and
on whether fire division and net explosive weight (NEW) are known.
Emergency authorities shall determine the withdrawal distance for
essential personnel at the fire. Emergency authorities shall determine
who are essential personnel.
(v) If a fire involves explosive substance, the initial withdrawal
distance applied shall be at least to the inhabited building distance
(IBD). See Table 2 to Sec. 184.10. If fire does not involve explosive
substances, emergency authorities shall determine the withdrawal
distance based on the situation at hand.
(vi) Structures or protected locations offering equivalent
protection for the distances listed in Table 2 to Sec. 184.10 may be
used in lieu of relocating personnel from the structure and/or location
to the specified emergency withdrawal distance.
(vii) Contractors should develop evacuation plans for their
facilities which reference the appropriate withdrawal distances as part
of the emergency response plan. Contractor personnel are responsible
for alerting local authorities of any imminent explosive accident on
the facility which may affect the local community and for providing
local authorities with the appropriate emergency withdrawal distances.
(2) Specific. (i) Contractors shall train operational personnel on
the characteristics of explosive substances, including their reactions
to heat and fire, as well as what to do in case of fire. Personnel
shall not attempt to fight fires involving Hazard Division (HD) 1.1 and
HD 1.2 AE. These AE detonate with a fragmentation hazard, and personnel
shall evacuate immediately, using protective cover where available and
activating deluge systems and fire alarms while escaping. Individuals
remain in danger until they reach shelter, although reaching IBD in the
open affords some safety. Exit drills should be conducted annually and
during exit drills, employees shall be advised of the safest escape
routes and evacuation points.
Table 2 to Sec. 184.10.--Emergency Withdrawal Distances for Nonessential Personnel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard division Unknown quantity Known quantity
----------------------------------------------------------
Unknown, located in facility, truck and or tractor 4,000 ft (1,220 m) 4,000 ft (1,220 m).
trailer
----------------------------------------------------------
Unknown, located in railcar 5,000 ft (1,524 m) 5,000 ft (1,524 m).
----------------------------------------------------------
1.1 and 1.5 \1\ Same as unknown facility, truck For transportation, use 2,500 ft (762 m) minimum
trailer or railcar as appropriate distance for 500 lb (227 kg) and below. Above 500 lb
(227 kg), for rail cars use 5,000 ft (1,524 m)
minimum distance, otherwise use 4,000 ft (1,220 m)
minimum distance. Use 4,000 ft (1,220 m) minimum
distance for bombs and projectiles with caliber 5 in
(127 mm) or greater.
For facilities, use 2,500 ft (762 m) minimum distance
for 15,000 lb (6,804 kg) and below. Use 4,000 ft
(1,220 m) minimum distance for net explosive weights
above 15,000 lb (6,804 kg) and less than or equal to
50,000 lb (22,680 kg). Above 50,000 lb (22,680 kg),
use
d = 105 W \1/3\.
--------------------
[[Page 16063]]
1.2 (1.2.1, 1.2.2, 2,500 ft (762 m) 2,500 ft (762 m).
and 1.2.3) 1.6 \1\
--------------------
1.3 \2\ 600 ft (183 m) Twice the IBD (Table C9.T10.) with a 600 ft (183 m)
minimum range.
--------------------
1.4 300 ft (91 m) 300 ft (91 m).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For HD 1.1 and HE 1.2 AE, if known, the maximum range fragments and debris will be thrown (including the
interaction effects of stacks of items, but excluding lugs, strongbacks, or nose and tail plates) may be used
to replace the minimum range.
\2\ For accidents involving propulsion units, it is not required to specify emergency withdrawal distances based
upon the potential flight ranges of these items.
\3\ This is the quantity-distance formula. 105 is the K-factor, a constant, and respresents the degree of damage
which is acceptable in this situation. The distance d is in feet and W is the net explosive weight in pounds.
(ii) If the fire in a HD 1.1 or HD 1.2 building does not directly
involve explosive substances and is small or in a segregated container,
an attempt should be made to extinguish the fire. After summoning
firefighters, responsible contractor personnel shall meet them as they
approach the facility to brief them. When HD 1.1 or HD 1.2 AE is
directly involved, firefighting forces should maintain IBD from the
fire. The safety of personnel fighting a HD 1.1 or HD 1.2 fire depends
on the accuracy of the information made available to all firefighting
forces. No person shall re-enter a burning building containing HD 1.1
or HD 1.2 AE.
(iii) Personnel in the immediate vicinity of HD 1.3 AE should
activate deluge systems and alarms. Unless the fire is minor, involves
no explosive, and appears controllable, firefighters shall confine
their efforts to prevent it from spreading to other buildings. Fire in
HD 1.3 AE creates a wide area of intense radiant heat, dangerous to
personnel and equipment. The firefighters should exercise extreme
caution.
(iv) HD 1.4 AE presents a moderate fire hazard. Fires involving
this material shall be fought until extinguished unless emergency
authorities determine to evacuate.
(i) Emergency planning. Contractors shall develop procedures or
plans to provide safety, security, and environmental protection. Plans
shall be coordinated with the applicable Federal, state, and local
emergency response authorities (e.g., law enforcement, fire
departments, and hospitals, etc.). At a minimum, those procedures or
plans shall include provisions for complying with Section 301-312 of
the Emergency Planning Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA).
(j) Automatic sprinkler systems. Properly installed and maintained
automatic sprinklers reduce fire losses. They are particularly useful
for load lines, AE manufacturing, receiving, shipping, inspection, and
workshops, and demilitarization.
(k) Deluge systems. (1) Contractors may use deluge systems to
supplement sprinklers, when the hazards are high, such as in powder
hoppers and cutters. Rate of rise, light actuating, ultraviolet, or
other quick-action devices for automatic control of deluge systems are
recommended. Part controls should serve as backup.
(2) To ensure immediate drenching of AE material, the distribution
outlets (nozzles, sprays, heads, etc.) should be as near the
explosive's exposed surface as permitted by the outlet discharge
pattern. When explosives are under tight hoods or covers inside
machines, distributing outlets belong inside the enclosed space.
(3) Nonmetallic, internally-spring-held caps should protect outlets
exposed to explosive vapors, gases, or dust. Upon exertion of pressure
within the outlet, the cap shall immediately pop. Caps should be
attached to outlets to prevent their dropping into equipment during a
deluge.
(4) Water flow and pressure should be determined for the hazard.
(5) Periodic inspections of deluge systems shall ensure that they
are in proper operating condition.
(6) The deluge valve should allow for automatic and part
activation. Part activation devices shall be placed at the operator
station or at exits in explosive operating buildings as determine by a
hazard analysis.
(7) NFPA Standard No. 13 and NFPA Standard No. 15 contain basic
installation rules.
(l) Firebreaks. A firebreak is an area of bare ground or vegetation
intended to limit the probability of fires causing a hazard to AE
areas. A firebreak, at least 50 ft (15 m) wide shall be maintained in
all directions around magazine and AE operating buildings or locations.
Barricades and other sloping ground, within the firebreak area, should
retain enough vegetation to prevent significant erosion. Growth of
vegetation within a firebreak shall be controlled to prevent rapid
transmission of fire. Relatively long vegetation of 6 to 8 in (152 to
203 mm) in length, which is green or sparsely spread, is acceptable. Do
not allow vegetation to become dry or dense. This could allow rapid
transmission of fire.
Sec. 184.11 Risk identification and management.
(a) General. AE operations involve many hazards and risks. These
include the type of hazards associated with any industrial enterprise
(e.g., lifting, slipping, tool use, toxic chemicals, potential
exposures to environmental extremes, etc.).
(1) The evaluation of hazards and risk of mishap addressed in this
section relate to processes not end products. The safety of operations
is a contractor responsibility. Only the Government can accept risk for
the AE it acquires and uses.
(2) A basic risk identification and management system is a
necessary element of a comprehensive AE safety program. The purpose of
this chapter is to address risk identification and management for all
AE operations.
(b) Risk management system. Contractors shall have a risk
identification and management system, which, as a minimum, results in
the analysis of materials, equipment, and personnel capabilities. This
analysis will aide in the development of a written SOP for AE contract
operations. The contractor shall document the analysis and keep it as
long as the SOP is active.
The analysis shall include such factors as: Initiation sensitivity,
quantity of materials, heat output, rate of burning, potential ignition
and initiation sources, protection capabilities of shields, various
types of clothing, fire protection systems, and personnel exposure with
special considerations (such as toxic or corrosive chemicals).
(1) The contractor shall perform risk analysis using personnel
knowledgeable in the process, materials, equipment and relevant safety
requirements.
[[Page 16064]]
(2) Hazard and risk. (i) A hazard is any condition, which, by
itself or by interacting with other variables, may result in death or
injury to personnel or damage to property. Controls only reduce the
likelihood or severity of hazards. They do not eliminate them.
(ii) After identifying a hazard, qualified contractor personnel
shall determine the associated risk. The risk analysis shall address
both the severity of a resulting mishap and the probability of
occurrence of a mishap. A risk deals with the mishap which arises from
a hazard, considering both the severity of its potential consequences,
and its likelihood of occurrence over time.
(iii) Evaluation of the hazard provides information useful for
ranking the degree of risk associated with a hazard. The degree of risk
indicates which hazardous conditions should receive priority for
corrective action when compared to other hazardous conditions. One
technique for ranking hazardous conditions is the assignment of a Risk
Assessment Code (RAC). Table 1 to Sec. 184.11 is an example of a risk
matrix. The evaluation of the hazard results in the assignment of a
narrative or numerical risk assessment such which management can judge
the seriousness of the risk before and after action is taken to control
it. Table 1 to Sec. 184.11 shows one risk matrix used by the
Department of Defense. Definitions of the code numbers and letters are
contained in Table 2 to Sec. 184.11.
Table 1 to Sec. 184.11.--Sample Risk Matrix Format
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mishap probability
Mishap severity -----------------------------------
A B C D
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I................................... 1 1 2 4
II.................................. 1 2 3 4
III................................. 2 3 4 5
IV.................................. 4 4 5 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2 to Sec. 184.11.--Risk Assessment Definitions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mishap severity Mishap probability Risk assessment codes (RAC)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. A mishap which could result in the death A. Likely to occur 1. Critical.
or permanent disability, or result in the immediately.
inability to deliver the contract item.
II. A mishap which could result in B. Probably will occur in 2. Serious.
permanent partial disability or temporary time.
total disability, in excess of three
months, or result in late delivery, 30
days or more, of the contract item.
III. A mishap which could result in lost C. Possible to occur in time 3. Moderate.
workdays or compensation for employees, or
result in the late delivery, less that 30
days, of the contract item.
IV. A mishap which could result in first D. Unlikely to occur........ 4. Minor
aid or minor supportive medical treatment, 5. Negligible.
or damage to process equipment or product
but would not affect the delivery of the
contract item.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Analytical methods. There are a number of analytical methods or
approaches to the performance of hazard/risk analyses. The complexity
of the process involved, the number of variables, and the severity of
the consequences of failure should determine the level and methodology
of the analysis used. The contractor shall select the level and best
method for performing the analysis.
(1) As a minimum, contractors shall break the total process into
successive steps and assess the hazards and risks for each process
step. A sample format for conducting such an analysis is contained in
Table 1 to Sec. 184.11. Any format, which provides essentially the
same information, is acceptable.
(2) A significant percentage of accidents occur during intermittent
operations such as setup, startup, maintenance, repair, response to
out-of-tolerance operation, and shut down/clean-up. Therefore analyses
must consider intermittent operations as well as normal operations.
(3) Risk decisions must not only consider the severity and
probability of a process change failure, but also recognize the
criticality of operations (e.g., dollar value, lead time to procure,
significance to end item or process, etc.).
(d) Information for analysis. (1) Contractors shall develop and use
a methodology to address any change to an AE operation which may
present a new hazard or increase the risk of a present hazard before
incorporating the change into an operation.
(2) Before introducing a change to an AE operation, contractors
shall perform a hazard analysis. Contractors shall maintain
documentation explaining how they will control the hazard or hazards if
the analysis indicates the change will result in any new hazards, or
increase the risk of present hazards. Contractors shall validate the
hazard controls for the changed operation, and maintain documentation
of the validation.
(3) Contractors shall use the information acquired from the hazard
analysis and validation process to revise SOPs and retrain employees.
Sec. 184.12 AE building design and layout.
(a) General. The design and layout of AE buildings are critical
considerations in explosive safety and directly impact Q-D requirements
and hazardous exposures to operating personnel and valuable equipment.
Preplanning and proper design can significantly reduce risk of injury
and property loss.
(b) Building exteriors. Fire, fragment generation, venting, and
evacuation are critical design parameters. Exterior wall and roof
coverings of AE operating buildings shall be designed with
noncombustible and, whenever possible, frangible (breakaway)
construction. AE buildings should be one story, except to meet process
requirements. Basements should not be used, since they expose personnel
above and make evacuation difficult.
(c) Interior walls, roofs and ceilings. Roofs and walls of AE
buildings shall be as light as practicable to vent an internal
explosion and produce the smallest number of fragments. Firewalls and
dividing walls constitute exceptions. AE buildings which might house
loose, finely divided explosive substances require smooth, fire
resistive walls and ceilings which are free from cracks and crevices.
When appropriate, paint walls and ceilings with high gloss paint to
minimize dust accumulation and facilitate cleaning. Avoid ledges that
collect dust. Bevel and keep clean all existing ledges. Seal all wall
joints and openings for wiring and plumbing against dust. Do not
install suspended ceilings or construct hollow walls in Class II
Hazardous Locations as defined by the NFPA Standard No. 70. Install
[[Page 16065]]
insulation and covering directly on the underside of the roof deck.
(d) Floors and work surfaces. Construct and finish floors and work
surfaces to facilitate cleaning, with no cracks or crevices in which
explosives could lodge and no exposed nails, screws, or bolts. Cove
bases at the junctions of walls and floors should be used. All
locations where exposed explosives or hazardous concentrations of
flammable vapor or gas are present require non-sparking floors and work
surfaces.
(e) Substantial dividing wall. (1) Substantial dividing walls,
constructed in accordance with the requirements of Army TM 5-1300, Navy
NAVFAC P-397, or Air Force AFR 88-22 (different designations for the
same publication), separate independent quantities of HE so they do not
need to be added when determining Q-D requirements.
(2) Avoid openings in dividing walls for conveyors, pass-through
boxes, or other uses when possible. When operationally necessary,
design closures with equivalent wall-strength characteristics.
(f) Exits and doors. Facility design and operational flow shall
eliminate all explosive hazards between an operator and an exit. AE
building design should include casement-type exit doors glazed with
non-shattering plastic material. All interior doors should open in the
direction of the flow of material through the building and should open
onto unobstructed passageways.
(g) Emergency egress. When hazard analysis determines that standard
exits and fire escapes are inadequate from work levels above the ground
floor, other means of emergency egress (e.g., safety chutes) shall aid
evacuation.
(h) Passageways. Design of weather-protected passageways between
buildings or magazines should include noncombustible construction and
fire stops.
(i) Roads and walkways. The road system should provide alternate
routes between inert locations without entering AE areas. Roads in AE
areas shall not dead end unless they dead end at, and serve a single AE
location. Facility design should provide hard-surface walkways and
roads at the entrance to or between AE buildings to prevent employees
from tracking such potential hazards as stones, grit, and other foreign
material into operating buildings.
(j) Windows and skylights. The use of conventional glass in areas
with a potential blast overpressure hazard creates a serious secondary
fragmentation hazard. Use safety glass or non-shattering plastic
materials (e.g., Lexan, Plexiglas) when practical. When glazing with
conventional glass is used, properly fixed plastic or wire mesh
screening may reduce the hazard.
(k) Drains and sumps. (1) All drain lines handling explosive wastes
shall have sumps or basins of sufficient capacity for the removal of
explosives by settling. The drains shall have adequate capacity. be
free of pockets. and have slopes of at least 0.25 in/ft (21 mm/m) to
prevent explosives settling-out in the drain line. Design of sumps
shall prevent suspended and settleable solid explosive material from
passing beyond the sumps in the wash water, and prevent overflow from
disturbing any floating solids. The settling rate of the material and
the usual rate of flow shall determine the sump capacity. The design
shall also permit easy removal of collected explosives, and shall allow
for retention of those that float on water until they can be removed.
Sump tanks or other types of construction (e.g., bolted) that permit
the explosives to settle in obscure or hidden spaces are not
acceptable.
(2) Care shall be taken to preclude deposition of explosives from
sump effluent due to drying, temperature changes, or interaction with
other industrial contaminations. Sweeping and other dry collecting
measures should be used to keep appreciably water-soluble explosives
out of the drainage system.
(3) Drains between the source of explosive and the sump shall have
troughs with rounded bottoms and with removable ventilated covers to
facilitate inspection for accumulation of explosives. Waste liquids
shall not run into closed drains and sewers. Inspect and clean out
drains periodically to prevent the excessive buildup of explosives.
Drains and sewers containing explosive waste materials shall not
connect into the normal sewage systems.
(l) Hardware. (1) Facility design shall provide for non-sparking
hardware in AE areas when hazard analyses determine sparks provide
sufficient energy to initiate exposed explosive materials, explosive
dusts, or flammable vapors. Avoid installing hardware (e.g., piping and
ducts) on blowout panels or walls
(2) Some fasteners (e.g., nuts and bolts) on or near operating
equipment can fall into explosives or explosive constituents and cause
friction, heat, and initiation. Operating personnel shall secure such
fasteners using safety wire or other methods.
(m) Ventilation. Exhaust fans through which combustible dust or
flammable vapor pass shall use nonferrous blades, or a casting lined
with nonferrous material. Motors shall meet NFPA Standard No. 70 rating
for the hazard classification of its location. Maintenance personnel
shall electrically bond and ground the entire exhaust system and clean
and service it on a regular schedule.
(n) Steam for processing and heating. Process steam is that which
is in direct contact with explosives, used directly in their
manufacture, or which, in case of equipment failure, would exhaust
directly into contact with explosives or explosive fumes. Avoid steam
or hot water pipes contacting wood, paper, or other combustible
materials.
(1) Steam temperature. The exterior of pipes shall not exceed 160
[deg]F (71 [deg]C). Maximum steam temperature should not exceed 228
[deg]F (109 [deg]C). When steam temperature must exceed 228 [deg]F (109
[deg]C) in hazardous locations, cover and paint the steam lines with an
impervious material or otherwise protect them against contact with
explosives.
(2) Steam pressure. Steam used for heating AE operating buildings
should have a maximum pressure of 5 psi (34.5 kPa). Steam pressure
shall not exceed 15 psi (103.4 kPa). When a reducing valve is used,
never bypass the relief valve in a manner permitting circumvention of
the pressure reduction equipment. Positive means shall prevent the
production of superheated steam caused by the throttling action of
reducing valves. The use of a ``water leg'' or water column is
recommend to control steam pressure of 5 psi (34.5 kPa) or less. When
close control of steam temperature is necessary, install indicating and
recording pressure or temperature gauges. Maintenance personnel should
test such devices periodically and record the test results. When
electrical resistance to ground is high, properly ground steam lines
where they enter buildings.
(o) Tunnels. The design and construction of tunnels between AE
buildings requires special consideration due to possible communication
of an explosion by shockwave and blast.
Sec. 184.13 Safety requirements for specific AE and AE operations.
(a) General. This section provides the minimum safety requirements
necessary for the prevention of mishaps involving specific AE and AE
operations. The contractor is responsible for analyzing each operation
and developing procedures to control or eliminate hazards.
(b) Properties of explosives. Knowledge of properties of specific
types of explosives is critical to the establishment of proper hazard
controls.
[[Page 16066]]
(1) Primary (initiating) explosives. Initiating explosives include
lead azide, lead styphnate, and tetracene. They are extremely sensitive
to friction, heat, electrostatic discharge and impact. When involved in
a fire, they may detonate.
(i) In storage, initiating explosives shall be kept wet with water
or water/alcohol mixtures to reduce sensitivity. Take every precaution
to prevent the liquid from freezing since this increases sensitivity.
Handling of frozen initiating explosives is prohibited. Assure the
water used for storage is free of bacteria forming impurities which
could react to form gases and rupture containers.
(ii) Operators shall keep work areas and equipment clean and
maintain good housekeeping to prevent contamination of these explosives
with foreign, particularly gritty, material markedly increases their
sensitivity.
(iii) Do not allow lead azide to contact copper, zinc, or alloys
containing any concentration of such metals because of the likely
formation of other azides that are more sensitive than the original.
Similar hazards exist for other explosives.
(2) Secondary (boostering and bursting) explosives. Boostering and
bursting explosives include tetryl, RDX, PETN, HMX and compositions
manufactured with these explosives. These explosives have sensitivities
between initiating explosives and those of explosives used as main
charges such as TNT. They may be ignited by heat, friction, or impact
and may detonate when burned in large quantities or at too great a
depth. Some of these materials are toxic when taken internally or by
skin contact and special precautions are necessary to protect
personnel. Use local exhaust ventilation, enclosed process systems,
automatic handling systems, etc., to minimize dust in the employee's
breathing zone.
(3) Main charge explosives. Main charge explosives include TNT,
tritonal, RDX , HMX, CL-20, and compositions manufactured with these
explosives. Use process hazard analysis to evaluate the safety of the
processing methodology, (e.g., melt-cast, extrusion, press and machine,
and mix-cast-cure versus sensitivity characteristics). Do not permit
alkaline cleaning agents or other alkaline products in buildings where
large quantities of these explosives are handled.
(4) Other explosives. Other common military explosives encountered
include black powder and nitroglycerin (NG). Black powder is a mixture
of potassium or sodium nitrate, charcoal, and sulfur, which is highly
sensitive to friction, heat, and impact. It deteriorates rapidly after
absorption of moisture, but retains its explosive properties
indefinitely if kept dry. NG's extreme sensitivity to impact and
friction is such that it is manufactured only as needed. Frozen
nitroglycerin, while less sensitive than liquid, may undergo internal
changes upon thawing and, if enough heat is generated, may detonate.
(5) Research of additional properties. Contractors must investigate
pertinent properties before handling other explosive substances.
Sensitivity data for the same characteristic, generated on different
types of equipment, are not necessarily comparable. Contractors must
thoroughly understand the sensitivity test method employed, the unit of
measure in which data are presented, and the relative ranking of the
explosive verses other similar explosives.
(c) Laboratory operations. (1) Research and development
laboratories and testing facilities constitute a separate category
involving guidance, restrictions, and relief from certain requirements
prescribed in this part.
(2) Review each operation at facilities designed for blast and
fragment confinement to ensure that the explosives limits are within
the laboratory or test area capability. Decrease explosives limits and
increase safe separation distances as the capability to confine
fragment and blast decreases.
(3) Inspect a total confinement facility after a detonation to
ensure structural integrity. It may become necessary to reduce the
explosives limits to prevent future blasts from exceeding the retention
capability.
(4) Review each proposed program for the laboratory or test
facility to determine all potential hazards including the following
considerations:
(i) Structural limitations of the facility.
(ii) Remote control viewing and operating equipment, if required.
(iii) Special safety precautions for personnel elsewhere in the
building.
(iv) Safe separation distances.
(v) Required deviations from other sections of this part.
(vi) SOP, which shall, at a minimum, include the following:
(A) Protective clothing.
(B) Warning signals.
(C) Fire and other emergency procedures.
(D) Special testing of equipment needed before operations (e.g.,
stray voltage and calibration checks).
(E) Removal of all explosives not needed for the operation.
(F) Arrangements for overnight storage of necessary explosives.
(G) Inspection and cleanup procedures after a test or detonation.
(5) Use no more explosives than absolutely required for a given
operation. Perform particularly hazardous laboratory operations
involving new or relatively unknown explosives by remote control. Use
operational shields in these operations and in new or untested
applications of explosives.
(6) When laboratories and testing facilities are shielded properly
to prevent the release of fragments, the minimum incremental safe
separation distances shown in Table 1 to Sec. 184.13 apply to
operations, facilities, and personnel.
(7) If the proposed storage facilities will confine the blast and
fragments, or if the incremental safe separation distances are as
indicated in paragraph (c)(6) of this section, up to 15 lbs (6.8 kg) of
explosive substance may be stored without consideration of storage
compatibility. Review the operation to determine all potential hazards
prior to use as outlined in paragraph (c)(6) of this section.
Table 1 to Sec. 184.13--Laboratory Q-D Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity (lbs) Distance (ft) \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over Not over IBD PTRD ILD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard Division 1.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 40 25 20
1 2 50 30 25
2 5 70 40 30
5 10 90 55 35
[[Page 16067]]
10 20 110 65 45
20 30 125 75 50
30 40 140 85 55
40 50 150 90 60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity (lbs) Distance (ft)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over Not over IBD PTRD ILD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard Division 1.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 5 10 10 10
5 10 15 15 15
10 20 20 20 20
20 30 25 25 25
30 50 30 30 30
50 80 35 35 35
80 100 40 40 40
100 150 45 45 45
150 200 50 50 50
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The distance above may be used only when structures, blast mats, and
so forth, can completely contain fragments and debris. If fragments
cannot be contained or the quantity of high explosives exceeds 50
pounds, then the distances shall be obtained from the Q/D tables of
DoD 6055.9 (reference (a)).
(d) Heat conditioning of AE. (1) All ovens, conditioning chambers,
dry houses and other devices and facilities which are capable, in
ordinary service, of heating AE to temperatures in excess of 90[deg] F
(32[deg] C) are heat-conditioning devices. Provide heat-conditioning
devices with dual independent fail-safe heat controls. For devices or
facilities heated by steam only, the requirement for dual heat controls
is satisfied if the steam pressure is controlled by a reducing valve
(maximum pressure of 5 psi, (34.45 kPa), unless otherwise authorized)
on the main building steam supply, and a thermostat.
(2) Ensure heat-conditioning devices are able to discharge
overpressure from an internal explosion. Use barriers or catching
devices to restrain blowout panels, doors, and other venting apparatus
and prevent excessive displacement during an accidental explosion.
(3) Heat-conditioning devices must be vented to allow any gases
produced to escape.
(4) Steam heat conditioning devices are preferred. However, when
using electrical heating elements, locate them where there is no
possibility of contact with explosives or flammable materials.
(5) Ensure the blades of a fan in a heat-conditioning device are
non-sparking and install its electric motor externally. Do not re-
circulate the air if the heating surfaces exceed 228[deg] F (109[deg]
C) or if the air contains materials which could collect on the heating
coils.
(6) Permit only electrical equipment and fixtures approved for use
in the hazardous atmosphere in question in or on a heat-conditioning
device used for explosives or flammable material.
(7) Ensure the interior of a heat-conditioning device is free of
crevices, openings, and other protuberances not easily cleaned, where
dust or flammable material could lodge.
(8) Interconnect and electrically ground all non-current-carrying
metal parts of a heat-conditioning device.
(9) Install heat-conditioning devices in isolated locations, set up
to give personnel maximum protection from the effects of an explosion.
Use operational shields and other personnel protection measures when
warranted.
(10) Safe separation distances or protective construction ensures
against an explosives accident in one heat-conditioning device from
propagating to others. Do not place hazardous materials in a room or
cubicle containing a heat-conditioning device, unless it can be shown
that a mishap in the conditioning device would not involve the other
materials.
(11) Operating procedures for heat-conditioning devices must:
(i) Limit the explosive materials in the device to the type and
quantity authorized for the specific device.
(ii) Address the critical parameters of explosives compositions
before processing in a heat-conditioning device. Ensure the device does
not exceed limits established for the hazardous composition being
conditioned.
(iii) Check heat-conditioning device temperatures at specified
intervals during operation.
(iv) Clean the conditioning devices, ducts, vacuum lines, and other
parts of the equipment subject to contamination by hazardous materials,
before introducing a different item or composition for conditioning.
(e) Spray painting. (1) Do not electrostatically spray paint loaded
AE.
(2) Use water wash or dry filter-type spray booths for loaded AE.
(3) Interlock controls for ventilating fan motors for spray
painting booths with the controls for the paint sprayer. With this
arrangement, failure of the ventilating system will shut off power to
the paint sprayer.
(4) Install high-voltage, electrically-powered, paint-spraying
equipment in accordance with the requirements of NFPA Standard No. 33
as applicable.
(5) Ensure conventional equipment used for spray painting in
standard spray booths meets the requirements of NFPA Standard No. 33.
Electrically ground the nozzles of all spray guns to suppress static
electricity.
(f) Drying AE. Use ovens which comply with the NFPA Standard No. 70
to dry loaded AE. Other requirements include the following:
(1) Ensure automatic thermostatic controls regulate temperatures
once they reach a maximum determined by the AE involved.
(2) Equip each oven with automatic internal sprinkler systems which
conform with NFPA Standard No. 13. Approved electrical heat actuated
[[Page 16068]]
devices, installed as required for NFPA Standard No. 70, Class I,
Division 1, Group D, hazardous locations may be used for automatic
operation of the system.
(3) Hot air or other means may supply heat, provided AE does not
contact coils, radiators, and heating elements.
(4) In case of power failure, the heat supply for any conveyor
system must automatically stop.
(5) Design electric drying units not approved for use in Class I
hazardous locations so that solvent vapor concentration in the oven is
kept below 25% of its lower explosive limit.
(g) Rework, disassembly, renovation, and maintenance. (1) Avoid
conducting AE rework and disassembly operations with other AE or inert
operations. When concurrent scheduling cannot be avoided, operations
shall be sufficiently separated from one another to protect adjacent
personnel and equipment, and prevent propagation to adjacent AE.
Separation may be accomplished with Q-D, operational shielding, or the
remote control of operations.
(2) Protect the worker and all other personnel from possible
initiation when the force applied during rework or disassembly is known
or expected to exceed assembly force.
(3) Personnel protection required during assembly operations is
normally also required during disassembly or rework operations. Use
lesser protection only if fully supported by a risk assessment. Verify
that assembly was within specification, the surfaces are not corroded
and whether sealant is present.
(4) Request specific safety guidance through contract channels when
renovation or maintenance is not adequately addressed in the contract.
(h) AE loading and associated operations. (1) Screening and
blending HE. Screen or visually inspect and pass over a magnetic
separator bulk HE intended for processing to detect extraneous
material. Do not subject HE to pinching, friction or impact in
screening equipment. Thoroughly clean HE screening units without
exhaust ventilation as necessary and after every shift, to prevent
hazardous accumulations of explosives dusts.
(2) Screening and blending initiating explosives. Provide suitable
operational shields for screening and blending operations involving
initiating explosives. As an alternative, locate operators at
barricaded ILD from screening and blending facilities.
(3) Explosives melting. (i) Do not exceed 228 [deg]F (109 [deg]F)
when melting explosives and keeping explosives molten. It is
permissible to use steam pressures up to 15 psi (103.35 kPa) (250
[deg]F (121 [deg]C) to melt or maintain TNT-based explosives in a
molten state.
(ii) Construct and maintain melt unit valves and melt mix draw-off
or other lines carrying molten explosives to prevent friction or impact
capable of igniting the explosives. Disassemble and regularly inspect
diaphragm type valves. Replace damaged or old diaphragms before cracks
develop to prevent metal-to-metal contact. Construct draw-off lines to
prevent exposure of threads, fastening screws, and bolts, both outside
and between the flanges. Use a sealing compound to prevent explosives
seepage or vapor condensation on the contacting surfaces of the bolts,
flanges, screws, and nuts. Electrically bond melt mix kettle draw-off
pipes to items being filled during draw-off operations. Individually
ground AE unless tests indicate that contact ground is adequate.
(iii) Wet-type collectors remove dust and vapors from exhausted
air, and are effective for melt mix exhausting systems. Do not re-
circulate water in the wet collector unless the system removes
hazardous suspensions. Discharge water retaining explosives to a
containment unit designed to keep them wet. Regularly inspect and flush
the exhaust and collecting equipment of explosives accumulations. Equip
each kettle with a complete dust and vapor collection system when
protective construction prevents propagation of a detonation between
melt kettles.
(4) Agitation. Equip agitation nitrators, washers, and other
machines with at least two means of agitation, each operating from an
independent power source. A loss of power if using only one power
source could result in material decomposition.
(5) Explosives machining. Awareness of the friction sensitivity of
explosives to be machined is required. Friction sensitivity values of
explosives listed in paragraphs (h)(5)(ii) and (h)(5)(iii) of this
section are available for comparison. Compare sensitivity values only
for identical test, methods and equipment.
(i) HE, cased or uncased, may be machined without special personnel
protection and without coolant, if no metal-to-metal contact is
involved, include: TNT, composition B with RDX at or below 60%, RDX
compositions containing 60% or less RDX and HMX compositions containing
60% or less HMX.
(ii) HE, cased or uncased, may be machined without special
personnel protection provided a coolant is directed on the tool and
explosives at their point of contact and no metal-to-metal contact is
involved, include: Octol, Pentolite (50-50 and 10-90), HMX compositions
with greater than 60% HMX, Cyclotols, Composition B and RDX
compositions with concentrations of RDX greater than 60%.
(iii) Machine other HE by remote control, and protect the operators
by a suitable operational shield. Do not machine primary explosives if
you can obtain desired shapes or sizes by other means (e.g., forming).
(iv) Use only a single drill bit with a diameter greater than 0.25
in (0.064 cm) when an unprotected operator is involved in drilling.
(v) Permit machining of cased explosives in an operation requiring
removal of metal before or after tool contact with the explosives
filler. Protect operators with operational shields and machine by
remote control.
(vi) Where wet machining is performed, use automatic interlocking
devices to prevent machining unless coolant is flowing. Establish
controls capable of stopping the machining if the coolant flow is
interrupted. When coolant flow must stop for adjustment of machining
tools, provide positive means to ensure that flow of coolant is
restored and all automatic control devices are operating before
machining resumes.
(vii) Maintain the lineal and rotational speeds of tools used for
the machining of explosives at the minimum required to perform the
operation safely and efficiently. The rate of feed should be consistent
with the hazard analysis.
(viii) Use pneumatically-or hydraulically-driven machine tools
whenever possible for machining operations on HE. Install control
mechanisms for hydraulic and pneumatic equipment to prevent
unauthorized personnel from tampering with speeds.
(ix) In all machining operations on cased or uncased HE, ensure
tool adjustments prevent contact between moving parts of the machining
equipment and metallic parts of the case or holding fixtures.
(x) Use machining tools compatible with the HE being processed.
Remove dull or damaged tools from HE machining operations.
(xi) Remove explosives products resulting from machining operations
with an exhaust system meeting NFPA Standard No. 70 requirements or by
immersion in a stream of water flowing away from the operation.
(xii) Machine HE with unknown physical or chemical characteristics,
by remote control with operators protected by operational shields
during AE operations.
(i) Assembly and crimping of complete rounds. Separate each
[[Page 16069]]
assembly and crimping operation from other operations by structures or
shielding sufficient to contain any fragments produced by an accidental
detonation.
(j) Pressing explosives. (1) Conduct each pelleting operation
involving black powder, tetryl, TNT, or other explosives of similar
sensitivity and each operation involving the pressing or
reconsolidation of explosives in a separate room or cubicle having
walls of sufficient strength to withstand an explosion of all
explosives present.
(2) Perform pressing or reconsolidating of explosives in small
caliber rounds, tracer bodies, tetryl lead-ins, detonators, and similar
items on machines having consolidating stations designed to preclude
propagation between stations and provide adequate operator protection.
Ensure operators stay behind tested protective barriers during such
operations.
(3) Only use punches and dies in matched sets which have passed
inspection and are calibrated. Regularly inspect and test by magnaflux,
X-ray or similar means, all punches and dies used in explosives
pressing operations.
(k) Protection of primers. Design equipment, transportation, and
operations to protect loose primers or primers in components from
accidental impact or pressure. When feasible, use a protecting cap to
cover the primer.
(l) Explosives washout and flashing facilities. Separate washout
operations in operating buildings or other locations from other
operations by operational shields or proper distances. Inspect AE
subjected to washout operations to ensure against residual explosives
contamination. When contamination is confirmed, decontaminate prior to
disposal.
(m) Heat-sealing equipment. Separate electric heat-sealing machines
from other operations. Establish temperature limits for heat-sealing
equipment with a safety factor below the ignition temperature of the
explosives, propellants, or pyrotechnics involved.
(n) Rebowling operations. Perform rebowling operations involving
primary explosives or primer mixes by remote control, with the operator
protected by an operational shield.
(o) Thread cleaning. (1) Use nonferrous picks for thread cleaning.
Stainless steel brushes are acceptable or use to clean threads of
explosives-loaded projectiles if a fuze seat liner separates the thread
cleaning operation from the explosive charge. Operators may use
operational shields or quantity distance separation to protect them
from unrelated operations.
(2) Power-actuated, thread-chasing tools may be used to clean
loaded projectiles when threads are imperfect because of previously
applied sealers. However, the operation must be performed within a
separate cubicle and by remote control. Hand-operated thread-chasing
tools may be used when no explosives are present in the threads.
(3) Do not cut threads or correct cross threads on projectiles
containing explosives. Straightening crossed threads is considered
thread cutting.
(p) Profile and alignment gaging operations. (1) Use operational
shields to enclose each profile and alignment gauging operation,
excluding small arms ammunition, to protect adjacent operations.
Develop the layout of equipment and operational procedures to minimize
personnel injury and property damage in case of an accident.
(2) When chamber gauging large caliber fixed ammunition, point the
gauge toward a dividing wall or other barrier. Use the same operator to
insert and remove each round. Never leave a round in the gauge. Gauge
rounds of mortar ammunition before attaching propellant increments and,
unless prohibited by the design characteristics, before assembly of the
ignition system.
Sec. 184.14 Test and testing requirements.
(a) General. The contractor is responsible for the safety of
testing programs. Test programs include any and all tests, evaluations,
quality assurance functions tests, or similar situations where AE
response to stimulus is the objective.
(b) Basic principles for test operations. The following safety
precautions apply where pertinent:
(1) Conduct all test operations in accordance with procedures
developed in accordance with Sec. 184.3 (c) and Sec. 184.6(i), using
a hazard analysis as the basis for the procedures.
(2) Wherever possible, substitute inert materials for live AE. When
only live AE will meet test objectives, protect test personnel. Use
remote control of operations, barricades, shields, remote methods of
shutting down the test operation, or other appropriate methods of
eliminating exposure to personnel. By definition, all tests involve
some level of uncertainty. Therefore test methods and procedures must
address all credible malfunctions, or non-function potentials and the
appropriate reaction to them.
(3) Assembly and testing requirements specific to each ammunition
and weapon system are contained in the appropriate technical part and
end-item specifications which should be incorporated into procedures.
The hazard analysis process should identify specific hazards of
assembly and test. It is particularly important to develop procedures
for the guidance of unique tests (e.g., fuze function, fragmentation,
thermal effects, barricade test) which do not duplicate assembly,
disassembly, or test requirements described in technical parts or other
government publications. Include disposal procedures for damaged
energetic materials and ordnance items. The following are general
assembly and testing safety requirements.
(4) Do not allow test conditions to compromise basic AE safety
considerations, for example, compatibility of materials, quantity
control, quantity distance, exposure of personnel to blast (including
hazardous noise levels), fragments and thermal effects, bonding and
grounding, and personal protective equipment.
(5) Recognize and plan for the mitigation of overpressure
(including sound), fumes, dust, fragments, thermal effects and
catastrophic failure of test equipment or barricades which can occur
during or as the result of testing.
(6) Clearly identify expended ordnance contaminated with residual
energetic or other hazardous materials. Include decontamination steps
in the test operations procedure.
(7) Some testing, such as electrical continuity, built-in-test, or
weapon functionality on components or all-up-rounds will require remote
operations. Perform this testing with approved test equipment at a
facility site-approved for the operation. When this is the case, the
following requirements apply:
(i) Do not expose any test personnel to operations that have a high
probability of resulting in a detonation, or to test operations that
involve intentional detonations. Protecting personnel from all
fragments and from overpressures exceeding 2.3 psi (overpressure at
k24) meets that requirement. Distance, operational shields (see
paragraph Sec. 184.3(g) of this part), or structural design of
buildings and bays involved, or a combination of these, can provide
this protection.
(ii) Protection by distance must include consideration of fragments
as well as overpressure. For many test operations involving relatively
small quantities of explosives, the distance at which the blast over
pressure drops to the 2.3-psi level is less than the minimum fragment
distance. When this occurs, the minimum distance between the operation
and any personnel is the fragmentation distance. Use of barricades,
earth covered shelters, or structural elements to control the
fragmentation hazard are acceptable when it is possible to demonstrate
this
[[Page 16070]]
protection by test or engineering design. Tests normally require an
overcharge of 25% NEW greater than the maximum expected charge weight
for testing, when testing is the sole proof of protection.
(iii) Provision of protection by structural design, whether by
itself or in conjunction with distance, requires specialized structural
designs. Army TM 5-1300, Navy NAVFAC P-397, or Air Force AFR 88-22
(different designations for the same publication, provides assistance
for these designs. When using this publication, Protection Category 1
is the level of design for personnel protection. Designs based on
lesser levels of protection are acceptable, depending upon the level of
risk to contract performance deemed acceptable by the PCO when
personnel exposure is not an issue.
(iv) Spalling and other phenomena of structural failure are part of
the design considerations when using the referenced part for
protection. Spalling is the ejection of material from the back face of
a slab or beam as the result of an explosion adjacent to the front
face. When not using the part for structural designs, spalling
protection must be part of the design and test of structural elements.
When test cell walls do not extend through the ceiling of the
structure, it is possible for overpressure and debris from an explosion
to escape over the top of the cell and injure personnel near the cells.
Designs must provide protection from such an eventuality. Similarly,
when cell walls extend through ceilings and roofs, these structural
elements must be strong enough to resist the effects of overpressure
and fragments, protecting personnel below.
(v) Install interlocks to prevent operator exposure to operations
when doors on any equipment or cells used for explosives processing
function as operational shields. Do not install door closure controls
within cells. Design cell door release devices to prevent personnel
from being stuck by a closing door and to allow egress from the cell.
These may require designs to become inoperative to prevent the
overpressure of an explosion from opening the door. Ensure that any
pass-throughs between cells prevent the transmission of fragments or
damaging overpressures. Typically, such pass-throughs have doors
interconnected so that only one door can open at a time.
(vi) Establish a warning system of flags, lights or sound signals
during testing operations. Provide personnel who are not familiar with
the warning system in test areas, and equipped test areas with a
telephone and/or radio to permit communication during testing
operations.
Sec. 184.15 Collection and destruction requirements for AE.
(a) General. This section provides safety requirements for the
collection and destruction of AE. It contains more detailed information
than other portions of this part due to the higher risks of these
operations. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed
regulations which apply to contractors and may impose requirements
beyond those in this part. Contractors shall avoid compromising
explosive safety for environmental considerations.
(b) Protection during disposal operations. (1) Operational shields
or special clothing shall protect personnel during disposal operations.
Fragmentation hazards require, at a minimum, overhead and frontal
protection for personnel. Contractors detonating AE may locate
personnel shelters at the appropriate IBD for the AE NEW. Personnel
shall use protective structures when destroying AE by detonation and
when burning AE that may detonate. Personnel shall not approach the
burning site, but shall observe an appropriate waiting period after the
fire is out.
(2) Personnel shall never work alone during disposal and
destruction operations. Warning signs or lights, roadblocks, or other
effective means shall restrict the area. One person, available in an
emergency, should observe from a safe distance while another performs
the operations.
(c) Collection of AE. (1) Water-soluble materials. Use sufficient
water to neutralize ammonium picrate (Explosive D), black powder, and
other soluble materials to ensure their complete dissolution. Dissolve
as little material as practicable at one time. Sweeping floors before
washing them down reduces the amount of dissolved material in the wash
water. Consult experts when uncertainty exists concerning the purity
and composition of wash water.
(2) Solid wastes. Collect explosives-contaminated solid waste
material, place in closed containers, and promptly deliver to buildings
for treatment or holding, or to the burning ground for destruction.
(3) Explosives dusts. (i) The contractor may use a vacuum system to
remove HE dusts such as TNT, tetryl, Explosive D, Composition B, and
Pentolite. The preferred removal method for explosives is a ``wet
collector'' which moistens the dust near the point of intake and keeps
it wet until disposal. Collect Explosive D in a dry system.
(ii) The contractor may collect more sensitive explosives such as
black powder, lead azide, lead styphnate, tracer, igniter, incendiary
compositions, and pyrotechnic materials by vacuum, provided they are
kept wet close to the point of intake. Collect each type representing a
different hazard separately so that black powder, for example, cannot
mix with lead azide. The vacuum system should release any build up of
gases. Confine the use of vacuum systems for collection of sensitive
explosive substances to operations involving small quantities of
explosives, that is, operations with fuzes, detonators, small-arms
ammunition, and black powder igniters. To minimize the fire and
explosion hazard, collect scrap pyrotechnic, tracer, flare, and similar
mixtures in No. 10 mineral oil or equivalent. Collect dry explosive
dust in an oil-filled receptacle available at each operation throughout
the shift. The oil level shall maintained at least 1 inch above the
level of any pyrotechnic mixture in the container. Some pyrotechnic
compositions float on oil. If it occurs use a wooden plunger to
submerge the material. Remove containers of scrap explosive for
disposal from the operating buildings at least once per shift. When
using oil, use the appropriate rated Class B firefighting equipment.
(d) Design and operation of collection systems. (1) Design
collection systems and chambers to prevent pinching thin layers of
explosives or explosives dust between metal parts. Pipes or ducts used
to convey dusts require flanged, welded, or rubber connections. The
contractor shall not use threaded connections. The system shall prevent
explosive dusts from accumulating in parts outside the collection
chamber. Pipes or ducts conveying high explosives shall have long
radius bends. Systems for propellant powder may use short radius bends,
provided they are stainless steel, with polished interiors. Minimize
the number of vacuum application points. Use wet primary collectors
when possible. The design of the vacuum collection system should
provide a separate exhaust line to the primary collection chamber from
each room. If this is not possible, a common header shall service no
more than two bays. Keep short lengths of vacuum lines from the
application points to the wet collectors. A single secondary collector
shall service as few primary collectors as possible. The contractor
shall connect not more than two dry primary collectors to a single
secondary collector (wet or dry type). Vacuum systems that are
permanently attached
[[Page 16071]]
to the explosive dust-producing machine may increase the likelihood of
detonation propagation through the collection system. Recommend using
partly operated vacuum systems unless dust concentrations pose an
explosion or health hazard. Partly operated hose connections to
explosive dust-producing machines should not interconnect.
(2) Install two collection chambers in series ahead of the pump or
exhauster to prevent explosives dust from entering the vacuum producer
in a dry vacuum collection system.
(3) There shall be no metal-to-metal contact on slide valves for
vacuum collection systems. An aluminum slide operating between two
ebonite spacer bars or similar compatible materials will eliminate
unacceptable metal-to-metal contact.
(4) Install dry-type portable vacuum collectors, limited to 5 lbs
(2.3 kg) of explosives, in a separate cubicle having substantial
dividing walls, or outside the building. Never install type of
collector in the bay or cubicle with the explosives. The contractor may
use wet-type portable vacuum collectors in explosives operating bays or
cubicles, provided limited quantities of explosives in the collector
meet the requirements of paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(3) of this
section. For dry collection over 5 lbs (2.3 kg) or wet collection over
8 lbs (3.64 kg) of explosives, the provisions of paragraphs (e)(1)
through (e)(3) of this section also apply.
(5) The design of wet collectors shall provide for:
(i) Proper immersion of explosives.
(ii) Breaking up of air bubbles to prevent release of airborne
particles, and
(iii) Prevent moistened particles of explosives from entering the
small piping between the collector and the exhauster or pump
(6) At least once every shift, remove the explosives dust from the
collection chamber to eliminate unnecessary and hazardous
concentrations of explosives. Clean entire system on a regular basis to
remove residual contamination, with parts dismantled as necessary.
(7) Electrically bond the entire explosives dust collection system
to the grounding system. Test the electrical bonding/grounding system
in accordance with Sec. 184.6(f)(5).
(8) Shield personnel workstations from vacuum systems.
(e) Location of collection chambers. (1) Whenever practicable,
locate dry-type explosives dust collection chambers, except portable
units, in the open, outside operating buildings, or in buildings set-
aside for that purpose. Provide a barricade or operational shield
appropriate for the NEW involved to protect operating personnel from
blast (2.3 psi) and fragments from the collection chamber. At least 3
ft (1 m) should separate the collection chamber from the barricade or
operational shield.
(2) When locating dry-type collection chambers outside the
operating building is not feasible, set aside a separate room for this
purpose in the building. The contractor shall not allow personnel to
work or pass through the dry-type collection chamber room. Walls
separating the room from other portions of the operating building shall
meet the requirements for operational shields for the NEW in the
collection chamber. Subdivide rooms with multiple collection chambers
into cubicles with only one collection chamber per cubicle.
(3) Stationary and portable wet-type collectors in operating bays
or cubicles shall not exceed 5 lbs (2.3 kg) NEW. When placed in
separate cubicles, quantities may increase to 8 lbs (3.64 kg). See
paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this section for location requirements
of wet collectors, containing more than 8 lbs (3.64 kg),
(f) AE awaiting destruction. Maintain IBD from AE destruction sites
and explosives stored in the open. If adequately protected from frontal
and overhead hazards, ILD separation between AE material awaiting
destruction and AE destruction sites is acceptable. Protect all AE
awaiting destruction from accidental ignition or explosion from
fragments, grass fires, burning embers, or blast originating from the
destruction site.
(g) Containers for waste explosives. Use appropriate containers for
AE waste to prevent leakage and spillage of contents. The contractor
shall not pinch or rub explosives during container closing and opening.
Clearly mark containers to identify contents. Do not use containers
constructed of spark-producing or easily ignited material.
(h) Destruction sites. (1) Site criteria. (i) Locate AE destruction
sites as far as possible from magazines, inhabited buildings, public
highways, runways, taxiways, and operating buildings. The minimum
separation distance is 1,250 ft (381 m) or the applicable fragmentation
distance, unless pits or similar aids (e.g., natural barricades) limit
the range of fragments. Since burning explosives may detonate,
contractor shall use appropriate protective barriers or separation
distances for the safety of personnel and property. To prevent
secondary fragments, do not burn or detonate AE on concrete, or in
areas having large stones or crevices.
(ii) For separation distances less than 1250 ft (381 m), use DoD
approved documentation to determine fragment and debris throw in
calculating the appropriate IBD based on the maximum NEW of AE present.
(iii) Recommend keeping firefighting equipment available to
extinguish grass fires and to wet down the area between burnings and at
the close of operations.
(iv) The contractor should not dispose of ordinary combustible
rubbish near AE and AE-contaminated material destruction sites.
(2) Materials and equipment for detonating explosives. (i)
Contractor should initiate detonations of AE with electric blasting
caps and blasting machines or permanently installed electric circuits
energized by storage batteries or conventional power lines. When
covering AE for disposal with earth, do not bury the blasting cap.
Prime the initiating explosives with sufficient primacord to allow
connecting the blasting cap above ground level.
(ii) Special requirements for using electric blasting caps and
electric blasting circuits follow.
(A) Never hold a blasting cap at the explosive (output) end. Hold
the wire lead end of the cap between the thumb and the index finger.
Whenever possible, point the explosive end of a hand-held cap down,
away from the body, and to the rear.
(B) Do not remove the shunt from the lead wires of the blasting cap
until ready to connect them to the blasting circuit, except during
electrical continuity test of the blasting cap and lead wires.
(C) Carefully hold the lead wires so that there is no tension where
they connect to the cap and partly straighten the lead wires. Do not
throw, wave through the air, or uncoil by snapping as a whip.
(D) Use blasting circuit wires in twisted pairs. Operators shall
keep blasting circuit wires twisted together and connected to ground at
the power source and twisted at the opposite end at all times except
when actually firing the charge or testing circuit for continuity and
extraneous electricity. Never connect the blasting cap to the blasting
circuit wires unless the blasting circuit wires are shorted and
grounded at the ends near the power source.
(E) Maintain safe distances between radio frequency (RF) energy
transmitters and electric blasting, demolition operations, and
unshielded electric blasting caps.
[[Page 16072]]
(F) Transport blasting caps in closed metal boxes wherever exposure
to RF energy and extraneous electricity is possible (i.e., vehicles
equipped with two-way radios).
(G) Operators should follow these procedures when connecting
electric blasting cap lead wires to the blasting circuit wires.
(1) Test the blasting circuit wires for electrical continuity.
(2) Test the blasting circuit for extraneous electricity. To test,
arrange a dummy test circuit similar to the actual blasting circuit,
except substitute a radio pilot lamp of suitable voltage for the
blasting cap. If the pilot lamp glows, indicating potentially dangerous
amounts of RF energy, stop blasting operations using electric blasting
caps. Blasting operations may resume using non-electric blasting caps
and safety fuse. The contractor may substitute other test instruments
(e.g. the DuPont ``Dectect-A-Meter'' or ``Voltohmeter,'') for the radio
pilot lamp. If the potential source of extraneous electricity is radar,
television, or microwave transmitters, test the actual blasting
circuit, including the blasting cap but without other explosives, for
extraneous electricity. Protect personnel performing such tests from
the effects of an exploding blasting cap.
(3) Test the blasting cap and its lead wires for electrical
continuity. The individual who removes the shunt should ground himself
or herself by grasping the blasting circuit wire prior to performing
the operation in order to prevent accumulated static electricity from
firing the blasting cap.
(4) Assure the blasting circuit wires are shorted and grounded at
the power source and connect the blasting cap lead wires to the
blasting circuit wires.
(5) Evacuate all but two persons from the area. One person shall
partially retreat and act as safety observer. The other person shall
maintain physical possession of a safety device that locks out the
blasting circuit (e.g., plug, key, pigtail, etc.) and shall place
blasting cap onto charge. Both persons will then retreat to personnel
shelter.
(6) Untwist blasting circuit wires at power source and test for
continuity. A galvanometer shall be used to test the firing circuit for
electric continuity before connection to the blasting machine.
(7) The individual assigned to make the connections shall confirm
that everyone in the vicinity is in a safe place before connecting the
blasting circuit wires to the power source and signaling for
detonation. This individual shall not leave the blasting machine or its
actuating device for any reason and when using a panel, shall lock the
switch in the open position until ready to fire, retaining the only
key. Connect blasting circuit wires to power source and fire the
charge.
(8) After firing, disconnect blasting circuit wires from power
source, twist the wires together, and connect to ground.
(9) Suspend blasting and demolition operations when electrical
storms are in the vicinity. At the first sign of an electrical storm,
short-circuit the blasting cap lead wires and the blasting circuit
wires, and evacuate all personnel from the demolition area to a safe
location.
(H) Use non-electric blasting caps and safety fuses when conditions
prevent the use of electrical initiators for detonation. At the
beginning of each day's operation and whenever using a new coil, test
the safety fuse's burning rate. The fuse shall be long enough for
personnel to evacuate to a safe distance. Under no circumstances shall
the fuse length be less than that required for a 2-minute burn time.
Use appropriately designed crimpers to affix fuses to detonators. Use
only fuses small enough in diameter to enter the blasting cap without
forcing. All personnel, except the fuse-actuator, shall move to the
personnel shelter or leave the demolition area before ignition.
(3) Servicing of destruction site. (i) Vehicles transporting AE to
burning or demolition grounds shall meet the requirements of this part.
No more than two persons shall ride in the cab. No one shall ride in
the truck bed.
(ii) The contractor should unload vehicles immediately then move
the vehicle from the burning or demolition area until completion of
destruction operations. The contractor should not open AE containers
before the vehicle departs.
(iii) The contractor shall place and open all AE containers set for
destruction at least 10 ft (3.1 m) from each other and from explosives
material previously set out to prevent rapid transmission of fire if
premature ignition occurs.
(iv) Close and move empty containers to prevent charring or damage
during destruction of AE. Delivery vehicles shall pick up and remove
empty containers on the next trip.
(i) Destruction by burning. (1) No mixing of an explosive with
extraneous material, other explosives, metal powders, detonators, or
similar items shall occur without authorization.
(2) Because of the danger of detonation, do not burn AE in large
quantities or in containers.
(3) Beds for burning explosives. (i) A bed of easily combustible
material at least two inches thick should be positioned under the
explosive bed to ensure complete consumption of wet explosives. The
combustible material should extend at least two inches beyond the edges
of the explosive bed. If necessary, the thickness and extent of the
combustible material may be adjusted, based on actual experience at the
site.
(ii) The explosive bed shall be no more than 3 in (76 mm) deep.
(iii) The ignition train of combustible material leading to the
explosives bed shall be positioned so that both it and the explosive
bed can burn in a controlled fashion and not propagate to any other
explosive treatment areas.
(iv) No burning shall take place when wind velocity exceeds 15 mph
(24 km/h).
(v) For direct ignition of a combustible train, use either a safety
fuse long enough to permit personnel to reach protective shelter or a
black powder squib initiated by an electric current controlled from a
distance or protective structure. Tying two or more squibs together may
be necessary to ensure ignition of the combustible train.
(vi) Burning solid propellants ignited by squibs do not require
combustible materials.
(vii) Evacuate sites of misfires for at least 30 minutes, after
which two qualified persons shall approach the position of the
explosives. One shall examine the misfire and the other shall act as
backup. The backup shall watch the examination from a safe distance,
behind natural or artificial barriers or other obstructions for
protection. The backup shall follow contractor procedures should an
accident occur.
(4) Burn loose, dry explosives without combustible material, if the
ground can remain uncontaminated. Check the ground for residual
unburned explosive for the safety of personnel and operations. Do not
pour volatile flammable liquids, at any stage, over explosives or the
underlying combustible material to accelerate burning.
(5) Always burn wet explosives on beds of non-explosive materials.
(6) Burn explosive powders (e.g., RDX, HMX, etc.) in desensitized
form to promote safe handling and prevent detonation.
(7) Empty oil-covered pyrotechnic materials from containers into
shallow metal pans before burning. The contractor may burn explosives
in the open containers.
(8) Prepare separate parallel beds of explosives for burning by not
less than
[[Page 16073]]
150 ft (46 m). Take care to prevent material igniting from smoldering
residue or from heat retained in the ground from previous burning
operations. Saturate a burned-over plot with water, then check for hot
spots, or allow 24 hours to elapse before the next burn.
(j) Destruction by detonation. (1) Detonation of AE should occur in
a pit of at least 4 ft (1.3 m) deep and be covered by at least of 2 ft
(0.6 m) of earth. Place the components on their sides or in a fashion
to enhance complete destruction. Place demolition blocks on top of the
AE and secure them with earth packed over them. Under certain
circumstances, the contractor may substitute bangalore torpedoes or
bulk HE for the demolition blocks. (Note: Detonations do not require a
pit at remote demolition areas.)
(2) Local regulations, atmospheric conditions, earth strata, etc.
shall dictate quantities destroyed at one time, both in pits and open
sites. Considering these variables, determine the acceptable NEW based
on criteria in Chapter 9, DoD 6055.9-STD. The contractor should use
this procedure for destruction of fragmentation grenades, HE
projectiles, mines, mortar shells, bombs, photoflash munitions, and HE
rocket heads separated from their motors.
(3) Search the surrounding area for unexploded AE after each
detonation.
(4) In cases of misfires, follow established procedures. Wait a
minimum of 30 minutes before approaching the site.
(k) Destruction by neutralization. Methods of neutralization
include dissolving in water-soluble material or chemical decomposition.
The contractor is responsible for investigating which of these is most
appropriate. The contractor shall comply with all applicable local,
state, and Federal requirements.
(l) Destruction chambers and incinerators. (1) General. The
contractor should destroy small, loaded AE components (e.g., primers,
fuzes, boosters, detonators, activators, relays, delays, and all types
of small-arms ammunition) in destruction chambers or deactivation
furnaces. The contractor should use explosives scrap incinerators for
burning tracer and igniter compositions, small quantities of solid
propellant, magnesium powder, sump cleanings, absorbent cleaning
materials, and similar materials. The contractor should equip
destruction chambers and incinerators with suitable pollution control
devices (e.g., multiple chamber incinerators with thermal incinerator
afterburners) and concrete barricades. The final incineration should
take place at 1400 [deg]F (760 [deg]C), minimum.
(2) Operation of incinerators. (i) The contractor shall not operate
the feeding conveyor until the incinerator temperature is high enough
to ensure complete destruction. The contractor should install
temperature recording devices.
(ii) To remove accumulated residue, shut down and thoroughly cool
the incinerators. Make repairs only during shutdown. Personnel entering
the incinerator to clean it shall wear respiratory protection to
prevent inhalation of toxic dusts or fumes (e.g., mercury from tracers
or lead from small-arms ammunition).
(3) Operation of destruction chambers and deactivation furnaces.
(i) Operation of destruction chambers and deactivation furnaces
requires remote control.
(ii) Operators shall not approach the unprotected side of the
concrete barricade, for any other reason, until enough time has elapsed
for explosives in the chamber to react. Perform regular inspections to
keep the feed-pipe chute or conveyor obstruction free.
(iii) Feed components into the chamber a few at a time. Post the
exact number permitted at one time for each type of component in a
place easily seen from the operator's working position.
(iv) Install guards on conveyor-feeding mechanisms to facilitate
feeding and to prevent items from jamming or falling.
(m) Support in disposal of waste. The contractor shall request
instructions from the responsible ACO if, at end of contract, there is
excess or residual Government-owned AE and the contract does not
address disposition. A contractor having difficulty safely disposing of
residual (scrap) AE related to contractual operations may request help
from the ACO.
Sec. 184.16 Construction and siting criteria.
Please refer to DoD 6055.9, Chapter 5 for guidance on facilities
construction and siting.
Appendix A to 32 CFR Part 184--Glossary
This appendix defines terms and phrases used in this part, which
are associated with ammunition, explosives, and other dangerous
materials. For those terms that are not found in this glossary
please refer to DoD 6055.9-STD for Q-D terminology. Because of
contractual reasons some terms of this part may be define
differently.
(a) Aboveground magazine. Any open area or any structure not
meeting the requirements of an ECM which is used for explosives
storage.
(b) Administration area. The area encompassing administrative
buildings which serve the entire installation. This excludes offices
located near and directly serving explosives storage and operating
areas.
(c) Aircraft passenger transport operations. Passenger transport
operations for the purpose of applying explosives Q-D tables are
defined as follows: Passenger transport traffic involving military
dependents and civilians other than those employed or working
directly for DoD Components. The following are not considered
passenger transport operations.
(1) Infrequent flights of base and command administrative
aircraft that may on occasion, provide some space available travel
to authorized personnel.
(2) Travel of direct hire appropriated funds personnel employed
by any DoD Component.
(d) Ammunition and explosives. Includes (but is not necessarily
limited to) all items of U.S.-titled (owned by the U.S. Government
through DoD Components) ammunition: propellants, liquid and solid.
pyrotechnics. high explosives. guided missiles. warheads. devices.
devices, and chemical agent substances and components presenting
real or potential hazards to life, property and the environment.
Excluded are wholly inert items and nuclear warheads and devices,
except for considerations of storage and stowage compatibility,
blast, fire, and non-nuclear fragment hazards associated with the
explosives.
(e) Ammunition and explosives aircraft cargo area. Any area
specifically designated for:
(1) Aircraft loading or unloading of transportation configured
ammunition and explosives.
(2) Parking aircraft loaded with transportation configured
ammunition and explosives.
(f) Ammunition and explosives area. An area specifically
designated and set aside from other portions of an installation for
the development, manufacture, testing, maintenance, storage or
handling of ammunition and explosives.
(g) Auxiliary building. Any building accessory to or maintained
and operated to serve an operating building line, plant, or pier
area. Explosive materials are not present in an auxiliary building,
such as powerplants, change houses, paint and solvent lockers, and
similar facilities.
(h) Barricade. An intervening barrier, natural or artificial, of
such type, size, and construction as to limit in a prescribed manner
the effect of an explosion on nearby buildings or exposures.
(i) Blast impulse. The product of the overpressure from the
blast wave of an explosion and the time during which it acts at a
given point (that is, the area under the positive phase of the
overpressure-time curve).
(j) Blast overpressure. The pressure, exceeding the ambient
pressure, manifested in the shock wave of an explosion.
(k) Cavern storage site. A natural cavern or former mining
excavation adapted for the storage of ammunition and explosives.
(l) Chamber storage site. An excavated chamber or series or
excavated chambers especially suited to the storage of
[[Page 16074]]
ammunition and explosives. A cavern may be subdivided or otherwise
structurally modified for use as a chamber storage site.
(m) Change house. A building provide with facilities for
employees to change to and from work clothes. Such buildings may be
provided with sanitary facilities, drinking fountains, lockers and
eating facilities.
(n) Classification yard. A railroad yard used for receiving,
dispatching, classifying, and switching of cars.
(o) Closure block. A protective constructive feature designed to
seal the entrance tunnel to an underground storage chamber in the
event of an explosion within the chamber. Magae blocks are passive
closures that are driven by the blast from a normally open to a
closed position. Klotz blocks area active closures, operated by a
hydraulic system to move from normally closed to an open position
(for access).
(p) Compatibility. Ammunition or explosives which may be stored
or transported together without significantly increasing either the
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude
of the effects of such as accident.
(q) Debris. Any solid particle thrown by an explosion or other
strong energetic reaction. For aboveground detonations, debris
usually refers to secondary fragments, which are transported by a
strong flow of detonation gasses.
(r) Debris trap. A protective construction feature in an
underground storage facility which is designed to capture fragments
and debris from a detonation within the facility. This usually
accomplished by using the inertia of the material to separate from
the detonation gas stream.
(s) Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction in which the output
of heat is enough to enable the reaction to proceed and be
accelerated without input of heat from another source. Deflagration
is a surface phenomenon with the reaction products flowing away from
the unreacted material along the surface at subsonic velocity. The
effect of a true deflagration under confinement is an explosion.
Confinement of the reaction increases pressure, rate of reaction and
temperature, and may cause transition into a detonation.
(t) Demilitarize. Any disarming, neutralizing, and any other
action rendering ammunition and explosives innocuous or ineffectual
for military use.
(u) Detonation. A violent chemical reaction with a chemical
compound or mechanical mixture evolving heat and pressure. A
detonation which proceeds through the reacted material toward the
unreacted material at a supersonic velocity. The result of the
chemical reaction is exertion of extremely high pressure on the
surrounding medium forming a propagating shock wave which is
initially of supersonic velocity. A detonation, when the material is
located on or near the surface of the found, is characterized
normally by a crater.
(v) Dividing wall. A wall designed to prevent, control, or delay
propagation of an explosion between quantities of explosives on
opposite sides of the wall.
(w) DoD mishap. An unplanned event or series of events which
results in damage to DoD property, occupational illness to DoD
military or civilian personnel, injury to DoD military personnel on
or off duty, injury to on-duty civilian personnel, damage to public
and private property, or injury and illness to non-DoD personnel as
a result of DoD operations.
(x) Donor/Acceptor. A total quantity of stored ammunition may be
subdivided into separate storage units in order to reduce the MCE,
and, consequently, the Q-D of an accidental detonation. The
separation distances, with or without an intervening barrier, should
be sufficient to ensure that a detonation does not propagate from
one unit to another. For convenience, the storage unit, which
detonates, is termed the donor and nearby units, which may be
endangered, are termed acceptors. The locations of the donor and
acceptor define the PES and ES, respectively.
(y) Earth-Covered Magazine (ECM). Any earth-covered structure
that meets soil cover depth and soil requirements of DoD 6055.9-STD.
ECM has three possible structural strength designations (``7-Bar'',
``3-Bar'', or ``Undefined''). The strength of an ECM's headwall and
door(s) determines its designation.
(z) Energetic liquid. A liquid, slurry, or gel, consisting of or
containing an explosive, oxidizer, fuel, or combination of the
above, may undergo, contribute to, or cause rapid exothermic
decomposition, deflagration, or detonation.
(aa) Engineering controls. Regulation of facility operations
through the use of prudent engineering principles, such as facility
design, operation sequencing, equipment selection, and process
limitations.
(bb) Expansion chambers. A protective construction feature in an
underground storage facility which is designed to reduce the blast
shock and overpressure exiting the facility by increasing the total
volume of the complex. It may also function as a operating area
within the underground facility, as well as a debris trap.
(cc) Explosion. A reaction of any chemical compound or
mechanical mixture, which, when initiated, undergoes a very rapid
combustion or decomposition releasing large volumes of highly heated
gases that exert pressure on the surrounding medium. In addition, a
mechanical reaction in which failure of the container causes the
sudden release of pressure from within a pressure vessel, for
example, pressure rupture of a steam boiler. Depending on the rate
of energy release, an explosion can be categorized as a
deflagration, a detonation, or pressure rupture.
(dd) Explosive. Any chemical compound or mechanical mixture
that, when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation, or other
suitable initiation, undergoes a very rapid chemical change with the
evolution of large volumes of highly heated gases which exert
pressures in the surrounding medium. The term applies to materials
which either detonate or deflagrate.
(ee) Explosives facility. Any structure or location containing
ammunition and explosives excluding combat aircraft parking areas or
ammunition and explosives aircraft cargo areas.
(ff) Exposed Site (ES). A location exposed to the potential
hazardous effects (blast, fragments, debris, and heat flux) from an
explosion at a potential site (PES). The distance to a PES and the
level of protection required for an ES determine the quantity of
ammunition or explosives permitted in a PES.
(gg) Firebrand. A projected burning or hot fragment whose
thermal energy is transferred to a receptor.
(hh) Fire-resistive. Combustible materials or structures that
have been treated or have surface coverings designed to retard
ignition of fire spread.
(ii) Flame-resistant. Combustible materials, such as clothing,
which have been treated or coated to decrease their burning
characteristics.
(jj) Flammable. A material which ignites easily and burns
readily.
(kk) Fragmentation. The breaking up of the confining material of
a chemical compound or mechanical mixture when an explosion takes
place. Fragments may be complete items, subassemblies, pieces
thereof, or pieces of equipment or buildings containing items.
(ll) General public. Persons not associated with the DoD
installation's mission or operations such as visitors, to include
guests of personnel assigned to the installation, or persons not
employed or contracted by DoD or the installation.
(mm) Hazardous fragment. A hazardous fragment is one having an
impact energy of 58 ft-lb or greater.
(nn) Hazardous fragment density. A density of hazardous
fragments exceeding one per 600 sq ft.
(oo) High explosive equivalent or explosive equivalent. The
amount of a standard explosive that, when detonated, will produce a
blast effect comparable to that which results at the same distances
from the detonation or explosion of a given amount of the material
or which performance is being evaluated. It usually is expressed as
a percentage of the total net weight of all reactive materials
contained in the item or systems. For the purpose of these
standards, TNT is used for comparison.
(pp) Hazard analysis. The logical, systematic examination of an
item, process, condition, facility, or system to identify and
analyze the probability, causes, and consequences of potential or
real hazards.
(qq) Holding yard. A location for groups of railcars, trucks, or
trailers used to hold ammunition, explosives, and dangerous
materials for interim periods before storage or shipment.
(rr) Hybrid propellants. A propellant charge using a combination
of physically separated solid and liquid (or jelled) substances as
fuel and oxidizer.
(ss) Hygroscopic. A tendency of material to absorb moisture from
its surroundings.
(tt) Hypergolic. A property of various combinations of chemical
to self-ignite upon contact with each other without a spark or other
external initiation.
(uu) Inhabited buildings. Buildings or structures, other than
operating buildings occupied in whole or in part by human beings,
both within and outside DoD
[[Page 16075]]
establishments. They include but are not limited to schools,
churches, residences (quarters), service clubs, aircraft passenger
terminals, stores, shops, factories, hospitals, theaters, mess
halls, post offices, and post exchanges.
(vv) Inspection station. A designated location at which trucks
and railcars containing ammunition and explosives are inspected.
(ww) Installation related personnel. Military personnel (to
include family members), DoD employees, DoD contractor personnel,
and other personnel having either a direct operational (military or
other Federal personnel undergoing training at an installation) or
logistical support (e.g., vendors) relationship with installation
activities.
(xx) Interchange yard. An area set aside for the exchange of
railroad cars or vehicles between the common carrier and DoD
activities.
(yy) Intraline distance. The distance to be maintained between
any two operating buildings and sites within an operating line, of
which at least one contains or is designed to contain explosives,
except that the distance from a service magazine for the line to the
nearest operating building may be not be less than the intraline
distance required for the quantity of explosives contained in the
service magazine.
(zz) K-Factor. The factor in the formula D = kW\1/3\
used in quantity-distance determinations where D represents distance
in feet and W is the net explosive weight in pounds. The K-factor is
a constant and represents the degree of damage that is acceptable.
Typical constants range from 1.25 to 50. the lower the factor, the
greater the damage that is accepted.
(aaa) Launch pads. The load-bearing base, apron, or platform
upon which a rocket, missile, or space vehicle and its launcher rest
during launching.
(bbb) Liquid propellants. Substances in fluid form (including
cryogenics) used for propulsion for operating power for missiles,
rockets, ammunition and other related devices (See DoD 6055.9-STD.
For purposes of this part, liquid fuels and oxidizers are considered
propellants even when stored and handled separately.
(ccc) Loading density. Quantity of explosive per unit volume
usually expressed as either pounds per cubic foot (lbs/
ft3). As applied to underground storage facilities, there
are two types of loading densities used in Q-D calculations:
(1) Chamber loading density is based on the NEW within an
individual storage chamber and the volume of the chamber
(Vch).
(2) The calculations of air blast peak pressures and IBD's for
explosions in underground storage facilities is based on the shock-
engulfed volume (Ve) of the facility. This is the total
volume filled by the expanding gases at the time the blast front
reaches the point of interest (e.g., the entrance to an adjacent
chamber). It includes volumes in any direction that the gases can
enter, to a distance from the explosion source that equals the
distance from the source to the point of interest. For IBD, the
point of interest is the tunnel opening.
(ddd) Loading docks. Facilities, structures, or paved areas,
designed and installed for transferring ammunition and explosives
between any two modes of transportation.
(eee) Lunchrooms. Facilities where food is prepared or brought
for distribution by food service personnel. It may serve more than
one PES. A breakroom in an operating building may be used by
personnel assigned to the PES to eat meals.
(fff) Magazine. Any building or structure, except an operating
building, used for the storage of ammunition and explosives.
(ggg) Mass-detonating explosives. HE, black powder, certain
propellants, certain pyrotechnics, and other similar explosives,
alone or in combination, or loaded into various types of ammunition
or containers, most of the entire quantity of which can be expected
to explode virtually instantaneously when a small portion is
subjected to fire, to severe concussion or impact, to the impulse of
an initiating agent, or to the effect of a considerable discharge of
energy from without. Such an explosion normally will cause severe
structural damage to adjacent objects. Explosion propagation may
occur immediately to other items of ammunition and explosives stored
sufficiently close to and not adequately protected from the
initially exploding pile with a time interval short enough so that
two or more quantities must be considered as one for Q-D purposes.
(hhh) Maximum Credible Event (MCE). In hazards evaluation, the
MCE from a hypothesized accidental explosion, fire, or agent release
is the worst single event that is likely to occur from a quantity
and disposition of ammunition and explosives. The event must be
realistic with a reasonable probability of occurrence considering
the explosion propagation, burning rate characteristics, and
physical protection given to the involved. The MCE evaluated on this
basis may then be used as a basis for effects calculations and
casualty predictions.
(iii) Module. A barricaded area comprised of a series of
connected cells with hard surface storage pads separated from each
other by barricades.
(jjj) Military munitions. All ammunition products and components
produced or used by for the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S.
Armed Services for national defense and security, including military
munitions under the control of the Department of Defense, the U.S.
Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the National Guard
personnel. The term ``military munitions'' includes confined
gaseous, liquid, and solid propellants, explosives, pyrotechnics,
chemical and riot control agents, smokes, incendiaries used by the
DoD Components, including bulk explosives and chemical warfare,
mortar rounds, artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition,
grenades, mines, torpedoes, depth charges, cluster munitions and
dispensers, demolition charges, and devices and components thereof.
``Military munitions'' do not include wholly inert items, improvised
explosive devices, and nuclear weapons, nuclear devices, and nuclear
components thereof. However, that term does include non-nuclear
components of nuclear devices, managed under the DoE's nuclear
weapons program, after all required sanitizing operations under the
``Atomic Energy Act of 1954,'' as amended, have been completed (40
CFR 260.10).
(kkk) Navigable streams. Those parts of streams, channels, or
canals capable of being used in their ordinary or maintained
condition as highways of commerce over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes, not including streams that
are not capable of navigation by barges, tugboats, and other large
vessels unless they are used extensively and regularly for the
operation of pleasure boats.
(lll) NEQ. Net explosive quantity expressed in kilograms.
(mmm) NEW. Net explosive weight expressed in pounds.
(nnn) Nitrogen padding (or Blanket). Used to fill the void or
ullage of a closed container with nitrogen gas to prevent oxidation
of the chemical contained therein and to avoid formation of a
flammable mixture, or to maintain a nitrogen atmosphere in or around
an operation of a piece of equipment.
(ooo) Non-combustible. Not burnable.
(ppp) Non-DoD Components. Any entity (government, private, or
corporate) that is not a part of the Department of Defense.
(qqq) Operating building. Any structure, except a magazine, in
which operations pertaining to manufacturing, processing, handling,
loading, or assembling of ammunition and explosives are performed.
(rrr) Operating line. A group of buildings, facilities or
related work stations so arranged as to permit performance of the
consecutive steps in the manufacture of an explosive, or in the
loading, assembly, modification, and maintenance of ammunition.
Parallel operating lines are adjacent buildings or other facilities
that process the same or comparable ammunition or explosives,
presenting parallel operating lines but may require physical
separation or other control measures to ensure inventory control and
management of explosives limits.
(sss) Operational shield. A barrier constructed at a particular
location or around a particular machine or operating station to
protect personnel, material, or equipment from the effects of a
possible localized fire or explosion.
(ttt) Parallel operating lines. Adjacent buildings or other
facilities that process the same or comparable ammunition. or
explosives presenting the same or comparable hazards and using the
same or comparable process methods. Such ammunition or explosives
processed at related work stations in the same building or facility
are not parallel operating lines but may require physical separation
or other control measures to ensure inventory control and management
of explosives limits.
(uuu) Passenger railroad. Any steam, diesel, electric, or other
railroad which carries passengers for hire.
(vvv) Potential Explosive Site (PES). The location of a quantity
of explosives that will create a blast, fragment, thermal, or debris
hazard in the event of an accidental explosion of its contents.
Quantity limits for ammunition and explosives at a PES are
determined by the distance to an ES.
(www) Prohibited area. A specifically designated area at
airfields, seadromes, or
[[Page 16076]]
heliports in which all ammunition and explosives facilities are
prohibited.
(xxx) Propellant. Explosives compositions used for propelling
projectiles and rockets and to generate gases for powering auxiliary
devices.
(yyy) Public highway. Any street, road, or highway used by the
general public for any type of vehicular travel.
(zzz) Public traffic route. Any public street, road, highway,
navigable stream, or passenger railroad (includes roads on a
military reservation that are used routinely by the general public
for through traffic).
(aaaa) Pyrotechnic material. The explosive or chemical
ingredients, including powdered metals, used in the manufacture of
military pyrotechnics.
(bbbb) Quantity-Distance (Q-D). The quantity of explosive
material and distance separation relationships that provide defined
types of protection. These relationships are based on levels of risk
considered acceptable for the stipulated exposures and are tabulated
in the appropriate Q-D tables. Separation distances are not absolute
safe distances but are relative protective or safe distances.
Greater distances than those shown in the tables shall be used
whenever practicable. Tables are contained in DoD 6055.9-STD and
form a part.
(cccc) Ready ammunition storage. A location where ammunition is
stored for near-term tactical or training use. Generally, ready
ammunition storage will supply one or more armament pads.
(dddd) Renovation. The work performed on ammunition, missiles,
or rockets to restore them to a completely serviceable condition.
this usually involves the replacement of unserviceable or outmoded
parts.
(eeee) Risk. The product of the probability or frequency an
accident will occur within a certain time and the accident's
consequences to people, property or the environment.
(ffff) Robust munitions. These are munitions that meet two of
the following three criteria:
(1) Have a ratio of the explosive weight to empty case weight
less than 1.00;
(2) Have a normal wall thickness of at least 0.4 inches; and
(3) Have a case thickness/NEW\1/3\>0.05 in/lb\1/3\. The
following cartridges are by definition, robust: 20mm, 25mm, and
30mm. Other examples of robust ammunition include MK 80 series
bombs, M107 projectiles, Tomahawk and Harpoon penetration warheads.
(Changed at 319th Board Meeting).
(gggg) Rock strength. Strong, moderately strong, and weak rock
are designators which provide a general classification of a rock
body into one of these rankings is based on the rock impedance
factor:
Rock impedance factor = p.c.10-6
and p = y/g
where
y is the rock density, lbs/ft3
g is the gravitational acceleration, ft/sec2
p is mass density of the rock, lbs-sec2/
ft4
c seismic velocity of the rock, ft/sec.
(1) The rock impedance factor will be 0.75 or more for strong
rock. Between 0.75 and 0.5 for moderately strong rock. and less than
0.5 for weak rock.
(2) Values of these parameters can usually be estimated based on
examinations of exposed rock outcrops or core samples from an
exploratory drill hole. For the detailed design of an underground
storage facility (maximum) span width, rock reinforcement, etc.),
standard rock mechanics classification systems should be used.
(hhhh) Runway. Any surface on land designated for aircraft
takeoff and landing operations, or a designated lane of water for
takeoff and landing operations of seaplanes.
(iiii) Secure explosives holding area. An area designated for
the temporary parking of commercial carriers' motor vehicles
transporting DoD-owned Arms, Ammunition, Explosives (AA&E).
(jjjj) Secure non-explosives holding area. An area designated
for the temporary parking of commercial carriers' motor vehicles
transporting Categorized DoD Arms, classified (SECRET or
CONFIDENTIAL) materials, and Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI).
(kkkk) Service magazine. A building of an operating line used
for the intermediate storage of explosives materials.
(llll) Single-chamber storage site. An excavated chamber with
its own access to the natural ground surface, not connected to any
other storage chamber.
(mmmm) Spall. Pieces of a material (and the process by which
they are formed) that are broken lose from the surface of a parent
body by tensile forces created when a compression shock wave travels
through the body and reflects from the surface. For underground
storage, spall normally refers to the rock broken loose from the
wall of an acceptor chamber by the shock wave transmitted through
the rock from an explosion in a nearby donor chamber.
(nnnn) Static missile battery. Deployed ground-based missiles
meant to be employed in a non-mobile mission for offensive or
defensive purposes.
(oooo) Static test stand. Locations on which liquid propellant
engines or solid propellant motors are tested in place.
(pppp) Substantial dividing wall. An interior wall designed to
prevent simultaneous detonation of explosives on opposite sides of
the wall. however, such walls may not prevent propagation (depending
on quantities and types of explosives involved).
(1) Substantial dividing walls are one way of separating
explosives into smaller groups to minimize the results of an
explosion and allow a reduction in Q-D. These walls do not protect
personnel near the wall from high explosives because the spalling of
wall surface opposite the explosion source may form dangerous
secondary fragments.
(2) Reinforced concrete-type walls may vary in thickness, but
will be at least 12 in (305 mm) thick. At a minimum, both will be
reinforced with rods at \1/2\ in (12.7 mm) in diameter. The rods
will be spaced not more than 12 in (305 mm) on centers horizontally
and vertically, interlocked with footing rods and secured to prevent
overturning. Rods on one face will be staggered with regard to rods
on the opposite face and should be approximately 2 in (50.8 mm) from
each face. Concrete should have a design compressive strength on
2,500 psi (17.24 MPa) or more. The capability to prevent
simultaneous detonation is based on a limit of 425 net lb (193 kg)
of mass-detonating explosives. All storage plans and Q-D
calculations shall be based on the total quantity of mass-detonating
explosives on both sides of a dividing wall when the quantity of
either side exceeds 425 lb (193 kg). Explosives should be 3 ft (0.91
m) or more from the wall.
(3) Retaining walls filled with earth or sand must be at least 5
ft (1.5 m) wide, with earth or sand packed between concrete,
masonry, or wooden retaining walls.
(qqqq) Support facilities. Ammunition and explosives storage or
operations that support solely the functions of tactical or using
units as distinguished from storage depots or manufacturing
facilities.
(rrrr) Suspect truck and car site. A designated location for
placing trucks and railcars containing ammunition and explosives
that are suspected of being in a hazardous condition. These sites
area also used for trucks and railcars that may be in a condition
that is hazardous to their contents.
(ssss) Taxiway or taxilane. Any surface designated as such in
the basic airfield clearance criteria specified by a DoD Component
publication or Federal Aviation Regulation.
(tttt) Toxic area. A defined area in which CG K or Class 6
chemical agents are handled or stored.
(uuuu) Ufer ground. A Ufer Ground is an earth electrode system
which consists of solid conductors encased along the bottom of a
concrete foundation footing or floor indirect contact with the
earth.
(vvvv) Unexploded ordnance. Explosive ordnance which has been
primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has
been fired, dropped, launched, projected or placed in such. a.
manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations,
personnel or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction
or design for any other cause.
(wwww) Unit risk. The risk to personnel and/or facilities that
is associated with debris, fragment and/or blast hazards that is
result of the detonation of a single round of ammunition.
(xxxx) Waste military munitions. Military munitions are waste
when they are solid or hazardous waste under the regulations (42
U.S.C. 9601, et seq. implementing the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) subpart EE of part 264 of 40 CFR), or defined as
a waste under a DoD Component's written procedures. Waste military
munitions are defined in Sec. 266.202 of 40 CFR). (Note: Decision
about whether specific munitions are or are not waste should be made
with reference to Sec. 260.10 and Sec. Sec. 266.200 through 266.206
of 40 CFR).
(1) An unused military munition is a solid waste when any of the
following occurs:
(A) The munition is abandoned by being disposed of, burned,
detonated (except during intended use), incinerated, or treated
before disposal.
(B) The munition is removed from storage in a military magazine
or other storage area for the purpose of being disposed of, burned,
or incinerated, or treated prior to disposal.
[[Page 16077]]
(C) The munition is deteriorated or damaged (e.g.< the integrity
of the munition is compromised by cracks, leaks, or other damage) to
the point that it cannot be put into serviceable condition, and
cannot reasonably be recycled or used for other purposes. or,
(D) An authorized military official has declared the munition a
solid waste. (Note: Declaration by and ``authorized military
official'' that munitions are waste (Section 266.202(b)(4) of 40
CFR) has a very limited meaning and applicability. The only example
is a declaration by the Army in 1984 that M55 rockets are waste. The
environmental Protection Agency expects that such a declaration
would be in writing. A decision that munitions are unserviceable, or
that they are to be transferred into a demilitarization account does
not, by itself, constitute a decision that the munitions are solid
waste).
(2) A used or fired military munition is a solid waste, it
follows:
(A) When transported off range or from the site of use, where
the site of use is not a range, for the purposes of storage,
reclamation, treatment, disposal, or treatment before disposal. or,
(B) If recovered, collected, and then disposed of by burial, or
land filling either on or off a range.
(C) For the RCRA (section 1004(27) of 40 CFR), a used or fired
military munition is a solid waste, and therefore, is potentially
subject to RCRA corrective action authorities under Section 3004(u)
and 3004(v), and 3008(h) of 40 CFR, the munition lands off-range and
is not promptly rendered safe and/or retrieved. Any imminent and
substantial threats associated with any remaining material must be
addressed. If remedial action is not possible, the operator of the
range must maintain a record of the event for as long as any threat
remains. The record must include the type of munition and its
location (to the extent the location is known). (For further
clarification see 40 CFR 266.202 under ``Definition of Solid
Waste.'').
(yyyy) Waiver. A written authority that provides a temporary
exception, permitting deviation from mandatory requirements of this
Part. It generally is granted for short periods of time pending
cancellation as a result of termination of scheduled work commitment
or correction of the waived conditions.
(zzzz) Wharf. A landing place or platform built into the water
or along the shore for the berthing of vessels.
(aaaaa) Wharf yard. A yard that is close to piers or wharves in
which railcars or trucks are held for short periods of time before
delivery to the piers or wharves.
Dated: March 15, 2005.
Jeannette Owings-Ballard,
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 05-5429 Filed 3-28-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P