[Federal Register: November 8, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 216)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 63363-63414]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr08no07-18]
[[Page 63363]]
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Part III
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25 et al.
Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank Safety
(EAPAS/FTS); Final Rule
[[Page 63364]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 26, 91, 121, 125, and 129.
[Docket No.: FAA-2004-18379; Amendment Nos. 1-60, 21-90, 25-123, 26-0,
91-297, 121-336, 125-53, 129-43]
RIN 2120-AI31
Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank
Safety (EAPAS/FTS)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This final rule amends FAA regulations for certification and
operations of transport category airplanes. These changes are necessary
to help ensure continued safety of commercial airplanes. They improve
the design, installation, and maintenance of airplane electrical wiring
systems and align those requirements as closely as possible with the
requirements for fuel tank system safety. This final rule organizes and
clarifies design requirements for wire systems by moving existing
regulatory references to wiring into a single section of the
regulations specifically for wiring and by adding new certification
rules. It requires holders of type certificates for certain transport
category airplanes to conduct analyses of their airplanes and make
necessary changes to existing Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
(ICA) to improve maintenance procedures for wire systems. It requires
operators to incorporate ICA for wiring into their maintenance or
inspection programs. And finally, this final rule clarifies
requirements of certain existing rules for operators to incorporate ICA
for fuel tank systems into their maintenance or inspection programs.
DATES: These amendments become effective December 10, 2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have technical questions about
the certification rules in this action, contact Stephen Slotte, ANM-
111, Airplane & Flight Crew Interface, Federal Aviation Administration,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2315;
facsimile (425) 227-1320, e-mail steve.slotte@faa.gov. If you have
technical questions about the operating rules, contact Fred Sobeck,
AFS-308, Aircraft Maintenance Division, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone: (202) 267-7355; facsimile (202) 267-7335, e-mail
frederick.sobeck@faa.gov. Direct any legal questions to Doug Anderson,
Office of Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2166; facsimile
(425) 227-1007, e-mail Douglas.Anderson@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is
found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's
authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing minimum
standards required in the interest of safety for the design and
performance of aircraft; regulations and minimum standards in the
interest of safety for inspecting, servicing, and overhauling aircraft;
and regulations for other practices, methods, and procedures the
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This
regulation is within the scope of that authority because it
prescribes--
New safety standards for the design of transport category
airplanes, and
New requirements necessary for safety for the design,
production, operation, and maintenance of those airplanes, and for
other practices, methods, and procedures relating to those airplanes.
Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
A. Summary of the NPRM
1. The Proposed Rule
2. Related Activities
B. Differences Between the NPRM and the Final Rule
C. Summary of Comments
III. Discussion of the Final Rule
A. Overview
B. Design Approval Holder (DAH) Requirements (part 26)
1. Requirements To Develop ICA
2. Changes to Location of Design Approval Holder Requirements
3. Interaction Between New Design Approval Holder Requirements
and Part 21
4. Compliance Dates
5. The Design Approval Holder Compliance Plan
6. Defining the Representative Airplane
7. Impact on Operators
8. EZAPs Already Completed
9. Wire Inspections
10. Protections and Cautions
11. Alignment of EWIS and Fuel Tank ICA
12. Approval of ICA
13. Rule Applicability
14. Non-U.S. Manufacturers
15. General Comments About Design Approval Holder Requirements
16. Airplanes Excluded From Design Approval Holder and EWIS
Operating Requirements
C. Electrical Wiring Interconnection System (EWIS) Certification
Rules (part 25 subpart H)
1. New Subpart for EWIS
2. The Definition of EWIS (Sec. 25.1701)
3. Functions and Installation: EWIS (Sec. 25.1703)
4. Systems and Functions: EWIS (Sec. 25.1705)
5. System Separation: EWIS (Sec. 25.1707)
6. System Safety: EWIS (Sec. 25.1709)
7. Component Identification: EWIS (Sec. 25.1711)
8. Fire Protection: EWIS (Sec. 25.1713)
9. Electrical Bonding and Protection Against Static Electricity:
EWIS (Sec. 25.1715)
10. Accessibility Provisions: EWIS (Sec. 25.1719)
11. Protection of EWIS (Sec. 25.1721)
12. Flammable Fluid Shutoff Means: EWIS (Sec. 25.1727)
13. Powerplant and APU Fire Detection System: EWIS (Sec.
25.1731)
14. Fire Detector Systems, General: EWIS (Sec. 25.1733)
15. Engine, Nacelle, and APU Wiring
16. Designated Fire Zones
17. Goal of the New Wiring Subpart
18. Harmonization
D. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS (Sec. 25.1729
and Appendix H)
1. Requirements for EWIS ICA
2. ICA as a Single Document
3. Standard Wiring Practices Manuals
4. Mandatory Replacement Times
5. Wire Identification Method Information
6. Electrical Load Data
E. Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements Subparts for
Operating Rules (parts 91, 121, 125, 129)
1. Establishment of New Subparts
2. Continued Airworthiness Subparts and Airworthiness Directives
3. Type and Scope of Requirements
F. Operating Requirements for EWIS (parts 121 and 129)
1. Requirements for Maintenance and Inspection Program Revisions
2. ICA Developed by Design Approval Holders
3. Different Requirements for Existing and Future Designs
4. ICA for Alterations
5. Alaska Operations
6. EWIS Inspections
7. Non-U.S. Registered Airplanes
8. Taking Airplanes Out of Service
9. Training
10. Reporting Requirements
G. Operating Requirements for Fuel Tank Systems (parts 91, 121,
125, and 129)
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1. Requirements for Maintenance and Inspection Program Revisions
2. Airplanes Excluded From Fuel Tank System Operating
Requirements
3. Change in Operator Compliance Date for Auxiliary Fuel Tank
ICA
4. Original Configuration and Auxiliary Fuel Tanks
5. Inspection and Maintenance Program Terminology
H. Regulatory Evaluation
1. Engine Costs
2. Wiring System Safety Analysis for Engines
3. Labor Rates
4. The Regional Airplane Fleet
5. Measure of Effectiveness
6. Operational Impacts
7. Training Costs
8. Costs for EZAP Analysis and Inspection of Engines
9. Engine Costs of Sec. 25.1362
10. Wire Labeling Costs
11. Additional Certification and Operator Costs
12. Previous Rulemaking
13. Relevance to the Current Fleet
14. Accidents Indirectly Initiated by EWIS
I. Harmonization Changes to Transport Category Certification
Rules (Part 25)
1. FAA/JAA (Joint Aviation Authority) Harmonization
2. Circuit Protective Devices (Sec. 25.1357)
3. Precautions Against Injury (Sec. 25.1360)
4. Electrical Supplies for Emergency Conditions (Sec. 25.1362)
5. Electrical Appliances, Motors, and Transformers (Sec.
25.1365)
J. Additional Certification Rule Changes (part 25)
1. Rules Changed To Accommodate Subpart H
2. Electrical Equipment and Installations (Sec. 25.1353)
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
V. The Amendments
I. Executive Summary
Safety concerns about wiring systems in airplanes were brought to
the forefront of public attention by a midair explosion in 1996
involving a 747 airplane. Ignition of flammable vapors in the fuel tank
was the probable cause of that fatal accident, and the most likely
source was a wiring failure that allowed a spark to enter the fuel
tank. All 230 people aboard the airplane were killed. Two years later,
an MD-11 airplane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 229
people aboard. Although an exact cause could not be determined, the
presence of resolidified copper on a portion of a wire of the in-flight
entertainment system cable indicated that wire arcing had occurred in
the area where the fire most likely originated.
Investigations of those accidents and later examinations of other
airplanes showed a collection of common problems. Deteriorated wiring,
corrosion, improper wire installation and repairs, and contamination of
wire bundles with metal shavings, dust, and fluids (which would provide
fuel for fire) were common conditions in representative examples of the
``aging fleet of transport airplanes.''
The FAA has concluded that current maintenance practices do not
adequately address wiring components, wiring inspection criteria are
too general, and maintenance instructions do not describe unacceptable
conditions, such as improper repairs and installations, in enough
detail.
With this final rule we are introducing new maintenance,
inspection, and design criteria for airplane wiring to address
conditions that put transport airplanes at risk of wire failures,
smoke, and fire. We are adding requirements for type certificate
holders and applicants for type certificates and supplemental type
certificates to analyze the zones of their airplanes for the presence
of wire and for the likely accumulation of contaminant materials. This
final rule also requires them to develop maintenance and inspection
tasks to identify, correct, and prevent wiring conditions that
introduce risk to continued safe flight. We are requiring that these
tasks be included in new Instructions for Continued Airworthiness for
wiring and that they be compatible with Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness for fuel tank systems. The EWIS ICA must not conflict
with the ICA for fuel tanks, and must avoid duplication and redundancy.
Too frequent disturbance to electrical wiring by repeated moving,
pulling, and flexing of the wire bundles will induce unnecessary stress
on the wiring and its components, which in turn could lead to
degradation, expedited aging, and failures. Thus it is important that
redundant tasks and unnecessary disturbances to the electrical wiring
be minimized. We are amending Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 operating rules to require operators
of transport category airplanes to incorporate maintenance and
inspection tasks for wiring into their regular maintenance programs and
we are clarifying existing requirements for fuel tanks.\1\ We are
creating a new subpart of part 25 to contain the majority of the
certification requirements for airplane wiring, including new rules to
improve safety in manufacture and modification. Finally, we are
creating a new part 26 for design approval holder requirements relating
to continued airworthiness and safety improvements and new subparts in
parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 for the same types of requirements for
operators.
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\1\ We are not amending 14 CFR part 135 because presently there
are only 20 airplanes with sufficient passenger or payload capacity
to be affected by this rule that fly in part 135 operations. Should
part 135 be amended to permit widespread usage of these larger
transport category airplanes, we may extend the operating
requirements of today's rule to part 135 at that time.
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Accompanying this final rule are guidance materials in the form of
advisory circulars (AC), which present one way, but not the only way,
to comply with specific parts of these regulations.
One of the ACs presents a suggested curriculum for electrical
wiring interconnection system (EWIS) training. Existing Sec. 121.375
requires that certificate holders or anyone performing maintenance have
a training program. This requirement ensures that anyone determining
the adequacy of maintenance work (including inspectors) is fully
informed about the procedures and techniques involved and is competent
to perform them. AC 120-94 provides guidance for complying with Sec.
121.375 as it applies to EWIS maintenance and inspection. In AC 120-94
we provide a suggested training program to address the informational
needs of the various people who come in contact with airplane EWIS, and
we encourage operators to include this training voluntarily. While the
Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) had
recommended some form of EWIS training be required for anyone likely to
come into contact with EWIS, we have determined the associated cost
would be unduly burdensome. There are 11 other ACs accompanying this
rule which provide guidance on different requirements contained here. A
few of them have been revised for clarification. In those instances,
this will be noted in section III. Otherwise, except for minor
editorial changes, the guidance accompanying this rule is being
published in the same form in which it was proposed and will not be
discussed here.
Since the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued Safety Recommendations A-
06-29 through -35 pertaining to fires on one particular model of
regional jet. In the 6 months between October 2005 and March 2006,
there were a total of 6 fires on regional jets. A seventh fire occurred
prior to that 6-month period. The NTSB stated that, in addition to the
danger posed by the fires, 2 of the incident airplanes temporarily lost
all flight displays. The NTSB's investigation
[[Page 63366]]
revealed that all of the fires originated from the same electrical
component--an electrical contactor located in the avionics compartment
beneath the floor of the captain's seat. The fires were caused by
moisture-induced short circuits between the electrical terminals of the
contactors. We have issued airworthiness directives (AD) to correct
this unsafe condition. However, if the requirements in this final rule
had been in effect, the type of failure that caused these 7 fires would
not have occurred. This is because several of the new requirements
directly address design issues that led to the fires. This final rule
is meant to proactively address wiring conditions existing in the
transport airplane fleet that we now know affect safe flight and can be
detected, corrected, or prevented.
We express present value benefits and costs using a 7% discount
rate. The total estimated benefits of this final rule, $801 million
($388 present value) over a 25-year period, are comprised of
operational benefits and safety benefits. The operational benefits are
estimated at $506.3 million ($237.5 million present value). The safety
benefits are estimated at $294.6 million ($150.6 million present
value). This final rule will prevent a portion of fatal and non-fatal
incidents and accidents while decreasing the impact that EWIS
discrepancies have on airline operations.
The estimated total cost of this final rule is $416 million ($233
million present value) over 25 years. The majority of these costs
($292.2 million, or $147.6 million present value) will be borne by
operators. The remainder of the projected costs will be borne by
aircraft and engine manufacturers, and, to a much lesser extent, the
FAA Oversight Offices.
II. Background
A. Summary of the NPRM
1. The Proposed Rule
On October 6, 2005 (70 FR 58508), the FAA published in the Federal
Register the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) entitled Enhanced
Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank Safety (EAPAS/
FTS), which is the basis of this final rule.
In that NPRM, we proposed development of Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA) for wiring systems and subsequent incorporation of
those ICA into operators' maintenance programs. We also proposed
alignment of the compliance times for operators to incorporate wire and
fuel tank system ICA into their maintenance programs.
We proposed changes in the certification rules to require more
attention during the design and installation of airplane systems to
conditions that could compromise wire safety and accessibility. And we
proposed a new part 25 subpart that would be dedicated to current and
new regulations about airplane wiring systems.
If you would like more details about the proposal, you can get a
copy by following the instructions under the Availability of Rulemaking
Documents heading at the end of this preamble.
2. Related Activities
On July 12, 2005, the FAA published in the Federal Register a
statement of policy for future management of the shared responsibility
between design approval holders (DAH) and operators in achieving
certain types of safety objectives. That stated policy is reflected in
the requirements of this final rule for DAHs to develop ICA for
airplane wiring systems.
Also published in the July 12, 2005 Federal Register was a
disposition of comments on a previous notice to extend the date for
operators to comply with special maintenance requirements for fuel tank
systems. That date was extended from December 6, 2004 to December 16,
2008.
On July 7, 2006, we published notice in the Federal Register
stating that, although we had originally proposed to align compliance
times for operator incorporation of ICA for wiring and for fuel tanks,
we later found it impractical to do so. This notice notified operators
that their compliance date for incorporation of fuel tank ICA is still
December 16, 2008.
Twelve draft ACs on different aspects of the rule accompanied the
NPRM and were made available for public comment at the same time. On
November 8, 2005, the comment period for the ACs was extended to
February 3, 2006, so that it would align with the comment period for
the NPRM.
B. Differences Between the NPRM and the Final Rule
We have revised the numbering for 14 CFR part 25 subpart H
Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS). We did this to
harmonize as much as possible with the planned European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) version of these rules. As discussed later, the design
approval holder requirements proposed in the NPRM as subpart I are now
contained in new part 26, again to harmonize more easily with the
regulatory structure of other national airworthiness authorities. We
also have made some changes to the compliance planning sections of
those rules. In response to comments, we have increased the compliance
time for the design approval holder requirements to 24 months from the
effective date of this rule. We have increased the time for operator
compliance with the EWIS requirements to 39 months from the effective
date of this rule. Because our regulatory process exceeded the time we
had originally planned for issuance of this rule, it is no longer
practical to align the operator compliance dates for the EWIS ICA with
those for fuel tanks. Coordination of the timing of the maintenance
tasks within those ICA is still desirable and possible, so that aspect
of our proposal remains unchanged in the final rule. We have, however,
extended the date for operators to submit ICA for auxiliary fuel tanks
to the FAA Oversight Office.
We have removed some airplanes from the exclusion lists of the DAH
requirements and the operating rules. This was either because they were
already excluded as a result of the definition of the affected
airplanes or because we have reconsidered the rationale for certain
exclusions. We have also made other, minor, changes in wording to the
proposed rules for the purposes of clarification or harmonization. We
discuss all of the changes in section III of this preamble.
C. Summary of Comments
The FAA received 39 comment letters about the proposed rule and
guidance material. The comments covered a wide spectrum of topics and a
range of responses, which we discuss more fully below. There was much
support for the general intent of the rule and the guidance material.
There were also requests for changes and for clarification.
III. Discussion of the Final Rule
A. Overview
This rule is a result of years of study, data gathering, and
collaboration with industry. It has been developed as a solution to the
problem of wire contamination and wire damage on airplanes, which can
result in system failures, smoke, and fire, and can threaten continued
safe flight.
Examinations by the Aging Systems Task Force of representative
airplanes from the fleet of aging transports revealed wiring that was
deteriorated, corroded, improperly installed and repaired, and
contaminated with materials such as metal shavings, dust,
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and fluids.\2\ The NTSB, as well as working groups of the FAA,
industry, and other Civil Aviation Authorities, found these conditions
to be common across the fleet, not just isolated instances of poor
maintenance. While systems have always been subject to careful scrutiny
of their safety and reliability during the certification process, the
wires that connect those systems had been considered appropriately
cared for when fitted and maintained according to standard industry
practices.
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\2\ Transport Aircraft Intrusive Inspection Project final report
dated December 29, 2000.
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Now we know that airplane wiring needs more attention. It needs to
be considered as a discrete system, and given the same careful scrutiny
as other systems. The design of wiring systems is important for
creating safe separation from other wires and systems and protecting it
from damage. Inspection and maintenance is important in uncovering and
repairing wire damage and preventing buildup of contaminants that can
cause damage and that also provide fuel for fire. Wire must be
inspected regularly and contaminant buildup must be prevented.
In considering the problems found on transport category airplanes,
we explored various alternatives. One alternative was to do nothing.
But the result of that approach would be a continuation of incidents
and accidents caused by deteriorated wiring systems. Once we knew there
was a problem affecting safe flight, doing nothing was not really an
option. We could have asked for voluntary support. But voluntary
programs in the past have not always resulted in complete
participation, and a voluntary program could not guarantee the level of
safety we want to ensure. Accordingly, we decided to develop a rule to
correct potential safety problems with airplane wiring, and to require
compliance of all those whose participation is necessary to achieve
that goal.
This rule enlists the aid of design approval holders in assessing
the wiring on their airplanes and in developing inspection and
maintenance tasks that operators can use to maintain wire safety. It
requires operators to incorporate into their inspection and maintenance
programs tasks for maintaining wire safety that are based on those
developed in accordance with requirements. It introduces new
certification rules for wire separation, identification, system safety,
protection from damage, access, and other aspects of wire safety. It
creates a new subpart in the certification rules for wire certification
so that the many existing requirements are more easily found. It also
requires that design approval holders align inspection and maintenance
tasks for wiring with those for fuel tank systems, to avoid duplication
and to ensure that the most rigorous task is accomplished. As an
example, if the EWIS ICA calls for a general visual inspection of a
certain wire and the fuel tank ICA calls for a detailed inspection of
the same wire, the general visual inspection task would be removed from
the EWIS ICA and the detailed inspection would be retained in the fuel
tank ICA, identified as both a fuel tank task and an EWIS task.
B. Design Approval Holder (DAH) Requirements (Part 26)
For design approval holders this final rule differs from the
proposal in the following four ways.
The physical location of the rule has changed, from the
proposed location in part 25, subpart I, to a new part 26.\3\
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\3\ Since the comments refer to the NPRM, however, the
commenters' original references are retained, including references
to proposed ACs.
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The compliance date has been changed from December 16,
2007, to 24 months after the effective date of the rule.
Two changes were made to the compliance plan requirement.
The definition of the ``representative airplane'' has been
clarified.
We have also made minor wording revisions to section 26.11 for
clarification. They do not change the requirements.
1. Requirements To Develop ICA
As discussed above, this rule introduces requirements for design
approval holders (DAH) to assess their airplanes in relation to wiring.
The assessment must be performed with an enhanced zonal analysis
procedure (EZAP), which is outlined in a part-25-series advisory
circular accompanying this rule entitled AC 25-27 ``Development of
Transport Category Airplane Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Using an Enhanced Zonal
Analysis Procedure.'' This AC was originally titled AC 120-XX ``Program
to Enhance Aircraft Electrical Wiring Interconnection System
Maintenance.'' The material contained in that proposed AC is now
presented in two separate ACs. Guidance for carrying out an EZAP
analysis, as required in the new parts 25 and 26 regulations in this
final rule, is presented in the newly titled No. 25-27 AC named above,
which will be referred to in the rest of this document as the DAH EZAP
AC. Guidance for the operator requirements will be presented in a
separate 120-series AC titled ``Incorporation of Electrical Wiring
Interconnection System (EWIS) Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
into the Operator's Maintenance Program.''
For each zone on the airplane that contains wiring, DAHs must
develop maintenance and inspection tasks to prevent contaminant buildup
on that wiring and maintain safety. They must then make those tasks
available to operators in the form of ICA readily identifiable as
pertaining to wiring. They must also assess those wiring ICA in
relation to ICA for fuel tank systems to make sure there are no
conflicts or redundancies between the two. The rule includes
requirements for the DAH to submit a compliance plan to the FAA
outlining how it intends to meet these requirements.
2. Changes to Location of Design Approval Holder Requirements
In the NPRM, we noted that we had not decided on the final location
of the continued airworthiness and safety improvements design approval
holder requirements of part 25, subparts A and I. We requested comments
on this issue, and received 7 comments on the rule location. Transport
Canada and British Airways stated that they wanted the requirements in
part 21. This was to keep the procedural requirements of the new
subpart with the present procedural requirements of part 21 and out of
the airworthiness standards parts of the regulations. EASA, Airbus,
Boeing, Aerospace Industries Association, and the General Aviation
Manufacturers Association stated that they wanted the requirements in a
new part or in part 21. EASA said these requirements must be in a
mandatory part of its system and CS (Certification Specifications) -25,
its equivalent to our part 25, is not mandatory. Others who commented
wanted to maintain part 25 as strictly an airworthiness standard.
Based on these comments and on discussions with Transport Canada,
EASA, and the Brazilian Agencia Nacional de Aviacao Civil, we decided
to create a new part 26 and move the enabling regulations out of part
25 and into part 21--Certification Procedures for Products and Parts.
We did this for several reasons.
First, moving these requirements to a new part keeps part 25 as
strictly an airworthiness standard for new transport category
airplanes. This is important because it maintains
[[Page 63368]]
harmonization and compatibility among the United States, Canada, and
the European Union regulatory systems. Second, integrating the
requirements into part 21 improves the clarity of how the part 26
requirements will address existing and future design approvals.
In creating the new part 26, we renumbered the previous sections of
part 25, subpart I, and we incorporated the changes discussed in this
preamble. A table of this renumbering follows:
Table 1.--Relationship of Proposed Subpart I to Final Rules in Part 26
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Part 26 Part 25, Subpart I
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Subpart A--General
Sec. 26.1 Purpose and Scope......... Sec. 25.1801(a) Purpose
and definition.
Sec. 26.3 Definitions............... Sec. 25.1801(b) and
25.1803.
Sec. 26.5 Applicability Table....... New.
Subpart B--Enhanced Airworthiness Program
for Aging Systems
Sec. 26.11 Electrical Wiring Sec. 25.1805 Electrical
Interconnection Systems (EWIS) Wiring Interconnection
Maintenance Program. Systems (EWIS) Maintenance
Program.
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As noted in the table above, we have added a new Sec. 26.5 to
provide an applicability table that will facilitate identifying those
provisions of part 26 that apply to affected persons at any given time.
As we add subparts to part 26, we will update this table to identify
the applicability of those new subparts. As with new subpart B of part
26 in this final rule, we will specify the details of applicability for
each new subpart in the new subparts themselves.
3. Interaction Between New Design Approval Holder Requirements and Part
21
It was our intent to treat those provisions of the requirements
establishing standards for design changes and revisions to the ICA as
airworthiness requirements. Adding a statement to the new Sec. 26.1(a)
that the requirements of part 26 are airworthiness requirements clearly
integrates these requirements with the procedures specified in part 21.
The result of treating these requirements as airworthiness requirements
is that any design changes that may be required by part 26 rulemaking
become part of the type design of the aircraft. This makes clear that
the full flexibilities allowed in part 21, such as equivalent level of
safety findings and special conditions, may be applied. Also, we added
Sec. 26.1(c) to make a distinction in part 26 between type
certificates and supplemental type certificates. Typically, for
interpreting part 21, reference to type certificates includes
supplemental type certificates unless usage of that term clearly
indicates otherwise. While the usage of those terms in part 26 is
contrary to the usage in part 21, we did this to make clear
distinctions in requirements within part 26.
To address the change to ``Special retroactive requirements''
originally proposed in Sec. 25.2(d) and to fully integrate the new
rule with part 21, we made four changes to part 21. First, Sec. 21.7
replaces proposed Sec. 25.2(d) by establishing the applicability of
continued airworthiness and safety improvement requirements. This
section establishes the general applicability of part 26 to design
approval holders, pending and future applicants for design approval,
and type certificate holders and licensees for newly produced transport
category airplanes.
While Sec. 21.7 makes part 26 applicable to pending applications,
Sec. 21.17(a) clarifies this applicability by adding part 26 to the
exception list of those requirements of the subchapter that are not
established by date of application for a type certificate but by date
that the type certificate is issued.
For changed products, in the case when the exceptions of Sec.
21.101(b)(1), (2) or (3) apply, new Sec. 21.101(g) makes clear that,
even if an applicant may use an early amendment to part 25, the
applicant must still comply with any applicable provisions of part 26.
For each applicable part 26 provision, an applicant may elect to comply
with a corresponding amendment to part 25 that is issued on or after
the date of the part 26 amendment. Under the normal application of
Sec. 21.101, if the exceptions of Sec. 21.101(b) do not apply, the
applicant would be required to comply with the latest amendments of
part 25 in lieu of the requirements of part 26.
Sections 21.31 and 21.50 are revised to make it clear that the
Airworthiness Limitations section of the ICA is part of the type design
and that changes to the ICA generated under part 26 must be made
available as part of the total ICA.
These changes to part 21 do not change or add any new requirements
to those proposed in the NPRM. Rather, they clarify the relationship
between existing part 21 and new part 26.
4. Compliance Dates
Several commenters proposed changes to the DAH compliance dates for
subpart I (now part 26) requirements. The proposal would have required
DAHs of existing airplanes to submit ICA for approval to the FAA
Oversight Office by December 16, 2007. This was based on an expected
effective date of June 30, 2006 for the final rule, and would have
allowed DAHs 18 months to complete compliance. The proposed operator
requirements would have allowed operators 12 months from the date DAHs
completed their ICA to incorporate EWIS tasks into their maintenance
program. The compliance date for operators (again based on an expected
final rule effective date of June 2006) was December 16, 2008.
Avions de Transport Regional (ATR), Aerospace Industries
Association and General Aviation Manufacturers Association (AIA/GAMA),
General Electric (GE), and Boeing requested a longer compliance time
for the DAH requirements. ATR specifically proposed 30 months because
it said it will need to review and update all of its maintenance
documentation. GE requested 36 months. Boeing and AIA/GAMA requested
the compliance time for DAHs be increased to 24 months. Boeing and AIA/
GAMA noted that industry, through ATSRAC, originally identified 24
months as the time needed to conduct the EZAP analysis for their
existing airplane configurations. But the FAA has now proposed
additional requirements, such as evaluating type certificate (TC)
holder changes mandated by airworthiness directives (AD) and compliance
plan activities. The commenters noted that the original schedule and
resource analysis did not account for these additional activities.
Additionally, Boeing and FedEx requested that the rule include required
time periods for FAA review and approval activities involved in the
compliance plans. Boeing and Airbus noted that the rules do not
currently limit the amount of time the FAA will take to review and
approve documents, which will negatively impact their compliance time.
Boeing stated that most DAHs will require the full 90 days for
developing a compliance plan, and will not initiate that plan until
they obtain FAA approval. So to ensure that they have an appropriate
time for compliance activities, they'll need FAA approval immediately,
which is impractical.
Boeing and AIA/GAMA also said that the hard compliance dates and an
expected final rule issuance in early 2007 will leave DAHs with less
than 12 months to comply with the subpart I requirements. Along with
Airbus and GE, they requested that we revise the compliance dates to
represent a number
[[Page 63369]]
of months after the effective date of the rule, rather than a hard
date. AIA/GAMA noted that this approach would prevent our process and
schedule for issuing the final rule from impacting DAH compliance
dates.
We agree with the commenters that additional time should be allowed
for DAH compliance with 26.11. While we understand that ICA for EWIS
have already been developed for a number of affected airplanes, we also
understand that not all DAHs have begun this activity. In addition, as
discussed later, DAHs that have already developed EWIS ICA may not have
addressed the ``representative airplane'' configurations, as required
by this rule. However, because DAHs would need to plan and coordinate
with the FAA anyway, we do not believe the requirements to do so will
significantly increase the amount of time needed to comply. In
consideration of these factors, we believe that 24 months will allow
sufficient time for DAHs to develop and submit the necessary compliance
plan, draft data and documents, and final data and documents to show
compliance with today's rule.
We have made a minor revision to section 26.11(d)(3), (d)(4) and
(d)(5). This is to clarify that the affected pending or future
applicants must comply either by a date based on the effective date of
the rule, or by the date of approval of the related certificate. Even
though we specifically discussed the intent of these dates in the NPRM
preamble, we believe that using the term ``approval of the
application,'' which appeared in the proposal (in proposed Sec.
25.1805(c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5)) indicating dates for compliance, may
have caused confusion. So, we have replaced the term ``application''
with the term ``certificate'' in 26.11(d)(3), (d)(4) and (d)(5).
We are not including FAA-required time periods for review and
approval of the required compliance plans. Instead, expectations for
FAA personnel have been defined in a new FAA order \4\ that directs the
Aircraft Certification and Flight Standards Services in their roles and
responsibilities for implementing these initiatives. The order includes
expected times (6 weeks) for reviewing and approving DAH compliance
plans, plans to correct deficiencies, and draft and final compliance
data and documents. To facilitate implementation, we will also train
affected personnel in their roles and responsibilities and provide in-
depth familiarization with requirements of the regulations and
associated guidance. The FAA's Aviation Safety organization's recent
registration as an ISO (International Organization for Standardization)
-9001-compliant organization will also facilitate standardized and
timely implementation of the review and approval process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Order 8110.26, ``Responsibilities and Requirements for
Implementing Part 26 Safety Initiatives,'' will be released
concurrently with this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several operators also requested revisions to the DAH compliance
dates, noting the potential adverse impact on them because of the time
it could take for FAA review and approval. Air Transport Association
(ATA) recommended that Sec. 25.1805(c)(1) (now 26.11(d)(1)) be
rewritten to provide a reasonable period of time (90 days) for the
necessary FAA review and approval activities. ATA noted that the amount
of time the FAA will take to review and approve TC holders' EWIS/FTS
ICA could reduce operator compliance time significantly. FedEx made
similar comments and noted that compliance dates should acknowledge
time for approval of compliance documents, distribution of those
documents, operator planning for addressing the requirements, and final
release of the changes in the operator's program. Royal Dutch Airlines
(KLM) was also concerned about FAA review and approval impacting
operators' compliance time and requested that the operator compliance
date be one year after ICA are approved. Boeing, ATR and U.S. Airways
also stated that the compliance time for the operational rules should
be based on availability of needed data.
Continental requested that operators be allowed 18 months rather
than 12 months to comply. It said a thorough training program would be
needed for maintenance personnel not familiar with wiring and its
components. This would require additional effort by the operator not
contemplated by simply having ICA incorporated into a maintenance task
or inspection program. Additionally, Continental stated that contract
maintenance personnel must also be trained for systems they maintain.
The National Air Carrier Association (NACA) requested that
operators have two years for compliance, dependent on DAHs complying
with their requirements on time.
Based on rationale the ATA provided for requesting the change, we
infer that ATA would like additional time (90 days) added to the
operator's compliance time rather than to the DAH's compliance time.
While it is inappropriate to put requirements for the FAA in a rule
applicable to DAHs, we have, as discussed previously, identified
expectations for FAA review and approval (including timeframes) in an
internal FAA order. The length of time to review plans, data, and
documents depends largely on the quality of the submittals. Acceptable
documents will take less time to review.
We have structured the requirements of the DAH rule and developed
complementary guidance to facilitate timely review and approval of DAH
submittals (compliance planning, draft document reviews, etc.). We do
agree, however, that a modest increase in operator compliance time
would help ensure that operators are not impacted by the FAA review and
approval process. We have revised the EAPAS compliance date for
operators from 12 months to 15 months.
Regarding the NACA request for a two-year compliance time, in the
past we have imposed numerous maintenance program revision requirements
through operational rules and ADs. Twelve months has been the typical
compliance time for these changes and has been sufficient for operators
to comply. The maintenance actions described in the maintenance program
changes would be accomplished sometime later, as specified in the
maintenance program. So operators will have sufficient time to plan and
conduct the necessary EWIS training.
On July 30, 2004, (69 FR 45936), we extended the Fuel Tank Safety
Operational Rule compliance dates to December 16, 2008, for reasons
outlined in that final rule. Because of the similar timelines for
operator incorporation of the FTS and EAPAS maintenance actions into
their programs, we had determined that aligning the compliance dates
for the FTS and EAPAS maintenance program changes would allow operators
to revise their maintenance program once to address both safety
initiatives. However, given delays in issuing the EAPAS rulemaking
proposal and the expectation for industry to have the FTS ICA developed
for compliance with the EASA rule (December 2007) and the FAA rule
(December 2008), we have determined that the benefits of aligning the
FTS and EAPAS compliance dates are not substantial enough to justify
further delay in implementing FTS maintenance actions. As previously
discussed, we are not extending the FTS operational rule compliance
date in this final rule.
[[Page 63370]]
5. The Design Approval Holder Compliance Plan
As noted above, in the NPRM we contemplated submission of a
proposed means of compliance, identifying all required submissions to
the FAA. The NPRM proposed submission of--
A project schedule identifying all major milestones.
A detailed explanation of how the proposed means of
compliance would be shown to comply if it differed from that described
in advisory material.
A proposal for submitting a draft of all compliance items
no less than 60 days before the compliance due date.
A proposal for how the approved ICA would be made
available to affected persons (operators and others required to comply
with this rule).
The proposal stated that if the FAA notified the DAH of
deficiencies in its proposed compliance plan or in its implementation
of that plan, the DAH must submit a corrected plan to the FAA Oversight
Office within 30 days. All of these compliance plan requirements were
contained in proposed Sec. 25.1805(d) and (e).
Airbus requested that Sec. 25.1805(d) and (e) be removed because,
it said, these requirements are unnecessary. Airbus believes the only
important compliance date is the final date for DAHs to submit the data
and documents necessary to support operator compliance. Boeing
recommended we remove the Sec. 25.1805(d)(3) requirement to identify
deviations to methods of compliance identified in FAA advisory material
because it does not agree that proposed methods of compliance should be
compared to other methods. Instead, it said, they should be evaluated
on their own merits.
The FAA agrees that some provisions of proposed Sec. 25.1803(d)
and (e) could be removed without adversely affecting our ability to
facilitate TC holder compliance. Specifically, proposed paragraph
(d)(3) would require TC holders to identify intended means of
compliance that differ from those described in FAA advisory materials.
While this is still a desirable element of any compliance plan, we have
concluded that an explicit requirement is unnecessary and it is not
included in this final rule. As with normal type certification
planning, we expect that TC holders will identify differences and fully
discuss them with the Oversight Office early in the compliance period
to ensure that these differences will ultimately not jeopardize full
and timely compliance. Because we believe that timely review and
approval is beneficial and will save both DAH and FAA resources, the
advisory material recommends that if the DAH proposes a compliance
means differing from that described in the advisory material, the DAH
should provide a detailed explanation of how it will demonstrate
compliance with this section. The Oversight Office will evaluate these
differences on their merits, and not by comparison with FAA advisory
material.
Similarly, proposed paragraph (e) contains provisions that would
have authorized the Oversight Office to identify deficiencies in a
compliance plan or the TC holder's implementation of the plan and
require specific corrective actions to remedy those deficiencies. While
we anticipate that this process will still occur in the event of a
potential non-compliance, we have concluded that it is unnecessary to
adopt explicit requirements to correct deficiencies and have removed
them from the final rule. Ultimately, TC holders are responsible for
submitting compliant EWIS ICA by the specified date. This section
retains the requirements to submit a compliance plan and to implement
the approved plan. If the Oversight Office determines that the TC
holder is at risk of not submitting compliant EWIS ICA by the
compliance date because of deficiencies in either the compliance plan
or the TC holder's implementation of the plan, the Oversight Office
will document the deficiencies and request TC holder corrective action.
Failure to implement proper corrective action under these
circumstances, while not constituting a separate violation, will be
considered in determining appropriate enforcement action if the TC
holder ultimately fails to meet the requirements of this section.
Additionally, in reviewing the comment, we realized that the rule
text could more clearly state our intent to allow DAHs flexibility to
modify their approved plan if necessary. So the final text of proposed
Sec. 26.11(f) has been modified to read ``each affected person must
implement the compliance plan, or later approved revisions * * *.'' In
response to Airbus' comment that the only important compliance date is
the final date for DAHs to submit the data and documents, we must
reiterate that we believe a compliance plan is important. The purpose
of a 90-day compliance date for the compliance plan is to allow all
parties to be informed about how the DAH will be meeting its
requirements and to ensure that the all necessary data will be provided
to the operators on time. Early development of a compliance plan will
give assurance of development of all the necessary data in time for the
operators to comply with their requirements.
6. Defining the Representative Airplane
Boeing requested that we define in advance of the final rule which
TC holder configuration changes mandated by ADs should be considered in
the EZAP. Boeing and AIA/GAMA noted that the DAH must consider airplane
configurations representative of each airplane model plus DAH-developed
modifications mandated by AD. Boeing stated that because ADs are
applicable to operators and not DAHs, and because most ADs are not
applicable to all airplanes within a specific model range, it is
difficult to define a representative airplane. Boeing does not believe
the proposed Sec. 25.1805 (now Sec. 26.11) compliance time allows
enough time to properly define the representative configuration.
As previously discussed, we have increased the proposed DAH
compliance time for a number of reasons, one of which was to allow
sufficient time for the DAH to identify the representative
configuration for each affected airplane model.
As discussed in the NPRM, the purpose of the requirement to address
all TC-holder-developed modifications mandated by AD is to make the
EZAP as complete and accurate as possible. It would serve no purpose to
require the TC holder to analyze an airplane configuration no longer in
service because an AD has mandated its modification. Therefore, TC
holders must assess all these modifications to determine whether they
affect the results of the EZAP. Because TC holders own the design data
for both the original configurations and these modifications, they are
the only entities capable of performing these assessments. When TC
holders develop AD-mandated modifications for airplanes still in
production, they normally incorporate these same modifications into new
airplanes. So this requirement imposes little additional burden for
these airplanes. At the same time, we recognize that it would be
unreasonable to require the TC holder to analyze modifications
developed by third parties. Accordingly, this requirement is limited to
TC-holder-developed modifications.
In reviewing Boeing's comment, we recognized that the proposed
definition of ``representative airplane,'' i.e., ``the configuration of
each model series airplane that incorporates all variations of EWIS
used on that series airplane * * *,'' could be interpreted in different
ways. It could be interpreted as applying to all post-production
[[Page 63371]]
modifications, not just those mandated by AD and those DAH-developed
modifications introduced into production. It could also refer to
variations used for post-production modifications, as well as those
used in production. Boeing correctly understands that we intended to
require evaluation only of variations used in production and those
post-production modifications mandated by AD. Section Sec. 26.11(b)
has been revised to clarify this. For those design changes made in
production for which the TC holder has issued service bulletins
describing post-production equivalents, the ICA should identify those
service bulletins with the corresponding production configurations.
This will enable operators that have incorporated these service
bulletins to determine that the ICA for the production modification
also applies to them.
7. Impact on Operators
Boeing asked that we separate the operational rule from DAH
requirements, with a separate comment period, so that defined service
information and associated costs can be evaluated by the operators.
Boeing contended that consolidating DAH and operational requirements
into one rulemaking action with one comment period prevents the FAA
from obtaining accurate cost estimates and prevents operators from
determining the true impact of the proposal on their operations. NACA
also expressed concern that operators cannot know the full impact of
this rule until DAHs develop the required ICA.
We have decided against separating the operational rules from the
DAH requirements. Separating the rules would not change the technical
requirements contained in this final rule but would substantially delay
implementation of the EAPAS safety initiative. Thus, it is essential to
include both certification and operational requirements in the final
rule to ensure maximum safety benefits to the flying public.
In addition to issues of timeliness, we note that while some
operators will not know the precise effects of the ICA developed by TC
holders on their maintenance programs, they should have a good
understanding of the nature and scope of the program from the NPRM and
the guidance material provided in the DAH EZAP AC (AC No. 25-27). As
discussed, both of these were derived from ATSRAC's recommendations,
which operators played a major role in developing. In addition, since
2004, multiple operators have been involved with several airplane
manufacturers in developing EWIS ICA using the EZAP analysis described
in the DAH EZAP AC. This has been accomplished by integrating EWIS ICA
development into the airplane manufacturer's normal maintenance
development program. Operators of the airplane model for which a
maintenance program is being developed (or revised) are always involved
in the development of that program. Therefore, these operators do know
the impact of integrating these new EWIS ICA into their maintenance
programs.
8. EZAPs Already Completed
Boeing asked that we include a statement in the final rule
indicating that EZAP analyses conducted prior to the effective date of
the final rule, and resultant ICA, comply with subpart I (now part 26)
requirements. Boeing questioned the statement that the proposed time
frames are supported by experience gained by EZAPs already performed,
when the NPRM did not discuss the acceptability of those analyses. It
noted that several EZAP analyses were conducted using MSG-3 \5\
methods, which differ slightly from those contained in proposed AC 120-
XX (now the DAH EZAP AC, No. 25-27). Boeing noted that, for those
cases, it must show the FAA Oversight Office how the previous analyses
were conducted, make any necessary changes, obtain industry agreement,
and have the FAA approve the resulting ICA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Air Transport Association (ATA) Maintenance Steering Group 3
(MSG-3) is a document containing a logic process used by the
airlines and manufacturers to develop scheduled maintenance programs
for an airplane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that work done before adoption of the rule will reduce
the level of effort required for DAHs to comply with the rule. But we
also recognize that some additional work may be necessary for DAHs to
show compliance. For example, EWIS ICA may not have been aligned with
FTS ICA or may not have been developed for the ``representative
airplane'' as defined in the rule. Therefore previous work cannot
automatically be considered compliant. Because we cannot say with any
confidence that no more work will be required, we are not adopting
Boeing's recommendation.
9. Wire Inspections
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) called the
proposal inadequate because it relies on enhanced zonal inspections to
detect latent failures in the wiring system, and it said that zonal
inspections detect only visible deteriorated wire.
The commenter said that without periodic or real-time monitoring of
airplane wiring, there is no way to predict a degraded state and
prevent future wire failures. NATCA recommended that we include
requirements for either continuous on-board detection of airplane
wiring faults, such as that provided by system self-test features, or
periodic maintenance tasks, to detect both visible and hidden
degradation in the wiring system.
The requirements adopted today do not prevent use of wire
monitoring or fault detection technology. Multiple non-destructive
inspection (NDI) tools and real-time monitoring techniques are being
developed for use in aircraft wiring inspection. However, current NDI
reflectometry technology is not yet mature enough for its use to be
mandated by the FAA. Although real-time monitoring technology, such as
arc fault circuit breaker technology, is further along in development,
it too is not yet mature enough to address all circuit types. We expect
that these technologies, when available, may be relatively more
expensive than conventional methods, so the need for visual inspection
of EWIS would remain even if this technology were widely available. We
made no change based on this comment.
10. Protections and Cautions
Boeing requested that we remove from subpart I (now part 26) the
requirement to include ICA instructions for protection and caution
information to minimize contamination and accidental damage during
maintenance activities. It suggested this language should be added to
the operating rule. Boeing considers the methods of protecting wiring
during maintenance to be best determined by the maintenance provider
and dependent on the type of maintenance activity underway. Boeing also
noted that operators who have already developed protection schemes
based on their experience will be required by the operational rules to
replace this with the one provided by the TC holder. Boeing does not
believe this is a positive step towards increased protection of EWIS.
United Airlines stated its support for requiring airplane
manufacturers to include specific recommendations for when and how to
protect wire bundles from damage during different phases of
maintenance.
We infer that Boeing is referring to the requirement in
H25.5(a)(1)(vi). That requirement applies both to new type certificates
complying with Sec. 25.1729
[[Page 63372]]
(proposed as Sec. 25.1739) and existing type certificates complying
with part 26. The requirement is consistent with ATSRAC's
recommendations. These recommendations were based on recognition that
the TC holder will have the best understanding of EWIS material
properties and vulnerabilities, and will be in the best position to
identify what protection and caution measures are needed. If operators
have developed their own instructions, they may be used as alternatives
or as supplements to those provided by the TC holder, if approved by
their Principal Inspector (PI). We have provided guidance to the FAA
field offices to allow for consideration of an operator's alternative
to that approved by the FAA Oversight Office. We made no rule change
based on this comment.
11. Alignment of EWIS and Fuel Tank ICA
AIA/GAMA and GE requested that the last sentence of proposed Sec.
25.1805(b) (now Sec. 26.11(b)), requiring minimization of redundant
requirements between EWIS and fuel tank ICA, be deleted. The commenters
stated that this is an economic and customer service issue beyond the
scope of the FAA's safety interest.
Boeing requested we include, within proposed Sec. 25.1805(b), the
levels of alignment of FTS and EWIS maintenance actions that will be
acceptable for compliance. While Boeing sees the benefit of eliminating
redundant maintenance activities, it considers itself unable to
determine how to show compliance with this requirement.
Minimizing redundant requirements is not just an economic issue for
operators. One of ATSRAC's findings is that repeated disturbance of
EWIS during maintenance is itself a source of safety problems.
Therefore, while ensuring that all necessary maintenance is performed,
it is also our objective to minimize disturbance by eliminating
redundant requirements. Too frequent disturbance to electrical wiring
by repeated moving, pulling, and flexing of the wire bundles will
induce unnecessary stress on the wiring and its components, which in
turn could lead to degradation, expedited aging, and failures. Thus it
is important that redundant tasks and unnecessary disturbances to the
electrical wiring be minimized. Operators will review their maintenance
tasks and coordinate with the DAHs to ensure that tasks are
incorporated into their maintenance program for the highest level of
safety and performed in the manner most suitable for their operation.
As discussed earlier, Boeing and other TC holders have been
required to develop ICA since 1981, and maintenance manuals even before
that. In developing ICA, TC holders routinely review individual tasks
to align them with other tasks being developed. This is done both to
avoid redundancy and to eliminate confusing or conflicting instructions
that could inadvertently lead to improper maintenance with unsafe
consequences. The purpose of the requirement to align the ICA is no
different. The intended ``levels of alignment'' are the same as would
be expected for ICA developed in connection with original type
certification. The MSG-3 and Maintenance Review Board (MRB) processes,
with which Boeing and other affected TC holders are familiar, have the
same objectives. The DAH EZAP AC, ``Development of Transport Category
Airplane Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness Using an Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure,''
No. 25-27, describes means of compliance that will achieve these
objectives. It provides a step-by-step process to assist applicants in
compliance with the electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS)
maintenance requirements. This process includes a step requiring an
analysis of the related maintenance tasks to ensure that they are
consolidated and/or aligned to maximize effectiveness and eliminate
redundancies and duplications between the EWIS and fuel tank ICA.
The airplane manufacturer will align the ICA requirements to the
greatest extent possible. No change to the final rule is necessary.
12. Approval of ICA
Boeing and AIA/GAMA requested further clarification of proposed
Sec. Sec. 25.1739 (now Sec. 25.1729) and 25.1805(b) (now Sec.
26.11(b)) requirements that ICA prepared in accordance with paragraph H
25.5 of Appendix H be submitted to the FAA Oversight Office for
approval. AIA/GAMA, Airbus, and FedEx recommended that EWIS ICA be
accepted by the FAA, rather than approved, with the exception of any
applicable airworthiness limitation items (ALI), which should be
approved. The commenters were concerned that the proposed requirements
are not consistent with the current requirement in Sec. 25.1529 that
ICA be found acceptable to the FAA (except for ALI, which must be
approved). FedEx also stated that creation of separate ``FAA-approved''
ICA will lead to confusion and fragmentation of what should be an
integrated inspection program.
As discussed earlier, one of the primary objectives of these DAH
rules is to ensure that operators have at least one source of FAA-
approved data and documents that they can use to comply with
operational requirements. This objective would be defeated if the
required data and documents were not, in fact, approved. Only by
retaining authority to approve these materials can we ensure that they
comply with applicable requirements and can be relied upon by operators
to comply with operational rules. We believe that there are differences
between EWIS ICA and other ICA that necessitate approval of EWIS ICA:
EWIS ICA are the means for compliance with some of the
technical requirements of new subpart H (Sec. 25.1707 relating to
system separation and Sec. 25.1711, component identification).
EWIS ICA contain highly technical information such as
electrical loads data and wiring practices standards that are more
complex than typical maintenance instructions.
EWIS ICA require a degree of consistency and
standardization that may not be necessary for other ICA.
We agree that further clarification is needed regarding FAA
Oversight Office approval of EWIS ICA. We do not intend to approve all
documents that contain EWIS ICA details, such as the airplane
maintenance manual. We do intend to review references in all documents
that are referred to in the EWIS ICA source documents. We have made
changes to the AC guidance information (AC 25.1701-1) to clarify
exactly what documents the FAA Oversight Office will approve. No change
to the final rule is necessary.
13. Rule Applicability
Today's rule is applicable to airplanes with a passenger capacity
of 30 or more passengers or a payload capacity of at least 7,500 pounds
operating in parts 121 and 129. NATCA requested that we consider
revising the rule applicability to address all transport airplanes
regardless of size or type of operation. It stated that all transport
airplanes are subject to the same aging safety concerns, and passengers
should have one level of safety.
The FAA has used these size criteria for the applicability of other
rulemakings because they capture the airplanes carrying the vast
majority of passengers and cargo. Similarly, by limiting applicability
of the EAPAS operational rules to parts 121 and 129, we focus these
requirements on the
[[Page 63373]]
airplanes that transport most passengers and cargo. Based on our
analysis, the additional safety benefit of extending the operational
requirements to all transport airplanes would not justify the
additional costs of doing so. We will continue to review this issue
and, as this rule is implemented, if we can demonstrate that it can be
applied cost effectively to smaller airplanes or other operators, we
may consider further rulemaking.
Several commenters requested revisions and clarification of
applicability with respect to supplemental type certificates (STC).
EASA requested we revise the applicability of Sec. 25.1805 (now Sec.
26.11(d)) to include STCs that significantly affect EWIS.\6\ British
Airways stated its support for the existing applicability, agreeing
that the analysis performed by the DAH would cover the EWIS they are
responsible for as well as the wiring changed or added by others. FedEx
requested clarification on means of compliance for STCs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ EASA plans to address STCs in its NPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the ATA requested we revise proposed Sec.
25.1805(c)(4) (now Sec. 26.11(d)) to clarify its applicability only to
new STCs issued after the effective date of the final rule and not to
existing STCs that may be modified after the effective date of the
rule. The ATA noted that some STCs are modified to expand the STC
effectivity as an operator's fleet grows and should not be evaluated
for compliance with Sec. 25.1805(c)(4).
Section 26.11 will apply to future applicants for STCs and to
existing TCs. As explained in the NPRM, we decided not to include
existing STCs in this section for two reasons. First, most existing
STCs do not provide detailed instructions for wiring installation,
relying on the judgment and expertise of the individual installer. In
most cases it would not be possible for the current STC holder to
evaluate these wiring installations. Second, in most cases, installers
have followed the TC holder's wire routing and installed STC wiring in
or adjacent to existing wiring. In these cases, implementing the
maintenance programs developed by the TC holder should adequately
address the safety issues identified in this rule that may exist in the
STC wiring. Our conclusion here is consistent with ATSRAC's
recommendations.
However, we will not revise Sec. 26.11 to exclude modifications to
existing STCs. As discussed, one reason we are not applying this rule
to existing STCs is that in many cases existing STCs do not include
data for EWIS that can be evaluated. As discussed in the NPRM, we
believe it is important that EWIS ICA be provided for all future STCs,
including changes to existing STCs. We have revised Sec. 26.11(d) to
clarify that ``if an existing STC is amended, this section would apply
to the amendment.''
The extent of the review required for changes to existing STCs
would be limited to the newly proposed changes. Applicants would not be
required to evaluate the entire design change approved under their
existing STC. For example, if an applicant proposed to add additional
monitors to an existing in-flight entertainment STC, only the EWIS
supporting the additional monitors would need to be evaluated for the
impact to the ICA. If an applicant were merely adding airplane models
of the same configuration to an existing STC, they would not need to
evaluate their STC.
Boeing Wichita asked whether it would be required to evaluate EWIS
for an entire airplane in order to comply with requirements of Sec.
25.1805 (now Sec. 26.11) when applying for an STC.
We do not intend to require applicants for design changes approval
to evaluate the EWIS of the entire airplane. Rather, these applicants
must evaluate whether their proposed design change would require
revision of the ICA developed by the TC holder (and any previous STC
applicants) in compliance with Sec. 26.11 to correctly address the
design change. An example would be if an STC applicant proposed to add
EWIS to a zone that did not previously have EWIS. The applicant would
need to develop an ICA revision providing for any maintenance actions
within that zone that may be necessary to comply with Appendix H to
part 25. We have revised Sec. 26.11 by adding a new paragraph (c) to
clarify this requirement.
14. Non-U.S. Manufacturers
Airbus also commented that proposed Sec. 25.1805 paragraphs (b),
(d), and (e) (now Sec. 26.11(b) and (e)) fail to acknowledge that non-
U.S. manufacturers will likely have to comply with similar regulations
issued by their own authorities. Airbus said that discussion of the
compliance plan and review of the compliance items should be delegated
to the relevant foreign authority, as far as permitted by existing
Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements.
We recognize the important role other national authorities are
likely to play in implementation of this rule. In addition to the on-
going efforts to harmonize these requirements, we have been working
closely with the other national authorities to define appropriate
roles, responsibilities, and relationships among all affected
authorities. As discussed in the NPRM, the compliance planning
provisions are equally important for foreign TC holders, and we expect
to have mutually agreeable arrangements with their authorities on how
this planning will be overseen.
15. General Comments About Design Approval Holder Requirements
We received a number of general comments responding to the concept
of DAH requirements rather than to the DAH requirements in this
specific rulemaking. We responded to these types of comments in the
comment disposition document accompanying our policy statement titled
``Safety--A Shared Responsibility--New Direction for Addressing
Airworthiness Issues for Transport Airplanes.'' Both were published in
the Federal Register on July 12, 2005. As a result, we will not respond
to such comments again here. We have included them, and our responses,
in a separate document in the docket. That document is titled ``General
Comments about DAH Requirements Sent to Docket Number 18379.''
Boeing and AIA/GAMA did not agree with our assessment that DAH
rules are necessary to support this initiative. They requested we
remove proposed Sec. 25.1805 (now Sec. 26.11) from the rule. They
contended that
The required material is neither complex nor limited to
the DAH,
Operators have the option of developing an enhanced zonal
inspection program without participation of the DAH, and
Operators will not be required to adopt maintenance
programs developed by the DAH.
Both commenters stated that developing EWIS ICA is not complex.
They noted the EZAP process is based on MSG-3 maintenance program
development procedures, which are neither complex nor limited to the
DAH. They believe that the DAH type design data needed for development
of maintenance tasks is also available to operators.
Boeing and AIA/GAMA also said that use of the MSG-3 process by the
DAH alone will only account for airplane configurations certified by
the DAH and some, but not all, AD-mandated modifications. Unique
configurations that evolved after delivery will not be considered by
the DAH. Boeing contended that operators are capable of assessing their
airplane configurations using proposed AC 120-XX (now the DAH EZAP AC)
and developing an
[[Page 63374]]
enhanced zonal inspection program without DAH involvement.
Additionally, Boeing stated that operators could develop ICA more
efficiently because they could concurrently address the baseline
configuration and any configuration changes made in service.
As discussed previously, the policy statement provides criteria for
deciding when DAH regulations are necessary.
Appendix H paragraph H25.5(a)(1) identifies information required to
perform the analysis and develop maintenance tasks. While some of this
information may be available to operators without assistance from the
DAH, operators would not have access to all of it.
Also, the methodology described in the AC may appear to be
relatively simple, but applying it properly requires considerable
expertise and judgment and can be quite complex. DAH involvement is
necessary to ensure it is applied properly. We believe that DAH
regulations are necessary for this safety initiative to ensure all of
the representative type design configurations are addressed in a timely
manner. The ``representative'' airplane is defined as the configuration
of each model series airplane that incorporates all the variations of
EWIS used on that model, and that includes all TC-holder-designed
modifications mandated by AD, as of the effective date of this rule.
Existing regulations regarding ICA as adopted in Amendments 21-50
and 25-54 require DAHs to provide ICA for the airplane as a whole. This
rule simply applies that same policy to EWIS, which were not
specifically addressed by those amendments.
We note that in the form in which the rules were proposed,
operators would be required to implement EWIS ICA based on those
``developed by the type certificate holder.'' That statement did not
clearly articulate our intent and we have corrected that language in
the final rule to reference ``in accordance with the provisions of
Appendix H of part 25 of this chapter applicable to each affected
airplane * * *.''
Both Boeing and AIA/GAMA requested that we establish, within the
final rule, all requirements for the DAHs regarding consistency,
standardization of process and requirements, and technical guidelines.
They do not believe the rule or guidance material is comprehensive
enough to enable DAHs to comply. Boeing stated that the root cause of
past difficulties with voluntary compliance lies with unclear
regulatory requirements and lack of appropriate guidance. Boeing noted
that the FAA attempted to address this problem in the proposed rule,
but said those attempts have fallen short of what is needed. It quoted
draft AC 25-XX: ``* * * the Compliance Team, as soon as possible after
issuance of the safety initiative rule, will provide the DAHs with our
expectations for the required analysis content [and] describe to the
DAHs our expectations for the content and format of their data * * *
.'' Boeing contends that visibility of requirements, expectations, and
technical requirements would ensure uniformity of application and
inform operators of what information they would receive from DAHs.
We partially agree. The program plan for the aging airplane rules
was to release associated guidance and policy for public comment upon
release of the NPRMs. We believe this approach should have helped
clarify our expectations of what is considered an acceptable approach
to compliance.
For this initiative, both the performance standards and guidance
materials were developed by ATSRAC, which had representatives from the
affected industry. We must presume that industry, in helping to develop
these materials, understood what would be expected for new TCs. We
consider these same materials to be sufficient for application to
existing TCs.
The comprehensiveness and level of detail of requirements and
related advisory material is at least equivalent to that for other ICA
currently in Appendix H, which DAHs have successfully complied with for
25 years. The purpose of compliance planning provisions is to ensure
that DAHs work closely with the FAA, as they do for initial
certification, in developing compliant data and documents. We made no
change to the rule due to this comment. However, we will clarify in AC
26-1 that the compliance team will meet with DAHs as soon as possible
after issuance of the final rule to ensure that guidance materials and
expectations related to rule implementation are clear.
16. Airplanes Excluded From Design Approval Holder and EWIS Operating
Requirements
The DAH requirements and the EWIS requirements for operators do not
apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Lockheed L-188
(2) Bombardier CL-44
(3) Mitsubishi YS-11
(4) British Aerospace BAC 1-11
(5) Concorde
(6) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(7) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(8) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(9) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(10) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(11) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(12) Airbus Caravelle
(13) Lockheed L-300
The airplanes excluded from these rules are not currently operating
under parts 121 or 129, so there is no need for DAHs to develop data to
support the operational rules for these airplane models. The Vickers
Viscount airplane appeared on this exclusion list in the NPRM. But
since the Vickers Viscount was originally type certificated before
January 1, 1958, this airplane is not subject to these rules because of
the general exclusion of airplanes type certificated before that date.
Thus it has been removed from the exclusion list. Similarly, the
Convair and DC-3 models that have been modified to incorporate turbine-
powered engines are also covered by this general exclusion, so they too
have been removed from the originally proposed exclusion list. The
Lockheed L-300 has been added to the exclusion list. There is only one
qualified aircraft, which was modified, used, and later retired by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1995. It would
not be cost effective to bring it into 121 operations. Thus it has been
excluded from the requirements of these rules.
C. Electrical Wiring Interconnection System (EWIS) Certification Rules
(Part 25 Subpart H)
1. New Subpart for EWIS
This final rule creates a new subpart H within part 25 of 14 CFR
addressing electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS). Its
purpose is to be the single place in the regulations where the majority
of certification rules pertaining to transport airplane wiring can be
found. Many of the rules contained in this new subpart are previously-
existing requirements that have been moved from different parts of the
regulations. Some have been reworded to make it clear that they apply
to wiring. Several of the rules in subpart H are new. As a whole, the
rules in subpart H are meant to improve the safety of transport
airplane wiring by making sure that it is designed to be safe.
Individually, the rules address different aspects of wiring design
safety, and they are discussed individually below.
To better harmonize with foreign airworthiness authorities, the
numbers of many of the rules in subpart H have been changed from those
originally proposed. The following table indicates the revised numbers.
Since commenters referred to the proposal when they
[[Page 63375]]
wrote to the FAA, however, their references below are the originally
proposed rule numbers. Similarly, if a commenter references a proposed
AC, the original draft AC number is retained, as used by the commenter.
Several of the proposed subpart H rules received no comments and remain
unchanged except for their numbers. Those will not be discussed here.
The following table indicates the rule number changes.
Table 2.--Subpart H Rule Renumbering
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule NPRM
Title in subpart H section section
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Definition.................................... 25.1701 25.1701
Functions and Installation: EWIS.............. 25.1703 25.1703
Systems and Functions: EWIS................... 25.1705 25.1719
System Separation: EWIS....................... 25.1707 25.1709
System Safety: EWIS........................... 25.1709 25.1705
Component Identification: EWIS................ 25.1711 25.1711
Fire Protection: EWIS......................... 25.1713 25.1713
Electrical Bonding and Protection against 25.1715 25.1717
Static Electricity: EWIS.....................
Circuit Protective Devices: EWIS.............. 25.1717 25.1721
Accessibility Provisions: EWIS................ 25.1719 25.1725
Protection of EWIS............................ 25.1721 25.1727
Flammable Fluid Protection: EWIS.............. 25.1723 25.1729
Powerplants: EWIS............................. 25.1725 25.1731
Flammable fluid shutoff means: EWIS........... 25.1727 25.1733
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness--EWIS 25.1729 25.1739
Powerplant and APU fire detector system: EWIS. 25.1731 25.1737
Fire detector systems, general: EWIS.......... 25.1733 25.1735
[Reserved].................................... deleted 25.1707
[Reserved].................................... deleted 25.1715
Instruments using a power supply: EWIS........ deleted 25.1723
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Definition of EWIS (Sec. 25.1701)
Section 25.1701 is a new requirement. It defines electrical wiring
interconnection systems (EWIS). The final rule differs from the
proposal in the addition of the words ``and external wiring of
equipment,'' discussed below.
Boeing commented that EWIS is not limited to the numbered items in
Sec. 25.1701(a). EWIS components might also include terminal blocks,
circuit protective devices, and contactors. Boeing requested we
indicate that EWIS may include these and other items as well.
We agree with Boeing that the EWIS components listed in Sec.
25.1701(a) are not a comprehensive list. There may be other devices
that would be considered part of an EWIS, as indicated by the phrase in
the lead-in sentence to the list of Sec. 25.1701(a)(1)-(13); ``* * *
this includes:'' A determination of whether a component is considered
to fall under the definition of EWIS must be made on specific design
details of a certification program.
Airbus commented that the phrase ``and external wiring of
equipment'' should be added to the list in proposed Sec. 25.1701(b) of
components covered by the EWIS definition. Airbus stated that for
completeness and consistency, external wiring of equipment should be
considered, since it can be part of the aircraft installation (e.g.,
galley connection wiring and seat connection wiring). Continental asked
if wire installed in seats is covered by the proposal.
We have added the phrase ``and external wiring of equipment'' to
the list of equipment in Sec. 25.1701(b). We consider this a
clarification of what constitutes an EWIS component and not an increase
in scope over the proposal. If an airplane component, such as a galley
or a seat, is manufactured with connection cables external to it, then
the external connection cables would be considered an EWIS component.
An individual commenter stated that the word ``interconnection'' in
the phrase ``electrical wiring interconnection systems'' is redundant
and should be eliminated. This commenter also requested that we cite
the numerous examples of airplane electrical wiring systems that are
not a part of the EWIS. This commenter further requested that we define
the term EWIS in the definition section and cite examples of components
included in and excluded from the system.
We do not concur with the request to remove ``interconnection''
from the term ``electrical wiring interconnection system'' (EWIS). The
EWIS certification and operational requirements in the final rule apply
to wires that ``interconnect'' airplane systems, as opposed to wiring
located solely within the enclosure of a piece of avionics equipment,
for example. Thus the word interconnection is integral and important in
describing what electrical wiring interconnection system means.
The definition of EWIS contained in Sec. 25.1701 does include
examples of airplane wiring and its associated components that are not
part of the EWIS. We believe that these examples are sufficient to
adequately articulate the regulatory definition of EWIS and that
further examples are unnecessary. We made no change due to this
comment.
We do not agree with the commenter's proposal to define EWIS in the
definition section. Although not specifically identified by the
commenter, we are assuming that he wants the definition to appear in 14
CFR part 1. Section 25.1701 contains the EWIS definition and clearly
states that the definition applies to ``The Chapter.'' This includes
all applicable certification and operational subchapters such as parts
25, 121, and 129 where the EWIS requirements are located. We have
revised the final rule to include a reference to Sec. 25.1701 in Sec.
1.2.
Continental Airlines quoted Sec. 25.1701 (definition) and the
preamble discussion to emphasize the following statements:
The term EWIS means any wire, wiring device, or combination of
these, including termination devices, installed in the airplane for
transmitting electrical energy between two or more termination
points * * *
* * * but any electrical connection used to support power and/or
signal transmission that is part of the airplane TC, and that is
used for the laptop or other carry-on items, is covered by the
proposed definition.
[[Page 63376]]
The commenter requested that the phrase ``signal transmission'' be
defined.
As used in the context of the proposal, signal transmission refers
to data transmitted through wired means, as opposed to wireless signal
transmission.
GE and AIA/GAMA commented that proposed Sec. 25.1701(c), which
provides for exceptions to the definition of an EWIS, means that the
equipment inside shelves, panels, etc. will have to show compliance
with EWIS requirements even if they are qualified to the standards of
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) document number RTCA/
DO-160. These commenters believe this would be the opposite of the
rule's intended meaning. They request that the following phrase be
deleted from the final rule: ``Except for the equipment indicated in
paragraph (b) of this section''.
As discussed in the NPRM, the definition of EWIS includes
electrical wiring interconnection system components inside shelves,
panels, racks, junction boxes, distribution panels, back-planes of
equipment racks including circuit board back-planes, and wire
integration units. This EWIS, unlike wiring within avionics equipment,
is typically designed and made for a particular airplane model or
series of models. Avionics components must be sent back to their
manufacturer or a specialized repair shop for service. But this type of
equipment is maintained, repaired, and modified by the same personnel
who maintain, repair, and modify the other EWIS in the airplane. In an
electrical distribution panel system, for example, separation must be
designed and maintained within the panel just as in the EWIS leading up
to that panel. Identification of components inside the panel is just as
important as for those outside the panel since the wiring inside the
panel is treated much the same. We have retained the first sentence of
proposed Sec. 25.1701(c).
3. Functions and Installation: EWIS (Sec. 25.1703)
Section 25.1703 (whose number is unchanged from that in the
proposal), is essentially derived from requirements of existing Sec.
25.1301. It requires that applicants select EWIS components that are of
a kind and design appropriate to their intended function. Factors such
as the components' design limitations, functionality, and
susceptibility to arc tracking and damage from moisture must be
considered in selecting EWIS components.
The final rule differs from the proposal in that words were changed
to clarify meaning and words inadvertently left out of the proposal
were put back in. We also removed the word ``adequately'' in response
to a comment from Boeing, as noted in the discussion elsewhere under
the heading System Separation (Sec. 25.1707).
Boeing commented that proposed Sec. 25.1703(a)(3) states that EWIS
must ``function properly when installed.'' Boeing proposed the final
rule be rewritten to say that EWIS must ``perform the function for
which it was intended without degrading the airworthiness of the
airplane.''
The commenter stated that it has had difficulty in the past with
the term ``function properly'' when applied to complex or non-essential
systems. It stated the suggested revision will help clarify the
regulation's intent.
We agree that in the past the term ``function properly'' has been
applied to complex or non-essential systems in a nonstandardized
manner. We have revised the final rule text as proposed.
Airbus, Boeing, General Electric, and Honeywell requested that we
add the words ``in the fuselage'' to Sec. 25.1703(c) so it is
consistent with the original regulation, Sec. 25.869 (a)(3). They said
that this will ensure that the requirements of Sec. 25.1703(c) are
consistent with the original requirement.
We agree. We mistakenly omitted the phrase ``in the fuselage'' in
the proposed wording. We have revised the final rule to include it.
EASA and Airbus commented that ATSRAC recommended that Sec.
25.1703 include the following requirement:
Electrical wiring interconnection system modifications to the
original type design must be designed and installed to the same
standards used by the original aircraft manufacturer or other
equivalent standards acceptable to the Administrator (for 14 CFR)/
authorities (for JAR).
EASA stated that this requirement will be included in the EASA
notice of proposed amendment (NPA) that will propose to adopt ATSRAC's
recommendations. Airbus said such a requirement is consistent with the
proposal's preamble and advisory material (reference proposed AC
25.17XX, paragraph 5.b.(8)(b)). Airbus said that including this
language in the final rule will ensure EWIS minimum compatibility for
modifications made after an airplane is delivered.
Similarly, the International Aviation Safety Association (IASA)
commented that airplane and wiring manufacturers should be required to
approve the type of wiring used in modifications to an approved type
design.
To add this additional requirement would essentially delegate to
the type certificate holder authority to establish standards that go
beyond the minimum safety standards required by part 25. The FAA does
not have legal authority to make such a delegation. As with other
airworthiness standards, an applicant who shows compliance with our
standards is entitled to design approval (reference Sec. 21.117). The
rationale for this is that our standards provide an acceptable level of
safety, so exceeding them is not necessary for safety. However, the
referenced advisory material does contain the following statement:
Only the components listed in the applicable manual or approved
substitutes should be used for the maintenance, repair, or
modification of the aircraft. EWIS modifications to the original
type design should be designed and installed to the same standards
used by the original aircraft manufacturer or other equivalent
standards acceptable to the FAA. This is because the manufacturer's
technical choice of an EWIS component is not always driven by
regulatory requirements alone. Sometimes specific technical
constraints would result in the choice of a component that exceeds
the minimum level required by the regulations.
We believe such a statement meets the intent of the ATSRAC
recommendation. Therefore, we made no changes based on this comment.
Airbus requested that the term ``hazard'' replace ``hazardous
effects'' in proposed Sec. 25.1703(d). Airbus said this would
eliminate ambiguous interpretation due to inappropriate use of what is
a system safety classification term in Sec. 25.1309(b). Airbus stated
that the effect on the component itself needs to be covered instead of
the effect on the function.
We infer from this comment that Airbus objects to the phrase
``hazardous effects'' because it believes this phrase implies that a
numerical probability analysis would be necessary to show that moisture
on EWIS components in known areas of moisture accumulation would not
create a hazard not shown to be improbable. A numerical probability
analysis is not necessary when demonstrating compliance with Sec.
25.1703(d). The intent is that good engineering and manufacturing
judgment be used when designing and installing EWIS components in areas
of known moisture accumulation to minimize potential for moisture to
cause an EWIS component failure. Such a failure could in turn lead to a
functional failure of the system it is associated with. Or it could
lead to accelerated
[[Page 63377]]
degradation of the component and localized electrical arcing could
occur. This in itself could lead to a hazardous condition. It is
important to protect the EWIS component from moisture damage. But it is
the possible safety hazard from failure of the component that the rule
is addressing, and not strictly the effect on the component, or its
function. The advisory material for Sec. 25.1703(d) states, in part,
the following:
This section requires that EWIS components located in areas of
known moisture build-up be adequately protected to minimize
moisture's hazardous effects. This is to ensure that all practical
means are used to ensure damage does not occur from fluid contact
with components.
We believe that this statement prevents confusion about whether or not
a numerical probability analysis is required for demonstrating
compliance with this requirement. It is not. We made no changes due to
this comment.
Boeing and AIA/GAMA commented that the preamble discussion of Sec.
25.1703(d) states that the rule proposes to ensure that ``all practical
means'' are used to prevent damage due to fluid contact. They noted
that one could interpret this guidance to mean that multiple means must
be used. Another interpretation could be that all practical means must
be considered and the most appropriate method used to address potential
for fluid impinging on wiring. For purposes of clarification, Boeing
requests that the term ``used'' be changed to ``considered.''
This rule is meant to require that all practical means be
considered and the most appropriate method used to address potential
damage from fluid contact with EWIS components. The advisory material
for this requirement has been clarified to state this.
4. Systems and Functions: EWIS (Sec. 25.1705)
Section 25.1705 was proposed as Sec. 25.1719. This section adds to
the regulations the concept that EWIS associated with systems required
for type certification or by operating rules must be considered an
integral part of those systems and considered in showing compliance
with all applicable requirements. In addition to this general
requirement, the rule lists other specific certification rules (for
example Sec. 25.773 Pilot compartment view and Sec. 25.981 Fuel tank
ignition prevention) for which the applicant must include consideration
of the EWIS that is part of the subject system in demonstrating
compliance.
There are two differences between the proposal and the requirement
as adopted: The section number has been changed, and a reference to
Sec. 25.1331(a)(2) (as discussed below) has been added.
EASA and Airbus requested that Sec. 25.1723 be deleted and
references to Sec. Sec. 25.1303(b) and 25.1331(a)(2) be moved to Sec.
25.1719 (now Sec. 25.1705).
We partially agree to this request. There is no need to list both
rules in Sec. 25.1705(b). It is necessary to refer to Sec.
25.1331(a)(2) because that requirement specifically applies to
instruments required by Sec. 25.1303(b). To list both Sec. Sec.
25.1303(b) and 25.1331(a)(2) would be redundant. Therefore we have
revised Sec. 25.1705(b) to include 25.1331(a)(2) and we have deleted
proposed Sec. 25.1723 from the final rule.
EASA suggested that references to Sec. Sec. 25.854 and 25.858 be
included in Sec. 25.1719 (now Sec. 25.1705). The subjects of these
two requirements are lavatory fire protection and cargo or baggage
compartment smoke or fire detection systems, respectively. EASA stated
that if we add Sec. Sec. 25.854 and 25.858 to Sec. 25.1719(b), Sec.
25.1735 can be deleted, because its intent would be addressed in Sec.
25.1719(a) and (b).
Requirements of Sec. 25.1705(a) apply to EWIS associated with
systems required for type certification or by operating rules. This is
slightly different from those in Sec. 25.1735, which apply to EWIS
associated with any installed fire protection system, whether or not it
is required for type certification or by operating rules. Therefore, we
cannot delete Sec. 25.1735. We have revised it, however, to include
references to Sec. Sec. 25.854 and 25.858. We included these two
requirements in the preamble discussion for the proposed Sec. 25.1735
and to avoid future confusion we believe they should be referenced
within the final rule.
5. System Separation: EWIS (Sec. 25.1707)
Section 25.1707 System Separation: EWIS was proposed as Sec.
25.1709. This rule requires applicants to design EWIS with appropriate
separation to minimize possibility of hazardous effects upon the
airplane or its systems.
Aside from the section number change, the difference between the
proposal and this final rule is that word changes have been made to
clarify meaning, and the reference in paragraph (a) has been changed.
EASA commented that proposed Sec. 25.1709 (now Sec. 25.1707) uses
the phrase ``any EWIS component failure'' in several places throughout
the requirement. EASA believes this implies that an exhaustive list of
possible EWIS component failures not related to the design under review
would have to be produced. It believes this goes beyond the intent of
the rule, and states that the equivalent EASA requirement will use the
wording ``an EWIS component failure * * *'' as was recommended by
ATSRAC. EASA recommended that the final rule language be revised to
adopt ATSRAC's recommended wording.
We have made the change EASA requested. The intent of the
requirement is that applicants assess all EWIS components that could
have a reasonable likelihood of failing in such a manner as to create a
hazardous condition. We believe the revised rule language is clearer
and will not cause an applicant to unreasonably consider EWIS component
failures that could not adversely impact required separation.
Boeing requested that the words ``adequately'' be removed from the
text of proposed Sec. 25.1703(d) (rule number unchanged) and
``adequate'' from Sec. 25.1709 (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (k), and
(l) (Sec. 25.1709 is now Sec. 25.1707). Boeing contends that
inclusion of these terms does not enhance interpretation of the rules.
It requested that we either delete them or add performance criteria
that define the term ``adequate.''
We believe the word ``adequate'' is necessary to the intent of
Sec. 25.1707. Paragraph (a) of that section provides objective
criteria outlining how adequate physical separation must be achieved.
We have also described various means of providing adequate physical
separation in the associated advisory material. Because each system
design and airplane model can be unique, and because manufacturers have
differing design standards and installation techniques, Sec. 25.1707
does not mandate specific separation distances. The advisory material
provides the criteria each airplane manufacturer should consider when
developing adequate physical separation for EWIS. These criteria
include the following factors:
The electrical characteristics, amount of power, and
severity of failure condition of the system functions performed by the
signals in the EWIS and adjacent EWIS.
Installation design features, including the number, type,
and location of support devices along the wire path.
The maximum amount of slack wire resulting from wire
bundle build tolerances and other wire bundle manufacturing
variabilities.
Probable variations in the installation of the wiring and
adjacent wiring, including position of wire support devices and amount
of wire slack possible.
[[Page 63378]]
The intended operating environment, including amount of
deflection or relative movement possible and the effect of failure of a
wire support or other separation means.
Maintenance practices as defined by the airplane
manufacturer's standard wiring practices manual and the ICA required by
Sec. 25.1529 and Sec. 25.1729.
The maximum temperature generated by adjacent wire/wire
bundles during normal and fault conditions.
Possible electromagnetic interference, high intensity
radiated fields, or induced lightning effects.
Although not related to this comment, we believe that the requirements
of Sec. 25.1707(c) could be stated more clearly. We have revised Sec.
25.1707(c) in the final rule to state that
* * * damage to circuits associated with essential functions
will be minimized under fault conditions.
We have removed the word ``adequately'' from Sec. 25.1703(d). As
used in proposed Sec. 25.1703(d), that word does not add clarity to
the requirement's intent and is therefore unnecessary.
GE suggested that for clarification we revise proposed Sec.
25.1709(l) (now Sec. 25.1707(l)) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.1709(l) Each EWIS must be designed and installed so
there is adequate separation between it and other aircraft
components, in order to prevent abrasion/chafing, vibration damage,
and other types of mechanical damage.
We agree with GE that the wording of this rule could be improved to
help clarify its requirements. We have revised Sec. 25.1707(l) to
state that
* * * EWIS must be designed and installed so there is adequate
physical separation between it and other aircraft components and
aircraft structure, and so that the EWIS is protected from sharp
edges and corners, to minimize potential for abrasion/chafing,
vibration damage, and other types of mechanical damage.
Boeing requested that the reference to Sec. 25.1309(b)(1) and
(b)(2) in Sec. 25.1709(a) (now Sec. 25.1707(a)) be deleted. It
commented that the applicable guidance material does not include a
numerical probability analysis. EASA commented that proposed Sec.
25.1709(a) limits applicability of Sec. 25.1309 to EWIS addressed by
subparagraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2). EASA believes that for administrative
purposes the final Sec. 25.1709(a) should simply reference Sec.
25.1309 because Sec. 25.1309 could be revised in the future or the
requirements of those paragraphs could be moved to a different
paragraph within Sec. 25.1309, making it necessary to also change
Sec. 25.1709. It stated that the equivalent EASA requirement will just
reference Sec. 25.1309.
We agree with Boeing's request to delete the reference to Sec.
25.1309(b)(1) and (b)(2) and do not agree with EASA's request to modify
the reference. The intent of the reference to failure conditions as
defined by Sec. 25.1309(b)(1) and (b)(2) was to require that an EWIS,
under normal and failure conditions, would not create an unsafe
condition. The failure conditions we were intending to reference are
``hazardous'' or ``catastrophic,'' used in EASA CS-25.1309 and in Sec.
25.1709. In reviewing the text of the proposal, however, we realized
that this reference could cause confusion as to the intent of the
requirement and that the reference to the ``catastrophic'' failure
condition is not necessary for the purposes of this requirement. To
better align the requirement of paragraph (a) with the requirements of
paragraphs (e) through (j), and to ensure adequate separation between
EWIS and other airplane systems not specifically addressed by those
paragraphs and paragraph (k), we have revised the first sentence of
25.1707(a). That sentence now reads: ``Each EWIS must be designed and
installed with adequate physical separation from other EWIS and
airplane systems so that an EWIS component failure will not create a
hazardous condition.'' We discuss the term ``hazardous condition'' in
our response to the next two comments.
General Electric and Honeywell commented that the wording of Sec.
25.1709 (now Sec. 25.1707) should be revised to clarify the meaning of
``hazardous conditions,'' so that a contained and detectable engine
nacelle or auxiliary power unit (APU) enclosure fire is clearly
distinguished from a fire within the pressurized fuselage as not being
hazardous. In a similar comment, Airbus requested that the language for
Sec. 25.1709(b) (now Sec. 25.1707(b)) be revised to reflect the
original ATSRAC recommendation as follows:
Each EWIS must be designed and installed so that any electrical
interference likely to be present in the airplane will not result in
hazardous effects upon the airplane or its systems unless shown to
be extremely remote.
Airbus stated that the ATSRAC-proposed words ``unless shown be to
extremely remote,'' should not be removed unless it can be interpreted
that the word ``likely'' excludes cases that are extremely remote and
this is expressed in the advisory material.
In our NPRM preamble discussion of this issue, we said that the
phrase ``hazardous condition'' in Sec. 25.1709 (now Sec. 25.1707) is
used in a different context than it is when associated with the EWIS
safety analysis requirements of Sec. 25.1705 (now Sec. 25.1709.)
While that statement remains true, we now realize that framing the
discussion around what a hazardous condition means in different rules
may have caused confusion. The meaning of the term ``hazardous
condition'' remains the same, whether used in Sec. 25.1707, in Sec.
25.1709, in current Sec. 25.1353, or in CS 25.1309. Here is the
definition for a hazardous failure condition, and also for a
catastrophic failure condition.
Hazardous Failure Condition:
Failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane
or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that there would be, for example:
A large reduction in safety margins or functional
capabilities; or
Physical distress or excessive workload such that the
flightcrew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or
completely; or
Serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of
persons other than the flightcrew.
Catastrophic Failure Condition:
Failure condition that would result in multiple fatalities, usually
with the loss of the airplane.
Hazardous and catastrophic failure conditions are descriptive terms
for situations that could occur in the airplane because of failures
(safety margins reduced, the flightcrew unable to perform accurately
because of adverse operating conditions, injuries to passengers, etc.).
These are situations that result from unsafe conditions and must be
avoided. Therefore, when an airplane is certified, the applicant must
show that the kinds of failures that could result in these kinds of
situations have been considered, and measures put in place to prevent
them.
In the System Separation rule, Sec. 25.1707, separation distances
or a barrier must be used to ensure that none of the types of failures
described in the rule will create a situation that would fit the
definition of a hazardous condition. The operative term in this rule is
that such failures will not create a hazardous condition. To show that
a given failure, such as fuel leakage onto EWIS components, will not
create a hazardous condition, the applicant may use a qualitative
analysis, consisting of expert engineering judgment, manufacturing
judgment, and an assessment of any relevant service history.
In the EWIS System Safety rule, Sec. 25.1709, the applicant must
show that each EWIS system is designed and installed so that each
hazardous failure
[[Page 63379]]
condition is extremely remote. The definition of a hazardous failure
condition remains the same. In this rule, however, a numerical
probability is required to demonstrate that the possibility for such an
occurrence is extremely remote.
Section Sec. 25.1709 uses both the terms ``hazardous'' and
``catastrophic'' and says that the applicant must not only show that
each hazardous failure condition is extremely remote, but that each
catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable and does not
result from a single failure. This would normally require a combination
of qualitative and quantitative analyses to demonstrate compliance.
The requirements of Sec. 25.1707 do not preclude use of valid
component failure rates if the applicant chooses to use a probability
argument in addition to the design assessment to demonstrate
compliance. It also does not preclude the FAA from requiring such an
analysis if the applicant cannot adequately demonstrate that hazardous
conditions will be prevented solely by using the qualitative design
assessment. However, we did not include the words ``unless shown to be
extremely remote'' in Sec. 25.1707 because we did not want to imply
that a numerical probability assessment was required to comply with
this rule.
The engine nacelles and APU enclosures are designated as fire zones
and this is taken into account in the design and installation of EWIS
in those areas. But we do not agree with GE and Honeywell that a fire
in the engine nacelle or APU enclosure could never create a hazardous
condition. There is always the possibility that the fire could not be
suppressed and could result in a safety hazard. We made no changes
because of these comments.
The National Air Carrier Association (NACA) commented that the
proposed EWIS system separation requirements in Sec. 25.1709 (now
Sec. 25.1707) are necessary for new aircraft. However, it said that
imposing these requirements and those of Sec. 25.1711 on existing
airplanes would be a significant economic burden.
The separation and identification requirements of Sec. Sec.
25.1707 and 25.1711 are applicable to new designs and do not apply to
previously certified products.
In a comment relating to proposed Sec. 25.1709 (now Sec.
25.1707), IASA requested that specific mention be made of wiring that
is required to regularly flex in position (such as that in doors and
hatches).
We agree that designers and installers should address the
additional stresses placed on wires and cables that are required to
regularly flex, such as those in doors and hatches. We have revised the
advisory material for Sec. Sec. 25.1703 and 25.1709 to reflect this.
However we do not concur that a change to Sec. 25.1707 is necessary.
As stated, these requirements are performance based. Applicants would
have to demonstrate that any wiring required to regularly flex in
operation would be able to maintain its designed separation distance
from other EWIS, components, or airplane structure as applicable.
Boeing and GE requested that we clarify Sec. 25.1709(d) (now Sec.
25.1707(d)). They asked whether an ``independent airplane power
source'' is considered to be an airplane level power source as is
related to an APU, battery, etc., or whether it is any power source
that transmits power. If it is the latter, they recommended that there
be some differentiation in the associated guidance material for the
differences between ground blocks and ground studs, and for the
differences between static grounds terminating at ground blocks and
ground studs. The commenters did not consider ground blocks ``a common
terminating location'' for non-redundant grounds.
As used in Sec. 25.1707(d), ``independent airplane power sources''
means a general source of power for the whole of the airplane or for
major subsystems (such as the permanent magnet generators that provide
power for fly-by-wire systems ). Examples include engine-or APU-driven
generators, batteries, and ram air turbines. We have revised the AC to
reflect this.
GE requested that the word ``physical'' be deleted from the text of
Sec. 25.1709(d) (now Sec. 25.1707(d)). It stated that adequate
separation should be all that is required and that using physical
separation is only one means of achieving this.
The FAA believes that the word ``physical'' is necessary, as
recommended by ATSRAC, to ensure that necessary separation is not
achieved solely by electrical isolation and use of control logic via
hardware or software implementation. We made no changes due to this
comment.
Airbus requested that the phrase ``will not create a hazardous
condition'' be replaced by the phrase ``will not create a hazard'' in
proposed Sec. 25.1709 (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j) (proposed Sec.
25.1709 is now Sec. 25.1707). Airbus commented that this would
eliminate ambiguous interpretation from inappropriate use of what is a
system safety classification term used in Sec. 25.1309(b).
We believe the word ``hazard'' is ambiguous and could cause
confusion in the context of the requirement. We believe that the
preamble discussion in the NPRM (which refers to this rule as Sec.
25.1709), the additional clarification given in this final rule, and
the advisory material for final Sec. 25.1707 clearly articulate what
is meant by the term ``hazardous condition.''
6. System Safety: EWIS (Sec. 25.1709)
This rule requires applicants to perform a system safety assessment
of the EWIS on their airplane. The current regulation requiring system
safety assessment for certification is Sec. 25.1309. But current Sec.
25.1309 only covers systems and equipment that are ``required by this
subchapter,'' and wiring for non-required systems is sometimes ignored.
The objective of new Sec. 25.1709 is to apply the concepts of Sec.
25.1309 to all wiring.
The safety assessment required by Sec. 25.1709 must consider
effects that both physical and functional failures of EWIS would have
on the airplane's safety. Based on that safety assessment, the
applicant must show that each EWIS failure considered to be hazardous
is extremely remote. Each EWIS failure considered to be catastrophic
must be shown to be extremely improbable and may not result from a
single failure.
This rule was proposed as Sec. 25.1705. That number has been
changed to Sec. 25.1709, to harmonize with foreign airworthiness
authorities. With the exception of that number change, this rule
remains unchanged from the form in which it was proposed.
Airbus suggested that use of the words ``extremely remote'' and
``extremely improbable'' should be avoided. It pointed out that the
preamble discussion for Sec. 25.1705 (now Sec. 25.1709) is based on a
qualitative approach and this was the basis of ATSRAC's recommendation.
Airbus said that no calculated number should be necessary for
compliance with this rule. It also said, with reference to the NPRM
preamble discussion, that ``jamming'' cannot be a justification for
creating Sec. 25.1705 because an EWIS cannot cause flight control
surface or pilot controls jamming.
The analysis required by Sec. 25.1709 is not purely a qualitative
assessment of the effects of EWIS failures. Nor was this the basis of
the ATSRAC recommendation. The analysis required by Sec. 25.1709 is
based on a qualitative and quantitative approach to assessing EWIS
safety, as opposed to a purely numerical, probability-based
quantitative analysis. This is consistent with existing Sec. 25.1309
assessments, where a qualitative analysis is always necessary, and the
quantitative
[[Page 63380]]
probability analysis is a means of compliance for the hazardous and
catastrophic failure conditions.
Section 25.1709 is based on the recommendation from ATSRAC. The
Sec. 25.1709 safety assessment must consider effects that both
physical and functional failures of EWIS would have on airplane safety.
The physical analysis is meant to be a qualitative assessment and its
results are to be integrated into the analysis required by Sec.
25.1309 (or other required assessments such as Sec. 25.671 as
applicable), which is both a qualitative and quantitative assessment.
In response to Airbus's comment that creation of EWIS requirements
should not be predicated on flight control surface or pilot controls
jamming, the NPRM preamble reference is in the context of explaining
that certain airplane systems are exempt from Sec. 25.1309. EWIS
associated with those exempt systems are thus also excluded, even
though those EWIS could create hazardous conditions in the same way as
any other EWIS. As a result, there is a need for a requirement to
address all the EWIS on an airplane. We made no changes based on these
comments.
While acknowledging that the aim of proposed Sec. 25.1705 (now
Sec. 25.1709) is to make the requirements of Sec. 25.1309 more
explicitly applicable to EWIS, Airbus requested that the text of this
rule be revised to read as follows:
Each EWIS must be designed and installed so it does not lead to
a catastrophic failure condition as a consequence of a single EWIS
failure. EWIS failure should be understood as failure affecting from
one to all EWIS components within a single bundle.
Airbus's rationale for this change is based on the originally estimated
32.8 accidents that adoption of the proposed rules will prevent over
the next 25 years. When combined with the number of airplanes projected
to be in service and their combined operating hours, the probability of
an EWIS causing a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition will be
less than is required to demonstrate compliance with Sec. 25.1709. The
commenter contended that if this rationale is accepted by the FAA, then
all an applicant should have to do is show in a qualitative manner that
an airplane's EWIS will not be the cause of a catastrophic event.
The purpose of Sec. 25.1709 is to ensure that the same analytical
rigor applied to other systems for compliance with Sec. 25.1309 is
applied to EWIS. That is why the proposal specified the same criteria
as Sec. 25.1309(b). Airbus's request would impose lesser criteria for
analysis of EWIS, even though the consequences of EWIS failures may be
just as severe as any other system failures. Airbus's justification for
its request relies on the estimated numbers of incidents in the initial
regulatory evaluation and an apparent assumption that this number would
meet the computed risk threshold required by Sec. 25.1309. This is not
the case. The analytical methods used for an economic evaluation are
very different from methods required for risk assessment by Sec.
25.1309 (or Sec. 25.1709). The regulatory evaluation is a projected
incident rate based on historical data. Estimating possible failures
for compliance requires a detailed evaluation of the modes and effects
of potential failures in a specific system design. We made no change
because of this comment.
Boeing requested that proposed Sec. 25.1705 (now Sec. 25.1709) be
included as a reference within Sec. 25.1309(b) as previously proposed
by industry. Boeing stated that duplicating the regulations leaves open
the possibility of deviations in application. GE commented that
proposed Sec. 25.1705 is not acceptable. It said the discussion of
this proposal, and the accompanying AC, contain several misstatements
regarding current use and means of compliance with Sec. 25.1309.
According to GE, this misunderstanding of Sec. 25.1309 has led to a
perception by the FAA that a new rule is needed, when in fact, Sec.
25.1309 already addresses the area of concern. The NPRM preamble states
that Sec. 25.1309 does not address single wire chafing or arcing as a
cause of failure: ``the physical portion has been neglected in past
system safety analyses.'' GE contended this is not true, because Sec.
25.1309 safety assessments have addressed wiring failures as sources of
fire. GE recommended that proposed Sec. 25.1705 be removed. It
suggested that the AC material for proposed Sec. 25.1705 be provided
to ARAC for incorporation into the Sec. 25.1309 AC.
As stated in the preamble discussion of the NPRM, and in its
related draft advisory material, the Sec. 25.1709 analysis may be
accomplished in conjunction with Sec. 25.1309 assessments. Having a
separate requirement for EWIS safety assessments will ensure that all
airplane EWIS are assessed for potential impact on safe operation. This
cannot be accomplished if Sec. 25.1709 is simply included as a
reference in Sec. 25.1309. Nor can we delete Sec. 25.1709 and
incorporate its means of compliance into future versions of advisory
material for Sec. 25.1309, as GE suggests. As discussed in the NPRM,
the requirements of Sec. 25.1709 are necessary. Current safety
analysis practice has been proven--by accidents and service history--to
be insufficient with respect to safety assessments of wire designs and
installations, including wire failures that can cause fires. The
requirements of Sec. 25.1709 are such that they complement those of
Sec. 25.1309 and address its shortcomings when it comes to safety
assessments of EWIS. Section 25.1309 does not allow any single failure
to result in catastrophic consequences, regardless of the failure
probability. The requirements of Sec. 25.1709 are consistent with
those of Sec. 25.1309. We made no changes due to these comments.
Federal Express referred to this statement in the preamble
discussion of proposed Sec. 25.1705 (now Sec. 25.1709):
If this information [what systems and functions the other wires
in the same and surrounding bundles support] is not available to the
modifier, then the EWIS system must be designed to accommodate this
lack of knowledge * * *.
FedEx said this would typically mean that wire being added for the
modification would need to be routed separately from existing airplane
wiring. It requested that, prior to adoption of this concept into any
advisory material or design standard, detailed guidance on separation
in confined areas such as equipment racks or breaker panels be
developed.
We believe that the advisory material for post-TC modifications
provides clear guidance for the case cited by Federal Express. When
separation cannot be maintained because of physical constraints (in
terminal strips and connectors, for instance), the applicant should
conduct the appropriate analysis to show that no adverse failure
conditions result from sharing the common device. This analysis
requires knowledge of the systems or system functions sharing that
device (again, the example would be terminal strips and connectors). If
a modifier cannot identify the systems or system functions in the
congested area, then the new EWIS would have to be routed through a
different area if an acceptable alternative method of providing
adequate separation is not provided. We made no changes to the final
rule because of this comment. However, we have expanded the final
advisory material for this requirement to provide clear guidance on the
specific scenario contained in FedEx's comment.
Boeing commented on the part of the Sec. 25.1705 (now Sec.
25.1709) discussion in the NPRM that states that an in-flight
entertainment (IFE) system installed on an airplane with subpart H as
part of its type certification basis would be subjected to a more
rigorous safety
[[Page 63381]]
assessment. Boeing noted its understanding that subpart H is applied to
applicants for type certificates, amended type certificates, and
supplemental type certificates. It asked whether it is correct that
``an application for that or another IFE system to be installed on any
airplane following the implementation of subpart H would be subjected
to a more rigorous safety assessment.''
Boeing asked whether an existing STC applicable to an existing
airplane model, applied to a new airplane of the same model but with
subpart H as part of its certification basis, would be subjected to
requirements of subpart H. It referred to the statement in the NPRM
that post-type certificate modifications have repeatedly introduced
wiring safety problems. Boeing asked for clarification of whether an
existing amended or supplemental type certificate would be subjected to
subpart H requirements prior to installation on an airplane with or
without subpart H as its basis of certification.
In the case of a previously certified IFE system being considered
for installation on an airplane model with subpart H in its
certification basis, the answer is yes. The IFE system would have to be
certified to the EWIS requirements of subpart H. To do otherwise could
compromise the safety of the airplane by applying a lesser
certification standard to the IFE system. After the effective date of
the final rule, if a modification is proposed for an existing airplane
model without subpart H in its certification basis, whether or not the
modification will need to have subpart H in its certification basis
will be decided on a case-by-case basis, and the requirements of Sec.
21.101, Designation of applicable regulations, will apply.
7. Component Identification: EWIS (Sec. 25.1711)
This rule requires applicants to identify EWIS components using
consistent methods that facilitate easy identification of the
component, its function, and its design limitations. For EWIS
associated with flight-essential functions, identification of the EWIS
separation requirement is also required.
The number of this rule remains unchanged from its number as
proposed. In response to comment, we have revised wording to clarify
its intent, as discussed below.
Boeing requested that we clarify Sec. 25.1711(a) by revising it as
follows:
EWIS components must be labeled or otherwise identified using a
consistent method that facilitates identification of the wire EWIS
component, its function, and its design limitations, if any.
GE requested we revise the same paragraph to read as follows:
EWIS components must be labeled or otherwise identified using a
consistent method that facilitates identification.
Boeing and GE also requested that we remove the requirement in
Sec. 25.1711(b) that, for systems requiring redundancy, components
must be identified with component part number, function, and separation
requirement for bundles. They stated that all wiring should be treated
with the same level of care. The commenters contended that as the
proposed requirement was written, the regulation was impractical to
implement, since there are many redundancy separation categories in the
aircraft. A given bundle might have different separation requirements
from multiple other bundles, from hydraulic systems, and from air
ducts, and the requirement could vary with axial distance along the
fuselage. There would not be room to add all this data to the bundle
label.
We have clarified Sec. 25.1711(a) as requested by Boeing. It is
the intent of this rule to require identification of all EWIS
components and not just the wire (which is one component of an EWIS).
We have revised that section by replacing the word ``wire'' with the
phrase ``EWIS component.''
We have decided against deleting the phrase ``of the wire, its
function, and its design limitations, if any'' from Sec. 25.1711(a).
It is important that the EWIS component's function and design
limitation information be easily and readily available to maintainers
and future modifiers. Labeling components with this information will
help ensure that the level of safety provided by the original design is
not degraded. It will also prevent potential safety hazards from
improper maintenance and from replacement of original parts with parts
not designed or intended for that particular use.
We have also decided against deleting Sec. 25.1711(b). We agree
that all wiring must be treated with care. But we are especially
concerned that wires and other EWIS components associated with flight-
essential or flight-critical systems be easily identifiable by those
designing and installing modifications, as well as by technicians
performing maintenance or repair. If a wire bundle has different
separation requirements as it is routed throughout the airplane, then
those varying separation requirements must be identified on the bundle
at the appropriate location where a particular separation requirement
is applicable. It would not be necessary to have each label on the
bundle contain all the differing separation requirements.
IASA suggested that using a color-coding approach to identifying
critical systems would help post-TC modifiers easily identify critical
airplane systems. We agree with the need to help ensure easy
identification of these systems so that post-TC modifications and
repairs do not inadvertently introduce unintended failure modes.
However, the EWIS identification requirements of Sec. 25.1711 do not
prescribe the means by which EWIS is identified. It only requires that
the identification scheme be consistent throughout the airplane and
that modifications follow the same scheme. Color coding of EWIS may be
an acceptable means to comply with the requirements. We made no changes
because of this comment.
US Airways stated that mandating identification for all terminals,
switches, connectors, or any component mounted in an area with limited
space could cause tags or something similar to be used. These would in
turn become contaminants.
We agree that some EWIS components may be so small that it would be
impractical to label the component directly with textual data, and that
excessive use of tags could become a source of future contamination.
However, Sec. 25.1711 states that other means of identification can be
used if the component cannot be physically marked. For example, the
manufacturer's consistent marking scheme may be such that a color code
is used to mark these types of components. Applicants will have to
collaborate with their FAA Aircraft Certification Office to work out
the details. The method of identification is not mandated by the rule.
It is left up to the applicant to propose a method of identification.
We made no changes based on this comment.
8. Fire Protection: EWIS (Sec. 25.1713)
This rule requires that EWIS components meet the applicable fire
and smoke protection requirements of Sec. 25.831(c). It further
requires that EWIS located in designated fire zones be fire resistant.
Insulation on electrical wires and cables is required to be self-
extinguishing when tested in accordance with the applicable portions of
Appendix F, part 1, of part 25. Section 25.1713 is adopted as proposed,
except that we removed the phrase ``at least'' that preceded ``fire
resistant.''
EASA and Airbus commented that Sec. 25.1713(a) should also
reference Sec. 25.863. Airbus stated that this reference is common
practice for fire
[[Page 63382]]
protection compliance demonstration for EWIS components. EASA stated
that the equivalent EASA requirement, CS 25.1713, will reference CS
25.863.
Because Sec. 25.1723 already requires EWIS components to meet
requirements of Sec. 25.863, it is not necessary to state the same
requirement in Sec. 25.1713.
Boeing commented that proposed Sec. 25.1713(c) repeats and
replaces Sec. 25.869(a)(4), except with the change underlined below:
(c) Insulation on electrical wire and electrical cable, and
materials used to provide additional protection for the wire and
cable, installed in any area * * *
Boeing requested that we change Sec. 25.1713(c) and/or Appendix F to
Part 25 to clarify which test article configurations (test components
individually or test components installed on the wire), and which
flammability tests are required for ``materials used to provide
additional protection for the wire and cable.''
Boeing noted that Appendix F only refers to electrical conduit. It
said the rule is clear on how electrical conduit and insulation on wire
must be tested, but not on how to test the ``materials used to provide
additional protection for the wire and cable.''
Boeing said that the rules should make clear what testing is
required for materials such as tight-fitting protective sleeve ( heat
shrinkable material, for example), loose-fitting protective sleeve
(such as spiral wrap or Varglas), or, for that matter, clamps, grommets
installed in holes, or other devices used to protect wire and cable.
We have not revised Sec. 25.1713(c) and/or Appendix F because we
believe the requirements of Sec. 25.1713(c) are clear and unambiguous.
A material used to protect wire such as heat shrinkable material, or
loose fitting protective sleeving such as spiral wrap or Varglas, must
be tested in accordance with the requirements of part 25, Appendix F,
part I, in the same manner as electrical wire is tested. As stated in
Appendix F, Part 1(a)(v), it is not necessary to test small parts such
as clamps and grommets because they would not contribute significantly
to the propagation of a fire.
9. Electrical Bonding and Protection Against Static Electricity: EWIS
(Sec. 25.1715)
Section 25.1715 requires that EWIS used for electrical bonding and
protection against static electricity meet the requirements of Sec.
25.899. It requires that EWIS components used for any electrical
bonding purposes (not just those used for protection against static
electricity) provide an adequate electrical return path under both
normal and fault conditions.
Section 25.1715 was proposed as Sec. 25.1717. Its number was
changed to better harmonize with foreign airworthiness authorities. In
response to comments, we have revised the wording of Sec. 25.1715 and
expanded it to clarify meaning, as discussed below.
Boeing stated that the term ``adequate electrical return path'' as
used in Sec. 25.1717 (now Sec. 25.1715) is difficult to define, and
should be replaced with performance criteria, such as the following:
On airplanes having grounded electrical systems, electrical
bonding provided by EWIS components must provide an electrical
return path capable of carrying both normal and fault currents
without creating a shock hazard.
GE requested clarification of what constitutes a fault condition for
compliance with proposed Sec. 25.1717. It asked if a fault condition
includes failure of the bonding path, such as physical breakage.
We have revised Sec. 25.1715 as requested by Boeing but have added
the phrase ``or damage to the EWIS components, other airplane system
components, or airplane structure.'' to the end of the suggested
revision.
In response to GE's comment, the intent of the requirement is to
ensure that the current return paths are sized so they can accommodate
fault currents due to component failure. One example would be shorted
integrated drive generator power feeder cables where electrical bonding
is used for the fault current path.
10. Accessibility Provisions: EWIS (Sec. 25.1719)
This rule requires access be provided to allow for inspection of
EWIS and replacement of their components, as necessary for continued
airworthiness.
Section 25.1719 was proposed as Sec. 25.1725. Its number has been
changed to facilitate harmonization. No other changes have been made.
EASA and Airbus commented that the wording of proposed Sec.
25.1725 (now Sec. 25.1719) is slightly different from that recommended
by ATSRAC. ATSRAC recommended that it state:
Means must be provided to allow for inspection of EWIS and the
replacement of its components as necessary for continued
airworthiness.
The NPRM proposed Sec. 25.1725 to read as:
Access must be provided to allow inspection and replacement of
any EWIS component as necessary for continued airworthiness.
Airbus said that the word ``access'' is ambiguous. For example, it
said, it is almost impossible to access the inside of a conduit. U.S.
Airways noted that the rule needs to be revised because there are areas
where access to cables and wire runs is not possible.
EASA suggested we change the rule to ATSRAC's original wording and
stated that it will use this wording in its equivalent requirement, CS
25.1719.
We have decided to retain the wording of this requirement as
proposed. However, it should be noted that it is not the intent of the
rule to require human physical access in all cases. If such access is
not possible because of physical design, then other inspection
techniques could be allowed, such as use of a remote optical device.
However, in response to U.S. Airways' statement, Sec. 25.1719 does
require that access be provided to allow for inspection and replacement
for any EWIS component if it is necessary for continued airworthiness.
Therefore there will not be areas where EWIS components are
inaccessible for airplanes with Sec. 25.1719 in their type
certification basis.
We have revised AC 25-1701-1 to reflect the fact that other types
of inspection techniques could be approved when human physical access
is not possible. Other types of emerging inspection techniques may not
require physical access.
11. Protection of EWIS (Sec. 25.1721)
Section 25.1721 requires that cargo or baggage compartments not
contain any EWIS whose failure would adversely affect safe operation.
It also requires that all EWIS be protected from damage by movement of
people and from damage from items carried on the airplane by passengers
or cabin crew.
Section 25.1721 was proposed as Sec. 25.1727. Its rule number was
changed to harmonize with regulations of foreign airworthiness
authorities. No other changes have been made.
Boeing suggested that this rule be revised to state that EWIS
should be protected so it ``* * * cannot be damaged by normal movement
of cargo or baggage in the compartment.'' It said this change will
clarify requirements. Boeing, GE, and AIA/GAMA stated that maintenance
personnel need to be trained in proper EWIS handling.
We have decided against revising Sec. 25.1721 in the manner Boeing
suggests. This requirement is not limited to ``normal movement.'' EWIS
in cargo or baggage compartments must be designed and installed so it
is protected in both normal and non-normal situations, such as when
cargo
[[Page 63383]]
containers come loose and strike compartment walls during flight
because of cargo system malfunctions.
We agree that training personnel in proper handling of EWIS is also
necessary. Although we have not mandated this training, except for
technicians and inspectors working directly with EWIS, we have outlined
a training program for a wide variety of personnel who work on
airplanes. This training program is outlined in Advisory Circular 120-
YY, Aircraft Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems Training
Program. We made no changes due to these comments.
GE requested that the phrase ``risk of damage'' be deleted from
proposed Sec. 25.1727 (now Sec. 25.1721). It stated that risk of
damage implies control of the failure effect of damage that is assumed
to occur, as in Sec. 25.901(c). It said that because 14 CFR 25.1309
already adequately controls the relationship between probability of a
failure condition and its effect, risk of damage should be deleted from
proposed Sec. 25.1727.
We believe it is necessary to address both damage and risk of
damage. Design and installation must be such that they preclude damage
to EWIS to the extent possible when all design and installation factors
are considered. We recognize, however, that it is not always possible
to prevent possible damage because of design or installation
considerations. EWIS components should be robust enough to minimize the
damage that could occur if they come into contact with cargo, baggage,
or personnel. We made no changes due to this comment.
12. Flammable Fluid Shutoff Means: EWIS (Sec. 25.1727)
Section 25.1727 requires that EWIS associated with each flammable
fluid shutoff means and control be ``fireproof'' (as defined in Sec.
1.1) or located and protected so that any fire in a fire zone will not
affect operation of the flammable fluid shutoff means, in accordance
with Sec. 25.1189.
Section 25.1727 was originally proposed as Sec. 25.1733. We have
changed its number to facilitate harmonization with foreign
airworthiness authorities. No other changes have been made.
Boeing recommended that the word ``fireproof'' in Sec. 25.1733
(now Sec. 25.1727) be replaced with ``fire resistant'' to be
consistent with terminology used in Sec. 25.869(a) and proposed Sec.
25.1735 (now Sec. 25.1733). AIA/GAMA stated that fire resistant and
fireproof are not synonymous.
AIA/GAMA is correct. ``Fireproof'' is a more stringent standard
than ``fire retardant.'' The basis for proposed Sec. 25.1727 is the
requirement of Sec. 25.1189(d) that ``each flammable fluid shutoff
means and control must be fireproof or must be located and protected so
that any fire in a fire zone will not affect its operation.''
To ensure the effectiveness of flammable fluid shutoff means and
controls, the requirement for EWIS associated with those systems must
be as stringent as the requirement for other components of those
systems.
13. Powerplant and APU Fire Detection System: EWIS (Sec. 25.1731)
This rule requires that EWIS that are part of a fire or overheat
detector system located in a fire zone be fire resistant, as defined in
Sec. 1.1. It also requires that EWIS components of any fire or
overheat detector system for any fire zone may not pass through another
fire zone unless:
They are protected against the possibility of false
warning caused by fire in the zone through which they pass, or
Each zone involved is simultaneously protected by the same
detector or extinguishing system.
This rule also requires that EWIS that are part of a fire or
overheat detector system in a fire zone meet requirements of Sec.
25.1203. Section 25.1203 requires approved, quick acting, fire or
overheat detectors in each designated fire zone, and in the combustion,
turbine, and tailpipe sections of turbine engine installations, to
provide prompt indication of fire in those zones.
Section 25.1731 was originally proposed as Sec. 25.1737. Its
number was changed for purposes of harmonization. No other changes have
been made.
EASA requested that the reference to Sec. 25.1203 be moved to
Sec. 25.1719 (now Sec. 25.1705 Systems and Functions: EWIS).
The intent of Sec. 25.1731 is to ensure that any EWIS components
associated with powerplant and auxiliary power units' fire detector
systems be as robust and fire resistant as the other components making
up these systems. The requirements of Sec. 25.1731 are based on those
contained in Sec. 25.1203. It could create confusion if the
requirements in Sec. 25.1731 were split between two separate subpart H
regulations as requested by EASA. Therefore we have retained the
originally proposed Sec. 25.1731 in this final rule.
14. Fire Detector Systems, General: EWIS (Sec. 25.1733)
Section 25.1733 requires that EWIS associated with any installed
fire protection system be considered in showing compliance with the
applicable requirements for that particular system. This is a new
requirement that has not previously existed in part 25. Current part 25
regulations contain fire detection system requirements for powerplants,
lavatories, and cargo compartments. Each of these fire detection
systems requires electrical wire, and failure of this wire could lead
to inability of the detection system to function properly. This rule
applies to all required fire protection systems with the exception of
those for powerplants and APUs. Requirements for EWIS associated those
systems are contained in Sec. 25.1731.
Section 25.1733 was originally proposed as Sec. 25.1735. Its
number was changed to better harmonize with foreign airworthiness
authorities. As stated previously in the discussion under the heading
of Systems and Functions: EWIS (Sec. 25.1705), we have revised this
rule to include references to Sec. Sec. 25.854 and 25.858, in response
to comments from EASA.
Boeing and GE requested that proposed Sec. 25.1735 (now Sec.
25.1733) be removed from subpart H, because it is not directly related
to EWIS certification. The commenters noted that any system, not just
fire detection systems, which uses wiring in its design will be
required to meet requirements of subpart H.
We have decided to adopt this requirement as proposed. Fire
detection systems need wire and other EWIS components to operate.
Failure of an associated EWIS component could lead to inability of the
detection system to function properly. Therefore EWIS components must
be considered an integral part of the fire detection system and meet
requirements of the applicable regulation.
15. Engine, Nacelle, and APU Wiring
GE, Honeywell, and AIA/GAMA commented that engine, nacelle, and APU
wiring should be exempt from the proposed EWIS certification and
maintenance requirements. They said wiring in these areas is extremely
rugged, has excellent reliability in service, and is easily accessible
for inspection. They further stated that it is physically impossible
for a wiring failure or deterioration in the propulsion system to cause
a hazardous or catastrophic effect. They expressed the view that
existing regulations are
[[Page 63384]]
adequate, as demonstrated by service experience, and application of
these rules to engine, nacelle and APU wiring confers no safety benefit
and would result in significant cost to industry.
We agree that EWIS components installed on the engine are very
robust. This is because the harsh environment in which they are
installed and the critical function engines play in the safe operation
of the airplane dictate such robust design and installation. However,
we do not agree that it is impossible for an engine wiring failure to
cause a hazardous or catastrophic condition. The following quote is
from the ``Lauda Air B767 Accident Report,'' dated July 21, 1993,
issued by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee Ministry of
Transport and Communications, Thailand--
Investigation of the accident disclosed that certain ``hot-
short'' conditions involving the electrical system occurring during
an auto-restow command, could potentially cause the DCV to
momentarily move to the deploy position.
This illustrates that, in the past, there have been designs where
an engine wiring failure could cause a catastrophic accident.
Application of these requirements to all wiring on part 25 airplanes
will help ensure that in the future we will minimize EWIS designs and
installations that could lead to serious safety issues. Our position is
consistent with ATSRAC's recommendation that engine wires not be
excluded from compliance with these new requirements. Additionally, our
regulatory analysis indicates that these rules are cost effective. We
made no rule change due to these comments.
16. Designated Fire Zones
General Electric (GE) commented that the entire rulemaking package
was written from the perspective of wiring contained in the pressurized
fuselage, and then extrapolated to other areas. It stated as an example
the assumption made throughout the NPRM that an electrical fire is
catastrophic. GE stated that this is not the case in a designated fire
zone, because such zones contain specific design measures to safely
detect, contain, and put out a fire. The commenter stated that
unpressurized portions of the airplane spend much of the flight at
ambient pressures which will not easily support combustion. GE
suggested that itemizing fuel sources that are isolated from the
pressurized portion of the airplane--engine oil, engine fuel--as if
they coexisted with the heated and air-conditioned section of the
aircraft is very misleading.
We believe that a fire in a fire zone is a safety issue. Fire zones
are designated as such because they are areas that have a higher
potential for a fire to occur. These zones do have fire detection and
suppression systems or other design features to mitigate effects of
fire. But these features are designed to meet a limited set of test
conditions for a limited duration of time and are not designed to meet
all anticipated sets of conditions that may exist in a fire zone. Any
fire on board an airplane, no matter where it occurs, has the potential
for serious safety consequences.
The rule package was written with the objective of ensuring the
safety of wiring in the entire airplane, consistent with the intent of
ATSRAC.
17. Goal of the New Wiring Subpart
GE and AIA/GAMA commented that many of the proposed subpart H EWIS
certification requirements are duplicative of existing part 25 rules.
They asserted that repeating a requirement in multiple locations
promotes differences in interpretation and confusion over acceptable
means of compliance. They recommended that the proposed subpart contain
new applicable requirements and act as a collector with references or
points to the existing applicable rules. They said this packaging
technique would provide the benefit of the common location sought by
the FAA to bring focus to the importance of EWIS design and
certification while minimizing the confusion, interpretation, and
divergence that challenges use of duplicate rule sets.
We do not agree with the opinion that the proposed certification
requirements of subpart H are duplicates of existing part 25
requirements. To be a duplicate implies that the requirement exists in
both the new subpart H and in other places within part 25. This is not
the case. As described in the proposal's preamble, some of the subpart
H requirements previously resided in other part 25 subparts. But they
have been relocated to the new subpart H, and in some cases enhanced,
and no longer exist elsewhere in part 25. Also, many requirements of
subpart H are new requirements. In some cases (for instance in Sec.
25.1705 in this final rule), we reference existing part 25 requirements
that are applicable to EWIS but have not been moved into subpart H
because they do not lend themselves to division into wire and non-wire
portions. The goal of collecting existing part 25 wire-related
requirements and developing new requirements is to make them easy to
locate, ensure their application to EWIS, and highlight the importance
of considering wiring and its associated components as an airplane
system. Eliminating the majority of the proposed subpart H requirements
and simply referencing other wire-related requirements in a new Sec.
25.1700 series paragraph would not support this goal.
18. Harmonization
British Airways, Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), Airbus, and the
Association of Asia Pacific Airlines requested that the proposed FAA
and European Aviation Safety Agency's (EASA) EWIS requirements and
advisory material be fully harmonized and made identical where
possible.
Harmonization of these requirements with EASA has been our goal
from the beginning. We have coordinated extensively with EASA and other
national civil aviation authorities to achieve this common objective.
While there may be some differences in wording because of our differing
regulatory procedures, our intent is to harmonize the substantive
requirements to the extent possible.
D. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS (Sec. 25.1729 and
Appendix H)
1. Requirements for EWIS ICA
Section 25.1729 requires that applicants prepare EWIS ICA in
accordance with requirements of Appendix H to part 25. Section 25.1729
was originally proposed as Sec. 25.1739. Its number has been changed
to facilitate harmonization with the regulations of foreign
airworthiness authorities. Otherwise, this rule remains unchanged from
the form in which it was proposed.
This final rule also revises paragraph H25.4 and adds a new
paragraph H25.5 to Appendix H--Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness. Section H25.5 is a new requirement. It requires TC
applicants and applicants for design change to develop maintenance
information for EWIS as part of the ICA that are required for design
approval. The EWIS ICA must be developed through the use of an enhanced
zonal analysis procedure (EZAP). The ICA must include tasks, and
intervals for performing those tasks, to reduce the likelihood of
ignition sources and accumulation of combustible material and tasks to
clean the EWIS of combustible material if there is not an effective
task to reduce the likelihood of its accumulation. The ICA must also
include--
Instructions for protections and cautions to prevent
accidental damage or contamination to EWIS during maintenance,
alteration, or repairs.
Acceptable maintenance practices in a standard format.
[[Page 63385]]
Wire separation requirements as determined under Sec.
25.1707.
Information explaining the EWIS identification method and
requirements for identifying any changes to EWIS under Sec. 25.1711.
Electrical load data and instructions for updating that
data.
The ICA developed through the use of an EZAP must be in the form of
a document appropriate for the information to be provided, easily
recognizable as EWIS ICA, and either contain required EWIS ICA or
specifically reference other portions of the ICA that contain this
information.
The amendment to section H25.4 requires that the Airworthiness
Limitations section of the ICA include any mandatory replacement times
for EWIS components.
The final wording for the requirement for ICA as a single document
was revised from its proposed form, to clarify intent, as discussed
below. No other changes have been made to these rules.
2. ICA as a Single Document
Boeing and AIA/GAMA requested we delete paragraph H25.5(b) of
Appendix H. This paragraph requires that EWIS ICA be contained in a
single document, easily recognizable as EWIS ICA. They said their
current approach is to produce several documents, including the
maintenance planning data document, airplane maintenance manual, and
standard wiring practices manual, with appropriate cross-references.
These documents may not be EWIS specific. Boeing and AIA/GAMA believe
separating EZAP-generated maintenance activities from those required by
Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 defeats the intent of the
rule and is impractical.
Additionally, Airbus, and GE suggested we revise H25.5(b) to say
``the ICA must be provided in a manner acceptable to the Administrator,
where instructions specific to EWIS are easily recognizable.'' They
believe there is no safety benefit in uniquely identifying ICA related
to, but not specific to, EWIS. They also requested that proposed Sec.
25.1739 (now Sec. 25.1729) be revised with a reference back to Sec.
25.1529 or deleted in its entirety. They stated that Sec. 25.1529
already requires Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to be
developed in accordance with Appendix H.
We do not agree that paragraph H25.5 (b) should be deleted or
revised as requested. The requirements of paragraph (b) do not preclude
incorporation by reference of detailed information. However, we expect
the DAH to provide a document appropriate for the information provided,
in other words, a single or source document that either includes the
EZAP-generated EWIS ICA or specifies where those EWIS ICA can be
located. This also means that, if incorporation by reference is the
approach taken by the DAH, all referenced documents are available at
the same time as the EWIS ICA source document. We have revised the text
of final H25.5(b) to clarify that the requirement only applies to EWIS
ICA developed in accordance with requirements of H25.5(a)(1) and that
the ``document must either contain the required EWIS ICA or
specifically reference other portions of the ICA that contain this
information.'' This does not change the meaning of the requirement, but
clarifies it.
We also do not agree with the request to delete or revise Sec.
25.1729. Having a separate requirement for EWIS ICA located within
subpart H is consistent with the purpose of creating the new subpart.
The goal was to collect existing part 25 wire-related requirements and
develop new requirements, make them easy to locate, ensure their
application to EWIS, and highlight the importance of considering wiring
and its associated component as an airplane system. We made no changes
due to this comment.
3. Standard Wiring Practices Manuals
Airbus commented about the requirement to include acceptable
maintenance practices in a standard format. Airbus made the point that
electronic standard wiring practices manuals (SWPM), in which such
maintenance practices can be found, are easily searchable. It requested
that manufacturers who publish their SWPMs electronically be either
exempt from the requirement for a standard format for SWPMs, and/or an
interim master breakdown index (which was outlined in the AC as an
approach to standardizing SWPM formats without rewriting them), or able
to adopt a similar approach.
We are rejecting Airbus's request to exempt electronic versions of
the SWPM from requirements of part 25, Appendix H, H25.5. The objective
of this requirement is to ensure that maintenance personnel can readily
access necessary information. They may work on many different models,
so having a standard format will facilitate this. An applicant may
propose an alternative ``standard'' format to that described in the AC,
as long as it achieves the same objective (again, taking into account
that maintenance personnel will be working on a range of models). The
master breakdown index described in AC 25-26 was developed so that
existing non-electronic SWPMs would not have to be reformatted. An
electronic SWPM, by definition, can be easily indexed to align with the
master breakdown index format as depicted in the AC. We made no changes
due to this comment.
4. Mandatory Replacement Times
Airbus requested that the requirement in section H25.4 to include
mandatory replacement times for EWIS in Airworthiness Limitations of
ICA be deleted because it is not related to any requirements to define
mandatory EWIS replacement times.
We are retaining H25.4. The intent of this requirement is not to
mandate life limits for EWIS components, but to ensure that the
designer consider whether EWIS life limitations are applicable to a
particular design and identify those limits in the Airworthiness
Limitations section of the ICA. Such limitations, if any, would be
identified when demonstrating compliance with Sec. 25.1703. That rule
requires that EWIS be installed according to limitations specified for
that EWIS component, and this might include life limits under certain
circumstances. For example, a given EWIS component may be well suited
for a particular environment, but because of technological limitations,
the material it is made of may degrade over time when exposed to
certain environmental stresses. The component manufacturer may
recommend that certain tests be performed at given intervals to ensure
that its material properties are still within its qualification limits,
and if they are not, recommend that the component be replaced. Life
limits might also be identified when demonstrating compliance with the
EWIS safety assessment requirements of Sec. 25.1705, as part of
identifying acceptable mitigation strategies to prevent hazardous or
catastrophic failures. We made no changes due to this comment.
5. Wire Identification Method Information
Airbus, AIA/GAMA, and GE suggested we delete the requirement in
proposed H25.5 for information explaining wire identification methods
and requirements for identifying changes to EWIS. They stated that
changes to EWIS, including future identification, are the modifier's
responsibility, and a DAH cannot anticipate all possible future changes
and give instructions for identification methods for changed
components.
[[Page 63386]]
This requirement is intended to ensure that EWIS components added
or changed due to post-TC modifications retain the same identification
scheme used by the design approval holder. It is not necessary for the
original DAH to anticipate future changes to EWIS. The original DAH is
only required to describe the original identification scheme used. An
example could be a particular color used to identify EWIS components
associated with a fly-by-wire system. It is the responsibility of the
future modifier to follow that EWIS identification scheme as required
by Sec. 25.1711.
6. Electrical Load Data
GE requested confirmation that H25.5(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) do
not apply to the existing fleet. Also, AIA/GAMA and GE contended that
electrical load data is a certification issue, not a continued
airworthiness issue, and future changes or updates to that information
is the modifier's responsibility. They requested that paragraph
H25.5(a)(5) be deleted.
The requirements of H25.5(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) do not apply to
the existing fleet unless a modification is introduced that would
require that these requirements be part of the type certification basis
of the modification, in accordance with 14 CFR 21.101.
We agree that it is the responsibility of modifiers (e.g., STC
applicants) to ensure that they update the actual load data of the
airplane they are modifying and document the electrical load data as
required by H25.5(a)(5). However, we have decided against deleting
paragraph H25.5(a)(5). We are using this requirement as a means to
ensure that accurate electrical load data is available to those who
need it. Accurate electrical load data is necessary to help ensure
continued airworthiness. It is important that the load demand of an
airplane's systems not exceed the generation and distribution capacity
of its electrical power system. By ensuring this, the necessary levels
of electrical power will always be available for those airplane systems
needed for safe operation. We made no changes due to this comment.
E. Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements Subparts for
Operating Rules (Parts 91, 121, 125, 129)
1. Establishment of New Subparts
This rule establishes new subparts in parts 91, 121, 125, and 129.
These new subparts will contain operator requirements for continued
airworthiness and safety improvements, just as the new part 26 will
contain requirements for continued airworthiness and safety
improvements applicable to DAHs. As we stated in the NPRM:
The FAA believes that inclusion of certain rules under the new
subparts will improve the reader's ability to readily identify rules
pertinent to continued airworthiness. * * * The proposed new
subparts consist of relocated, revised, and new regulations
pertaining to continued airworthiness of the airplane. Unless we say
otherwise, our purpose in moving requirements to these new subparts
is to ensure easy visibility of those requirements applicable to the
continued airworthiness of the airplane. We do not intend to change
their legal effect in any other way. (70 FR 58537)
Our creating these new subparts does not, by itself, impose any new
requirements; it simply establishes the locations in which these
requirements will be placed. In some cases, as with the fuel tank
safety provisions of today's final rule, we may adopt parallel sections
in all four new subparts. In other cases, as with the EWIS provisions
of today's final rule, we may adopt requirements in only certain
subparts. But in each case, the new requirements will only be adopted
after public notice and opportunity to comment where we will explain
the proposed scope and effect of the new requirements.
Other new regulations and new subparts have been added to the CFR
since publication of the NPRM. As a result, some of the rule numbers
and some of the letter names for the new subparts that were proposed
for this rule have already been used. In this final rule we have
revised those rule numbers and subpart letter names where necessary.
Provisions enabling each of the new Continued Airworthiness and
Safety Improvements subparts, which were inadvertently left out of the
proposal, have been added here. The placement of certain provisions
within the rules has also been revised. The table below indicates the
changes. Commenters' original references are retained here, however,
for ease of reference to the proposal, including references to draft
ACs.
Table 3.--Operations Rules Changes From NPRM to Final Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part Final rule NPRM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
91................ Sec. 91.1(d) (new)..... N/A.
91................ Subpart L--Continued Subpart L--Continued
Airworthiness and Safety Airworthiness and Safety
Improvements. Improvements.
91................ Sec. 91.1501 Purpose Sec. Sec. 91.1501
and definition. Purpose and definition.
91................ Sec. 91.1507 Fuel tank Sec. 91.1507 Fuel tank
system inspection system maintenance
program. program.
121............... Sec. 121.1(g) (new).... N/A.
121............... Subpart AA--Continued Subpart Y--Continued
Airworthiness and Safety Airworthiness and Safety
Improvements. Improvements.
121............... Sec. 121.1101 Purpose Sec. 121.901 Purpose
and definition. and definition.
121............... Sec. 121.1111 Sec. 121.911 Electrical
Electrical wiring wiring interconnection
interconnection systems systems (EWIS)
(EWIS) maintenance maintenance program.
program..
121............... Sec. 121.1113 Fuel tank Sec. 121.913 Fuel tank
system maintenance system maintenance
program. program.
125............... Sec. 125.1(e) (new).... N/A
125............... Subpart M--Continued Subpart M--Continued
Airworthiness and Safety Airworthiness and Safety
Improvements. Improvements.
125............... Sec. 125.501 Purpose Sec. 125.501 Purpose
and definition.. and definition.
125............... Sec. 125.507 Fuel tank Sec. 125.507 Fuel tank
system inspection system inspection
program. program.
129............... Subpart A--General....... Subpart A--General.
129............... Sec. 129.1(b).......... Sec. 129.1(b).
129............... Subpart B--Continued Subpart B--Continued
Airworthiness and Safety Airworthiness and Safety
Improvements. Improvements.
129............... Sec. 129.101 Purpose Sec. 129.101 Purpose
and definition. and definition.
129............... Sec. 129.111 Electrical Sec. 129.111 Electrical
wiring interconnection wiring interconnection
systems (EWIS) systems (EWIS)
maintenance program. maintenance program.
129............... Sec. 129.113 Fuel tank Sec. 129.113 Fuel tank
system maintenance system maintenance
program. program.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63387]]
2. Continued Airworthiness Subparts and Airworthiness Directives
The Regional Airline Association (RAA) commented that proposed
Sec. 121.901(a) (now Sec. 121.1101(a)), as a stand-alone provision,
is unlimited in scope. It contended that the requirement can be
interpreted to mean that operators must incorporate any future design
and maintenance changes that a type certificate holder incorporates
into its ICA, regardless of their airworthiness status. The RAA said
that this would effectively eliminate the need for any future
airworthiness directives. The RAA said it therefore has the potential
to eliminate operator participation in the rulemaking process for
future original equipment manufacturers' recommendations affecting
maintenance and design of their fleet.
In a similar vein, United Parcel Service (UPS) recommended we not
adopt the new subpart for part 121 and instead use the part 39 AD
process to implement required actions once the necessary data and
documents have been developed by manufacturers. It stated the new
subpart, as proposed, will allow the FAA to impose regulations prior to
development of a technically feasible solution available for comment.
UPS stated that operators would be unable to accurately comment on the
cost and feasibility of the actions required for compliance. The
current AD process allows operators the ability to comment on a
specific solution with a known cost impact.
We do not believe that Sec. 121.1101(a) as a stand-alone provision
can be reasonably construed as unlimited in scope. Section 121.1101(a)
describes the purpose of the new Subpart AA and who it is applicable
to, and defines the ``FAA Oversight Office.'' It does not impose
technical requirements. Any specific requirements for continued
airworthiness and safety improvements will be proposed for comment in
the same way as the EWIS and fuel tank safety requirements included in
this final rule were proposed for comment. The FAA will continue to
issue airworthiness directives in accordance with requirements of 14
CFR part 39 when we find that an unsafe condition exists in a product
and the condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of
the same type design.
We also disagree that subpart AA should not be created. The new
requirements contained in subpart AA are necessary to raise the level
of safety by correcting fleet-wide continued airworthiness issues.
Airworthiness directives only address specific unsafe conditions that
exist in a product and are likely to exist or develop on products of
the same type design. Continued airworthiness issues, such as EWIS
maintenance, affect all transport category airplanes. In addition,
using ADs to implement these requirements would mean that ADs would
need to be continually issued as new models, model variants, or
modifications are introduced by a DAH. The use of the AD process to
impose the requirements contained in subpart AA would not be the most
effective method to address these issues.
We do not believe that adopting the new subpart instead of issuing
ADs will prevent operators from being able to accurately comment on the
cost and feasibility of the manufacturers' proposed requirements. It
would be impractical to set up a comment period for each specific set
of maintenance changes developed by the manufacturers, as the commenter
appears to want. However, a substantial cost/benefit analysis is always
prepared to support any proposed 14 CFR regulation and public comments
are solicited. This is a more comprehensive analysis than those
prepared for an AD. We made no changes due to this comment.
3. Type and Scope of Requirements
The Air Transport Association (ATA) commented that in proposed
Sec. 121.1101(a), the words ``* * * may include, but are not limited
to * * *'' can be interpreted to mean that at a minimum the operator's
maintenance program must incorporate 100% of all design changes and
100% of all ICA, not just the EWIS/FTS design changes and ICAs to be
developed. ATA stated there is no justification presented in the NPRM
for such an open-ended regulatory requirement. It said this requirement
cannot be interpreted consistently by all operators impacted or by all
the FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors with oversight responsibility. ATA
recommended that the second sentence of Sec. 121.1101(a) be rewritten
as follows:
These requirements may include revising the maintenance program
by incorporating the intent of applicable revisions to the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, as identified in this
subpart.
As explained in the NPRM (at 58538-9), this rulemaking is one of
several to adopt new requirements relating to continued airworthiness,
and the purpose of creating these new subparts is to have a common
location for all of these requirements, both existing and proposed. The
purpose of Sec. 121.1101(a) (and its counterparts, Sec. Sec.
91.1501(a), 125.501(a), and 129.101(a)), is to identify the type and
scope of requirements that may be included within this subpart. It is
purposely broad to encompass possible future rulemaking but does not
itself impose requirements. Any future requirements will be proposed
through the normal rulemaking process and all interested parties will
be afforded the opportunity to comment on them.
As under current requirements for ICA, a TC holder is required to
update ICA to address any new design change for which they get
approval. An operator altering an airplane to incorporate the new
design change would have to update its maintenance program ``based on''
the approved ICA. TC holders may also update their ICA in the absence
of design changes, but, as under existing regulations, these updates
would not be mandatory unless we issue an AD mandating them, which we
would do only if necessary to address an unsafe condition. Operators
may also independently revise their EWIS and fuel tank ICA. Under
today's final rule, these changes would have to be approved by their
Principal Inspector.
F. Operating Requirements for EWIS (Parts 121 and 129)
1. Requirements for Maintenance and Inspection Program Revisions
For those operating under parts 121 and 129, we are establishing,
within the new Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
subparts, requirements to revise maintenance and inspection programs to
include maintenance and inspection tasks for EWIS. The tasks must be
based on ICA developed in accordance with Appendix H.
We have extended the compliance dates for Sec. Sec. 121.1111 and
129.111. They were originally proposed with a compliance date of
December 16, 2008. But as a result of comments discussed earlier we
have decided to fix the time for compliance as a number of months after
the effective date, rather than as a hard date, and to also allow some
additional time beyond that which was originally contemplated. The
compliance date for these rules is now 39 months after the effective
date of the rule. We have also revised these rules to clarify meaning,
as discussed below.
2. ICA Developed by Design Approval Holders
Boeing noted that the proposed operational regulations would
require that the maintenance program revisions be based on ICA
developed by the DAH.
[[Page 63388]]
Boeing would like clarification of the interpretation of the term
``based on.'' It asked whether certificate holders are expected to
adopt, without change, the ICA provided by the DAHs.
As discussed previously, it was not our intent to require operators
to use ICA developed by TC holders. While we think it is very likely
that operators will use those ICA, we intend that they be able either
to develop their own or to contract with third parties for ICA, as long
as they meet the applicable requirements. We have revised the
operational rules to clarify this flexibility. Deviations from the EWIS
or fuel tank system maintenance programs that have been developed in
accordance with the requirements of SFAR 88 or Appendix H must be
approved by the operator's Principal Inspector, who will coordinate the
changes with the FAA Oversight Office as appropriate. Similarly, later
changes to either the EWIS maintenance program or the fuel tank system
maintenance program must be approved by the operator's Principal
Inspector, who will coordinate the changes with the FAA Oversight
Office, as appropriate. In some cases, coordination with the Oversight
Office will be necessary to ensure that the program's original
objectives are still met. Details of these coordination procedures are
defined in an FAA order and described in an advisory circular.
3. Different Requirements for Existing and Future Designs
RAA requested that proposed Sec. 121.911 (now Sec. 121.1111) be
revised so the performance objective of the ``retrofit'' requirements
may be distinguished from the design changes that may be considered for
newly manufactured fleet types. The commenter assumed that each OEM
will be required to re-certify to the new standards provided in the
part 25 proposal, and that carriers would be subjected to a massive
retrofit program. NACA requested that we clarify requirements by being
more specific about differences between new production aircraft and
retrofitting aircraft. They ask if all the part 25 enhancements will
become ICA and fall under these requirements.
At the outset, Sec. 121.1111 requires neither ``retrofit'' nor
``design changes.'' It simply imposes requirements for operators'
maintenance programs. We agree that some clarification is appropriate.
As explained in the NPRM, the purpose of Sec. 26.11 is to require type
certificate holders to develop ICA for existing airplanes that would
enable operators to comply with this section. For those airplanes, only
certain provisions of new paragraph H25.5 (H25.5(a)(1) and (b)) are
required. But for all future airplane designs subject to new Sec.
25.1729, type certificate applicants must show compliance with all
provisions of paragraphs H25.4(a)(3) and H25.5. Our intent in the
operational rules is to require operators to incorporate into their
maintenance programs all of the EWIS ICA developed for each of their
airplanes. For existing airplanes, this would be limited to ICA meeting
paragraphs H25.5(a)(1) and (b). For future airplanes, this would also
include ICA meeting the remaining requirements of paragraphs
H25.4(a)(3) and H25.5. We have revised Sec. 121.1111 (and Sec.
129.111) to clarify these differences.
KLM disagreed with the requirement for operators of all airplanes,
regardless of the airplane's age, to implement maintenance program
inspections and procedures for EWIS. The commenter contended that the
amount of exposure to deteriorating factors on new aircraft is limited,
so there is negligible benefit to performing additional maintenance
tasks on wiring. The commenter also pointed out that checking wiring on
a new aircraft may even cause more wiring failures due to maintenance
near the wiring. KLM suggested we consider a threshold for starting the
first inspections.
Although older airplanes have been exposed to more stressors that
can accelerate the degradation of wire and other EWIS components, age
is not the sole factor in degradation. We do not want to specify a
threshold for starting the first EWIS inspections. The intervals for
performing the inspections, including the first ones, are determined by
performing the EZAP analysis. Factors to be considered in establishing
intervals are the hostility of the environment in which the EWIS is
located and the likelihood of accidental damage. Neither of these
factors is necessarily dependent on age, and EWIS failures can occur on
newer airplanes. So the ``threshold'' for the first EWIS inspection
would normally be the same as the interval, measured from the issuance
of the first certificate of airworthiness. The results of the analysis
are reviewed by industry working groups (as part of the MSG-3 process)
and approved by the FAA Oversight Office. It is during the industry
working group review that the final inspection intervals are set and
subsequently approved by the FAA. We made no changes due to this
comment.
4. ICA for Alterations
British Airways requested that proposed Sec. 121.911 (now Sec.
121.1111) be revised to state that if changes to the ICA are required
after alterations, incorporation of these changes into the maintenance
program may be delayed until after the airplane has resumed service,
but before it reaches the ``relevant age or flight hours.'' The
commenter expressed concern that the current wording would result in
extended operational delays and grounded aircraft after minor
alterations or repairs. British Airways also expressed concerns about
SFAR 88-related alterations/component changes conducted while the
airplane is in a normal operating environment (e.g., at the ramp). It
asked whether inspections or incorporation of ICA changes to the
maintenance program must be completed before resuming operations and,
if so, requests a rule change allowing ICA incorporation into
maintenance programs after the airplane returns to service but before
it reaches the ``relevant age or flight hours.''
The only alterations for which EWIS ICA will be developed are those
for which compliance with either Sec. Sec. 26.11 or 25.1729 must be
shown--in other words, major alterations approved under STCs or amended
TCs. The only alterations for which fuel tank system ICA will be
developed are those for which compliance with either SFAR 88 or Sec.
25.1529 must be shown--again, major alterations approved under STCs or
amended TCs. We believe that any of these alterations would be
scheduled to occur during a period of allocated downtime such as a
scheduled maintenance ``C Check.'' The maintenance planning for such
modifications should include the actions necessary to incorporate
additional EWIS or fuel tank ICA into the approved maintenance or
inspection program. No additional time would be needed for these
actions. Accordingly, no changes were made due to these comments.
5. Alaska Operations
Senator Stevens of Alaska stated that this rule will have severe
consequences to residents and cargo carriers operating in his state.
Referencing Section 1205 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of
1996 (49 U.S.C. 40113(f)), and the uniqueness of aviation in Alaska,
Senator Stevens, Everts Air Cargo, and Alaska Senator Murkowski
requested that ``intrastate'' operations in Alaska be exempted from
this rule.
Consistent with 49 U.S.C. 40113(f), the FAA has carefully
considered the potential impact of this rulemaking on Alaska intrastate
operators to determine whether intrastate service in Alaska would be
adversely affected. We have
[[Page 63389]]
determined that there would not be an adverse effect and that
regulatory distinctions are inappropriate.
Under both EAPAS and the Fuel Tank Safety Rule, manufacturers are
required to develop maintenance program revisions and make them
available to operators to support their compliance with the operational
rules. We have concluded that in the case of both the EAPAS and FTS
operations rules, any burden on affected operators in implementing
these changes would not have a significant impact. Under EAPAS, the
changes would be integrated into existing inspections that are
currently performed during heavy maintenance checks. The fuel tank
tasks, which would be aligned with the EAPAS inspections, would also be
performed during these checks. Because these additional inspections
would be only a small additional piece of a much more extensive
maintenance visit, we concluded that they would have no adverse effect
on intrastate service in Alaska.
Lynden Air Cargo requested that the L-382G aircraft be excluded
from requirements of proposed Sec. Sec. 121.911 and 121.913 (now
Sec. Sec. 121.1111 and 121.1113). Senator Stevens asked that Lynden
Air Cargo's six L-382G airplanes in interstate operation be exempted.
Lynden Air Cargo said that it does not carry passengers and operates a
small fleet largely outside the U.S. It stated that it is in the public
interest to maintain its unique capabilities in Alaska where it
supports remote communities and projects with no roads or waterways, as
well as regularly supporting the U.S. military during critical
campaigns and the ongoing war on terrorism. Lynden Air Cargo also asked
to be excluded from Sec. 121.909 (now Sec. 121.1109).
We do not believe it is appropriate to exclude the L-382G from
requirements of Sec. Sec. 121.1111 and 121.1113 for those airplanes in
interstate operation. The safety rationale for these rules applies
equally to that airplane. Lynden Air Cargo may apply for an exemption
to these rules in accordance with 14 CFR part 11. However, under Sec.
11.81, Lynden Air Cargo must provide information stating why granting
such an exemption would be in the public interest and why it would not
adversely affect safety, or how it would provide a level of safety
equivalent to the final rule. Also, we are not granting Lynden Air
Cargo's request for an exclusion from Sec. 121.1109. That requirement,
which is not a new rule but simply a renumbering of the requirement
formerly designated as Sec. 121.370a, has been in effect since
November 1, 2002 (reference 67 FR 72761, December 6, 2002), and we did
not make any changes to that rule other than changing its section
number.
6. EWIS Inspections
Lynden Air Cargo stated that it does not have the engineering staff
to effectively analyze and comment on the myriad complexities
associated with the proposed certification rule changes. However, it
said that with an aircraft type certificated under CAR 4b (Lockheed L-
382G Hercules), the cost to ``retroactively'' apply these new
certification rules would require extraordinary expenditures. Lynden
had the following concerns about the practical application and
implementation of specific inspection criteria for EWIS under EZAP-
developed methods:
How does an inspector accomplishing a general visual
inspection (GVI) or a detailed inspection (DET) of EWIS make a specific
determination of airworthiness? The FAA has failed to state an
objective criteria in its proposed rule (i.e., what will be the accept/
reject criteria?).
If there are no actual circuit defects, what corrective
action will be required? An immediate action? Or can it be scheduled
and effectively planned for a future inspection action?
Disturbing wire bundles for inspections can induce more
problems than are corrected.
The proposed operating rules do not require ``retroactive''
application of design requirements. They do require that operators
include EWIS maintenance tasks in their maintenance programs. Any post-
inspection actions are based on results of the GVI or DET. If
inspections determine that EWIS components need cleaning or repairing,
procedures for accomplishing these tasks are contained in the airplane
manufacturer's standard wiring practices manual or equivalent
procedures developed by the operator. If inspection shows that no
circuit defects exist (to use the words of the commenter) then no
corrective action would be required. We agree that moving, or
disturbing, wire bundles does have the potential to cause damage if not
done with care. Precautions for preventing such damage should be part
of the operator's overall EWIS maintenance program.
7. Non-U.S. Registered Airplanes
Boeing requested that the FAA clarify whether the proposed part 129
rule would affect foreign operators operating non-U.S. registered
airplanes into the United States. They noted that part 129 usually
applies to these operations and it seems unusual that they have been
omitted in the proposed rule.
Under International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex \7\ 8,
the state of registry of an airplane is the state responsible for its
airworthiness. For this reason, the airworthiness regulations of part
129, including those contained in new subpart B, apply only to U.S.-
registered airplanes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ICAO's 98 articles, created and accepted at its Chicago
Convention, established the privileges and obligations of member
states. Standards and recommended practices of ICAO are designated
as ``Annexes'' to the Convention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Taking Airplanes Out of Service
US Airways requested clarification of Sec. 91.911 to stipulate
that aircraft need not be taken out of service specifically to
accomplish the revised inspections.
We believe that U.S. Airways meant to ask for clarification of
Sec. 121.911 (now Sec. 121.1111) instead of Sec. 91.911, which is
not contained in the proposal. Operators will have considerable
flexibility in determining when inspections will be performed. For
example, in the appendix of the DAH EZAP AC, which describes an
acceptable procedure for establishing EWIS inspection intervals, even
inspections of EWIS located in the most severe environment with the
highest risk of accidental damage may be performed at intervals ranging
from an ``A'' check to a ``1-C'' check, which are normally scheduled
maintenance intervals. Although we cannot guarantee that an airplane
will not have to be taken out of service specifically to accomplish the
new EWIS maintenance program requirements, we believe these tasks can
be scheduled to be performed during other scheduled maintenance times.
Section 121.1111 does not require tasks to be accomplished at any
particular intervals. It only requires that the maintenance program for
a particular airplane include inspections and procedures for EWIS.
9. Training
The NTSB referred to its recommendation A-00-108 of Sept. 19, 2000,
in which it asked the FAA to address the need for improved training of
maintenance personnel to ensure adequate recognition and repair of
potentially unsafe wiring conditions. The NTSB commented that, since
non-EWIS maintenance actions often compromise EWIS safety, training of
all maintenance personnel on EWIS maintenance and inspection is
critical. The board would like us to amend the NPRM to specifically
state that all maintenance personnel must receive EWIS training.
[[Page 63390]]
We agree with the NTSB on the importance of training personnel not
directly involved with EWIS maintenance and inspection. But the cost of
training all groups identified by ATSRAC as people working directly
with, indirectly with, or in the vicinity of, EWIS was not commensurate
with the benefits. While not required as a result of this final rule,
AC 120-94 provides a sample curriculum for a more comprehensive
training program. We strongly encourage organizations to voluntarily
offer this training.
10. Reporting Requirements
The NTSB commented that in its recommendation A-00-108 it asked the
FAA to address improved reporting of potentially unsafe electrical
wiring conditions. It noted that the NPRM holds manufacturers and
operators responsible for proper maintenance and inspection of EWIS.
The board contends there can be no quantitative measurement of how well
the maintenance and inspection system is performing without an
effective mechanism to collect basic data, examine the findings, and
provide reporting about performance.
The NTSB noted that, even though it has supported the FAA's
previous NPRMs to revise and improve the service difficulty reporting
(SDR) system, the FAA has withdrawn both. It noted that restricted
access to existing data and inability to effectively search available
data inhibits research into recurring or potential problems that may
exist across operators, and such research is important in the
prevention of accidents. The board strongly encouraged the FAA to amend
the NPRM to address this issue and revise the SDR system, regardless of
any potential industry opposition.
We have developed an Enhanced Airworthiness Datamart (EADM),
covering the years 1995 to the present, which provides analysts with a
more detailed view of SDRs. We have deployed the EADM on the Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system secured portal.
It integrates those reports with information on aircraft age, hours,
and cycles from the Airclaims database. The resulting data set allows
the user to identify trends in service difficulties as a fleet of
aircraft ages.
Also, with the 1995 creation of the Air Transport Association (ATA)
code 97 for electrical wiring, precise reporting of electrical problems
is possible. In 1995 the FAA updated its Joint Aircraft Systems/
Component Codes (JASC) to include electrical wiring. We added ATA code
97 to each airplane system category for the wiring within those
systems. Because of these new analysis tools, we made no changes due to
this comment. While the value of the contents of service difficulty
reporting systems is contingent upon the accuracy of reporting by the
operators, the data is publicly available and useful in analysis
(http://av-info.faa.gov/isdr/SDRQueryControl.ASP?vB=IE&cD=32).
G. Operating Requirements for Fuel Tank Systems (Parts 91, 121, 125,
and 129)
1. Requirements for Maintenance and Inspection Program Revisions
This rule includes provisions for operators to revise their
maintenance programs by adding maintenance tasks for fuel tanks. These
maintenance tasks must be based on ICA that have been developed in
accordance with SFAR 88 or Sec. 25.1529 and Appendix H and approved by
the FAA Oversight Office. Parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 each contain
these requirements in the new subparts for Continued Airworthiness and
Safety Improvements. These fuel tank requirements are not new
requirements. Rather, they clarify requirements of previously existing
rules.
When this rule was proposed in October 2005, our intent was to set
the same operator compliance date for the fuel tank and EWIS
maintenance program revisions. This would have allowed both sets of
tasks to be added at the same time and required that the maintenance
program be revised only once. As discussed earlier, the rulemaking
process took longer than expected. At this time, we do not want to
delay inclusion of the fuel tank tasks into maintenance. Thus, while
the compliance date for the EWIS maintenance revision requirements of
Sec. Sec. 121.1111 and 129.111 has been changed, the compliance date
for this fuel tank maintenance revision requirement remains December
16, 2008, the date that was originally proposed. We have, however,
changed the date by which the certificate holder must submit
maintenance instructions for auxiliary fuel tanks to the FAA Oversight
Office. That date is now June 16, 2008. The list of airplanes excluded
from the requirements of these rules has also been changed. The
requirement in Sec. 26.11 that the EWIS ICA prepared by the DAH must
be compared with fuel tank ICA to ensure compatibility and minimize
redundancy remains unchanged.
2. Airplanes Excluded From Fuel Tank System Operating Requirements
We have revised the list of airplanes excluded from the operating
requirements for fuel tank systems. For these rules, which affect
airplanes operating under parts 91, 121, 125, and 129, the list of
excluded airplanes includes those models of airplanes that are neither
U.S.-registered nor operated under these parts. Because of this, the
type certificate holders have not complied with SFAR 88 and, in several
cases, the type certificates have been surrendered. Subjecting these
models to the operational requirements for fuel tank safety would,
therefore, have no effect.
Additionally, since the Vickers Viscount airplane was originally
type certificated before January 1, 1958, this airplane is not subject
to the EAPAS or Fuel Tank Safety rules because of the general exclusion
of airplanes type certificated before that date. This airplane model
has been removed from the exclusion list originally proposed.
Similarly, the Convair and DC-3 models that have been modified to
incorporate turbine-powered engines are also covered by this general
exclusion. The Lockheed L-300 has been added to the exclusion list.
That exception was granted because there is only one qualified
aircraft, which was modified, used, and later retired by NASA in 1995.
It would not be cost effective to bring it into 121 operations.
The proposal excluded the Lockheed L-188, the Mitsubishi YS-11, and
the BAC 1-11. There are still more than 20 airplanes of each model
listed on the U.S. registry. For these models, the FAA has granted
partial exemptions to the respective DAHs for SFAR 88 requirements. In
each case, these exemptions, while relieving design approval holders of
some requirements, also have required them to develop service
information to be provided to affected operators and have explicitly
declined to exempt the operators from these operational rules.
Therefore, we have reconsidered the proposed exclusion of these models
and concluded that they should not be excluded.
The following airplane models are excluded from the Fuel Tank
Safety Operational Rules:
(1) Bombardier CL-44
(2) Concorde
(3) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(4) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(5) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(6) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(7) Handley Page Herald Type 300
[[Page 63391]]
(8) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(9) Airbus Caravelle
(10) Lockheed L-300
3. Change in Operator Compliance Date for Auxiliary Fuel Tank ICA
As stated in the NPRM preamble, the current FTS requirements
mandate that ICA must be developed for the ``actual configuration of
the fuel tank systems of each affected airplane.'' The fuel tank ICA
must address the fuel tank system as defined by the airplane's type
certificate (TC), any supplemental TCs, and any field-approved
incorporated auxiliary fuel tank systems.
In the NPRM preamble, we acknowledged that the original wording of
the Fuel Tank Safety Rule proved to be unclear to many in the industry.
We proposed revised regulatory language in the NPRM to clarify the
original intent. The revision clarifies that holders of STCs, as well
as TC holders for the affected airplane models, must develop ICA as
required by SFAR 88, and that the operator is required to develop
maintenance instructions for field-approved auxiliary fuel tanks. The
clarified language regarding field-approved auxiliary fuel tanks was
included in paragraphs 91.1507(b), 121.913(b) (the number of proposed
Sec. 121.913 has been changed in this final rule to Sec. 121.1113),
125.507(b), and 129.113(b) of the NPRM. Those paragraphs require
operators to develop and submit to the FAA Oversight Office proposed
ICA by December 16, 2007 to address their field-approved auxiliary fuel
tanks.
While the referenced paragraphs were clarifications and not newly
proposed requirements, industry has expressed uncertainty regarding the
scope of effort required by operators. As that uncertainty will not be
completely addressed until issuance of this rule, which will provide
the necessary clarification, we think it is appropriate to provide
additional time for operators to develop and submit auxiliary fuel tank
ICA proposals to the FAA Oversight Office. We have decided to extend
the compliance date for these operator submittals to June 16, 2008.
This will allow additional time for operators to conduct the necessary
analyses and develop appropriate ICA, or contract with other experts to
perform this work if needed. The June 16, 2008 date will also allow
adequate time for the FAA's Oversight Office to review and approve the
operator-developed ICA and for the operators to revise their
maintenance programs accordingly by December 16, 2008.
4. Original Configuration and Auxiliary Fuel Tanks
United Airlines referred to the statement in the NPRM that new
maintenance programs must be developed based on the actual
configuration of the aircraft. It asked if this is intended to include
only major alterations (STCs), or minor alterations affecting wiring
systems as well.
The commenter refers to a portion of the NPRM discussing
operational requirements of the Fuel Tank Safety Rule. As explained in
the NPRM, we are revising these requirements to eliminate reference to
the ``actual configuration'' of the fuel tank system. Instead, these
requirements clarify that operators' maintenance programs must address
the fuel tank system of the airplane as originally configured and
auxiliary fuel tanks later installed. All auxiliary fuel tank
installations are considered major alterations.
On a related issue, under the operational rules adopted as part of
the Fuel Tank Safety Rule (Sec. 121.370(b)), operators were required
to revise their maintenance programs to include fuel tank safety
instructions, regardless of whether TC and STC holders provided such
revisions, as required by SFAR 88. In this final rule, we revise these
operational requirements to require that operators revise their
maintenance programs to incorporate fuel tank ICA developed by TC
holders, ICA developed by the operator for field-approved auxiliary
fuel tanks, and ICA developed by STC holders, if any. The effect of
this change is that, except for auxiliary fuel tanks installed under
field approvals, operators are not required to develop ICA to comply
with this rule; they are only required to revise their programs to
incorporate ICA developed by others. Therefore if an STC holder does
not develop ICA, then the operator has no further action to comply with
the operational rule for that STC design configuration. However, if it
appears STC holders will not provide timely support for the operators,
we will consider enforcement action.
5. Inspection and Maintenance Program Terminology
Boeing commented that Sec. 125.507 refers to a fuel tank system
inspection program; whereas the companion sections in parts 91, 121,
and 129 refer to a fuel tank system maintenance program. It asked
whether this difference was intentional, and, if so, what is the
purpose of the difference.
Boeing identifies a longstanding difference in terminology between
the regulations applicable to air carrier operations (parts 121 and
129) and other operations (parts 91 and 125). For air carriers, we
commonly use the term ``maintenance program'' to refer to the required
program for inspection and maintenance of aircraft (see Sec. Sec.
121.367 and 129.14). For other operations, we use the term ``inspection
program,'' which is typically narrower in scope than the programs
required of air carriers (see Sec. Sec. 91.409 and 125.247). For
purposes of this rulemaking, the requirements for the two types of
programs are the same. As Boeing notes, we have not always been
consistent in our use of this terminology.
H. Regulatory Evaluation
The final regulatory evaluation that accompanies this final rule
can be found in the docket. In response to comments, we have revised
our cost and benefit estimates in several instances from those included
in the initial regulatory evaluation.
1. Engine Costs
GE commented that new rules invariably involve additional
engineering work on the first certification program to comply. There is
often redesign required partway through the program, especially when
airplane rules are being applied to engine components, which are
designed in advance of the airplane. GE estimated additional costs of
understanding proposed subpart H and redesigning engine wiring
accordingly at $3,000,000 to $7,000,000 for the first certification
program only, and this figure doesn't include additional costs
identified by regulation.
We accept this estimate and incorporate this general engineering
cost into the costs estimated in our final regulatory evaluation. To
estimate total general engine design costs to the industry, we use a
median of $5 million and multiply it by the number of engine
manufacturers (5) to arrive at total costs of $25 million ($23.4
million present value using a discount rate of 7%).
2. Wiring System Safety Analysis for Engines
GE commented that the proposed Sec. 25.1705 (now Sec. 25.1709)
requirement for an independent safety analysis of wiring systems would
add to the certification cost of each new program. The incremental cost
would be similar to the existing cost of a safety analysis.
Since the original comment, the engine manufacturer has provided
additional supporting data. The FAA agrees and incorporates this data
into this regulatory evaluation. The total estimated cost to this
engine
[[Page 63392]]
manufacturer as a result of this requirement is $6.6 million ($3.2
million present value).
We have revised our cost evaluation based upon this estimate. Using
this annual estimate for one manufacturer, we have developed an
industry estimate. The corresponding total cost for five engine
manufacturers is $31.5 million ($14.7 million present value) and is
contained in the final regulatory evaluation.
3. Labor Rates
GE commented that the estimated fully burdened hourly labor cost of
$55.18 for engineers is too low because it doesn't include employee
benefits. GE contended that including benefits would bring labor costs
to $73 per hour. Boeing commented that in this proposal and the
proposed rule on ``Reduction of Fuel Tank Flammability in Transport
Category Airplanes'' there were differences in the fully burdened rates
used for aviation engineers and mechanics. Boeing requested that costs
associated with this proposal be reevaluated using the more realistic
rates contained in Docket No. FAA-2005-22997.
We have updated the wage rates in our final regulatory analysis. In
the final regulatory evaluation we use $75 as the burdened hourly cost
for an engineer and $50 as the burdened hourly cost for a mechanic. A
detailed discussion can be found in the ``key assumptions & labor
rates'' section of the final regulatory evaluation.
4. The Regional Airplane Fleet
The Regional Airline Association (RAA) requested we revise the
cost-benefit analysis because it cites no regional transport category
airplane accidents or incidents to indicate that concern over wiring
systems is comparable for all airplanes affected by the proposed rule.
The commenter said that wiring system malfunctions are generally unique
to a specific fleet type, and the review of the NTSB database, most of
the EAPAS NPRM Supplemental Material, and ATSRAC's review were limited
to wiring discrepancies in airplanes with passenger seating of 100
persons or more. The RAA stated that differences in the regional
airline fleet would justify a less stringent design review. For
example, no airplanes with 50 seats or less have in-flight
entertainment systems. Regional airplane galleys generally have no more
than a single coffee maker, and almost none have ovens, so the
electrical loads and wiring required to support this type of service is
minimal. Regional operators are less likely to revise seating or make
other modifications to the cabin from their original configuration. The
commenter said that inspection of regional airplanes affords fewer
opportunities to disturb existing wiring, since accessibility into
locations where wire bundles may be inadvertently damaged is limited.
It noted that the turboprop fleet, in particular, operates at altitudes
and locations where emergency landings can be readily accomplished.
The RAA said its members will incur greater costs than the larger
fleet because regional operators must amortize compliance costs over a
significantly smaller seat revenue base.
Smaller transport airplanes do, and will continue to, exhibit the
same EWIS degradation issues found in larger transports in absence of
this final rule. Since the NPRM, the NTSB has issued Safety
Recommendations A-06-29 through -35 pertaining to fires on one
particular model of regional jet. In the six months between October
2005 and March 2006, there were a total of six fires on regional jets.
A seventh fire occurred prior to that six month period. In addition to
the danger posed by the resulting fires, the NTSB stated that two of
the incident airplanes temporarily lost all flight displays. The
investigation by the NTSB revealed that all of the fires originated
from the same electrical component \8\ and that the fires were caused
by moisture-induced short circuits between the electrical terminals of
the contactors. If the requirements contained in this final rule had
been in effect, the type of failure that was the cause of these seven
fires would not have occurred. This is because several of the new
requirements directly address the design issues that lead to the fires.
The following bullets address the specific requirements and the reason
the failures would have been prevented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ An electrical contactor located in the avionics compartment
beneath the floor and slightly aft of the captain's seat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 25.1701 provides a regulatory definition of an EWIS.
The portion of the electrical contactor that was the cause of the
failure would have been considered an EWIS component.
Sec. 25.1703 requires the proper selection of EWIS
components. Although the electrical contactor was qualified to perform
its intended function by the current Sec. 25.1301, the new
requirements of Sec. 25.1703 would have gone further by requiring a
specific assessment of the component to ensure that it is installed
correctly and operated within its limitations (Sec. 25.1703(a)(2)) and
that if located in a known area of moisture accumulation (which it is)
that it be protected to minimize any hazardous effects due to moisture
(Sec. 25.1703(d)).
Sec. Sec. 25.1707 and 25.1709 would have prevented
redundant power sources for essential airplane systems from receiving
power from the same electrical contactor, as was the case with this
aircraft design. Section 25.1707 requires that adequate separation
between power sources be provided and that they not interfere with each
other. Section 25.1709 requires an EWIS safety assessment to
demonstrate that failures cannot occur unless they can be shown to be
either extremely remote or extremely improbable, depending on the
severity of the failure.
The regional jet (RJ) fleet uses the same EWIS components, design
and installation methods, and maintenance techniques as the larger
transports. Although RJs typically do not have in-flight entertainment
systems and the same type of galleys as the larger transports, they
share many systems that have historically exhibited EWIS-related
problems. Examples are the power distribution systems, cargo areas,
hydraulic systems, wheel wells, and high density areas such as the
cockpit and avionics racks. On average, RJs fly more cycles per day
than larger transports. So while their life cycle might be shorter in
years than the larger transports, because their systems are cycled on a
more frequent basis, their EWIS are subjected to more exacerbating
factors causing degradation in a shorter period of time. We have
reviewed SDR data spanning a five year period to specifically identify
EWIS failures on RJs. Although the NTSB findings alone might
demonstrate the underlying necessity of this final rule, in response to
comment, the FAA has evaluated the annual number of wiring SDRs
specifically by aircraft category. The final regulatory evaluation
demonstrates that the number of EWIS failures for regional jets and
large transports should not be examined separately.
5. Measure of Effectiveness
The RAA requested that we validate use of a 68% effectiveness
measure in the cost-benefit analysis. It noted that the benefit
analysis suggests that by adopting the proposed regulations, ``industry
will be able to detect 68 percent of EWIS problems before a failure
occurs.'' This was based on an FAA review of service difficulty reports
(SDR) for EWIS failures for the period 1995-2002 and expert judgment.
The commenter said that it could not determine the validity of the SDR
analysis, but that NTSB data over the last 10 years does not show the
wiring
[[Page 63393]]
malfunctions projected by this benefit analysis. The RAA contended that
the SDR review and expert judgment of SDR data does not reflect the
types of malfunctions that would cause unscheduled landings or non-
fatal and fatal events, and that the effectiveness measure for this
proposal is no better than 23%.
Our evaluation was based on a review of thousands of SDR entries
and on the ATSRAC-produced Intrusive Inspection Report. In the NPRM, we
did not assume that the rule would be 100 percent effective. Instead we
measured expected effectiveness at 68%. The judgment used to evaluate
EWIS failures in the regulatory evaluation refers to conclusions
reached by experienced FAA and industry engineering and operational
personnel reviewing operator-reported data and applying their
considerable expertise to determine operational impacts of the EWIS
conditions identified. In response to comment, we have re-evaluated the
expected effectiveness and lowered it to 60%. Total potential benefits
are multiplied by the 60% effectiveness measure to arrive at the
expected total benefits. The initial and final regulatory evaluations
provide a detailed description of how we arrived at 68% and 60%
effectiveness rates. Despite the effectiveness measure decreasing from
68% (in the NPRM) to 60% (in the final rule), the total benefits
increase. This is because the wiring problems were much greater than we
originally estimated. Because of our comprehensive examination since
the NPRM, we learned that there are more unscheduled landings and
operational problems occurring from electrical wiring failures than
originally included in our calculations. Since the NPRM we have
analyzed all of the most recent data available.
Existing rules require operators to submit reports notifying the
FAA of the occurrence or detection of failures, malfunctions, or
defects in systems and components of aircraft. These service difficulty
reports (SDR) are filed when a system, component, or part of an
aircraft, power plant, propeller, or appliance fails to operate in the
normal or usual manner.
The FAA reviewed all of the most recent reports from operators. The
most recent reports from operators demonstrate that failures of the
electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS) are much greater than
previously anticipated and estimated in the NPRM.
In our analysis, we quantify and estimate the economic impact that
will occur when these electrical failures and malfunctions are averted.
Although we categorize and quantify averting such failures as
``operational benefits,'' the occurrence of these failures has a direct
effect on passenger safety and such failures are often precursors to
more serious events.
In the NPRM we forecasted 1,118 unscheduled landings caused by
wiring problems; of which 760 (68%) would be averted. In addition to
the averted unscheduled landings, we estimated 968 events would cause
delays; of which 658 (68%) would be averted.
Based on the most recent data and our comprehensive review, in the
final rule, we estimate roughly 2,202 unscheduled landings; of which
1,321 (60%) will be averted. In addition, there will be 13,649
electrical wiring failures that will have an operational impact; of
which 8,189 (60%) will be averted.
Accordingly, operational benefits increased in the final rule from
$192 million (NPRM estimate) to $506 million.
The revised safety benefits as reflected in the final rule are
based on a revised effectiveness estimate of 60% and an updated
forecast showing the trend of operators to use smaller aircraft with
higher load factors. This caused an overall decrease in the estimated
safety benefits as reflected in the final rule. A detailed discussion
of the effectiveness determination can be found in the regulatory
evaluation.
6. Operational Impacts
UPS requested that we remove the operational improvements portion
of the benefits calculation and restrict cost calculations to tangible
safety benefits versus direct compliance costs. The commenter stated
that this change would reduce the overall benefit calculation by $192.3
million.
The commenter contrasted the following to justify this request:
The proposal calculates that averting a 3.5 hour delay
will save airlines $35,739.
The calculation in the proposed rule for Fuel Tank
Flammability Reduction (FTFR), dated November 2005, uses a delay cost
of $24.43 per minute, so a delay of 3.5 hours yields an estimated cost
of $5,130 per event.
UPS stated it is notable that the FAA cites the benefit of an
averted delay in one proposed rule, and the cost of a similar delay in
another. Both were open for comment at the same time. The commenter
contended that the value of operational improvements is highly
subjective, inconsistent, doesn't yield accurate results, and is
specific to each operator.
Boeing commented that it is unusual that the FAA has included
averted delays, unscheduled landings, and failures of in-flight
entertainment systems, which are essentially airline economic concerns,
as part of the benefits accruing from the proposed rule. Boeing noted
that the FAA included these benefits because, to quote the NPRM,
``delays and unscheduled landings contain safety risks for passengers
and crew and increase the likelihood of a more serious event.'' This
commenter questioned the relationship between these non-normal but safe
events. It disagreed with their inclusion in this analysis as a method
of justifying rulemaking. Boeing stated that in past endeavors, the FAA
has not permitted Boeing use of these events as benefits.
We have decided to retain the operational impacts estimated in the
benefit calculations. As prescribed by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), the regulatory evaluation should attempt to quantify all
potential real incremental benefits to society in monetary terms, and
this includes operational improvements that would result from adoption
of these requirements. We have clarified our terminology since the
NPRM. This final rule evaluates operational impacts.
The operational impacts (``delays'' in the NPRM) that are
quantified in the final regulatory evaluation of EAPAS/FTS cannot be
compared with delays estimated in the Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction
NPRM (FTFR). The estimates contained in FTFR include crew costs, ground
handling costs, and fuel costs. The operational impact benefits for
EAPAS/FTS evaluate impacts from operator equipment malfunctions and
failures in wiring as reported by operators in SDRs.
Operational impacts caused by EWIS failures are more serious and
have a higher cost impact than the delays characterized in the FTFR
NPRM. Wiring failures have an immediate impact on operations and the
model estimates them accordingly. Fuel tank inerting problems,
addressed in FTFR, are not necessarily fixed immediately. The
operational impact estimated in the regulatory evaluation for this rule
uses operator reports of failures, malfunctions, or defects of systems
and components of the aircraft. The five years of data and accompanying
analysis is included in the final regulatory evaluation and in appendix
C. These types of failures are more serious (in terms of cost and time)
than the delay of $24.43 per minute as reported by ATA and used in that
evaluation. The operational impacts (as
[[Page 63394]]
estimated in the final regulatory evaluation) of wiring failures have
safety impacts and increase the likelihood of a more serious event.
7. Training Costs
GE commented that training addressed in proposed AC 120-YY is
commercially available, at $60 per employee trained, to be repeated
biannually. It stated that costs of having employees occupied in
training rather than production were not factored into our estimate. GE
said the training it investigated involves 17 modules, at an average of
30 minutes each, resulting in 8.5 hours per trained employee,
biannually, in addition to the $60 /employee/year. GE said the cost to
operators and service shops of providing training is therefore $308/
employee/year. U.S. Airways stated that the average annual cost of
$131,108 for developing a training program seems to be significantly
below actual costs. United Airlines asked if operators will be expected
to follow proposed AC120-YY. It says ``target level one'' training
alone takes 40 hours and the three hours quoted in the NPRM seems
extremely low.
The FAA agrees that the required training might be available
commercially. We base our cost estimates on module C of AC 120-94,
which requires less intensive training than the program identified by
commenters. The training required by this final rule does not apply to
production personnel, but to maintenance and inspection personnel only,
as required by Sec. 121.375. Therefore we did not consider the cost of
having production personnel in training. We believe that the training
covered by Module C is the minimum additional training required to
comply with the new EWIS inspection requirements. We estimated the time
to conduct this training at 3 hours for target groups 1, 2, 4, and 6,
as provided by ATSRAC and stated in the initial regulatory evaluation.
Training for the remaining modules and target groups is voluntary and
not required for compliance with this final rule. No changes were made
as a result of these comments.
RAA stated that using care when working around wiring, being
knowledgeable about electrical systems, and teaching technicians that a
maintenance/alteration task is not complete until the area is
thoroughly cleaned are simply common sense and need not be mandated.
The commenter expressed confidence these maintenance practices already
exist among its members, and said that specific retrofit requirements
can be more efficiently mandated by Airworthiness Directives.
RAA said one member suggested it would enhance its training not on
how to develop inspection programs, but as a preventative maintenance
aide for technicians. The commenter suggested the FAA (with industry
assistance) issue an ``Electrical Systems Installation & Repair
Standard Practices Hand Book'' that supplements or replaces the
sections in AC 43.13, along with video training modules. RAA suggested
that training on concepts like proper routing of wire bundles with
sufficient supports that are not so tight as to increase the
possibility of chafing within the bundle would be more beneficial than
inspecting after the fact. The commenter said that availability of
quality training to many technicians will result in a cultural change
in the industry that can roll over to other practices.
The final regulatory evaluation clearly shows that the benefits
exceed the costs of the proposed EWIS maintenance requirements. As
stated in the NPRM preamble discussion, investigations of previous
accidents and examinations of other airplanes shows that deteriorated
wiring, corrosion, improper wire installation and repairs, and
contamination of wire bundles with various contaminants are common
conditions in today's transport category fleet. Current maintenance
practices do not adequately address wiring components, wiring
inspection criteria are too general, and unacceptable conditions, such
as improper repairs and installations, are not described in enough
detail in maintenance instructions. We commend the RAA member airline
for volunteering to enhance its EWIS training program and we encourage
other companies to do the same. A complete EWIS training course,
developed by ATSRAC, is contained in AC 120-94. Also, we have produced
a course on good wiring practices which is available to the public
through our Oklahoma City training center.
8. Costs for EZAP Analysis and Inspection of Engines
GE commented that reviewing an engine manual to identify tasks that
touch or approach wiring is estimated at 160 hours. Checking a manual
for the 41 items listed on pages 10-11 of proposed AC120-XX (this
material is now in the DAH EZAP AC), for each of the 14 harnesses per
engine, is estimated at 40 hours. It estimated compliance costs to GE
at $438,000. GE stated that incorporating all 41 elements on pages 10-
11 of proposed AC120-XX into a C-check would increase C-check time by a
minimum of 1 day, resulting in 15,000 extra days of maintenance a year
for operators, at a cost of $150 million annually.
Our final regulatory evaluation accounts for additional cost
estimates in part due to the comments received from the engine
manufacturer. Since we are not making any changes to part 33, engine
manufacturers will not be required to perform an EZAP. The FAA
disagrees with GE's estimate because airplane manufacturers have
already completed EZAP analyses on existing airplanes without support
from engine manufacturers.
We do not concur with GE's statement that performing an EZAP on
engine-mounted EWIS components will result in an additional day being
added to the length of a C-check (assuming that the frequency of the
maintenance tasks require them to be completed on a C-check cycle).
Based on data provided by one airplane manufacturer, we estimate that
an additional 1 to 3 inspection tasks per engine will be necessary
based on the results of applying EZAP to the engine zone. Since we
anticipate that these additional tasks will be incorporated into
scheduled maintenance down-times, no additional time for gaining access
to the engines will be required. We expect that these additional tasks
will be performed during scheduled maintenance visits and the
corresponding costs are contained in the cleaning, inspection, and
downtime sections of the regulatory evaluation.
GE contended that supporting manufacturer compliance with proposed
subpart I (now part 26) will involve an estimated 240 work days, or
$140,000, plus travel expenses of $100,000, per program. Even with cost
savings for technically similar engines, GE said its costs for the DAH
requirements would be $3,600,000.
Airplane manufacturers have already completed EZAP analyses on
several different models of aircraft, and engine manufacturers have not
provided support for these activities. We are not making any changes to
part 33. Engine manufacturers are not required to support airframe
manufacturers in complying with this final rule for either existing or
future certification programs.
9. Engine Costs for Sec. 25.1362
GE commented that costs of Sec. 25.1362 were not addressed. As
discussed previously, this rule requires that a suitable electrical
supply be provided to those services required for emergency procedures
after an emergency landing or ditching. GE stated that because very low
levels of electrical energy can ignite
[[Page 63395]]
fuel under laboratory conditions, it is not clear that any electrical
supply to the fuel shut-off valve could be predicted to meet this rule.
GE suggested that one way to comply would be by substituting a
mechanical cable for the electrical signal to the engine fuel shut-off
valve. It stated that such a cable, extending from the engine to the
wing/body join, would increase costs by approximately $20,000 per
engine installation. It would also be less reliable, leading to an
incremental unreliability of 0.4 cable seizures per million attempted
engine shutdowns, and incremental maintenance costs. GE estimated an
average annual cost to operators of $1,000,000.
We do not concur with GE's cost estimate for Sec. 25.1362
compliance. GE interpreted the requirement to mean that electrical
faults must be minimized to prevent them from causing a fire. The FAA's
intent here is to ensure that there is necessary electrical power
available to allow the emergency service equipment, such as a fuel
shut-off valve, to operate after an emergency landing or ditching. Also
as discussed previously, we have revised final Sec. 25.1362 to clarify
this point. We made no changes due to this comment.
10. Wire Labeling Costs
GE commented that the cost estimate for the labeling requirements
of Sec. 25.1711 appears based on mechanics adding labels during final
assembly. GE stated that identifying wires at 15-inch intervals
requires many more than the estimated 3,500 labels per airplane. Since
fly-by-wire aircraft typically contain 100 miles of wiring, a label at
15-inch intervals equals over 422,000 labels per aircraft. GE stated
that manufacturing wire with labels is more practical but would require
that manufacturers invest in more tooling, plus drawing changes to
harnesses and cables. GE estimated its cost at $9,300,000 over 25 years
or $370,000 per year. Spectrum Technologies contended that the burden
for wire identification labeling was significantly underestimated,
particularly in relation to heat shrink labels and probably other
types. The NPRM estimates a wire identification time of 30 seconds per
label. Spectrum said that, based on industry practice, the time for
heat shrink labeling is more like 240 seconds per sleeve.
In response to the estimated cost of $0.05 per label, Spectrum
contended that the typical figure for industry brand name heat shrink
labels is more like $1.50, depending on size. It said that the total
cost of adding just one heat shrink sleeve can be calculated as $2.88.
The new rule does not require that additional labels be manually
added to wiring. It only requires additional information to be included
in the wire labeling that already exists. It appears that the commenter
assumes that there are no labeling requirements in effect today.
Section 25.1301 already requires that components be identified. The
requirement contained in this final rule expands on those requirements
by imposing additional labeling requirements. Complying with Sec.
25.1711 will be a matter of providing additions to, or changing the
type of, information already on the EWIS labels that exist today. Based
upon existing practices, our analysis estimates this additional cost.
Spectrum Technologies commented on the technical and economic
advantages of a specific prescriptive means of compliance. Based on
comments since the NPRM, we have verified our estimates. While we
disagree with the specific estimates in the illustrative comment, we
believe that manufacturers will demonstrate compliance using the most
efficient and cost effective technology available.
11. Additional Certification and Operator Costs
Boeing and AIA/GAMA commented that we failed to account for
additional certification costs in complying with the new requirements
in subpart H and supporting all subpart H requirements for amendments
to existing type certificates. Boeing maintained that the FAA should
account for these costs, as well as:
Additional ``ongoing coordination necessary to ensure
ongoing communication and cooperation between the applicants and the
FAA'' described in draft Advisory Circular 25-XX.
Costs borne by DAHs to perform the EZAP process detailed
in draft Advisory Circular 120-XX (now in the DAH EZAP AC).
Most importantly, increased costs associated with enhanced
maintenance of wiring on all in-service airplanes.
Boeing asked that we include these costs in the analysis to get a
true understanding of the burden associated with the projected benefits
of the proposed rule. AIA/GAMA requested we include costs to operators
for enhanced EWIS maintenance and updated labor rates for engineers as
well as these additional items:
Additional DAH manufacturing costs for future part 25 TC
and STC products that include new subpart H (regardless of seating
capacity).
Training for maintenance personnel. This should include
existing airplanes subject to new Sec. 121.911 (now Sec. 121.1111),
Sec. 125.507, and Sec. 129.111 EWIS ICA requirements as well as
future airplanes that include new subpart H and associated EWIS ICA
requirements.
Additional general aviation operator (part 91/135) costs
associated with enhanced maintenance of EWIS on all future airplanes
that include new part 25 subpart H and associated EWIS ICA
requirements. This should consider additional airplane downtime and
necessary training for maintenance personnel.
Additional repair station costs to update FAA-approved
maintenance training manuals and provide training to their maintenance
personnel.
In response to these comments, the FAA estimates the costs for
ongoing coordination necessary to ensure ongoing communication and
cooperation between the applicants and the FAA. Neither the preliminary
nor final regulatory evaluation includes cleaning and inspection costs
for deliveries of future aircraft operated in parts 91 and 135 because
there is no operational requirement to do so. Other than the increased
cost of EWIS component identification addressed in the regulatory
evaluation, we believe that there will be minimal additional
manufacturing costs associated with complying with the new EWIS
certification requirements.
As in the preliminary regulatory evaluation, we continue to
estimate the following costs:
Subpart H TC certification costs.
Subpart H STC certification costs.
EZAP costs for existing TCs, future TCs, and future STCs.
SWPM update costs.
EWIS identification costs for TCs and STCs.
Training costs for maintenance personnel.
Planning costs to part 121 operators.
Cleaning/inspection costs to part 121 operators.
Downtime costs to part 121 operators.
12. Previous Rulemaking
The RAA requested that the cost-benefit analysis be revised to
account for previous rulemaking actions that mitigate likelihood that
an accident/incident similar to those that prompted this rulemaking
action will occur in the future. The RAA requested that if benefits of
a revised cost-benefits analysis are less than the cost of adopting the
operating rule, proposed
[[Page 63396]]
part 121 & 129 affecting the current fleet be withdrawn.
The commenter considered the benefits analysis a ``double count,''
or a count of the same fatalities as a benefit in future accident
avoidance as were counted to justify previous rulemaking. It stated
that industry has spent millions of dollars in fleet retrofit and
inspection improvements, mostly mandated by rulemaking, and there has
been a dramatic decrease in the accident rate despite increased fleet
growth. RAA said the estimated 5.3% ratio of accidents to incidents has
changed dramatically in the last 10 years, but the benefits analysis
does not acknowledge this.
GE stated that the benefit claimed for this rule does not account
for previous rules introduced to address the MD11 in-flight fire and
accident, specifically the rule on cabin insulation materials. GE said
that the effect of that rule was to prevent wire arcing from
propagating into a fire within the pressurized fuselage, by removing
flammable materials. The commenter argues that since significant
measures have already been taken to prevent a recurrence of this kind
of accident, the benefit claimed for the EAPAS rule package should be
reduced accordingly, but says is not clear whether this has been done.
The cost-benefit analysis evaluates the risk of passenger deaths
associated with wiring failures. We analyze the historical number of
wire failures and evaluate them in the context of this rulemaking. The
accidents and incidents listed in appendix B of the preliminary
regulatory evaluation included neither TWA 800 nor Swissair 111, so we
have not ``double counted'' benefits as the RAA contends.
Although we have issued various ADs and other rules dealing with
flammability of insulation blankets, those rules do not address the
issue of wire contamination that can also be a source of fuel for on-
board fires. Adoption of EAPAS will help minimize likelihood of an on-
board fire due to wire contamination and wire failures.
We continue to observe an overall increase in wire-related failures
as demonstrated in EWIS SDRs, accidents, and incidents. Although wire
type and insulation materials have evolved over the years, the means to
design, install, and maintain EWIS remain much the same. To reduce
occurrences of wire-related incidents and accidents, it is necessary to
adopt the requirements contained in this final rule.
13. Relevance to the Current Fleet
The RAA requested that we revise the cost-benefit analysis to
determine relevance of the ASTRAC analysis to the current fleet. It
stated that the analysis and recommendations were largely based on
inspections of wiring on decommissioned airplanes that at the time
(1998) were older than 20 years (DC-8, DC-9, DC-10, 727, etc.). The RAA
estimated that those airplane wiring systems were certified at least 50
years ago, and since then aircraft wiring systems have improved. It
further stated that the analysis estimates such airplanes represent
less than 1% of the current fleet. The commenter asked how we can imply
that ASTRAC's analysis has any relevance to today's fleet.
The RAA also questioned the validity of using a 25-year period for
determining benefits. It questioned projecting 25 years into the future
to justify benefits for a retrofit rule and stated that all other
retrofit rules have projected 10 to 20 years. The RAA called it
unrealistic to use an accident/incident review for older aircraft
projected to be retired from service before the end of the 25-year
amortization period.
We believe that ATSRAC's analysis is relevant to today's fleet. The
regulatory evaluation cites ATSRAC's non-intrusive inspection report
finding 3,372 total discrepancies during the non-intrusive wiring
inspections of 81 airplanes. The ``effectiveness measure'' looks at
continuing failures, malfunctions, or defects in the current fleet as
reported by operators, and evaluates them with respect to the Intrusive
Inspection Report. This final rule will change the certification,
design, installation, and maintenance practices for EWIS, which, up to
this time, have changed very little since the jet age began. In
addition, the physical environments in which wires are installed and
the types of hazards they are exposed to are very similar regardless of
airplane age. At the same time, airplane designs have become more
vulnerable to EWIS safety problems because they are more dependent on
electrical systems and less dependent on mechanical systems, as in the
case of electronic flight control systems.
We chose the 25-year benefit period because we expect, on average,
that a newly manufactured airplane would be in service for that period
of time. There will also be airplanes delivered in the next 25 years
that are impacted by these requirements. As stated in the preliminary
regulatory evaluation the 25-year analysis parallels the expected
useful life of an aircraft impacted by this proposal.
14. Accidents Indirectly Initiated by EWIS
The NTSB was concerned that the cost-benefit analysis does not
account for indirect EWIS-initiated accident causes, such as those that
occurred during the June 6, 1992, accident involving COPA flight 201
that crashed near Tucuti, Panama. For that accident, an instrument's
gyroscope wire was believed to have frayed and shorted, leading to
erroneous instrument indications and the pilots' loss of control of the
airplane. The Board believes that the number of EWIS-related accidents
and incidents that can be prevented will exceed that predicted by the
FAA.
We acknowledge that functional effects of wiring failures may have
contributed to additional incidents and accidents. Although additional
benefits could be estimated for indirect causes, we have focused our
analysis on direct causes only.
I. Harmonization Changes to Transport Category Certification Rules
(Part 25)
1. FAA/JAA (Joint Aviation Authority) Harmonization
At the time the EWIS certification requirements in this final rule
were being developed, several existing part 25 certification
requirements were also undergoing revision as part of a separate joint
harmonization effort with the European JAA.\9\ These rules were the
result of an effort to develop a common, or ``harmonized'' set of
standards between 14 CFR part 25 and JAR-25, which was then the
European counterpart to part 25. Because this harmonization effort was
essentially complete when drafting of this final rule began, the
harmonized rules were used as the baseline for the new EWIS
certification rules. The harmonized rules are finalized here. This
final rule also further revises several of the harmonized rules to
accommodate the new EWIS requirements.
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\9\ The JAA is the Joint Aviation Authority of Europe and the
JAR is its Joint Aviation Requirements, the equivalent of our
Federal Aviation Regulations. In the time since these rules were
developed, in 2003, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was
formed. EASA is now the principal aviation regulatory agency in
Europe, and we intend to continue to work with EASA to ensure that
this rule is also harmonized with its Certification Specifications
(CS). But since the harmonization efforts involved in developing
these rules occurred before EASA was formed, it was the JAA that was
involved with them. So while the JAR and CS are essentially
equivalent, and in the future we will be focusing on the CS, it is
the JAR that will be referred to in the historical background
discussions in this final rule.
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We received no comments about sections 25.899, 25.1309, and
25.1310.
[[Page 63397]]
They are finalized here in the same form in which they were proposed.
2. Circuit Protective Devices (Sec. 25.1357)
Section 25.1357 specifies standards for use, functional
requirements, and installation requirements for electrical circuit
protective devices. These standards protect the airplane's wiring from
electrical faults or malfunctions. JAR paragraph 25.1357(d) contains a
requirement to provide sufficient spare fuses, formerly located in
paragraph (f). The reason the JAA moved this text from paragraph (f) to
(d) was to make it clear that the spare fuse requirement does not apply
to fuses that are inaccessible in flight. We are moving the spare fuse
requirement of paragraph (f) to paragraph (d) to harmonize with the JAR
requirement. This rule continues to address the underlying safety issue
by providing protection for the airplane's electrical system from
wiring faults or malfunctions, and by ensuring that there is no
confusion about use of spare fuses in flight.
In addition to the harmonization changes we made to Sec. 25.1757,
we also added a requirement that airplane systems normally requiring
power removal have a power switch to accomplish this, instead of
relying on using the circuit breaker.
Continental Airlines asked if the prohibition against circuit
breaker use as the primary means of power removal or reset during
normal operations applies to existing STC installations or to future
amendments to existing STCs.
Section 25.1357(f) will not require an existing installed STC
system to be changed. As with any other change to the airworthiness
standards of part 25, whether future amendments to those STCs would be
required to comply with the requirements of Sec. 25.1357(f) would be
determined in accordance with Sec. 21.101.
AIA/GAMA and GE requested that we clarify what is meant in Sec.
25.1357(f) by ``normal operation.'' They asked whether consideration
for the need of a switch extends to non-normal or emergency situations.
It is not the intent of the requirement that every electrically
powered system in the airplane have a means to remove power other than
a circuit breaker. We distinguish between airplane systems normally
turned on and off during normal operations, such as passenger
convenience systems, and those systems normally powered at all times,
such as flight deck multi-function displays or the flight-management
computer. But if, for example, the flight-management computer requires
power cycling regularly as a part of normal operations, this system
would also be required to have a means to do this other than using
circuit breakers that are not specifically designed for use as a
switch. Non-normal or emergency situations do not need to be considered
when determining the need for a switch.
3. Precautions Against Injury (Sec. 25.1360)
Section 25.1360 is a new rule requiring that the electrical system
and equipment be designed to minimize risk of electrical shock and
burns to the crew, passengers, and maintenance and servicing personnel
during normal operations. This rule adopts the current JAR standard and
is in line with current industry practice. It is unchanged from the
form in which it was proposed.
AIA/GAMA and GE requested that the term ``maintenance'' in Sec.
25.1360 be limited to line maintenance.
We infer from GE's comment that it wants Sec. 25.1360 amended to
revise the phrase ``maintenance personnel'' to read ``line maintenance
personnel.'' We are not adopting GE's request. We believe the intent of
the requirement is clear because of the phrase ``using normal
precautions.'' Maintenance personnel, whether working line or shop
maintenance, are trained to use caution when working on, or around,
live electrical circuits. Section 25.1360 requires, in part, that the
airplane's electrical system be designed so that shock hazards to
maintenance personnel are minimized when they are taking normal
precautionary measures to avoid shock hazards. We made no changes due
to this comment.
4. Electrical Supplies for Emergency Conditions (Sec. 25.1362)
Section 25.1362 is a new rule that duplicates current JAR
standards. It requires that a suitable electrical supply be provided to
those services required for emergency procedures after an emergency
landing or ditching. The circuits for these services must be designed,
protected, and installed so that risk of the services being rendered
ineffective under these emergency conditions is minimized. Section
25.1362 has been changed from the form in which it was originally
proposed in order to clarify meaning, as discussed below.
Boeing Wichita requested that we clarify what is meant by the words
``protected'' and ``minimized.'' Honeywell and GE asked that the second
sentence of the section be deleted. They said there is no clear
approach to providing electrical power to the fuel shut-off valve on an
engine or APU without potential for it being an ignition source after
an emergency landing. They suggested wording could be added to AC
25.1362-1X as follows:
Use of the normal aircraft supply voltage has been found to
acceptably minimize the risk of fire.
We do not agree to delete the second sentence of Sec. 25.1362. The
intent of the requirement is to prevent disconnection of the electrical
supply to the required services before the emergency procedures are
completed. The concern of this rule is not that the circuits are the
source of the fire but rather that they be capable of shutting off the
services that could contribute to the fire. We concur with Boeing
Wichita's request to clarify the intent of the requirements and we have
revised the final Sec. 25.1362 to do this. We have also revised the
associated advisory circular to clarify appropriate means of
compliance.
5. Electrical Appliances, Motors, and Transformers (Sec. 25.1365)
Section 25.1365 is a new rule within the ``Miscellaneous
Equipment'' section of subpart F concerning design and installation of
domestic appliances, electrical motors, and transformers. The term
``domestic appliance'' is used to refer to those items placed on the
airplane to provide service amenities to passengers. Examples of
domestic appliances are cooktops, ovens, microwave ovens, coffee
makers, water heaters, refrigerators, and toilet flush systems. Section
25.1365 requires that domestic appliances be designed and installed so
that in the event of failures, the requirements of Sec. Sec. 25.1309
(b), (c), and (d) would be satisfied. It requires that galleys and
cooking appliances be such as to minimize risk of overheating or fire
and that they be installed to prevent damage or contamination of other
equipment from fluids or vapors resulting from spillage during use of
the appliances. It also requires that all electric motors and
transformers be provided with a thermal protection device unless it can
be shown that the circuit protective device required by Sec.
25.1357(a) would be sufficient to show compliance with requirements of
Sec. 25.1309(b). We made no changes to this rule.
Honeywell and GE requested that we change the wording of Sec.
25.1365(d) to limit it to motors and transformers for domestic systems.
We have decided against limiting applicability of Sec. 25.1365(d)
to domestic appliances. Our intent is that Sec. 25.1365(d) apply to
all motors and transformers on the airplane. While the NPRM only
discussed domestic appliances, the risk of smoke or fire hazard
addressed by this paragraph is
[[Page 63398]]
not limited to domestic appliances. The exception to this would be if a
circuit protective device is shown to negate the need for the thermal
protective device (as allowed by the rule language). We would
anticipate that engine- and APU-mounted motors and transformers would
fall into this category because adding thermal protection devices in
those cases could negatively impact the reliability of those devices.
The intended scope of this paragraph is apparent both from the rule
language and from the advisory material for that section:
Section 25.1365(d) is broader in scope [than just domestic
appliances] and requires that all electric motors and transformers,
including those on domestic appliances, have a thermal protection
device * * *.
J. Additional Certification Rule Changes
1. Rules Changed to Accommodate Subpart H
To create the new subpart H as the single place for the majority of
wiring certification requirements, some existing requirements applying
to wire were moved out of the rules in which they currently exist and
placed in the new subpart. The rules of which those EWIS requirements
were previously a part or which were the basis of a new EWIS
requirement have thus been revised to support the new EWIS subpart.
They are:
Sec. 25.611.
Sec. 25.855.
Sec. 25.869.
Sec. 25.1203.
Sec. 25.1301.
Sec. 25.1309.
Sec. 25.1353.
Sec. 25.1357.
We did not receive any comments about most of these rule revisions,
and they are finalized here in the same form in which they were
proposed. Some rules received minor editorial changes that did not
change their meaning and do not require discussion here. We did receive
comments about Sec. 25.1353 and made revisions to it, as discussed
below.
2. Electrical Equipment and Installations (Sec. 25.1353)
Section 25.1353 requires that electrical equipment and controls
must be installed so that operation of any one unit or system of units
will not adversely affect the simultaneous operation of any other
electrical unit or system essential to safe operation. Any electrical
interference likely to be present in the airplane must not result in
hazardous effects upon the airplane or its systems. Section 25.1353 is
revised to remove references to wiring and cables to accommodate the
relocation of wiring requirements to the new subpart H. We've further
revised this rule in response to comments and to avoid redundancy.
AIA/GAMA and GE requested that we delete the reference to Sec.
25.1357 from proposed Sec. 25.1353(b). We agree that the proposed
Sec. 25.1353(b) references to Sec. 25.1357 and the subpart H
requirements are unnecessary. Section 25.1301(b) requires that EWIS
meet requirements of subpart H of part 25. So the reference to some of
those requirements in proposed Sec. 25.1353(b) is redundant. The
reference to Sec. 25.1357 in Sec. 25.1353(b) is not necessary because
Sec. 25.1717 requires that electrical wires and cables be designed and
installed so they are compatible with the circuit protection devices
required by Sec. 25.1357. We've amended the final rule to reflect
this.
Boeing Wichita asked, in regard to Sec. 25.1353(a), that we
clarify whether ``any electrical interference likely to be present on
the airplane'' is limited to items approved for installation, or
includes anything likely to be carried onto the airplane, like customer
printers and fax machines.
This rule applies to equipment that is installed and certified to
part 25. It does not cover interference that may come from items
carried on board by people. Operational rules cover such items (i.e.,
Sec. Sec. 121.306, 125.204, 135.144).
U.S. Airways asked that we clarify the electrical bonding
requirements in Sec. 25.1353. It contended that, by definition, the
bonding point is part of the EWIS and as such could be the fault. In
that instance it would not provide the required return path.
The intent of the requirement is that electrical return paths be
adequately sized and properly installed to handle the highest normal
and fault current levels that would be expected to occur. The
requirement is not addressing a fault of the bonding path itself.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Paperwork Reduction Act
As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA submitted a copy of the new information collection
requirements in this final rule to the Office of Management and Budget
for its review. OMB approved the collection of this information and
assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0723.
This final rule consists of regulatory changes applying to wiring
systems and fuel tank systems in transport category airplanes. Some of
those changes will require new information collection. Comments
received about these requirements and the FAA's response are discussed
earlier in this document, under the Disposition of Comments section.
The new information requirements and the persons who would be required
to provide that information are described below.
Required Information, Use, and Respondents
(1) Section Sec. 25.1711 requires that electrical wiring
interconnection systems (EWIS) components be labeled to identify the
component, its function, and its design limitations, if any. If the
EWIS is part of a system that requires redundancy, the labeling must
also include component part number, function, and separation
requirements for bundles. This specificity of labeling will be required
to ensure that maintenance can be handled properly and with the
appropriate caution for maintaining the safety features the wiring
system was designed to provide. The information marked on the wires
will be used by maintenance personnel for repair and cautionary tasks,
and by modifiers so that original safety features are retained during
modifications. The future airplane manufacturer and anyone who modifies
the airplane will bear the burden of this labeling requirement.
(2) Section Sec. 26.11 requires that existing TC holders develop
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) for EWIS, and that those
ICA be approved by the FAA. Applicants for approval of design changes
will be required to develop revisions to those EWIS ICA for any
modifications to the airplane that might affect them. Section Sec.
25.1729 and Appendix H will apply the requirement for EWIS ICA to
future applicants for TCs. EWIS ICA will be used by operators to
prepare their maintenance programs. This requirement is necessary to
ensure that wiring is properly maintained and inspected to avoid
problems that could affect safety.
(3) Section 26.11 will also require that TC holders submit to the
FAA a plan detailing how they intend to comply with its requirements.
This information will be used by the FAA to assist the TC holder in
complying with requirements. The compliance plan is necessary to ensure
that TC holders fully understand the requirements and are able to
provide information needed by the operators for the operators' timely
compliance with the rule.
(4) Anyone operating an airplane under part 121 will be required to
revise their existing maintenance program to incorporate the
maintenance and inspection tasks for EWIS contained in
[[Page 63399]]
the EWIS ICA. The information incorporated into the maintenance program
will be used by maintenance personnel to maintain the integrity of
airplane wiring systems. This requirement is necessary to ensure that
wiring is properly maintained and inspected to avoid problems that
could affect safety.
(5) As a result of the revised maintenance programs that will be
required for airplanes operating under part 121, maintenance personnel
will be performing inspections and maintenance procedures to address
safety issues specific to wiring systems. Although this final rule does
not specifically require new training, existing Sec. 121.375 requires
that certificate holders or persons performing maintenance have a
training program to ensure that persons determining the adequacy of
such work (including inspectors) are fully informed about the
procedures and techniques involved and are competent to perform them.
To comply with this requirement in relation to requirements for revised
maintenance programs for EWIS included in this final rule, certificate
holders will be required to develop any additional training program
needed to ensure that the appropriate personnel are adequately prepared
to carry out the revised maintenance programs.
(6) The revision to part 25 Appendix H requires that future
manufacturers include acceptable EWIS practices in their ICA, presented
in a standard format. This information will be used by maintenance
personnel for wiring maintenance and repairs. The requirement is
necessary because information about cautionary tasks during maintenance
that can prevent situations that could compromise safety need to be
available to maintenance personnel. Standard wiring practices manuals,
in which this information is presented, often differ from manufacturer
to manufacturer and so are difficult for maintenance personnel to find
specific information in. The requirement for a standard format is meant
to correct this. Because of this rule, manufacturers will change their
Standard Wiring Practices Manuals (SWPM).
Annual Burden Estimate
To provide estimates of the burden to collect information, the FAA
developed categories. The following summary table contains the impacted
entities, average annual hours and the corresponding average annual
cost. Details of the estimates are in the paragraphs below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirement/entities
affected Annual hours Annual cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1a.............. TC Labeling--Hardware. .............. $21,525
1b.............. TC Labeling--Labor.... 1,788 89,400
1c.............. STC Labeling--Hardware .............. 83,688
1d.............. STC Labeling--Labor... 6,953 347,634
2a.............. Existing TC Holders-- 11,450 858,720
EZAP.
2b.............. Future TC Applicants-- 7,156 536,700
EZAP.
2c.............. Future STC Applicants-- 6,283 471,225
EZAP.
2d.............. ICA Approval.......... 96 7,200
3............... Compliance Plan 128 9,600
Development.
4............... Operators Revise 2,550 191,268
Maintenance Program.
5............... Training Development.. 2,208 165,600
6............... SWPM.................. 734 55,040
-------------------------------
Total................. 39,346 2,837,600
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1a. The FAA estimates that an additional 3,500 labels might be
installed in each newly certificated part 25 airplane. We calculate
hardware costs by multiplying 3,500 labels per airplane by 5 cents per
label, and then by the total annual estimated deliveries (123) of
affected aircraft. Thus, the annual cost for TC identification hardware
is $21,525.
1b. With 3,500 labels installed in 123 affected aircraft annually,
we estimate a total of 430,500 labels. The total estimated annual
average hours are 1,788. Using the burdened hourly cost for a mechanic
($50), the annual labor cost burden for TC identification is $89,400.
1c. The requirements contained in this final rule will also affect
airplane modifiers when electrical wiring supplemental type
certificates (STC) are installed on airplanes. We estimate that
approximately 103 STCs a year will require additional identification of
roughly 250 additional labels (.05 per label) per STC installation.
Since we estimate 250 labels at .05 per label, each STC installation
will cost an additional $12.50. The annual hardware cost of $83,688 is
estimated by multiplying the number of STCs (103) by the number of
airplane installations per STC (65) and finally by the additional
hardware cost of $12.50.
1d. For the STC identification labor costs, we estimate roughly
1,673,750 additional labels will be installed annually (103 STCs x 250
labels x 65 aircraft). The identification requirements for STCs will
require an annual burden of approximately 6,953 hours. Using the
burdened hourly cost of a mechanic ($50), the annual labor cost for the
identification requirement to airplane modifiers is $347,634.
2a. Part 26 requires TC holders to perform an EZAP analysis to
develop Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) for EWIS. Over
the period of analysis, the FAA estimates the proposal would require
11,450 average annual engineering hours resulting in the average annual
cost of $858,720 (using the fully burdened hourly rate of $75 for an
engineer).
2b. Future TC applicants will also perform an EZAP analysis to
develop ICA for EWIS. The FAA estimates one part 25 type certificate
per year, with the estimated average annual labor hours to perform the
analysis of 7,156. This would result in average annual costs of
$536,700.
2c. Future applicants for supplemental type certificates will also
perform an EZAP analysis to develop ICA for EWIS. The total annual
number of affected STCs is 103. The annual burden hours of 6,283 is
calculated by multiplying the annual number of STCs (103) by the hourly
estimate to perform EZAP on an STC (61). Using the estimate of 61 hours
per STC and the burdened hourly cost of $75, the corresponding costs to
perform EZAP on 103 STCs annually will be $471,225.
2d. The FAA estimates 60 labor hours (per airplane model) to submit
ICA to the FAA for approval. The FAA estimates 2,400 hours for roughly
40 models. The average annual hours are 96, with corresponding average
annual
[[Page 63400]]
costs of $7,200 (using the burdened hourly cost of $75).
3. Manufacturers will present a compliance plan for approval
describing how they intend to comply with the requirements in the final
rule. Over the period of analysis, the average annual estimated cost to
the manufacturer to develop the compliance plan is $9,600, with annual
hours of 128.
4. Operators will revise their existing maintenance program to
incorporate the maintenance and inspection tasks for EWIS contained in
the ICA. Over the period of analysis, the FAA estimates 63,756 total
hours, or 2,550 average annual hours required to revise existing
maintenance programs. Using the burdened labor cost for an engineer,
the average annual planning cost is $191,268.
5. The estimated cost to develop training considers the industry's
standard training factor of 200 hours per one hour of prepared training
material. 600 hours is the estimated training development time for the
3-hour training course for each operator. When combined with 92
operators, the total hours would be 55,200 or 2,208 annually. Combined
with the burdened hourly cost of $75, the average annual cost for
training development would be $165,600.
6. Manufacturers will change the Standard Wiring Practices Manual
(SWPM). The FAA calculates 734 as the average annual hours required to
update manuals resulting in the average annual burden of roughly
$55,040.
An agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information,
nor may it impose an information collection requirement unless it
displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
control number.
International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these regulations.
Economic Assessment, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact
Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Changes to federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each federal agency
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S.
standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider international
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S.
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by state, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995).
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
final rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) will not have
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities; (3) will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States; and (4) will not impose an unfunded
mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private
sector by exceeding the threshold identified above. While this rule is
not economically significant as defined in section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866 or in DOT's Regulatory Policy and Procedures, it is
otherwise significant under both documents. Accordingly, the rulemaking
package has been reviewed by OMB. These analyses are summarized below.
Total Costs and Benefits of This Rulemaking
The total estimated cost of this final rule is $416 million ($233
million present value). The total estimated benefits are $801 million
($388 million present value). In the NPRM, we examined certain specific
(narrower) categories of operational benefits for the operators. Since
the NPRM, and at the request of commenters, we have performed an all-
encompassing and exhaustive review of all wiring failures as required
to be reported by the operators. This review demonstrated that airline
operational impact from electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS)
failures alone was greater than previously anticipated and estimated in
the NPRM. Appropriately, in this final rule, we estimate the higher
benefits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal values Present value (in
Cost category (in millions) millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harmonization $- $-
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 25 Subpart H--Certification.. $68.1 $35.6
Part 25 Subpart H--Engines........ 31.6 26.6
Part 26 ICA....................... 22.9 22.1
Part 121 ICA Operater Cost........ 292.2 147.6
Approval Cost..................... 1.7 1.4
-------------------------------------
Total Cost.................... 416 233
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefit category Nominal values Present values
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Operational Benefits........ $506.3 $237.5
Total Safety Benefits............. 294.6 150.6
-------------------------------------
Total--All Benefits........... 801 388
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Minor differences in totals due to rounding.
Who Will Be Affected by This Rulemaking?
Manufacturers of Part 25 Airplanes
Operators of large transport category airplanes
Part 25 applicants
Engine Manufacturers
[[Page 63401]]
Assumptions and Sources of Information
Discount rate--7%
Period of analysis--25 Years, 2006 through 2030
Burdened labor rate (as shown in key assumptions and
labor rates in regulatory evaluation)
--Aerospace engineers--$75/hour
--Maintenance personnel--$50/hour
Value of fatality avoided--Value of fatality avoided--
$3.0 million (Source: ``Revised Departmental Guidance, Treatment of
Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic Evaluations,''
Office of the Secretary of Transportation Memorandum'', January 29,
2002)''. Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic
Evaluations,'' Office of the Secretary of Transportation
Memorandum'', January 29, 2002).
Fleet-Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS)
Fleet Growth (2.8% per year) & Passenger Occupancy
Rates--FAA Aerospace Forecasts Years 2006-2017
Failures, Incidents and Accidents--The National
Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center
Aircraft Value--Economic Values for Evaluation of
Federal Aviation Administration Investment and Regulatory Programs
1998
Articles Referenced
Irrgang, M.E. ``Airline Irregular Operations'' Handbook
of Airline Economics, 1995.
Wojcik, Leonard A. ``Models To Understand Airline and
Air Traffic Management Authority Decision-Making Interactions in
Schedule Disruptions: From Simple Games to Agent-Based Models,''
Handbook of Airline Strategy, 2001.
Wright, T.P. ``American Methods of Aircraft
Production'' 1939.
Alternatives We Considered
Alternative 1--Require operators to clean & inspect each airplane
every C-check or every three years. This would result in an estimated
additional $179.3 million ($72.2 million present value) in cleaning and
inspection costs, and an additional $88 million ($31.6 million present
value) in downtime. This alternative would result in additional costs
of $251.5 million ($120.3 million present value) with no commensurate
increase in benefits.
Alternative 2--Explicitly require EWIS training for other groups of
people in addition to maintenance workers. The groups and additional
costs are:
Flight deck crew--$126 million ($76 million present
value).
Cabin crew--$63 million ($38 million present value).
The total estimated additional cost of this alternative is roughly
$189 million ($113 million present value) with no commensurate increase
in benefits.
Alternative 3--No new regulation (status quo)--
There was a midair explosion in 1996 involving a 747 airplane. Two
years later, another commercial airplane (an MD-11) crashed into the
Atlantic Ocean, killing all 229 people aboard. The investigations and
later examinations of other airplanes showed deteriorated wiring,
corrosion, improper wire installation and repairs, and the
contamination of wiring in commercial aircraft. We have observed and
analyzed a continuing trend in electrical wiring events. The
continuance of these events is demonstrated in accidents, incidents,
and service difficulties that endanger passengers. The FAA believes
that this trend of events is unacceptable, that this rulemaking is
necessary to improve aviation safety, and that this final rule will
decrease the frequency of these events. By introducing the new
maintenance, inspection, and design criteria for airplane wiring
contained in this final rule, we are ensuring that there will be a
substantial decrease in the number of electrical-wiring-related
accidents and incidents, and thereby an increase in aviation safety.
Benefits of This Rulemaking
The FAA estimates $801 million ($388 million present value) as the
total benefits of this final rule. In the table below, the categories
of benefits are shown. The middle column gives the nominal values of
quantified benefits, and the right-hand column gives the total
incremental present value benefits broken down by category type.
Costs of This Rulemaking
The FAA estimates $416 million ($233 million present value) as the
total cost of this final rule. The following table specifies the cost
categories, incremental nominal costs and incremental present value
costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal values Present values
Benefits (in millions) (in millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Impacts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Averted unscheduled landings...... $274.3 $128.8
Other Operational Impacts......... 232.0 108.7
-------------------------------------
Total Operation Benefits...... 506.3 237.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Averted Non fatal events.......... $44.4 $22.7
Averted Fatal events.............. 250.2 127.9
-------------------------------------
Total Safety Benefits......... 294.6 150.6
-------------------------------------
Total--All Benefits....... 801 388
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal values (in Present values (in
Cost millions) millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harmonization $- $-
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 25 Subpart H--Certification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TC Certification Cost......... $31.0 $15.8
TC-EZAP Future................ 12.9 6.6
STC Certification Cost........ 11.3 5.8
STC Labeling Hardware......... 2.0 1.0
[[Page 63402]]
STC Labeling Labor............ 8.3 4.8
TC Labeling Hardware.......... 0.5 0.3
TC Labeling Labor............. 2.1 1.2
-----------------------------------------
Total Certification Costs. 68.1 35.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 25 Subpart H--Engines
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engine Certification.......... $25.0 $23.4
Safety Analysis............... 6.6 3.2
-----------------------------------------
Total Engine Costs........ 31.6 26.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 26 ICA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EZAP.......................... $21.5 $20.8
SWPM.......................... 1.4 1.3
-----------------------------------------
Total Part 26 ICA Costs... 22.9 22.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 121 ICA Operater Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planning...................... $4.8 $4.2
Training...................... 20.7 14.2
Training Development.......... 4.1 3.6
Cleaning & Inspections........ 189.5 94.0
Downtime...................... 72.1 31.6
-----------------------------------------
Total Operator Costs...... 291.2 147.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approval Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approve EWIS ICA For Future $0.126 $0.064
TCs..........................
Approve ICA For Existing TCs.. 0.156 0.151
Approve ICA for Future STCs... 0.556 0.284
Approve Inspection & 0.828 0.801
Maintenance Program..........
Compliance Plan............... 0.240 0.232
-----------------------------------------
Total Approval Costs...... 1.9 1.5
-----------------------------------------
Total Costs........... 416 233
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
We have conducted a complete regulatory flexibility analysis to
assess the impact on small entities. The FAA uses the size standards
from the Small Business Administration for Air Transportation and
Aircraft Manufacturing specifying companies with less than 1,500
employees as small entities.
The FAA believes that this final rule will not result in a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The purpose of this analysis is to provide the reasoning underlying the
FAA determination. The FAA has determined that:
No part 25 manufacturers are small entities.
There will not be a significant impact on a substantial
number of amended TC or supplemental TC (STC) applicants.
There will not be a significant impact on a substantial
number of small carriers as a result of this final rule.
The current United States part 25 airplane manufacturers include:
Boeing, Cessna Aircraft, Gulfstream Aerospace, Learjet (owned by
Bombardier), Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas (a wholly-owned
subsidiary of The Boeing Company), Raytheon Aircraft, and Sabreliner
Corporation. These manufacturers will incur type certificate (TC) and
amended TC costs. Because all U.S. transport-aircraft category
manufacturers have more than 1,500 employees, none are considered small
entities.
Future STC applicants will incur additional compliance costs. These
applicants will incur the cost only if the applicant believes the
expected revenue from additional sales will exceed the expected cost.
While future STC costs will be passed on to airplane operators, it is
not possible to determine operator
[[Page 63403]]
would buy and install such STCs. Because expected revenue would be
greater than the expected cost, the FAA believes there will not be a
significant impact on a substantial number of STC applicants.
Furthermore, the FAA also calculates economic impact on small-
business part 121 operators. We measured the economic impact on small
part 121 operators by dividing the compliance cost by the firm's annual
revenue. The impact of this final rule is below \1/2\ of one percent
for eighteen small entities where data was available. For the remaining
3, where data was available, the cost impact is 0.83%, 1.08% and 1.68%
of revenues. Therefore, the FAA believes that this final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small-
business part 121 operators.
The full regulatory flexibility analysis can be found in the final
regulatory evaluation. No part 25 manufacturers are small entities,
there will not be a significant impact on a substantial number of
amended TC or STC applicants, and there will not be a significant
impact on a substantial number of small operators. Therefore, as the
Acting FAA Administrator, I certify that this rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Final International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are
not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the
potential effect of this final rule and determined that it will impose
the same costs on domestic and international entities and thus has a
neutral trade impact.
Final Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by
the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant
regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-adjusted value
of $128.1 million in lieu of $100 million.
This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements
of Title II do not apply.
Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and therefore does not have federalism implications.
Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation,
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, we
requested comments on whether the proposed rule should apply
differently to intrastate operations in Alaska. We did receive comments
from Senators Stevens and Murkowski and Everts Air Cargo on this
subject, as discussed earlier. Also as discussed earlier, however, we
have determined that there would not be an adverse effect on Alaska
intrastate operators, the burden of this rule on affected intrastate
operators in Alaska would be minimal, and based on the administrative
record of this rulemaking, that there is no need to make any regulatory
distinctions applicable to intrastate aviation in Alaska.
Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or
Use
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is not
a ``significant energy action'' under Executive Order 12866, and it is
not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by--
(1) Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov
(2) Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
(3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html
.
You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this
rulemaking.
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit
http://www.regulations.gov.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question
regarding this document, you may contact its local FAA official, or the
person listed under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the
beginning of the preamble. You can find out more about SBREFA on the
Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/
.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 1
Air Transportation.
14 CFR Part 21
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Exports, Imports, Reporting and
recordkeeping.
[[Page 63404]]
14 CFR Parts 25, 91, 125
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Continued airworthiness.
14 CFT Part 26
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Continued airworthiness.
14 CFR Parts 121, 129
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Continued airworthiness.
V. The Amendments
0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration
amends Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations parts 1, 21,
25, 26, 91, 121, 125, and 129 as follows:
PART 1--DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
0
2. Amend Sec. 1.2 to add the abbreviation ``EWIS'' in alphabetical
order to read as follows:
Sec. 1.2 Abbreviations and symbols.
* * * * *
EWIS, as defined by Sec. 25.1701 of this chapter, means electrical
wiring interconnection system.
* * * * *
PART 21--CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS
0
3. The authority citation for part 21 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113,
44701-44702, 44704, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
Subpart A--General
0
4. Amend part 21 by adding a new Sec. 21.7 to read as follows:
Sec. 21.7 Continued airworthiness and safety improvements for
transport category airplanes.
(a) On or after December 10, 2007, the holder of a design approval
and an applicant for a design approval must comply with the applicable
continued airworthiness and safety improvement requirements of part 26
of this subchapter.
(b) For new transport category airplanes manufactured under the
authority of the FAA, the holder or licensee of a type certificate must
meet the applicable continued airworthiness and safety improvement
requirements specified in part 26 of this subchapter for new production
airplanes. Those requirements only apply if the FAA has jurisdiction
over the organization responsible for final assembly of the airplane.
Subpart B--Type Certification
0
5. Amend Sec. 21.17 by revising paragraph (a) introductory text to
read as follows:
Sec. 21.17 Designation of applicable regulations.
(a) Except as provided in Sec. 23.2, Sec. 25.2, Sec. 27.2, Sec.
29.2, and in parts 26, 34 and 36 of this subchapter, an applicant for a
type certificate must show that the aircraft, aircraft engine, or
propeller concerned meets--
* * * * *
0
6. Amend Sec. 21.31 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 21.31 Type design.
* * * * *
(c) The Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness as required by parts 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33
and 35 of this subchapter, or as otherwise required by the
Administrator; and as specified in the applicable airworthiness
criteria for special classes of aircraft defined in Sec. 21.17(b); and
* * * * *
0
7. Amend Sec. 21.50 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 21.50 Instructions for continued airworthiness and
manufacturer's maintenance manuals having airworthiness limitations
sections.
* * * * *
(b) The holder of a design approval, including either the type
certificate or supplemental type certificate for an aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller for which application was made after January 28,
1981, shall furnish at least one set of complete Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness, to the owner of each type aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller upon its delivery, or upon issuance of the first
standard airworthiness certificate for the affected aircraft, whichever
occurs later. The Instructions must be prepared in accordance with
Sec. Sec. 23.1529, 25.1529, 25.1729, 27.1529, 29.1529, 31.82, 33.4,
35.4, or part 26 of this subchapter, or as specified in the applicable
airworthiness criteria for special classes of aircraft defined in Sec.
21.17(b), as applicable. Thereafter, the holder of a design approval
must make those instructions available to any other person required by
this chapter to comply with any of the terms of those instructions. In
addition, changes to the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness shall
be made available to any person required by this chapter to comply with
any of those instructions.
Subpart D--Changes to Type Certificates
0
8. Amend Sec. 21.101 by revising paragraph (b) introductory text and
adding a new paragraph (g) to read as follows:
Sec. 21.101 Designation of applicable regulations.
* * * * *
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, if
paragraphs (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section apply, an applicant may
show that the changed product complies with an earlier amendment of a
regulation required by paragraph (a) of this section, and of any other
regulation the Administrator finds is directly related. However, the
earlier amended regulation may not precede either the corresponding
regulation incorporated by reference in the type certificate, or any
regulation in Sec. Sec. 23.2, 25.2, 27.2, or 29.2 of this subchapter
that is related to the change. The applicant may show compliance with
an earlier amendment of a regulation for any of the following:
* * * * *
(g) Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this section, for transport
category airplanes, the applicant must show compliance with each
applicable provision of part 26 of this chapter, unless the applicant
has elected or was required to comply with a corresponding amendment to
part 25 of this chapter that was issued on or after the date of the
applicable part 26 provision.
PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
0
9. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.
0
10. Amend Sec. 25.611 by re-designating the existing paragraph as
paragraph (a) and adding new paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.611 Accessibility provisions.
(a) * * *
(b) EWIS must meet the accessibility requirements of Sec. 25.1719.
[[Page 63405]]
0
11. Amend Sec. 25.855 by revising paragraph (e) introductory text and
adding new paragraph (j) as follows:
Sec. 25.855 Cargo or baggage compartments.
* * * * *
(e) No compartment may contain any controls, lines, equipment, or
accessories whose damage or failure would affect safe operation, unless
those items are protected so that--
* * * * *
(j) Cargo or baggage compartment electrical wiring interconnection
system components must meet the requirements of Sec. 25.1721.
0
12. Amend Sec. 25.869 by removing paragraph (a)(4) and revising
paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) as follows:
Sec. 25.869 Fire protection: systems.
(a) * * *
(2) Equipment that is located in designated fire zones and is used
during emergency procedures must be at least fire resistant.
(3) EWIS components must meet the requirements of Sec. 25.1713.
* * * * *
0
13. Amend part 25 by adding a new Sec. 25.899 to subpart D to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.899 Electrical bonding and protection against static
electricity.
(a) Electrical bonding and protection against static electricity
must be designed to minimize accumulation of electrostatic charge that
would cause--
(1) Human injury from electrical shock,
(2) Ignition of flammable vapors, or
(3) Interference with installed electrical/electronic equipment.
(b) Compliance with paragraph (a) of this section may be shown by--
(1) Bonding the components properly to the airframe; or
(2) Incorporating other acceptable means to dissipate the static
charge so as not to endanger the airplane, personnel, or operation of
the installed electrical/electronic systems.
0
14. Amend Sec. 25.1203 by revising paragraph (e) and adding a new
paragraph (h) as follows:
Sec. 25.1203 Fire detector system.
* * * * *
(e) Components of each fire or overheat detector system in a fire
zone must be fire-resistant.
* * * * *
(h) EWIS for each fire or overheat detector system in a fire zone
must meet the requirements of Sec. 25.1731.
0
15. Amend Sec. 25.1301 by designating the introductory text as
paragraph (a), re-designating paragraphs (a) through (d) as (a)(1)
through (4), and adding a new paragraph (b) as follows:
Sec. 25.1301 Function and installation.
* * * * *
(b) EWIS must meet the requirements of subpart H of this part.
0
16. Amend Sec. 25.1309 by removing paragraph (e) and re-designating
paragraph (g) as paragraph (e), and revising paragraph (f) as follows:
Sec. 25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
* * * * *
(f) EWIS must be assessed in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 25.1709.
0
17. Amend part 25 by adding a new Sec. 25.1310, to read as follows:
Sec. 25.1310 Power source capacity and distribution.
(a) Each installation whose functioning is required for type
certification or under operating rules and that requires a power supply
is an ``essential load'' on the power supply. The power sources and the
system must be able to supply the following power loads in probable
operating combinations and for probable durations:
(1) Loads connected to the system with the system functioning
normally.
(2) Essential loads, after failure of any one prime mover, power
converter, or energy storage device.
(3) Essential loads after failure of--
(i) Any one engine on two-engine airplanes; and
(ii) Any two engines on airplanes with three or more engines.
(4) Essential loads for which an alternate source of power is
required, after any failure or malfunction in any one power supply
system, distribution system, or other utilization system.
(b) In determining compliance with paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) of
this section, the power loads may be assumed to be reduced under a
monitoring procedure consistent with safety in the kinds of operation
authorized. Loads not required in controlled flight need not be
considered for the two-engine-inoperative condition on airplanes with
three or more engines.
0
18. Revise Sec. 25.1353 to read as follows:
Sec. 25.1353 Electrical equipment and installations.
(a) Electrical equipment and controls must be installed so that
operation of any one unit or system of units will not adversely affect
the simultaneous operation of any other electrical unit or system
essential to safe operation. Any electrical interference likely to be
present in the airplane must not result in hazardous effects on the
airplane or its systems.
(b) Storage batteries must be designed and installed as follows:
(1) Safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during
any probable charging or discharging condition. No uncontrolled
increase in cell temperature may result when the battery is recharged
(after previous complete discharge)--
(i) At maximum regulated voltage or power;
(ii) During a flight of maximum duration; and
(iii) Under the most adverse cooling condition likely to occur in
service.
(2) Compliance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section must be shown
by test unless experience with similar batteries and installations has
shown that maintaining safe cell temperatures and pressures presents no
problem.
(3) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any battery in normal
operation, or as the result of any probable malfunction in the charging
system or battery installation, may accumulate in hazardous quantities
within the airplane.
(4) No corrosive fluids or gases that may escape from the battery
may damage surrounding airplane structures or adjacent essential
equipment.
(5) Each nickel cadmium battery installation must have provisions
to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems that
may be caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate
during a short circuit of the battery or of individual cells.
(6) Nickel cadmium battery installations must have--
(i) A system to control the charging rate of the battery
automatically so as to prevent battery overheating;
(ii) A battery temperature sensing and over-temperature warning
system with a means for disconnecting the battery from its charging
source in the event of an over-temperature condition; or
(iii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for
disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of
battery failure.
(c) Electrical bonding must provide an adequate electrical return
path under both normal and fault conditions, on airplanes having
grounded electrical systems.
0
19. Amend Sec. 25.1357 by revising paragraphs (d) and (f) to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.1357 Circuit protective devices.
* * * * *
[[Page 63406]]
(d) If the ability to reset a circuit breaker or replace a fuse is
essential to safety in flight, that circuit breaker or fuse must be
located and identified so that it can be readily reset or replaced in
flight. Where fuses are used, there must be spare fuses for use in
flight equal to at least 50% of the number of fuses of each rating
required for complete circuit protection.
* * * * *
(f) For airplane systems for which the ability to remove or reset
power during normal operations is necessary, the system must be
designed so that circuit breakers are not the primary means to remove
or reset system power unless specifically designed for use as a switch.
* * * * *
0
20. Amend part 25 by adding a new Sec. 25.1360 to read as follows:
Sec. 25.1360 Precautions against injury.
(a) Shock. The electrical system must be designed to minimize risk
of electric shock to crew, passengers, and servicing personnel and to
maintenance personnel using normal precautions.
(b) Burns. The temperature of any part that may be handled by a
crewmember during normal operations must not cause dangerous
inadvertent movement by the crewmember or injury to the crewmember.
0
21. Amend part 25 by adding a new Sec. 25.1362 to read as follows:
Sec. 25.1362 Electrical supplies for emergency conditions.
A suitable electrical supply must be provided to those services
required for emergency procedures after an emergency landing or
ditching. The circuits for these services must be designed, protected,
and installed so that the risk of the services being rendered
ineffective under these emergency conditions is minimized.
0
22. Amend part 25 by adding a new Sec. 25.1365 to read as follows:
Sec. 25.1365 Electrical appliances, motors, and transformers.
(a) Domestic appliances must be designed and installed so that in
the event of failures of the electrical supply or control system, the
requirements of Sec. 25.1309(b), (c), and (d) will be satisfied.
Domestic appliances are items such as cooktops, ovens, coffee makers,
water heaters, refrigerators, and toilet flush systems that are placed
on the airplane to provide service amenities to passengers.
(b) Galleys and cooking appliances must be installed in a way that
minimizes risk of overheat or fire.
(c) Domestic appliances, particularly those in galley areas, must
be installed or protected so as to prevent damage or contamination of
other equipment or systems from fluids or vapors which may be present
during normal operation or as a result of spillage, if such damage or
contamination could create a hazardous condition.
(d) Unless compliance with Sec. 25.1309(b) is provided by the
circuit protective device required by Sec. 25.1357(a), electric motors
and transformers, including those installed in domestic systems, must
have a suitable thermal protection device to prevent overheating under
normal operation and failure conditions, if overheating could create a
smoke or fire hazard.
0
23. Amend part 25 by adding new subpart H to read as follows:
Subpart H--Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS)
Sec.
25.1701 Definition.
25.1703 Function and installation: EWIS.
25.1705 Systems and functions: EWIS.
25.1707 System separation: EWIS.
25.1709 System safety: EWIS.
25.1711 Component identification: EWIS.
25.1713 Fire protection: EWIS.
25.1715 Electrical bonding and protection against static
electricity: EWIS.
25.1717 Circuit protective devices: EWIS.
25.1719 Accessibility provisions: EWIS.
25.1721 Protection of EWIS.
25.1723 Flammable fluid fire protection: EWIS.
25.1725 Powerplants: EWIS.
25.1727 Flammable fluid shutoff means: EWIS.
25.1729 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS.
25.1731 Powerplant and APU fire detector system: EWIS.
25.1733 Fire detector systems, general: EWIS.
Subpart H--Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS)
Sec. 25.1701 Definition.
(a) As used in this chapter, electrical wiring interconnection
system (EWIS) means any wire, wiring device, or combination of these,
including termination devices, installed in any area of the airplane
for the purpose of transmitting electrical energy, including data and
signals, between two or more intended termination points. This
includes:
(1) Wires and cables.
(2) Bus bars.
(3) The termination point on electrical devices, including those on
relays, interrupters, switches, contactors, terminal blocks and circuit
breakers, and other circuit protection devices.
(4) Connectors, including feed-through connectors.
(5) Connector accessories.
(6) Electrical grounding and bonding devices and their associated
connections.
(7) Electrical splices.
(8) Materials used to provide additional protection for wires,
including wire insulation, wire sleeving, and conduits that have
electrical termination for the purpose of bonding.
(9) Shields or braids.
(10) Clamps and other devices used to route and support the wire
bundle.
(11) Cable tie devices.
(12) Labels or other means of identification.
(13) Pressure seals.
(14) EWIS components inside shelves, panels, racks, junction boxes,
distribution panels, and back-planes of equipment racks, including, but
not limited to, circuit board back-planes, wire integration units, and
external wiring of equipment.
(b) Except for the equipment indicated in paragraph (a)(14) of this
section, EWIS components inside the following equipment, and the
external connectors that are part of that equipment, are excluded from
the definition in paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Electrical equipment or avionics that are qualified to
environmental conditions and testing procedures when those conditions
and procedures are--
(i) Appropriate for the intended function and operating
environment, and
(ii) Acceptable to the FAA.
(2) Portable electrical devices that are not part of the type
design of the airplane. This includes personal entertainment devices
and laptop computers.
(3) Fiber optics.
Sec. 25.1703 Function and installation: EWIS.
(a) Each EWIS component installed in any area of the aircraft must:
(1) Be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function.
(2) Be installed according to limitations specified for the EWIS
components.
(3) Perform the function for which it was intended without
degrading the airworthiness of the airplane.
(4) Be designed and installed in a way that will minimize
mechanical strain.
(b) Selection of wires must take into account known characteristics
of the wire in relation to each installation and application to
minimize the risk of wire damage, including any arc tracking phenomena.
(c) The design and installation of the main power cables (including
generator cables) in the fuselage must allow for a reasonable degree of
deformation and stretching without failure.
[[Page 63407]]
(d) EWIS components located in areas of known moisture accumulation
must be protected to minimize any hazardous effects due to moisture.
Sec. 25.1705 Systems and functions: EWIS.
(a) EWIS associated with any system required for type certification
or by operating rules must be considered an integral part of that
system and must be considered in showing compliance with the applicable
requirements for that system.
(b) For systems to which the following rules apply, the components
of EWIS associated with those systems must be considered an integral
part of that system or systems and must be considered in showing
compliance with the applicable requirements for that system.
(1) Sec. 25.773(b)(2) Pilot compartment view.
(2) Sec. 25.981 Fuel tank ignition prevention.
(3) Sec. 25.1165 Engine ignition systems.
(4) Sec. 25.1310 Power source capacity and distribution.
(5) Sec. 25.1316 System lightning protection.
(6) Sec. 25.1331(a)(2) Instruments using a power supply.
(7) Sec. 25.1351 General.
(8) Sec. 25.1355 Distribution system.
(9) Sec. 25.1360 Precautions against injury.
(10) Sec. 25.1362 Electrical supplies for emergency conditions.
(11) Sec. 25.1365 Electrical appliances, motors, and transformers.
(12) Sec. 25.1431(c) and (d) Electronic equipment.
Sec. 25.1707 System separation: EWIS.
(a) Each EWIS must be designed and installed with adequate physical
separation from other EWIS and airplane systems so that an EWIS
component failure will not create a hazardous condition. Unless
otherwise stated, for the purposes of this section, adequate physical
separation must be achieved by separation distance or by a barrier that
provides protection equivalent to that separation distance.
(b) Each EWIS must be designed and installed so that any electrical
interference likely to be present in the airplane will not result in
hazardous effects upon the airplane or its systems.
(c) Wires and cables carrying heavy current, and their associated
EWIS components, must be designed and installed to ensure adequate
physical separation and electrical isolation so that damage to circuits
associated with essential functions will be minimized under fault
conditions.
(d) Each EWIS associated with independent airplane power sources or
power sources connected in combination must be designed and installed
to ensure adequate physical separation and electrical isolation so that
a fault in any one airplane power source EWIS will not adversely affect
any other independent power sources. In addition:
(1) Airplane independent electrical power sources must not share a
common ground terminating location.
(2) Airplane system static grounds must not share a common ground
terminating location with any of the airplane's independent electrical
power sources.
(e) Except to the extent necessary to provide electrical connection
to the fuel systems components, the EWIS must be designed and installed
with adequate physical separation from fuel lines and other fuel system
components, so that:
(1) An EWIS component failure will not create a hazardous
condition.
(2) Any fuel leakage onto EWIS components will not create a
hazardous condition.
(f) Except to the extent necessary to provide electrical connection
to the hydraulic systems components, EWIS must be designed and
installed with adequate physical separation from hydraulic lines and
other hydraulic system components, so that:
(1) An EWIS component failure will not create a hazardous
condition.
(2) Any hydraulic fluid leakage onto EWIS components will not
create a hazardous condition.
(g) Except to the extent necessary to provide electrical connection
to the oxygen systems components, EWIS must be designed and installed
with adequate physical separation from oxygen lines and other oxygen
system components, so that an EWIS component failure will not create a
hazardous condition.
(h) Except to the extent necessary to provide electrical connection
to the water/waste systems components, EWIS must be designed and
installed with adequate physical separation from water/waste lines and
other water/waste system components, so that:
(1) An EWIS component failure will not create a hazardous
condition.
(2) Any water/waste leakage onto EWIS components will not create a
hazardous condition.
(i) EWIS must be designed and installed with adequate physical
separation between the EWIS and flight or other mechanical control
systems cables and associated system components, so that:
(1) Chafing, jamming, or other interference are prevented.
(2) An EWIS component failure will not create a hazardous
condition.
(3) Failure of any flight or other mechanical control systems
cables or systems components will not damage the EWIS and create a
hazardous condition.
(j) EWIS must be designed and installed with adequate physical
separation between the EWIS components and heated equipment, hot air
ducts, and lines, so that:
(1) An EWIS component failure will not create a hazardous
condition.
(2) Any hot air leakage or heat generated onto EWIS components will
not create a hazardous condition.
(k) For systems for which redundancy is required, by certification
rules, by operating rules, or as a result of the assessment required by
Sec. 25.1709, EWIS components associated with those systems must be
designed and installed with adequate physical separation.
(l) Each EWIS must be designed and installed so there is adequate
physical separation between it and other aircraft components and
aircraft structure, and so that the EWIS is protected from sharp edges
and corners, to minimize potential for abrasion/chafing, vibration
damage, and other types of mechanical damage.
Sec. 25.1709 System safety: EWIS.
Each EWIS must be designed and installed so that:
(a) Each catastrophic failure condition--
(1) Is extremely improbable; and
(2) Does not result from a single failure.
(b) Each hazardous failure condition is extremely remote.
Sec. 25.1711 Component identification: EWIS.
(a) EWIS components must be labeled or otherwise identified using a
consistent method that facilitates identification of the EWIS
component, its function, and its design limitations, if any.
(b) For systems for which redundancy is required, by certification
rules, by operating rules, or as a result of the assessment required by
Sec. 25.1709, EWIS components associated with those systems must be
specifically identified with component part number, function, and
separation requirement for bundles.
(1) The identification must be placed along the wire, cable, or
wire bundle at appropriate intervals and in areas of the airplane where
it is readily visible to maintenance, repair, or alteration personnel.
[[Page 63408]]
(2) If an EWIS component cannot be marked physically, then other
means of identification must be provided.
(c) The identifying markings required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this section must remain legible throughout the expected service life
of the EWIS component.
(d) The means used for identifying each EWIS component as required
by this section must not have an adverse effect on the performance of
that component throughout its expected service life.
(e) Identification for EWIS modifications to the type design must
be consistent with the identification scheme of the original type
design.
Sec. 25.1713 Fire protection: EWIS.
(a) All EWIS components must meet the applicable fire and smoke
protection requirements of Sec. 25.831(c) of this part.
(b) EWIS components that are located in designated fire zones and
are used during emergency procedures must be fire resistant.
(c) Insulation on electrical wire and electrical cable, and
materials used to provide additional protection for the wire and cable,
installed in any area of the airplane, must be self-extinguishing when
tested in accordance with the applicable portions of Appendix F, part
I, of 14 CFR part 25.
Sec. 25.1715 Electrical bonding and protection against static
electricity: EWIS.
(a) EWIS components used for electrical bonding and protection
against static electricity must meet the requirements of Sec. 25.899.
(b) On airplanes having grounded electrical systems, electrical
bonding provided by EWIS components must provide an electrical return
path capable of carrying both normal and fault currents without
creating a shock hazard or damage to the EWIS components, other
airplane system components, or airplane structure.
Sec. 25.1717 Circuit protective devices: EWIS.
Electrical wires and cables must be designed and installed so they
are compatible with the circuit protection devices required by Sec.
25.1357, so that a fire or smoke hazard cannot be created under
temporary or continuous fault conditions.
Sec. 25.1719 Accessibility provisions: EWIS.
Access must be provided to allow inspection and replacement of any
EWIS component as necessary for continued airworthiness.
Sec. 25.1721 Protection of EWIS.
(a) No cargo or baggage compartment may contain any EWIS whose
damage or failure may affect safe operation, unless the EWIS is
protected so that:
(1) It cannot be damaged by movement of cargo or baggage in the
compartment.
(2) Its breakage or failure will not create a fire hazard.
(b) EWIS must be designed and installed to minimize damage and risk
of damage to EWIS by movement of people in the airplane during all
phases of flight, maintenance, and servicing.
(c) EWIS must be designed and installed to minimize damage and risk
of damage to EWIS by items carried onto the aircraft by passengers or
cabin crew.
Sec. 25.1723 Flammable fluid fire protection: EWIS.
EWIS components located in each area where flammable fluid or
vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid system must be considered a
potential ignition source and must meet the requirements of Sec.
25.863.
Sec. 25.1725 Powerplants: EWIS.
(a) EWIS associated with any powerplant must be designed and
installed so that the failure of an EWIS component will not prevent the
continued safe operation of the remaining powerplants or require
immediate action by any crewmember for continued safe operation, in
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 25.903(b).
(b) Design precautions must be taken to minimize hazards to the
airplane due to EWIS damage in the event of a powerplant rotor failure
or a fire originating within the powerplant that burns through the
powerplant case, in accordance with the requirements of Sec.
25.903(d)(1).
Sec. 25.1727 Flammable fluid shutoff means: EWIS.
EWIS associated with each flammable fluid shutoff means and control
must be fireproof or must be located and protected so that any fire in
a fire zone will not affect operation of the flammable fluid shutoff
means, in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 25.1189.
Sec. 25.1729 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS.
The applicant must prepare Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
applicable to EWIS in accordance with Appendix H sections H25.4 and
H25.5 to this part that are approved by the FAA.
Sec. 25.1731 Powerplant and APU fire detector system: EWIS.
(a) EWIS that are part of each fire or overheat detector system in
a fire zone must be fire-resistant.
(b) No EWIS component of any fire or overheat detector system for
any fire zone may pass through another fire zone, unless:
(1) It is protected against the possibility of false warnings
resulting from fires in zones through which it passes; or
(2) Each zone involved is simultaneously protected by the same
detector and extinguishing system.
(c) EWIS that are part of each fire or overheat detector system in
a fire zone must meet the requirements of Sec. 25.1203.
Sec. 25.1733 Fire detector systems, general: EWIS.
EWIS associated with any installed fire protection system,
including those required by Sec. Sec. 25.854 and 25.858, must be
considered an integral part of the system in showing compliance with
the applicable requirements for that system.
0
24. Amend H25.1 of Appendix H to part 25 by revising paragraph (a) to
read as follows:
Appendix H To Part 25--Instructions For Continued Airworthiness
H25.1 General.
(a) This appendix specifies requirements for preparation of
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness as required by Sec. Sec.
25.1529, 25.1729, and applicable provisions of parts 21 and 26 of
this chapter.
* * * * *
0
25. Amend H25.4 of Appendix H to part 25 by revising paragraph (a)(1)
and adding new paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:
Appendix H To Part 25--Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
* * * * *
H25.4 Airworthiness Limitations section.
(a) * * *
(1) Each mandatory replacement time, structural inspection
interval, and related structural inspection procedures approved
under Sec. 25.571.
* * * * *
(3) Any mandatory replacement time of EWIS components as defined
in section 25.1701.
* * * * *
0
26. Amend Appendix H to part 25 by adding new paragraph H25.5 to read
as follows:
Appendix H To Part 25--Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
* * * * *
H25.5 Electrical Wiring Interconnection System (EWIS)
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
(a) The applicant must prepare Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA) applicable to EWIS as defined by Sec. 25.1701
that are
[[Page 63409]]
approved by the FAA and include the following:
(1) Maintenance and inspection requirements for the EWIS
developed with the use of an enhanced zonal analysis procedure that
includes:
(i) Identification of each zone of the airplane.
(ii) Identification of each zone that contains EWIS.
(iii) Identification of each zone containing EWIS that also
contains combustible materials.
(iv) Identification of each zone in which EWIS is in close
proximity to both primary and back-up hydraulic, mechanical, or
electrical flight controls and lines.
(v) Identification of--
(A) Tasks, and the intervals for performing those tasks, that
will reduce the likelihood of ignition sources and accumulation of
combustible material, and
(B) Procedures, and the intervals for performing those
procedures, that will effectively clean the EWIS components of
combustible material if there is not an effective task to reduce the
likelihood of combustible material accumulation.
(vi) Instructions for protections and caution information that
will minimize contamination and accidental damage to EWIS, as
applicable, during performance of maintenance, alteration, or
repairs.
(2) Acceptable EWIS maintenance practices in a standard format.
(3) Wire separation requirements as determined under Sec.
25.1707.
(4) Information explaining the EWIS identification method and
requirements for identifying any changes to EWIS under Sec.
25.1711.
(5) Electrical load data and instructions for updating that
data.
(b) The EWIS ICA developed in accordance with the requirements
of H25.5(a)(1) must be in the form of a document appropriate for the
information to be provided, and they must be easily recognizable as
EWIS ICA. This document must either contain the required EWIS ICA or
specifically reference other portions of the ICA that contain this
information.
0
27. Amend 14 CFR by adding new part 26 to read as follows:
PART 26--CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS AND SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS FOR
TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
Subpart A--General
Sec.
26.1 Purpose and scope.
26.3 Definitions.
26.5 Applicability table.
Subpart B--Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Aging Systems 26.11
Electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS) maintenance program.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.
Subpart A--General
Sec. 26.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) This part establishes requirements for support of the continued
airworthiness of and safety improvements for transport category
airplanes. These requirements may include performing assessments,
developing design changes, developing revisions to Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness (ICA), and making necessary documentation
available to affected persons. Requirements of this part that establish
standards for design changes and revisions to the ICA are considered
airworthiness requirements.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, this part
applies to the following persons, as specified in each subpart of this
part:
(1) Holders of type certificates and supplemental type
certificates.
(2) Applicants for type certificates and supplemental type
certificates and changes to those certificates (including service
bulletins describing design changes).
(3) Persons seeking design approval for airplane repairs,
alterations, or modifications that may affect airworthiness.
(4) Holders of type certificates and their licensees producing new
airplanes.
(c) An applicant for approval of a design change is not required to
comply with any applicable airworthiness requirement of this part if
the applicant elects or is required to comply with a corresponding
amendment to part 25 of this chapter that is adopted concurrently or
after that airworthiness requirement.
(d) For the purposes of this part, the word ``type certificate''
does not include supplemental type certificates.
Sec. 26.3 Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
FAA Oversight Office is the aircraft certification office or office
of the Transport Airplane Directorate with oversight responsibility for
the relevant type certificate, supplemental type certificate, or
manufacturer, as determined by the Administrator.
Sec. 26.5 Applicability table.
Table 1 of this section provides an overview of the applicability
of this part. It provides guidance in identifying what sections apply
to various types of entities. The specific applicability of each
subpart and section is specified in the regulatory text.
Table 1.--Applicability of Part 26 Rules
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applicable
sections
---------------
Subpart B
(EAPAS/FTS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective Date of Rule.................................. TBD
Existing \1\ TC Holders................................. 26.11
Pending \1\ TC Applicants............................... 26.11
Existing \1\ STC Holders................................ N/A
Pending \1\ STC/ATC Applicants.......................... 26.11
Future \2\ STC/ATC Applicants........................... 26.11
Manufacturers........................................... N/A
Persons Seeking Design Approval of Repairs.............. N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As of the effective date of the identified rule.
\2\ Application made after the effective date of the identified rule.
Subpart B--Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Aging Systems
Sec. 26.11 Electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS)
maintenance program.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, this
section applies to transport category, turbine-powered airplanes with a
type certificate issued after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of the
original certification, or later increase in capacity, have--
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.
(b) Holders of, and applicants for, type certificates, as
identified in paragraph (d) of this section must develop Instructions
for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) for the representative airplane's
EWIS in accordance with part 25, Appendix H paragraphs H25.5(a)(1) and
(b) of this subchapter in effect on December 10, 2007 for each affected
type design, and submit those ICA for review and approval by the FAA
Oversight Office. For purposes of this section, the ``representative
airplane'' is the configuration of each model series airplane that
incorporates all variations of EWIS used in production on that series
airplane, and all TC-holder-designed modifications mandated by
airworthiness directive as of the effective date of this rule. Each
person specified in paragraph (d) of this section must also review any
fuel tank system ICA developed by that person to comply with SFAR 88 to
ensure compatibility with the EWIS ICA, including minimizing redundant
requirements.
(c) Applicants for amendments to type certificates and supplemental
type certificates, as identified in paragraph (d) of this section,
must:
[[Page 63410]]
(1) Evaluate whether the design change for which approval is sought
necessitates a revision to the ICA required by paragraph (b) of this
section to comply with the requirements of Appendix H, paragraphs
H25.5(a)(1) and (b). If so, the applicant must develop and submit the
necessary revisions for review and approval by the FAA Oversight
Office.
(2) Ensure that any revised EWIS ICA remain compatible with any
fuel tank system ICA previously developed to comply with SFAR 88 and
any redundant requirements between them are minimized.
(d) The following persons must comply with the requirements of
paragraph (b) or (c) of this section, as applicable, before the dates
specified.
(1) Holders of type certificates (TC): December 10, 2009.
(2) Applicants for TCs, and amendments to TCs (including service
bulletins describing design changes), if the date of application was
before December 10, 2007 and the certificate was issued on or after
December 10, 2007: December 10, 2009 or the date the certificate is
issued, whichever occurs later.
(3) Unless compliance with Sec. 25.1729 of this subchapter is
required or elected, applicants for amendments to TCs, if the
application was filed on or after December 10, 2007: December 10, 2009,
or the date of approval of the certificate, whichever occurs later.
(4) Applicants for supplemental type certificates (STC), including
changes to existing STCs, if the date of application was before
December 10, 2007 and the certificate was issued on or after December
10, 2007: June 7, 2010, or the date of approval of the certificate,
whichever occurs later.
(5) Unless compliance with Sec. 25.1729 of this subchapter is
required or elected, applicants for STCs, including changes to existing
STCs, if the application was filed on or after December 10, 2007,
December 10, 2009, or the date of approval of the certificate,
whichever occurs later.
(e) Each person identified in paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(4)
of this section must submit to the FAA Oversight Office for approval a
compliance plan by March 10, 2008. The compliance plan must include the
following information:
(1) A proposed project schedule, identifying all major milestones,
for meeting the compliance dates specified in paragraph (d) of this
section.
(2) A proposed means of compliance with this section, identifying
all required submissions, including all compliance items as mandated in
part 25, Appendix H paragraphs H25.5(a)(1) and (b) of this subchapter
in effect on December 10, 2007, and all data to be developed to
substantiate compliance.
(3) A proposal for submitting a draft of all compliance items
required by paragraph (e)(2) of this section for review by the FAA
Oversight Office not less than 60 days before the compliance time
specified in paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) A proposal for how the approved ICA will be made available to
affected persons.
(f) Each person specified in paragraph (e) must implement the
compliance plan, or later approved revisions, as approved in compliance
with paragraph (e) of this section.
(g) This section does not apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Lockheed L-188
(2) Bombardier CL-44
(3) Mitsubishi YS-11
(4) British Aerospace BAC 1-11
(5) Concorde
(6) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(7) VFW--Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(8) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(9) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(10) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(11) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(12) Airbus Caravelle
(13) Lockheed L-300
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
28. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1155, 40103, 40113, 40120, 44101,
44111, 44701, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 44722,
46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 47528-47531,
articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(61 stat. 1180).
0
29. Amend Sec. 91.1 by adding a new paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 91.1 Applicability.
* * * * *
(d) This part also establishes requirements for operators to take
actions to support the continued airworthiness of each airplane.
0
30. Amend part 91 by adding new Subpart L as follows:
Subpart L--Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
Sec.
91.1501 Purpose and definition.
91.1503 [Reserved]
91.1505 [Reserved]
91.1507 Fuel tank system inspection program.
Subpart L--Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
Sec. 91.1501 Purpose and definition.
(a) This subpart requires operators to support the continued
airworthiness of each airplane. These requirements may include, but are
not limited to, revising the inspection program, incorporating design
changes, and incorporating revisions to Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness.
(b) For purposes of this subpart, the ``FAA Oversight Office'' is
the aircraft certification office or office of the Transport Airplane
Directorate with oversight responsibility for the relevant type
certificate or supplemental type certificate, as determined by the
Administrator.
Sec. 91.1503 [Reserved]
Sec. 91.1505 [Reserved]
Sec. 91.1507 Fuel tank system inspection program.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, this
section applies to transport category, turbine-powered airplanes with a
type certificate issued after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of
original type certification or later increase in capacity, have--
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.
(b) For each airplane on which an auxiliary fuel tank is installed
under a field approval, before June 16, 2008, the operator must submit
to the FAA Oversight Office proposed maintenance instructions for the
tank that meet the requirements of Special Federal Aviation Regulation
No. 88 (SFAR 88) of this chapter.
(c) After December 16, 2008, no operator may operate an airplane
identified in paragraph (a) of this section unless the inspection
program for that airplane has been revised to include applicable
inspections, procedures, and limitations for fuel tank systems.
(d) The proposed fuel tank system inspection program revisions
specified in paragraph (c) of this section must be based on fuel tank
system Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) that have been
developed in accordance with the applicable provisions of SFAR 88 of
this chapter or Sec. 25.1529 and part 25, Appendix H, of this chapter,
in effect on June 6, 2001 (including those developed for auxiliary fuel
tanks, if any, installed under supplemental type certificates or other
design approval) and that have been approved by the FAA Oversight
Office.
[[Page 63411]]
(e) After December 16, 2008, before returning an airplane to
service after any alterations for which fuel tank ICA are developed
under SFAR 88, or under Sec. 25.1529 in effect on June 6, 2001, the
operator must include in the inspection program for the airplane
inspections and procedures for the fuel tank system based on those ICA.
(f) The fuel tank system inspection program changes identified in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section and any later fuel tank system
revisions must be submitted to the Flight Standards District Office
(FSDO) responsible for review and approval.
(g) This section does not apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Bombardier CL-44
(2) Concorde
(3) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(4) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(5) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(6) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(7) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(8) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(9) Airbus Caravelle
(10) Lockheed L-300
0
31. Re-designate the text of Sec. 91.410 as new Sec. 91.1505, remove
and reserve paragraph (b), and revise the section heading of newly re-
designated Sec. 91.1505 to read as follows:
Sec. 91.1505 Repairs assessment for pressurized fuselages.
* * * * *
Sec. 91.410 [Reserved]
0
32. Add and reserve a new Sec. 91.410.
PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS
0
33. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-
44904, 44912, 45101-45105, 46105, 46301.
0
34. Amend Sec. 121.1 by adding a new paragraph (g) to read as follows:
Sec. 121.1 Applicability
* * * * *
(g) This part also establishes requirements for operators to take
actions to support the continued airworthiness of each airplane.
0
35. Amend part 121 by adding new subpart AA to read as follows:
Subpart AA--Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
Sec.
121.1101 Purpose and definition.
121.1103 [Reserved]
121.1105 [Reserved]
121.1107 [Reserved]
121.1109 [Reserved]
121.1111 Electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS)
maintenance program.
121.1113 Fuel tank system maintenance program.
Subpart AA--Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
Sec. 121.1101 Purpose and definition.
(a) This subpart requires persons holding an air carrier or
operating certificate under part 119 of this chapter to support the
continued airworthiness of each airplane. These requirements may
include, but are not limited to, revising the maintenance program,
incorporating design changes, and incorporating revisions to
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
(b) For purposes of this subpart, the ``FAA Oversight Office'' is
the aircraft certification office or office of the Transport Airplane
Directorate with oversight responsibility for the relevant type
certificate or supplemental type certificate, as determined by the
Administrator.
Sec. 121.1103 [Reserved]
Sec. 121.1105 [Reserved]
Sec. 121.1107 [Reserved]
Sec. 121.1109 [Reserved]
Sec. 121.1111 Electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS)
maintenance program.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, this
section applies to transport category, turbine-powered airplanes with a
type certificate issued after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of
original type certification or later increase in capacity, have--
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7500 pounds or more.
(b) After March 10, 2011, no certificate holder may operate an
airplane identified in paragraph (a) of this section unless the
maintenance program for that airplane includes inspections and
procedures for electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS).
(c) The proposed EWIS maintenance program changes must be based on
EWIS Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) that have been
developed in accordance with the provisions of Appendix H of part 25 of
this chapter applicable to each affected airplane (including those ICA
developed for supplemental type certificates installed on each
airplane) and that have been approved by the FAA Oversight Office.
(1) For airplanes subject to Sec. 26.11 of this chapter, the EWIS
ICA must comply with paragraphs H25.5(a)(1) and (b).
(2) For airplanes subject to Sec. 25.1729 of this chapter, the
EWIS ICA must comply with paragraph H25.4 and all of paragraph H25.5.
(d) After March 10, 2011, before returning an airplane to service
after any alterations for which EWIS ICA are developed, the certificate
holder must include in the airplane's maintenance program inspections
and procedures for EWIS based on those ICA.
(e) The EWIS maintenance program changes identified in paragraphs
(c) and (d) of this section and any later EWIS revisions must be
submitted to the Principal Inspector for review and approval.
(f) This section does not apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Lockheed L-188
(2) Bombardier CL-44
(3) Mitsubishi YS-11
(4) British Aerospace BAC 1-11
(5) Concorde
(6) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(7) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(8) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(9) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(10) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(11) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(12) Airbus Caravelle
(13) Lockheed L-300
Sec. 121.1113 Fuel tank system maintenance program.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, this
section applies to transport category, turbine-powered airplanes with a
type certificate issued after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of
original type certification or later increase in capacity, have--
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7500 pounds or more.
(b) For each airplane on which an auxiliary fuel tank is installed
under a field approval, before June 16, 2008, the certificate holder
must submit to the FAA Oversight Office proposed maintenance
instructions for the tank that meet the requirements of Special Federal
Aviation Regulation No. 88 (SFAR 88) of this chapter.
(c) After December 16, 2008, no certificate holder may operate an
airplane identified in paragraph (a) of this section unless the
maintenance program for that airplane has been revised to include
applicable
[[Page 63412]]
inspections, procedures, and limitations for fuel tanks systems.
(d) The proposed fuel tank system maintenance program revisions
must be based on fuel tank system Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA) that have been developed in accordance with the
applicable provisions of SFAR 88 of this chapter or Sec. 25.1529 and
part 25, Appendix H, of this chapter, in effect on June 6, 2001
(including those developed for auxiliary fuel tanks, if any, installed
under supplemental type certificates or other design approval) and that
have been approved by the FAA Oversight Office.
(e) After December 16, 2008, before returning an aircraft to
service after any alteration for which fuel tank ICA are developed
under SFAR 88 or under Sec. 25.1529 in effect on June 6, 2001, the
certificate holder must include in the maintenance program for the
airplane inspections and procedures for the fuel tank system based on
those ICA.
(f) The fuel tank system maintenance program changes identified in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section and any later fuel tank system
revisions must be submitted to the Principal Inspector for review and
approval.
(g) This section does not apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Bombardier CL-44
(2) Concorde
(3) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(4) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(5) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(6) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(7) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(8) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(9) Airbus Caravelle
(10) Lockheed L-300
Sec. 121.368 [Re-designated as Sec. 121.1105]
0
36. Re-designate Sec. 121.368 as new Sec. 121.1105.
Sec. 121.368 [Reserved]
0
37. Add and reserve a new Sec. 121.368.
0
38. Re-designate Sec. 121.370 as new Sec. 121.1107, remove and
reserve paragraph (b), and revise the section heading to read as
follows:
Sec. 121.1107 Repairs assessment for pressurized fuselages.
* * * * *
Sec. 121.370 [Reserved]
0
39. Add and reserve a new Sec. 121.370.
Sec. 121.370a [Re-designated as Sec. 121.1109]
0
40. Re-designate Sec. 121.370a as new Sec. 121.1109.
Sec. 121.370a [Reserved]
0
41. Add and reserve a new Sec. 121.370a.
PART 125--CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A SEATING
CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF
6,000 POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH
AIRCRAFT
0
42. The authority citation for part 125 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44705, 44710-
44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722.
0
43. Amend Sec. 125.1 by adding a new paragraph (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 125.1 Applicability.
* * * * *
(e) This part also establishes requirements for operators to take
actions to support the continued airworthiness of each airplane.
0
44. Amend part 125 by adding new subpart M to read as follows:
Subpart M--Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
Sec.
125.501 Purpose and definition.
125.503 [Reserved]
125.505 [Reserved]
125.507 Fuel tank system inspection program.
Subpart M--Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
Sec. 125.501 Purpose and definition.
(a) This subpart requires operators to support the continued
airworthiness of each airplane. These requirements may include, but are
not limited to, revising the inspection program, incorporating design
changes, and incorporating revisions to Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness.
(b) For purposes of this subpart, the ``FAA Oversight Office'' is
the aircraft certification office or office of the Transport Airplane
Directorate with oversight responsibility for the relevant type
certificate or supplemental type certificate, as determined by the
Administrator.
Sec. 125.503 [Reserved]
Sec. 125.505 [Reserved]
Sec. 125.507 Fuel tank system inspection program.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, this
section applies to transport category, turbine-powered airplanes with a
type certificate issued after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of
original type certification or later increase in capacity, have--
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7500 pounds or more.
(b) For each airplane on which an auxiliary fuel tank is installed
under a field approval, before June 16, 2008, the certificate holder
must submit to the FAA Oversight Office proposed maintenance
instructions for the tank that meet the requirements of Special Federal
Aviation Regulation No. 88 (SFAR 88) of this chapter.
(c) After December 16, 2008, no certificate holder may operate an
airplane identified in paragraph (a) of this section unless the
inspection program for that airplane has been revised to include
applicable inspections, procedures, and limitations for fuel tank
systems.
(d) The proposed fuel tank system inspection program revisions must
be based on fuel tank system Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
(ICA) that have been developed in accordance with the applicable
provisions of SFAR 88 of this chapter or Sec. 25.1529 and part 25,
Appendix H, of this chapter, in effect on June 6, 2001 (including those
developed for auxiliary fuel tanks, if any, installed under
supplemental type certificates or other design approval) and that have
been approved by the FAA Oversight Office.
(e) After December 16, 2008, before returning an aircraft to
service after any alteration for which fuel tank ICA are developed
under SFAR 88, or under Sec. 25.1529 in effect on June 6, 2001, the
certificate holder must include in the inspection program for the
airplane inspections and procedures for the fuel tank system based on
those ICA.
(f) The fuel tank system inspection program changes identified in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section and any later fuel tank system
revisions must be submitted to the Principal Inspector for review and
approval.
(g) This section does not apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Bombardier CL-44
(2) Concorde
(3) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(4) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(5) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(6) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(7) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(8) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(9) Airbus Caravelle
(10) Lockheed L-300
0
45. Re-designate Sec. 125.248 as new Sec. 125.505, remove and reserve
paragraph (b), and revise the section heading of newly re-designated
Sec. 125.505 to read as follows:
[[Page 63413]]
Sec. 125.505 Repairs assessment for pressurized fuselages.
* * * * *
Sec. 125.248 [Reserved]
0
46. Add and reserve a new Sec. 125.248.
PART 129--OPERATIONS: FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS AND FOREIGN OPERATORS OF
U.S.-REGISTERED AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN COMMON CARRIAGE
0
47. The authority citation for part 129 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1372, 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901-44904, 44906,
44912, 46105, Pub. L. 107-71 sec. 104.
Sec. 129.16 [Re-designated as Sec. 129.109]
0
48. Re-designate Sec. 129.16 as Sec. 129.109.
Sec. 129.32 [Re-designated as Sec. 129.107]
0
49. Re-designate Sec. 129.32 as Sec. 129.107, revise the section
heading of newly re-designated Sec. 129.107, and remove and reserve
paragraph (b). The revised heading reads as follows:
Sec. 129.107 Repairs assessment for pressurized fuselages.
* * * * *
Sec. 129.33 [Re-designated as Sec. 129.105]
0
50. Re-designate Sec. 129.33 as Sec. 129.105.
0
51. Designate newly re-designated Sec. Sec. 129.105, 129.107, and
129.109 as Subpart B and add a new subpart heading to read as follows:
Subpart B--Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements
* * * * *
0
52. Designate existing Sec. Sec. 129.1, 129.11, 129.13, 129.14,
129.15, 129.17, 129.18, 129.19, 129.20, 129.21, 129.22, 129.23, 129.25,
129.28, and 129.29, as Subpart A and add a new subpart heading to read
as follows:
Subpart A--General
* * * * *
0
53. Revise paragraph (b) of Sec. 129.1 to read as follows:
Sec. 129.1 Applicability and definitions.
* * * * *
(b) Operations of U.S.-registered aircraft solely outside the
United States. In addition to the operations specified under paragraph
(a) of this section, Sec. Sec. 129.14 and 129.20 and subpart B of this
part also apply to U.S.-registered aircraft operated solely outside the
United States in common carriage by a foreign person or foreign air
carrier.
* * * * *
0
54. Add Sec. 129.101 to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 129.101 Purpose and definition.
(a) This subpart requires a foreign person or foreign air carrier
operating a U.S. registered airplane in common carriage to support the
continued airworthiness of each airplane. These requirements may
include, but are not limited to, revising the maintenance program,
incorporating design changes, and incorporating revisions to
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
(b) For purposes of this subpart, the ``FAA Oversight Office'' is
the aircraft certification office or office of the Transport Airplane
Directorate with oversight responsibility for the relevant type
certificate or supplemental type certificate, as determined by the
Administrator.
Sec. 129.103 [Reserved]
0
55. Add and reserve Sec. 129.103 to subpart B.
0
56. Add Sec. 129.111 to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 129.111 Electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS)
maintenance program.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, this
section applies to transport category, turbine-powered airplanes with a
type certificate issued after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of
original type certification or later increase in capacity, have--
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7500 pounds or more.
(b) After March 10, 2011, no foreign person or foreign air carrier
may operate a U.S.-registered airplane identified in paragraph (a) of
this section unless the maintenance program for that airplane includes
inspections and procedures for EWIS.
(c) The proposed EWIS maintenance program changes must be based on
EWIS Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) that have been
developed in accordance with the provisions of Appendix H of part 25 of
this chapter applicable to each affected airplane (including those ICA
developed for supplemental type certificates installed on each
airplane) and that have been approved by the FAA Oversight Office.
(1) For airplanes subject to Sec. 26.11 of this chapter, the EWIS
ICA must comply with paragraphs H25.5(a)(1) and (b).
(2) For airplanes subject to Sec. 25.1729 of this chapter, the
EWIS ICA must comply with paragraph H25.4 and all of paragraph H25.5.
(d) After March 10, 2011, before returning a U.S.-registered
airplane to service after any alterations for which EWIS ICA are
developed, the foreign person or foreign air carrier must include in
the maintenance program for that airplane inspections and procedures
for EWIS based on those ICA.
(e) The EWIS maintenance program changes identified in paragraphs
(c) and (d) of this section and any later EWIS revisions must be
submitted to the Principal Inspector or Flight Standards International
Field Office responsible for review and approval.
(f) This section does not apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Lockheed L-188
(2) Bombardier CL-44
(3) Mitsubishi YS-11
(4) British Aerospace BAC 1-11
(5) Concorde
(6) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(7) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(8) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(9) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(10) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(11) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(12) Airbus Caravelle
(13) Lockheed L-300
0
57. Add Sec. 129.113 to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 129.113 Fuel tank system maintenance program.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, this
section applies to transport category, turbine-powered airplanes with a
type certificate issued after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of
original type certification or later increase in capacity, have--
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7500 pounds or more.
(b) For each U.S.-registered airplane on which an auxiliary fuel
tank is installed under a field approval, before June 16, 2008, the
foreign person or foreign air carrier operating the airplane must
submit to the FAA Oversight Office proposed maintenance instructions
for the tank that meet the requirements of Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 88 (SFAR 88) of this chapter.
(c) After December 16, 2008, no foreign person or foreign air
carrier may operate a U.S.-registered airplane identified in paragraph
(a) of this section unless the maintenance program for that airplane
has been revised to include applicable inspections, procedures, and
limitations for fuel tank systems.
[[Page 63414]]
(d) The proposed fuel tank system maintenance program revisions
must be based on fuel tank system Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA) that have been developed in accordance with the
applicable provisions of SFAR 88 of this chapter or Sec. 25.1529 and
part 25, Appendix H, of this chapter, in effect on June 6, 2001
(including those developed for auxiliary fuel tanks, if any, installed
under supplemental type certificates or other design approval) and that
have been approved by the FAA Oversight Office.
(e) After December 16, 2008, before returning a U.S.-registered
airplane to service after any alteration for which fuel tank ICA are
developed under SFAR 88, or under Sec. 25.1529 in effect on June 6,
2001, the foreign person or foreign air carrier must include in the
maintenance program for the airplane inspections and procedures for the
fuel tank system based on those ICA.
(f) The fuel tank system maintenance program changes identified in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section and any later fuel tank system
revisions must be submitted to the Principal Inspector or Flight
Standards International Field Office responsible for review and
approval.
(g) This section does not apply to the following airplane models:
(1) Bombardier CL-44
(2) Concorde
(3) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C
(4) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW-614
(5) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T
(6) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305
(7) Handley Page Herald Type 300
(8) Avions Marcel Dassault--Breguet Aviation Mercure 100C
(9) Airbus Caravelle
(10) Lockheed L-300
Issued in Washington, DC, on October 22, 2007.
Robert A. Sturgell,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7-21434 Filed 11-7-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P