FR Doc 06-8232

[Federal Register: September 26, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 186)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 56064-56070]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26se06-19]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2004-19755; Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-23-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM); reopening of
comment period.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is revising an earlier proposed airworthiness
directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. The original
NPRM would have required repetitive tests to detect hot air leaking
from the trim air diffuser ducts or sidewall riser duct assemblies
(collectively referred to in this proposed AD as ``TADDs''), related
investigative actions, and corrective actions if necessary. The
original NPRM also would have provided an optional terminating action
for the repetitive tests. The original NPRM resulted from reports of
sealant deteriorating on the outside of the center wing fuel tank and
analysis that sealant may deteriorate inside the tank due to excess
heat from leaking TADDs. This action revises the original NPRM by
referring to improved inspection procedures and extending the
repetitive interval for certain related investigative actions. We are
proposing this supplemental NPRM to prevent leakage of fuel or fuel
vapors into areas where ignition sources may be present, which could
result in a fire or explosion.

DATES: We must receive comments on this supplemental NPRM by October
23, 2006.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this supplemental NPRM.
DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow

the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending your

comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207, for service information identified in this
proposed AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Kinney, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone
(425) 917-6499; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or
arguments regarding this supplemental NPRM. Send your comments to an
address listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number
``Docket No. FAA-2004-19755; Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-23-AD'' at
the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this
supplemental NPRM. We will consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this supplemental NPRM in light of those
comments.
We will post all comments submitted, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov
, including any personal information you provide. We will

also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this supplemental NPRM. Using the search function
of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our
dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or
signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union,
etc.). You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the
Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you
may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

Examining the Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov
, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level in the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in ADDRESSES. Comments will be available in the
AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.

[[Page 56065]]

Discussion

We proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) for an AD (the ``original NPRM'') for certain Boeing
Model 747 airplanes. The original NPRM was published in the Federal
Register on December 1, 2004 (69 FR 69844). The original NPRM proposed
to require repetitive tests to detect hot air leaking from the trim air
diffuser ducts or sidewall riser duct assemblies (collectively referred
to in this supplemental NPRM as ``TADDs''), related investigative
actions, and corrective actions if necessary. The original NPRM also
would have provided an optional terminating action for the repetitive
tests.

Actions Since Original NPRM Was Issued

Since we issued the original NPRM, we have received reports
indicating that the procedures referenced in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 2, dated March 4, 2004 (which we
referenced in the original NPRM as the applicable source of service
information for the proposed actions), are not sufficient to detect a
damaged TADD in a timely manner.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4,
dated November 17, 2005. Revision 4 of the service bulletin describes
procedures that are similar to those in Revision 2. However, Revision 4
revises the part numbers for certain improved sidewall riser duct
assemblies for installation on Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes
that are not freighters. This change is due to new environmental and
flammability-resistance standards required under amendments 25-110, 91-
279, 121-301, 125-43, and 135-90 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.
(Refer to the final rule, docket no. FAA-2000-7909, ``Improved
Flammability Standards for Thermal/Acoustic Insulation Materials Used
in Transport Category Airplanes'' (68 FR 45046, July 31, 2003; with
corrections published 68 FR 50054, August 20, 2003; and 69 FR 6532,
February 11, 2004).) Revision 4 of the service bulletin also recommends
increasing the initial inspection threshold from 27,000 flight hours to
32,000 flight hours, and the repetitive inspection interval from 7,000
flight hours to 12,000 flight hours, for the general visual inspection
for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs.
Certain changes to the service information that were originally
introduced in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 3, dated
December 21, 2004, are retained in Revision 4 of the service bulletin:
Chapter 21-61-20 of the airplane maintenance manual (AMM)
has been revised to contain more definitive pass/fail criteria for the
repetitive tests and inspections of the TADDs. These revised criteria
increase the chances of a defective TADD being detected in a timely
manner.
Chapter 21-61-21 of the AMM contains procedures for
unwrapping insulation blankets as necessary before the general visual
inspection to detect defective TADDs is done on Boeing Model 747-400
non-freighter series airplanes.
Accomplishing the actions specified in Revision 4 of the service
information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition. We
have revised paragraphs (f), (g), (h), and (j) and Note 2 of this
supplemental NPRM to refer to Revision 4 of the service information. We
have also added a new paragraph (k) to this supplemental NPRM, and re-
identified the subsequent paragraph, to give credit for actions done
before the effective date of the AD in accordance with previous issues
of the service bulletin.
With regard to extending compliance times for the general visual
inspection, we have revised Table 1 of this supplemental NPRM to extend
the repetitive interval for the general visual inspections from 7,000
flight hours to 12,000 flight hours. We have also revised Table 1 of
this supplemental NPRM to extend the initial compliance threshold from
27,000 total flight hours to 32,000 total flight hours.

Comments

We have considered the following comments on the original NPRM.

Request To Relieve Testing Requirement

British Airways requests that we revise paragraph (f) of the
original NPRM to relieve operators of the requirement to do a test to
detect hot air leaking from the TADDs at the same time as the general
visual inspection for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs. The
commenter notes that, if the inspection is being accomplished, there is
no need to do the test during the same maintenance check. The commenter
assumes that the inspection exceeds the intent of the test in that the
inspection would detect discrepancies of the TADDs that the test may
not.
We concur with the commenter's request. We agree that it would be
redundant to perform a hot air leak test at the same time as the
general visual inspection when the repetitive intervals for these
actions coincide. Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f) of this
supplemental NPRM to clarify that, when the compliance times for a hot
air leak test and a general visual inspection coincide, the hot air
leak test is not required at that time.

Request To Allow Installation of Serviceable Improved TADDs

The Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of its member
Northwest Airlines (NWA), and Boeing request that we revise paragraphs
(h) and (j) and Note 3 of the original NPRM to allow installation of
serviceable improved TADDs. Boeing states that the improved TADDs are
expected to hold up well in service, and its customers are concerned
about the proposed restriction on installing serviceable TADDs. In its
comment submitted through ATA, NWA states that it does not believe that
the failure rate of new TADDs is a significant improvement over
properly repaired or serviceable used TADDs. NWA states that only a
very small percentage of high-time TADDS have failed in service, and it
believes that all duct leaks will be sufficiently addressed by the
repetitive tests and inspections proposed in the original NPRM. NWA
also disagrees that the TADDs deteriorate at a known rate in service,
which was the justification stated in the original NPRM for not
allowing installation of used TADDs. Similarly, Boeing comments that
the deterioration rate is highly variable.
We agree with the commenters' request to allow installing
serviceable improved TADDs. Our intent was to prohibit installing used
ducts of the old type, not used ducts of the improved type. We have
determined that installing serviceable improved parts will provide an
acceptable level of safety. We have revised paragraphs (h) and (j) of
this supplemental NPRM accordingly, and we have omitted Note 3 from
this supplemental NPRM. However, as mentioned in the discussion of New
Relevant Service Information, improved flammability standards may
prohibit installing certain new, improved TADDs on non-freighter
airplanes. Subsequent to the publication of the original NPRM, some of
the improved TADDs failed a test of their insulation that is required
by the improved flammability standards. Thus, under the requirements of
that rule, certain improved TADDs that were listed in revisions of
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418 prior to Revision 4, can no longer
be installed (although they need not be removed if they were

[[Page 56066]]

installed prior to September 2, 2003, the effective date of FAA-2000-
7909).
Also, we do not agree with the commenters' statements that the rate
of deterioration is unknown, although we acknowledge that there are
many variables that contribute to the deterioration of the TADDs. The
rate of deterioration is known to the extent that we know that TADDs
having accumulated more than 20,000 total flight hours are suspect.
Also, we do not know of an inspection process that would be adequate to
ensure the integrity of a used duct of the old material. For these
reasons, we have determined that it is not appropriate to allow
installation of used TADDs made of the old material.

Request To Remove References to Deteriorated Sealant

Boeing requests that we revise the original NPRM to remove
references to ``reports of deteriorating sealants both inside and
outside the center wing fuel tank due to heat damage from leaking
TADDs.'' Boeing states that it is not aware of reports of damaged fuel
tanks caused by leaking TADDs.
We agree to revise the statement of what prompted the proposed AD
to remove the references to reports of deterioration of the sealant
inside the center wing fuel tank. We are unable to confirm direct
observation of primary seal deterioration.
However, we disagree that primary or secondary seal deterioration
is unlikely. Following reports of TADD leaks, Boeing analyzed the
temperatures that the primary (inside) and secondary (outside) fuel
barriers could reach. Analysis revealed that the secondary barrier
could reach temperatures between 300 [deg]F and 450 [deg]F, and that
internal tank temperatures could reach 378 [deg]F. The sealants are not
effective above 325 [deg]F and are not qualified for prolonged exposure
above 160 [deg]F. In addition, FAA personnel observed deterioration of
the secondary sealant in the center wing fuel tank. Therefore, if any
damage or discrepancy of a TADD is found, we find it necessary to
require a general visual inspection for damage of the primary and
secondary fuel barriers of the center wing tank, and adjacent areas and
items, as specified in paragraph (h) of this supplemental NPRM.
Based on this information, we have revised the Summary of this
supplemental NPRM to state that the original NPRM ``resulted from
reports of sealant deteriorating on the outside of the center wing fuel
tank and analysis that sealant may deteriorate inside the tank due to
excess heat from leaking TADDs.'' We have similarly revised paragraph
(d) of this supplemental NPRM.

Request To Require Inspections Only on Affected Side

ATA, on behalf of NWA, requests that we revise paragraph (h) of the
original NPRM to require an inspection for damage of the fuel barriers
and adjacent areas only on the side of the airplane where a TADD
failed. In its comment submitted through ATA, NWA states that the
original NPRM does not acknowledge that the TADDs are located on both
the left and right sides of the airplane. Neither ATA nor NWA state a
justification for the request.
We infer that the commenter's request is intended to reduce the
amount of work that needs to be accomplished to allow a quicker return
of the airplane to service. We agree that it would be acceptable to
inspect the fuel barriers and adjacent areas only on the side of the
airplane where a TADD failed if no damage is found on the side of the
airplane where a TADD failed. However, if any damage of the fuel
barriers or adjacent areas is found on the side of the airplane where a
TADD failed, both sides of the airplane must be inspected. Both sides
must be inspected because the barrier damage is caused by hot air and
if there is damage to one side, then there may be enough leakage to
damage the other side.
We have revised paragraph (h)(1) of this AD to state that, ``If no
damage is found on the side of the airplane where the damaged or
discrepant TADD is found, inspecting the other side of the airplane is
not required.''
In addition, we have revised paragraph (j) of this AD to clarify
the specific circumstances under which tests and inspections required
by paragraph (f) of this AD are terminated. These changes better
acknowledge that, as the commenter points out, there are TADDs on both
the left and right sides of the airplane.

Request To Revise Repetitive Inspection Intervals

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) requests that we extend the
repetitive interval for the hot air leak test specified in paragraph
(f)(1) of the original NPRM from 1,200 flight hours to 1,600 flight
hours. The commenter states that the repetitive interval of 1,200
flight hours is not consistent with its maintenance intervals. KLM
explains that its A-check is 770 flight hours, so it would have to
perform this test either every A-check or in between A-checks. KLM
states that either alternative would result in excessive cost. KLM
notes that a repetitive interval of 1,600 flight hours would allow it
to perform the test every second A-check. Boeing also commented that
the interval for the hot air leak test should coincide with actual A-
check intervals.
We do not agree with the request to extend the repetitive interval
for the hot air leak test. The extension of the repetitive interval for
the general visual inspections to 12,000 flight hours, as discussed
previously, is contingent on the repetitive hot air leak tests being
performed at intervals not to exceed 1,200 flight hours. We find that
this repetitive interval is necessary to ensure that any discrepant
TADD will be detected in a timely manner. We note that the 1,200-
flight-hour repetitive interval is consistent with Boeing's
recommendation in Revision 4 of the service bulletin and in its re-
evaluation of compliance times. Further, since maintenance schedules
vary among operators, it is not possible for us to revise the
repetitive interval to meet the needs of a specific operator. In
developing an appropriate repetitive interval for this action, we
considered the manufacturer's recommendation, the degree of urgency
associated with the subject unsafe condition, the average utilization
of the affected fleet, and the time necessary to perform the test
(estimated at 3 work hours). In light of all of these factors, we find
that 1,200 flight hours is an appropriate interval of time for affected
airplanes to continue to operate between repetitive tests without
compromising safety. We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this
regard. However, paragraph (l) of the supplemental NPRM provides
operators the opportunity to request an extension of the compliance
time if data are presented to justify such an extension.

Request To Revise Compliance Time for Inspection of Replaced TADDs

ATA, on behalf of NWA, suggests that we revise the compliance time
for the general visual inspection for damaged or replaced TADDs made of
the original material. Paragraph (i) of the original NPRM specifies a
compliance time of 27,000 flight hours after the TADD is replaced for
this inspection. The commenter suggests that this compliance time be
revised to ``the next C-check after 21,200 flight hours.''
We partially agree with this request. We do not agree with the
request to state the compliance time in relation to a C-check. We find
that such a non-specific compliance time would not ensure that damaged
TADDs are detected in a timely manner. However, we agree to extend the
compliance time for inspecting replaced TADDs from 27,000

[[Page 56067]]

flight hours to 32,000 flight hours after replacement. We note that
affected operators may elect to do the general visual inspection of the
TADDs earlier than the stated compliance time, if it is more convenient
to their maintenance schedules. We have revised paragraph (i) of this
supplemental NPRM accordingly.

Request To Revise Compliance Time for Initial Leak Test

ATA, on behalf of NWA, requests that we revise the compliance time
for the initial test specified in paragraph (f)(1) of the original
NPRM. NWA states support for the test but believes that an equivalent
level of safety can be achieved by doing the initial test at the
compliance time specified in the referenced service bulletin, which the
commenter interprets as 180 days or 2,000 hours, whichever is first.
NWA states that a failed duct is often detected when floorboards or
sidewalls become hot, or when the airplane crew has difficulty
controlling cabin temperatures. Thus, a failed duct is often corrected
by normal maintenance practices that limit exposure to high
temperatures. For this reason, NWA states that compliance time for the
initial inspection recommended in the service bulletin is sufficient to
detect duct leaks that are not detected during normal operations.
We do not agree with the commenter's request. We note that 180 days
or 2,000 flight hours (whichever is first) is the compliance time
recommended by the referenced service bulletin for airplanes with
20,000 or more total flight hours. However, as we explained in the
``Differences Between the Proposed AD and Service Information'' section
of the original NPRM, the compliance threshold of 21,200 total flight
hours is the equivalent of the inspection threshold of 20,000 total
flight hours specified in the service bulletin, plus one repeat
interval (1,200 flight hours). In addition, the manufacturer has not
requested that we revise the compliance time proposed in the original
NPRM. In developing an appropriate compliance time for the initial
test, we considered the manufacturer's recommendation, and the degree
of urgency associated with the subject unsafe condition. In light of
these factors, we find that the compliance time of 21,200 total flight
hours, or 1,200 flight hours after the effective date of the AD,
whichever is later, represents an appropriate interval of time for
affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety.
We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this regard.

Request To Ensure Adequate Supply of Replacement Parts

Lufthansa requests that we ensure that an adequate supply of
replacement parts will be available for operators to comply with the
proposed requirements. The commenter notes that there have been delays
in obtaining material for planned modifications in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418. The commenter states that it
anticipates that it will find TADDs that must be replaced.
We acknowledge the commenter's concerns and the delays it
experienced. Parts availability is one of the factors that we consider
when establishing a compliance time for an AD. In this case, we have
determined through the manufacturer that an adequate supply of
replacement parts will be available for operators to accomplish the
proposed requirements within the proposed compliance time. We find that
no additional changes to the supplemental NPRM are needed in this
regard.

Request To Clarify Requirements of Paragraph (h)

Boeing requests that we revise paragraph (h) of the original NPRM
to state that the actions in that paragraph apply if any discrepancy is
found during either the hot air leak test or the general visual
inspection for damage in accordance with paragraph (f) of the original
NPRM.
We contacted Boeing for clarification of the meaning and intent of
its comment. Upon further review of paragraph (h) of the original NPRM,
Boeing concluded its comment was not necessary and could be withdrawn.
We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this regard.

Request To Allow Use of Later Revisions of Service Information

Air New Zealand (ANZ) requests that we revise paragraph (j) of the
original NPRM, Optional Terminating Action, to allow use of later
revisions of the referenced service information. ANZ notes that, when
the AD refers to a specific revision of the service bulletin, e.g.,
Revision 2, operators may not use the later revisions without being out
of compliance with the requirements of the AD when new service
information is released that contains new part numbers for equivalent
or better parts. ANZ suggests that we include language referring to
``any subsequent documents, which list a new or equivalent part number
or better, that does not have this unsafe condition.''
We do not agree with the request to refer to later revisions of the
service information that have not yet been released. (As explained
previously, we have revised this supplemental NPRM to refer to Boeing
Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4.) When we refer to a specific
service bulletin in an AD, using a phrase such as that suggested by the
commenter, or a phrase like ``or later FAA-approved revisions,''
violates Office of the Federal Register regulations for approving
materials that are incorporated by reference. However, affected
operators may request approval to use a later revision of the
referenced service bulletin as an alternative method of compliance,
under the provisions of paragraph (l) of this supplemental NPRM. We
have not changed the supplemental NPRM further in this regard.

Request To Revise Cost Impact

Qantas Airways (QANTAS) requests that we revise the cost impact
stated in the original NPRM. The commenter believes that the original
NPRM underestimates the number of work hours necessary to do the
general visual inspection for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs.
QANTAS notes that significant time is necessary to gain access to the
TADDs to perform the inspection and to close up after the inspection,
in addition to testing the in-seat entertainment equipment. The
commenter notes that the estimate of 43 work hours in Boeing Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418 is more realistic.
We do not agree. The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions
typically does not include incidental costs such as the time required
to gain access and close up, time necessary for planning, or time
necessitated by other administrative actions. Those incidental costs,
which may vary significantly among operators, are almost impossible to
calculate. We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this regard.

Requests for Editorial Changes

Boeing requests that we revise the Relevant Service Information
section of the original NPRM as follows:
Revise the statement, ``The related investigative actions
are repetitive general visual inspections for discrepancies or damage
of the TADDs* * * '' to also refer to the hot air leak tests as related
investigative actions.
Revise the statement, ``After a TADD is replaced with a
new, improved TADD, the repetitive inspections are no longer needed for
that TADD,'' to note that neither the repetitive leak tests nor the
repetitive inspections are needed after a new, improved TADD is
installed.

[[Page 56068]]

Boeing's rationale for the first change is that the statement in
the original NPRM implies that only the visual inspections constitute
valid investigative actions. Boeing's rationale for the second change
is to avoid questions (from operators) and misinterpretation.
We acknowledge the commenter's requests. However, we do not agree
that any change is necessary. The Relevant Service Information section
of the original NPRM states that the referenced service bulletin
``describes procedures for repetitive tests to detect hot air leaking
from the TADDs, related investigative actions, and corrective actions
if necessary.'' The statement to which the commenter refers defines
what we mean by ``related investigative actions.'' We find that the
contents of the Relevant Service Information section are sufficiently
clear as written in the original NPRM. With regard to the commenter's
second item, we agree with the statement as revised by the commenter.
However, the Relevant Service Information section of the original NPRM
is not restated in this supplemental NPRM. Thus, no change is possible
in this regard.

Explanation of Additional Changes

We have reduced the estimated number of airplanes that would be
affected by this supplemental NPRM to be consistent with the number of
airplanes identified in the service bulletin.
After the original NPRM was issued, we reviewed the figures we have
used over the past several years to calculate AD costs to operators. To
account for various inflationary costs in the airline industry, we find
it necessary to increase the labor rate used in these calculations from
$65 per work hour to $80 per work hour. The cost impact information,
below, reflects this increase in the specified hourly labor rate.
We have revised this action to clarify the appropriate procedure
for notifying the principal inspector before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies.

FAA's Determination and Proposed Requirements of the Supplemental NPRM

Certain changes discussed above expand the scope of the original
NPRM; therefore, we have determined that it is necessary to reopen the
comment period to provide additional opportunity for public comment on
this supplemental NPRM.

Costs of Compliance

There are about 1,081 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs for
U.S. operators to comply with this supplemental NPRM.

Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Work Average U.S.-
Action hours labor rate Cost per airplane registered Fleet cost
per hour airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hot air leak test............... 3 $80 $240, per test 216 $51,840, per test
cycle. cycle.
General visual inspection....... 5 80 400, per 216 86,400, per
inspection cycle. inspection cycle.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this supplemental NPRM and placed it in the AD docket. See
the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory
evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

Boeing: Docket No. FAA-2004-19755; Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-
23-AD.

Comments Due Date

(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by October
23, 2006.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

[[Page 56069]]

747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, 747-400F, 747SR, and
747SP series airplanes; certificated in any category; line numbers 1
through 1316 inclusive.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from reports of sealant deteriorating on the
outside of the center wing fuel tank and analysis that sealant may
deteriorate inside the tank due to excess heat from leaking trim air
diffuser ducts or sidewall riser duct assemblies (collectively
referred to in this AD as ``TADDs''). We are issuing this AD to
prevent leakage of fuel or fuel vapors into areas where ignition
sources may be present, which could result in a fire or explosion.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.

Repetitive Tests and Inspections

(f) Do the actions in Table 1 of this AD at the times specified
in Table 1 of this AD, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4,
dated November 17, 2005. When the compliance times for a hot air
leak test and a general visual inspection coincide, the hot air leak
test is not required at that time, but is required within 1,200
flight hours (i.e., one repeat interval) after the general visual
inspection.

Table 1.--Compliance Times
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Then repeat within this interval
Do this action-- Initially at the later of-- until paragraph (j) is done--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Repetitive test to detect hot air Prior to the accumulation of 1,200 flight hours.
leaking from TADDs. 21,200 total flight hours, or
within 1,200 flight hours
after the effective date of
this AD.
(2) General visual inspection for damage Prior to the accumulation of 12,000 flight hours.
or discrepancies of the TADDs. 32,000 total flight hours, or
within 12,000 flight hours
after the effective date of
this AD, except as provided by
paragraph (g) of this AD.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection
is: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area,
installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or
irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to
ensure visual access to all surfaces in the inspection area. This
level of inspection is made under normally available lighting
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or
droplight and may require removal or opening of access panels or
doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain
proximity to the area being checked.''

Note 2: Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4, refers
to Chapters 21-61-20 and 21-61-21 of the 747 Airplane Maintenance
Manual as an additional source for service information for the test
and inspections of the TADDs.

(g) If any hot air leak is found during any test required by
paragraph (f) of this AD: Before further flight, do the general
visual inspection for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs, in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4, dated November 17, 2005.

Corrective Actions

(h) If any damage or discrepancy is found during any general
visual inspection for damage required by paragraph (f) or (g) of
this AD: Do the actions in paragraphs (h)(1), (h)(2), (h)(3), and
(h)(4) of this AD, as applicable. Do all of these actions in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4, dated November 17, 2005.
(1) Before further flight: Perform a general visual inspection
for damage of the primary and secondary fuel barriers of the center
wing tank; structure adjacent to the discrepant TADD; and cables,
cable pulleys, and raised cable seals in the over-wing area. If no
damage is found on the side of the airplane where the damaged or
discrepant TADD is found, inspecting the other side of the airplane
is not required.
(2) Before further flight: Repair all damage or discrepancies
found.
(3) Before further flight: Replace any damaged TADD with a new
TADD having the same part number or a new or serviceable, improved
TADD having a part number listed in the ``New TADD Part Number'' or
``New Sidewall Riser Duct Assy Part Number'' column, as applicable,
of the tables in Section 2.C.2. of the service bulletin.
(4) Repeat the test and inspection required by paragraph (f) of
this AD at the times specified in Table 1 of this AD, except as
provided by paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD.
(i) For any original-material TADD that is replaced with a new
TADD having the same part number as the TADD being replaced: Within
21,200 flight hours after the TADD is replaced, do the test to
detect hot air leaking from the replaced TADD, and within 32,000
flight hours after the TADD is replaced, do the general visual
inspection for damage, as specified in paragraph (f) of this AD.
Thereafter, repeat the test and inspection at the repetitive
intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD, except when the times for
a hot air leak test and a general visual inspection coincide, the
leak test is not required.

Optional Terminating Action

(j) Replacing existing TADDs with new or serviceable, improved
TADDs terminates repetitive test and inspection requirements as
specified in paragraphs (j)(1), (j)(2), and (j)(3) of this AD. New
or serviceable, improved TADDs are those having a part number listed
in the ``New TADD Part Number'' or ``New Sidewall Riser Duct Assy
Part Number'' column, as applicable, of the tables in Section 2.C.2.
of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 3, dated December
21, 2004; or Revision 4, dated November 17, 2005.
(1) The repetitive general visual inspections required by
paragraph (f)(2) of this AD are terminated for each TADD that is
replaced with a new or serviceable, improved TADD.
(2) Replacing all TADDs on one side of the airplane with new or
serviceable, improved TADDs terminates all repetitive tests required
by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD and all repetitive inspections
required by paragraph (f)(2) of this AD only for the side of the
airplane on which the improved TADDs are installed.
(3) Replacing all TADDs on both sides of the airplane with new
or serviceable, improved TADDs terminates all repetitive tests
required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD and all repetitive
inspections required by paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.

Previously Accomplished Actions

(k) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, dated November
14, 2002; Revision 1, dated October 16, 2003; Revision 2, dated
March 4, 2004; or Revision 3, dated December 21, 2004; are
acceptable for compliance with the corresponding actions required by
this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.

[[Page 56070]]

Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 14, 2006.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 06-8232 Filed 9-25-06; 8:45 am]

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