[Federal Register: December 12, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 238)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 74459-74461]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr12de06-3]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD;
Amendment 39-14850; AD 2006-25-09]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires a
general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing
damage on the auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires and the
upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank and repair if necessary. This
AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We
are issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank, which could result in a potential
ignition source, and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could
cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
DATES: This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 27,
2006.
We must receive comments on this AD by February 12, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this AD.
DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
[[Page 74460]]
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and
Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for the service
information identified in this AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137;
telephone (562) 627-5262; fax (562) 627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Boeing also conducted an investigation and analysis on McDonnell
Douglas Model MD-11 airplanes that revealed that eleven airplanes had
two locations of unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank. Unprotected APU power feeder wires
that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary
``piggy back'' fuel tank, could result in a potential ignition source
and, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) MD11-24A222,
dated August 16, 2006. The ASB describes procedures for performing a
general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing
damage on the APU feeder wires and upper surface of the auxiliary fuel
tank. If protective conduit is installed, the ASB specifies that no
further action is necessary. If no protective conduit is installed and
no chafing is found, the ASB describes procedures for installing
sleeving and high temperature tape and replacing clamps below the cabin
floor beams. If no protective conduit is installed and chafing is
found, the ASB describes procedures to repair any damaged APU power
feeder wires and any damaged upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank
structure, as well as installing sleeving and high temperature tape and
replacing clamps below the cabin floor beams. Accomplishing the actions
specified in the service information is intended to adequately address
the unsafe condition.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD
The unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or
develop on other airplanes of the same type design that may be
registered in the U.S. at some time in the future. Therefore, we are
issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank, which, if not corrected, could
result in a potential ignition source, and in combination with fuel
vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the
service information described previously.
Costs of Compliance
None of the airplanes affected by this action are on the U.S.
Register. All airplanes affected by this AD are currently operated by
non-U.S. operators under foreign registry; therefore, they are not
directly affected by this AD action. However, we consider this AD
necessary to ensure that the unsafe condition is addressed if any
affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the
future.
If an affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register
in the future, the required actions would take about 1 work hour per
airplane, at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based on these
figures, the estimated cost of the AD would be $80 per airplane.
FAA's Determination of the Effective Date
No airplane affected by this AD is currently on the U.S. Register.
Therefore, providing notice and opportunity for public comment is
unnecessary before this AD is issued, and this AD may be made effective
in less than 30 days after it is published in the Federal Register.
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect
flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for
public comment; however, we invite you to submit any relevant written
data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an
address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-
2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD'' at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall
regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD that
might suggest a need to modify it.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov
, including any personal information you provide. We will
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA
[[Page 74461]]
personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of that Web
site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets,
including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed
the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit
http://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov
, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System
receives them.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES
section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
2006-25-09 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-14850. Docket No. FAA-
2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F
airplanes, identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A222,
dated August 16, 2006; certificated in any category.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct
unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires that come
into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ``piggy
back'' fuel tank, which could result in a potential ignition source,
and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel
tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
General Visual Inspection
(f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD,
perform a general visual inspection for installation of conduit and
chafing damage on APU power feeder wires and upper surface of the
auxiliary fuel tank, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin MD11-24A222, dated August 16, 2006. Before further flight,
accomplish any applicable repair or replacement in accordance with
the alert service bulletin.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(h) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A222,
dated August 16, 2006, to perform the actions that are required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the
Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this
document in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data
and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for a copy of this
service information. You may review copies at the Docket Management
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet
at http://dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html
.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 30, 2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E6-20951 Filed 12-11-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P