[Federal Register: January 23, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 14)]
[Notices]
[Page 3513-3518]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr23ja06-58]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[Report No. AUC-06-65-A (Auction No. 65); DA 06-3]
Auction of 800 MHz Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service Licenses
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of new nationwide
commercial Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service licenses in the 800 MHz
band (Auction No. 65), scheduled to commence on May 10, 2006. This
document also seeks comments on reserve prices or minimum opening bids
and other procedures for Auction No. 65.
DATES: Comments are due on or before January 31, 2006 and reply
comments are due on or before February 7, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail
to the following address: auctions65@fcc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Brian Carter at
(202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Jeff Crooks at (202)
418-0660. For service rules questions: Erin McGrath or Richard
Arsenault (legal); or Jay Jackson or Moslem Sawez (technical) at (202)
418-0620.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 65
Comment Public Notice released on January 10, 2006. The complete text
of the Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice, including attachments and
related Commission documents is available for public inspection and
copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m.
to 11:30 p.m. on Friday at the FCC Reference Information Center,
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554.
The Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice and related Commission
documents may also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating
contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th
Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202-488-
5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may contact BCPI at its Web site:
http://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering documents from BCPI please
provide the appropriate FCC document number for example, DA 06-3. The
Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice and related documents are also
available on the Internet at the Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/65/
.
[[Page 3514]]
I. Licenses To Be Offered in Auction No. 65
1. Alternative Band Configurations. The Commission will auction
licenses in three alternative band configurations: (1) Band Plan 1,
comprised of two overlapping, shared, cross-polarized 3 MHz licenses
(Licenses A and B, respectively), (2) Band Plan 2, comprised of an
exclusive 3 MHz license and an exclusive 1 MHz license (Licenses C and
D, respectively), and (3) Band Plan 3, comprised of an exclusive 1 MHz
license and an exclusive 3 MHz license (Licenses E and F,
respectively), with the blocks at opposite ends of the band from Band
Plan 2. Licenses in only one of these mutually incompatible band
configurations will be awarded. The band plan that receives the highest
aggregate bids in the auction will be implemented, and licenses
composing that configuration will be awarded to winning bidders subject
to review of the long-form license applications. Because the three band
configurations are mutually incompatible, applications for licenses in
different band plans will be mutually exclusive. The descriptions and
licenses available in Auction No. 65 are listed in Attachment A of the
Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice.
2. Permissible Services. A new licensee may provide any type of
air-ground service (i.e., voice telephony, broadband Internet, data,
etc.) to aircraft of any type, and serve any or all aviation markets
(commercial, government, and general). A licensee must provide service
to aircraft. A new licensee may not provide ancillary land mobile or
fixed services in the 800 MHz air-ground spectrum.
3. Eligibility Restriction. In order to promote competition in the
800 MHz air-ground band, the Commission has prohibited any party from
obtaining a controlling interest, either at auction or by a post-
auction transaction, in new licenses for more than three megahertz of
spectrum (either shared or exclusive) in the band. No single party,
therefore, may hold more than one license in any of the available band
configurations.
4. International Coordination. To promote interoperable
communications and to manage interference, some of the ground station
locations in North America and channel block assignments of the 800 MHz
air-ground band have been predetermined consistent with bilateral
agreements with Mexico and with Canada. These agreements, which provide
for coordinated use of the 800 MHz air-ground frequencies over North
American airspace, are based on a narrow bandwidth channel scheme, and
therefore may need to be renegotiated to provide for more flexible use
of this spectrum based on the band plan configuration that is
implemented as a result of the auction.
5. Spectrum Sharing Plan. If Band Plan 1, which is comprised of two
overlapping 3 MHz licenses, is implemented, the new licensees will be
required to jointly file a spectrum sharing and site selection plan
with the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) within six months
of the initial grant of their spectrum licenses, and they will be
required to notify the Bureau of any changes to the plan. The Bureau
will issue a public notice prior to the commencement of Auction No. 65
in which it will specify the filing requirements for such a plan. This
approach will provide parties with overlapping spectrum licenses
flexibility to configure their systems without having to adhere to
minimum spacing requirements or site locations predetermined by the
Commission.
6. Incumbent Licensee. In the Air-Ground Order, the Commission
granted Verizon Airfone--the only incumbent service provider in the 800
MHz air-ground band--a nonrenewable license to operate in the band for
five years. This license will expire in May 2010. Verizon Airfone must
transition its incumbent narrowband operations from four to one
megahertz of spectrum in the band within two years of the initial grant
date of a new license in the band. The Commission has directed the
Bureau to adopt reporting requirements so that Airfone's transition of
its base stations and its subscribers' aircraft to operations in one
megahertz of the 800 MHz air-ground band may be monitored. The Bureau
will issue a public notice enumerating such requirements by February 6,
2006. Airfone must file its initial transition status report with the
Commission six months from the date of the grant of any new license in
the band and at each of the three six-month intervals thereafter.
7. In addition, if Airfone, or an affiliate of Airfone, wins an
exclusive 3 MHz license at auction, the Bureau will issue a public
notice within 60 days of the grant of such a license, which requires
the company to include in each status report information regarding the
transition of its existing subscribers from its narrowband system to a
broadband system and to file additional status reports at six-month
intervals from the conclusion of the two-year transition period until
the expiration of its five-year nonrenewable license.
II. Auction Procedures
8. Section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
requires the Commission to ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any
competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is
allowed * * * before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and
comment on proposed auction procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the
provisions of section 309(j)(3) and to ensure that potential bidders
have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific rules
that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission
directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated authority, to seek
comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start
of each auction. The Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following
issues relating to Auction No. 65.
A. Auction Structure
i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design
9. The Bureau proposes to conduct Auction No. 65 as a simultaneous
multiple-round auction. As indicated above, licenses will be offered in
three mutually incompatible band configurations, and the band plan that
receives the highest aggregate bids in the auction will be implemented.
The Bureau believes the simultaneous multiple-round auction design is
an appropriate auction design given these circumstances. This type of
auction offers every license for bid at the same time and consists of
successive bidding rounds in which eligible bidders may place bids on
individual licenses. Bidding remains open on all licenses until bidding
stops on every license. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
ii. Round Structure
10. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 65 over the Internet.
Alternatively, telephonic bidding will also be available. The toll-free
telephone number for telephonic bidding will be provided to qualified
bidders.
11. The simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of
sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the release of round
results. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the
auction. Details on viewing round results, including the location and
format of downloadable round results files, will be included in the
same public notice.
12. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the bidding
schedule in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances
speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their
[[Page 3515]]
bidding strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of
time for the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds
per day, depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors.
iii. Stopping Rule
13. The Bureau has discretion to establish stopping rules before or
during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction within
a reasonable time. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes to employ a
simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule means
that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding closes
simultaneously on all licenses.
14. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the
first round in which no bidder submits any new bids or applies a
proactive waiver. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding
will remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.
15. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 65: (a) Use a
modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified
stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after the first
round in which no bidder applies a waiver or submits any new bids on
any license for which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus,
absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a
license for which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep
the auction open under this modified stopping rule; (b) keep the
auction open even if no bidder submits any new bids or applies a
waiver. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had
applied a waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and
a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding
eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver; (c) declare that
the auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds
(special stopping rule). If the Bureau invokes this special stopping
rule, it will accept bids in the specified final round(s) after which
the auction will close.
16. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very
slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely
that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time.
Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to
increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number
of bidding rounds per day and/or changing the minimum acceptable bid
percentage. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
iv. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
17. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend,
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply
their activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
B. Bidding Procedures
i. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
18. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned. A
bidder's upfront payment is a refundable deposit to establish
eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to licenses
for the specific spectrum subject to auction protect against frivolous
or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds
from which to collect payments owed at the close of the auction. With
these factors in mind for Auction No. 65, we propose upfront payments
of $100,000 per license.
19. Consistent with the Bureau's usual practice, we further propose
that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder will
determine the bidder's bidding eligibility in bidding units. For
Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes to assign 100,000 bidding units per
license. The number of bidding units for a given license is fixed and
does not change during the auction as prices change.
20. However, because the mutually incompatible band configurations
and the three megahertz eligibility restriction limit a bidder to
winning only a single license, the Bureau proposes to permit a bidder
with 100,000 bidding units of eligibility to bid or be active
simultaneously on any or all of the licenses it selected on its FCC
Form 175, rather than being limited to activity on a single license
with 100,000 bidding units as our usual activity and eligibility rules
would require. That is, under the Bureau's proposal, an upfront payment
of $100,000 would give a bidder 100,000 bidding units of eligibility,
which in turn would permit the bidder to be active on any or all of the
licenses it selected on its FCC Form 175, making it unnecessary to
acquire more than 100,000 bidding units of bidding eligibility in order
to bid or be active simultaneously on more than one license.
21. The proposed upfront payment and number of bidding units for
each license available in Auction No. 65 is also set forth in
Attachment A of the Auction No. 65 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
ii. Activity Rule
22. In order to ensure that an auction closes within a reasonable
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction
before participating. Bidders are required to be active during each
round of the auction. If a bidder fails to maintain the required
activity level in a round, it must use one of the limited number of
activity rule waivers allotted to it in order to maintain its current
level of eligibility. In a typical FCC auction, if the bidder has no
activity rule waivers remaining, its eligibility will be reduced.
23. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes the following activity
requirement: in each round of the auction, a bidder desiring to
maintain its eligibility to participate in the auction is required to
be active (place a bid or hold the provisionally winning bid) on at
least one license. Under the Bureau's proposal for upfront payments and
bidding eligibility, a bidder must have 100,000 bidding units of
eligibility to participate in the auction--i.e., to bid on at least one
license--and may hold a maximum of 100,000 bidding units of
eligibility. Therefore, under the Bureau's proposal for this auction,
any reduction in a bidder's eligibility will effectively preclude the
bidder from further bidding in the auction. In other words, failure to
maintain the required activity level will have the effect of
eliminating the bidder from further bidding in the auction unless an
activity rule waiver is used.
[[Page 3516]]
24. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that
believe this activity rule should be modified should explain their
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and
suggested alternative activity rules.
iii. Activity Rule Waivers
25. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's
eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round being
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an
entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity rule
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of bidding
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round.
26. The FCC Auction System assumes that a bidder that does not meet
the activity requirement would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver
(if available) rather than lose bidding eligibility, which in this
auction would have the effect of precluding the bidder from further
bidding in the auction. Therefore, the system will automatically apply
a waiver at the end of any bidding round in which a bidder fails to be
active (place a bid or hold the provisionally winning bid) on at least
one license unless the bidder has no activity rule waivers available.
If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required
activity requirement, it will no longer be permitted to place bids in
the auction.
27. A bidder may apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a
means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder
proactively applies an activity rule waiver (using the ``apply waiver''
function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which no
bids are submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's
eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC
Auction System in a round in which there are no new bids will not keep
the auction open. A bidder cannot submit a proactive waiver after
submitting a bid in a round, and submitting a proactive waiver will
preclude a bidder from placing any bids in that round. Applying a
waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted, that
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
28. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 65 be
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth
above. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
iv. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
29. Section 309(j) calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods
for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum opening bid
amount when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the Commission
determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid amount is not in
the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has
directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid
amount and/or reserve price prior to the start of each auction.
30. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid amount, on
the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the
auction below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to
accelerate the competitive bidding process. The auctioneer, however,
often has the discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount during
the course of the auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening
bid amount and the reserve price to be the same amount.
31. In light of the distinctive features of the Air-Ground
Radiotelephone Service and Section 309(j)'s requirements for
competitive bidding, the Bureau proposes to set minimum opening bids
for each license and to establish a published aggregate reserve price
for the entire band. The Bureau believes a minimum opening bid amount,
which has been used in other auctions, is an effective tool for
accelerating the competitive bidding process. At the same time, given
uncertainty regarding the relative values of the 800 MHz Air-Ground
Radiotelephone Service licenses, the Bureau believes that it can best
comply with the Commission's statutory mandate to recover for the
public a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource by
establishing a published reserve price for the entire band. Under this
proposal, if the sum of the provisionally winning bids at the close of
bidding does not meet or exceed the aggregate reserve price, the
Commission will cancel the auction and no licenses will be awarded on
the basis of the bidding.
32. More specifically, for Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposed to
set minimum opening bids on a license-by-license basis as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum
Licenses Bandwidth opening bid
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A and B............................ 3 MHz (2 MHz shared). $1,500,000
C and F............................ 3 MHz................ 2,800,000
D and E............................ 1 MHz................ 200,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. The Bureau also proposes to establish a published reserve price
of $5,000,000 for the entire band. Attachment A of the Auction No. 65
Comment Public Notice also sets forth the proposed minimum opening bids
and reserve price. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
34. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts
will result in unsold licenses, or are not reasonable amounts, or
should instead operate as reserve prices, they should explain why this
is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters are advised to support their claims with valuation analyses
and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid amount levels or
formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bid amounts and the
reserve price, the Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as
the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the
availability of technology to provide service, issues of interference
with other spectrum bands and any other relevant factors that could
reasonably have an impact on valuation of the 800 MHz Air-Ground
Radiotelephone Service licenses. Commenters proposing to reduce or
eliminate the reserve price should address the extent to which minimum
opening bids should be changed as a result. The Bureau also seeks
comment on whether, consistent with section 309(j), the public interest
would be served by having no minimum opening bid amounts or reserve
price.
v. Bid Amounts
35. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Auction System
interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for each license.
36. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal
to its minimum opening bid amount until the bids placed enable the FCC
Auction System to calculate a higher price for the license. If such a
price can be calculated, the minimum acceptable bid amount for the
license will be determined in a two-step process: (a) The FCC Auction
System designates a
[[Page 3517]]
price for each license. For licenses with provisionally winning bids,
this price will be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning
bid. For all other licenses, the price will be equal to the amount of
the highest bid placed on the license by any non-provisionally winning
bidder; (b) the price is increased by the minimum acceptable bid
percentage.
37. The minimum acceptable bid amount will be calculated by
multiplying the license price times the sum of one plus the minimum
acceptable bid percentage--e.g., if the minimum acceptable bid
percentage is five percent, the minimum acceptable bid amount will
equal (license price) * (1.05), rounded. The Bureau will round the
result using our standard rounding procedures.
38. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each license consist of the
minimum acceptable bid amount and additional amounts calculated using
the minimum acceptable bid amount and the bid increment percentage. The
Bureau will round the results using our standard rounding procedures.
The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum
acceptable bid amount times the sum of one plus the bid increment
percentage, rounded--e.g., if the bid increment percentage is five
percent, the calculation is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 +
0.05), rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, rounded; the
second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable
bid amount times the sum of one plus two times the bid increment
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10,
rounded; the third additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum
acceptable bid amount times the sum of one plus three times the bid
increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) *
1.15, rounded; etc. Note that the bid increment percentage need not be
the same as the minimum acceptable bid percentage.
39. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes to use a minimum
acceptable bid percentage of five percent. This means that the minimum
acceptable bid amount for a license will be approximately five percent
greater than the provisionally winning bid amount for the license. The
Bureau proposes to use a bid increment percentage of five percent.
40. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, the bid
increment percentage, and the number of acceptable bid amounts if it
determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau will do so by
announcement in the FCC Auction System during the auction. The Bureau
seeks comment on these proposals.
vi. Provisionally Winning Bids
41. At the end of each bidding round, the FCC Auction System will
determine the provisionally winning bids by considering all of the bids
that have been placed in the auction and determining which band plan
option has the highest aggregate bid while not allowing a bidder to
have more than one provisionally winning bid. The only licenses that
can have provisionally winning bids are those of the band plan option
with the highest aggregate bid; the licenses of the other band plan
options will not have provisionally winning bids.
42. If a provisionally winning bid must be selected from among
identical bid amounts submitted on a license (i.e., tied bids), we will
use a random number generator to select a single bid from among the
tied bids. (Each bid is assigned a random number, and the tied bid with
the highest random number wins the tiebreaker.) The remaining bidders,
as well as the provisionally winning bidder, can submit higher bids in
subsequent rounds. However, if the auction were to end with no other
bids being placed, the winning bidder would be the one that placed the
selected provisionally winning bid.
43. Similarly, in the event of identical aggregate high bid amounts
on more than one band plan (i.e., tied band plans), the tie between
band plans will be broken based on the random numbers of the
corresponding bids. The tied band plan with the highest sum of the
random numbers will become the band plan for which there are
provisionally winning bids.
44. A consequence of the mutually incompatible band configurations
and the three megahertz eligibility restriction is that a bid that does
not become a provisionally winning bid at the conclusion of the round
in which it was placed may become a provisionally winning bid at the
conclusion of a subsequent round.
45. Bidders are reminded that provisionally winning bids count
toward activity for purposes of the activity rule.
vii. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
46. For Auction No. 65, the Bureau proposes the following bid
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding
round, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that
round. By removing selected bids in the FCC Auction System, a bidder
may effectively unsubmit any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
47. The Bureau proposes for Auction No. 65 that bidders not be
permitted, in any round, to withdraw bids made in previous rounds. The
Commission has recognized that bid withdrawals may be an important tool
to help bidders avoid incomplete aggregations of licenses and pursue
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the
course of an auction. In Auction No. 65, however, bidders may win only
one license and therefore will not face risks of being unable to secure
desired aggregations of licenses. In addition, the Bureau believes that
given the small number of licenses in the auction and the nature of the
licenses being offered, bidders will not need to use bid withdrawals to
pursue backup strategies in the same way bidders may need to do so in
some auctions. Moreover, in previous auctions, the Bureau has observed
instances in which bid withdrawals arguably may have been used for
strategic, anticompetitive purposes. While the Bureau continues to
recognize that bid withdrawals may play an important role in an
auction, the Bureau notes that bid withdrawals have not been available
in several previous auctions. The Bureau seeks comment on these
proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.
III. Conclusion
48. Comments are due on or before January 31, 2006, and reply
comments are due on or before February 7, 2006. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary Attn: WTB/ASAD, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Parties who file comments
by paper must file an original and four copies of each filing. U.S.
Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail should be
addressed to 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554. Filings can be
sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or
by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. The Bureau also
requires that all comments and reply comments be filed electronically
to the following address: auction65@fcc.gov. The electronic mail
containing the comments or reply comments must include a subject or
caption referring to ``Auction No. 65 Comments'' and the name of the
commenting party. The Bureau requests that parties format any
attachments to electronic mail as
[[Page 3518]]
Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word documents. Copies
of comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection
between 8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) Monday through Thursday
or 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays in the FCC Reference Information
Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554, and
will also be posted on the Web page for Auction No. 65 at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/65/
.
49. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the
substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one- or two-sentence description of the views
and arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining
to oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose
proceedings are set forth in 47 CFR 1.1206(b) of the Commission's
rules.
Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 06-664 Filed 1-19-06; 1:22 pm]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P