[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 245 (Friday, December 19, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77644-77656]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-30193]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement--Operations Involving
Plutonium, Uranium, and the Assembly and Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons
AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),
is issuing this Record of Decision (ROD) for the continued
transformation of the nuclear weapons complex (Complex). This ROD is
based on information and analyses contained in the Complex
Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(SPEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) issued on October 24, 2008 (73 FR 63460);
comments received on the SPEIS; other NEPA analyses as noted; and other
factors, including cost, technical and security considerations, and the
missions of NNSA. The SPEIS analyzes the potential environmental
impacts of alternatives for transforming the nuclear weapons complex
into a smaller, more efficient enterprise that can respond to changing
national security challenges and ensure the long-term safety, security,
and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
The alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS are divided into two
categories: programmatic and project-specific. Programmatic
alternatives involve the restructuring of facilities that use or store
significant (i.e., Category I/II) quantities of special nuclear
material (SNM).\1\ These facilities produce plutonium components
(commonly called pits \2\), produce highly enriched uranium (HEU)
components (including secondaries \3\), fabricate high explosives (HE)
components, and assemble and disassemble nuclear weapons. The decisions
announced in this ROD relate to the programmatic alternatives analyzed
in the SPEIS. NNSA is issuing a separate ROD relating to the project-
specific alternatives.
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\1\ As defined in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
special nuclear material is: (1) Plutonium, uranium enriched in the
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 and any other material which the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be special nuclear
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the
foregoing. Special nuclear material is separated into Security
Categories I, II, III, and IV based on the type, attractiveness
level, and quantity of the material. Categories I and II require the
highest level of security.
\2\ A pit is the central core of a nuclear weapon, principally
made of plutonium or enriched uranium.
\3\ A secondary is the component of a nuclear weapon that
contains elements needed to initiate the fusion reaction in a
thermonuclear explosion.
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NNSA has decided to implement its preferred programmatic
alternative as described in the SPEIS and summarized in this ROD. This
decision will transform the plutonium and uranium manufacturing aspects
of the complex into smaller and more efficient operations while
maintaining the capabilities NNSA needs to perform its national
security missions. The three major elements of the decisions announced
in this ROD are:
(1) Manufacturing and research and development (R&D) involving
plutonium will remain at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in
New Mexico. To support these activities, NNSA will construct and
operate the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear
Facility (CMRR-NF) at LANL as a replacement for portions of the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility, a structure that is
more than 50 years old
[[Page 77645]]
and faces significant safety and seismic challenges to its continued
operation.
(2) Manufacturing and R&D involving uranium will remain at the Y-12
National Security Complex in Tennessee. NNSA will construct and operate
a Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 as a replacement for
existing facilities that are more than 50 years old and face
significant safety and maintenance challenges to their continued
operation.
(3) Assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons and high explosives
production and manufacturing will remain at the Pantex Plant in Texas.
These decisions will best enable NNSA to meet its statutory mission
while minimizing technical risks, risks to mission objectives, costs,
and environmental impacts. These decisions continue the transformation
begun following the end of the Cold War and the cessation of nuclear
weapons testing, particularly decisions announced in the 1996 ROD for
the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management (SSM PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236) (61 FR 68014; Dec.
26, 1996). This ROD explains why NNSA is making these programmatic
decisions, why it is appropriate to make them at this time, and the
flexibility NNSA has to adapt these decisions as needed in response to
any changes in national security requirements that may occur in the
near term.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Complex
Transformation SPEIS or this ROD, or to receive copies of these,
contact: Ms. Mary E. Martin, NNSA NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of
Environmental Projects and Operations, NA-56, U.S. Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, toll free
1-800-832-0885 ext. 69438. A request for a copy of the SPEIS or this
ROD may be sent by facsimile to 1-703-931-9222, or by e-mail to
[email protected]. The SPEIS, this ROD, the project-
specific ROD, and additional information regarding complex
transformation are available at http://www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com and http://www.nnsa.doe.gov.
For information on DOE's NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M.
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-20), U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC
20585, 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 800-472-2756. Additional
information regarding DOE NEPA activities and access to many DOE NEPA
documents are available through the DOE NEPA Web site at: http://www.gc.energy.gov/NEPA.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
NNSA prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA
Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). This ROD is based on
information and analyses contained in the Complex Transformation
Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SPEIS) (DOE/
EIS-0236-S4) issued on October 24, 2008 (73 FR 63460); comments
received on the SPEIS; other NEPA analyses as noted; other factors,
including cost, technical and security considerations, and the missions
of NNSA. NNSA received approximately 100,000 comment documents on the
Draft SPEIS from Federal agencies; state, local, and tribal
governments; public and private organizations; and individuals. In
addition, during the 20 public hearings that NNSA held, more than 600
speakers made oral comments.
National security policies require DOE, through NNSA, to maintain
the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as the nation's
core competencies in nuclear weapons. Since completing the SSM PEIS and
associated ROD in 1996, DOE has pursued these objectives through the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program emphasizes development and
application of greatly improved scientific and technical capabilities
to assess the safety, security, and reliability of existing nuclear
warheads without nuclear testing. Throughout the 1990s, DOE also took
steps to consolidate the Complex to its current configuration of three
national laboratories (and a flight test range operated by Sandia
National Laboratories), four industrial plants, and a nuclear test
site. This Complex enables NNSA to design, develop, manufacture,
maintain, and repair nuclear weapons; certify their safety, security,
and reliability; conduct surveillance on weapons in the stockpile;
store Category I/II SNM; and dismantle and disposition retired weapons.
Sites within the Complex and their current weapons program missions are
described in the following paragraphs.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore,
California--LLNL conducts research, design, and development of nuclear
weapons; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; provides
safety, security, and reliability assessments and certification of
stockpile weapons; conducts plutonium and tritium R&D, hydrotesting, HE
R&D and environmental testing; and stores Category I/II quantities of
SNM. LLNL also conducts destructive and nondestructive surveillance
evaluations on pits to evaluate their reliability. NNSA is currently
removing Category I/II SNM from the site and by 2012 LLNL will not
maintain these categories of SNM. NNSA is constructing the National
Ignition Facility (NIF) at LLNL, which will allow a wide variety of
high-energy-density investigations. NIF is scheduled to begin
operations in 2009.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, New Mexico--LANL
conducts research, design, and development of nuclear weapons; designs
and tests advanced technology concepts; provides safety, security, and
reliability assessments and certification of stockpile weapons;
maintains production capabilities for limited quantities of plutonium
components (i.e., pits) for delivery to the stockpile; manufactures
nuclear weapon detonators for the stockpile; conducts plutonium and
tritium R&D, hydrotesting, HE R&D and environmental testing; and stores
Category I/II quantities of SNM. LANL also conducts destructive and
nondestructive surveillance evaluations on pits to assess their
reliability.
Nevada Test Site (NTS), 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada--
NTS maintains the capability to conduct underground nuclear testing;
conducts high hazard experiments involving nuclear material and high
explosives; provides the capability to process and dispose of a damaged
nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device; conducts non-nuclear
experiments; conducts hydrodynamic testing and HE testing; conducts
research and training on nuclear safeguards, criticality safety, and
emergency response; and stores Category I/II quantities of SNM.
Pantex Plant (Pantex), Amarillo, Texas--Pantex dismantles retired
weapons; fabricates HE components, and performs HE R&D; assembles HE,
nuclear, and non-nuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and
modifies weapons; performs nonintrusive pit modification; \4\ and
evaluates and performs surveillance of weapons. Pantex stores Category
I/II
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quantities of SNM for the weapons program and stores other SNM in the
form of surplus plutonium pits pending transfer to SRS for disposition.
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\4\ Nonintrusive pit modification involves changes to the
external surfaces and features of a pit.
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Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina--SRS extracts
tritium and performs loading, unloading, and surveillance of tritium
reservoirs, and conducts tritium R&D. SRS does not store Category I/II
quantities of SNM for NNSA's weapons activities, but does store
Category I/II quantities for other DOE activities. SRS is currently
receiving Category I/II surplus, non-pit plutonium from LLNL for
storage pending its disposition.
Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), Oak Ridge, Tennessee--Y-12
manufactures uranium components for nuclear weapons, cases, and other
nuclear weapons components; evaluates and tests these components;
stores Category I/II quantities of HEU; conducts dismantlement,
storage, and disposition of HEU; and supplies HEU for use in naval
reactors.
The following two sites are part of the Complex but would not be
affected by decisions announced in this ROD.
Kansas City Plant (KCP), Kansas City, Missouri--KCP manufactures
and procures non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons and evaluates
and tests these components. KCP has no SNM. The General Services
Administration, as the lead agency, and NNSA, as a cooperating agency,
prepared an Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-1592, Apr. 2008) regarding
the potential environmental impacts of modernizing the facilities and
infrastructure for the non-nuclear production activities conducted by
the KCP as well as moving these activities to other locations. The
agencies issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (73 FR 23244; Apr.
29, 2008) regarding an alternative site in the Kansas City area. The
SPEIS does not assess alternatives for the activities conducted at the
KCP.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, New Mexico;
Livermore, California; and other locations--SNL conducts systems
engineering of nuclear weapons; conducts research, design, and
development of non-nuclear components; manufactures non-nuclear
components, including neutron generators, for the stockpile; provides
safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and
conducts HE R&D, tritium R&D, and environmental testing. The principal
laboratory is located in Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM); a division
of the laboratory (SNL/CA) is located in Livermore, California. SNL
also operates the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) near Tonopah, Nevada, for
flight testing of gravity weapons (including R&D and testing of nuclear
weapons components and delivery systems). In 2008, NNSA completed the
removal of SNL/NM's Category I/II SNM. SNL/NM no longer stores or uses
these categories of SNM on an ongoing basis, although it may use
Category I/II SNM for limited periods in the future. No SNM is stored
at TTR, although some test operations have involved SNM.
Alternatives Considered
NNSA has been considering how to continue the transformation of the
Complex since the Nuclear Posture Review \5\ was transmitted to
Congress by the Department of Defense in early 2002. NNSA considered
the Stockpile Stewardship Conference in 2003, the Department of Defense
Strategic Capabilities Assessment in 2004, the recommendations of the
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on the Nuclear Weapons
Complex Infrastructure in 2005, and the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Nuclear Capabilities in 2006 as to how transformation should
continue. Based on these studies and other information, NNSA developed
the range of reasonable alternatives for the Complex that could reduce
its size, reduce the number of sites with Category I/II SNM (and
storage locations for these categories of SNM within sites), eliminate
redundant activities, and improve the responsiveness of the Complex.
The following programmatic capabilities involving SNM are evaluated in
the SPEIS:
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\5\ The Nuclear Posture Review is a comprehensive analysis that
lays out the direction for the United States' nuclear forces.
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Plutonium operations, including pit manufacturing;
Category I/II SNM storage; and related R&D;
Enriched uranium operations, including canned subassembly
manufacturing, assembly, and disassembly; Category I/II SNM storage;
and related R&D; and
Weapons assembly and disassembly and HE production
(collectively, A/D/HE).
The programmatic alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
No Action Alternative. NNSA evaluated a No Action Alternative,
which represents continuation of the status quo including
implementation of past decisions. Under the No Action Alternative, NNSA
would not make additional major changes to the SNM missions now
assigned to its sites.
Programmatic Alternative 1: Distributed Centers of Excellence. This
alternative would locate the three major SNM functional capabilities
(plutonium, uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly) involving
Category I/II quantities of SNM at two or three separate sites. This
alternative would create a consolidated plutonium center (CPC) for R&D,
storage, processing, and manufacture of pits. Production rates of up to
125 pits per year for single shift operations and up to 200 pits
annually for multiple shifts and extended work weeks are assessed for a
CPC in this alternative. A CPC could consist of new facilities, or
modifications to existing facilities at LANL, NTS, Pantex, SRS, or Y-
12. The SPEIS also evaluated an option under this alternative that
would upgrade facilities at LANL to produce up to 80 pits per year.
This option would involve the construction and operation of the CMRR-
NF. Highly-enriched uranium storage and uranium operations would
continue at Y-12. Under this alternative, NNSA analyzed two options--
construction of a new UPF and an upgrade of existing facilities at Y-
12. The weapons A/D/HE mission would remain at Pantex under this
programmatic alternative.
Programmatic Alternative 2: Consolidated Centers of Excellence.
NNSA would consolidate the three major SNM functions (plutonium,
uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly) involving Category I/II
quantities of SNM at one or two sites under this alternative. Two
options were assessed: (1) The single site option (referred to as the
consolidated nuclear production center [CNPC] option); and (2) the two-
site option (referred to as the consolidated nuclear centers [CNC]
option). Under the CNPC option, a new CNPC could be established at
LANL, NTS, Pantex, SRS, or Y-12. Under the CNC option, the plutonium
and uranium component manufacturing missions would be separate from the
A/D/HE mission. The Consolidated Centers of Excellence Alternative
assumed production rates of up to 125 weapons per year for single shift
operations and up to 200 weapons annually for multiple shifts and
extended work weeks.
Programmatic Alternative 3: Capability-Based Alternative. Under
this alternative, NNSA would maintain a basic capability for
manufacturing components for all stockpile weapons, as well as
laboratory and experimental capabilities to support stockpile
stewardship, but would reduce production facilities in-place such that
NNSA would produce only a nominal level of replacement components
(approximately 50 components per year). Within this alternative, NNSA
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also evaluated a No Net Production/Capability-Based Alternative, in
which NNSA would maintain capabilities to continue surveillance of the
weapons stockpile, produce limited life components, and dismantle
weapons, but would not add new types or increased numbers of weapons to
the stockpile. This alternative involves minimum production (i.e.,
production of 10 sets of components or assembly of 10 weapons per year)
within facilities with a larger manufacturing capability. Both options
of this alternative would involve the construction and operation of a
CMRR-NF.
Preferred Alternative
The Final SPEIS identified the following preferred alternatives for
restructuring facilities that use significant quantities of SNM:
Plutonium R&D and manufacturing: LANL would provide a
consolidated plutonium research, development, and manufacturing
capability within TA-55 (the Technical Area at LANL containing
plutonium processing facilities) enabled by construction and operation
of the CMRR-NF. The CMRR-NF would replace the existing CMR facility (a
50-year-old facility that has significant safety issues that cannot be
addressed in the existing structure), to support transfer of plutonium
R&D and Category I/II quantities of SNM from LLNL, and consolidation of
weapons-related plutonium operations, including plutonium R&D and
storage of Category I/II quantities of SNM, at LANL. Until completion
of a new Nuclear Posture Review in 2009 or later, the net production at
LANL would be limited to a maximum of 20 pits per year. Other national
security actinide missions (e.g., emergency response, material
disposition, nuclear energy) would continue at TA-55.
Uranium manufacturing and R&D: Y-12 would continue as the
uranium center, producing components and canned subassemblies, and
conducting surveillance and dismantlement. NNSA completed construction
of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) in 2008 and
will consolidate HEU storage in that facility.\6\ NNSA would build a
UPF at Y-12 to provide a smaller and modern highly-enriched uranium
production capability, replacing 50-year-old facilities.
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\6\ The environmental impacts of HEUMF and its alternatives are
analyzed in the Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-
12 National Security Complex (DOE/EIS-0309, 2001); NNSA announced
its decision to construct and operate HEUMF on March 13, 2002 (67 FR
11296).
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Assembly/disassembly/high explosives production and
manufacturing: Pantex would remain the assembly/disassembly/high
explosives production and manufacturing center. NNSA would consolidate
non-destructive weapons surveillance operations at Pantex.
Consolidation of Category I/II SNM: NNSA would continue
ongoing actions to transfer Category I/II SNM from LLNL under the No
Action Alternative and phase out Category I/II operations at LLNL by
the end of 2012.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
Section 101 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4331) establishes a policy of
federal agencies having a continuing responsibility to improve and
coordinate their plans, functions, programs, and resources so that,
among other goals, the nation may fulfill its responsibilities as a
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations. The CEQ, in its
``Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR
18026; Mar. 23, 1981), defines the ``environmentally preferable
alternative'' as the alternative ``that will promote the national
environmental policy expressed in NEPA's Section 101.''
The analyses in the SPEIS of the environmental impacts associated
with the programmatic alternatives indicated that the No Net
Production/Capability-Based Alternative is environmentally preferable.
This alternative would result in the minimum infrastructure demands
(e.g., electricity and water use would be reduced by almost 50 percent
at some sites); produce the least amount of wastes (radioactive wastes
would be reduced by approximately 33-50 percent compared to the No
Action Alternative); reduce worker radiation doses (by approximately
33-50 percent compared to the No Action Alternative); and require the
fewest employees (up to 40 percent fewer at some sites). Almost all of
these reductions in potential impacts result from the reduced
production levels assumed for this alternative.
Alternatives Considered but Eliminated From Detailed Study
NNSA considered programmatic alternatives other than those
described above, but concluded that these alternatives were not
reasonable and eliminated them from detailed analysis. As discussed in
the SPEIS, the following alternatives were considered but eliminated
from detailed study: (1) Consolidate the Three Nuclear Weapons
Laboratories (LLNL, LANL and SNL); (2) Curatorship Alternative; (3)
Smaller CNPC Alternative; (4) New CPC with a Smaller Capacity; (5)
Purchase Pits; (6) Upgrade Building 332 at LLNL to enable pit
production; (7) Consider Other Sites for the CPC; (8) Redesign Weapons
to Require Less or No Plutonium; and (9) Do Not Produce New Pits (see
Section 3.15, Volume I of the SPEIS).
Decisions
With respect to the three major SNM functional capabilities
(plutonium, uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly) involving
Category I/II quantities of SNM, NNSA has decided to keep these
functional capabilities at three separate sites:
Plutonium manufacturing and R&D will remain at LANL, and
NNSA will construct and operate the CMRR-NF there to support these
activities;
Uranium manufacturing and R&D will remain at Y-12 and NNSA
will construct and operate a UPF there to support these activities;
Assembly/disassembly/high explosives production and
manufacturing will remain at Pantex.
With respect to SNM consolidation, NNSA will continue ongoing
activities \7\ to transfer Category I/II SNM from LLNL under the No
Action Alternative and phase out Category I/II operations at LLNL by
the end of 2012.
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\7\ In regard to surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable plutonium
currently at LLNL, transfer to SRS for storage pending disposition
is being undertaken consistent with decisions announced on September
11, 2007, in an Amended ROD (72 FR 51807) based on the Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic EIS.
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Bases for Decisions
Overview
NNSA's decision locates the three major functional capabilities
involving Category I/II quantities of SNM at three separate sites where
these missions are currently performed. The selected alternative, which
is a combination of the Distributed Centers of Excellence and
Capability-Based Alternatives, has the least cost and lowest risk.
Consolidation or transfer of uranium and plutonium operations to other
sites (as analyzed in several options under the Distributed and
Consolidated Centers of Excellence Alternatives) could result in lower
operational costs and other benefits if and when such an alternative
were fully implemented. However, movement of any of these three major
capabilities to another site poses unacceptable programmatic risks and
would cost far more than the selected alternative for an extended
period of time. Moving one or more of these capabilities would take
years to achieve and might be unsuccessful; in the interim, NNSA would
need to build some new facilities at the sites where these capabilities
are currently located
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simply to maintain those capabilities during the relocation process.
Similarly, the No Action Alternative is unacceptable because it
would require NNSA to continue operations in facilities that are
outdated, too costly to operate, and not capable of meeting modern
environment, health and safety (ES&H) or security standards. These
facilities cannot be relied upon much longer, and must be replaced or
closed.
Under NNSA's decision, plutonium operations remain at LANL. It will
not construct a new pit manufacturing facility such as a CPC or a CNPC
because it appears unlikely there will be a need to produce more than
10-80 pits per year in the future and because constructing these
facilities would be very expensive. Instead, NNSA will upgrade the
existing plutonium facilities at the laboratory and will construct a
CMRR-NF.\8\ Construction of this facility is a needed modernization of
LANL's plutonium capabilities--continued use of the existing CMR
facility is inefficient and poses ES&H and security issues that cannot
be addressed by modifying the CMR. Uranium operations remain at Y-12,
and NNSA will construct a UPF because the existing uranium production
facilities are also beyond their useful lives, inefficient, and present
ES&H and security issues similar to those at CMR. CMRR-NF and UPF will
be safer, seismically robust, and easier to defend from potential
terrorist attacks. Their size will support production rates appropriate
for a reasonable range of future stockpile sizes, and would not be much
smaller if future production rates were much lower than currently
anticipated.\9\
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\8\ NNSA prepared an Environmental Impact Statement for the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (CMRR EIS)
(DOE/EIS-0350). The CMRR EIS evaluates potential impacts of the
proposed relocation of analytical chemistry and materials
characterization activities and associated R&D to a new CMRR. The
proposed CMRR consists of a nuclear facility--CMRR-NF--and a
separate radiological laboratory, administrative office, and support
building. See also the 2008 Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement
for Los Alamos National Laboratory (2008 LANL SWEIS, DOE/EIS-0380).
In deciding to construct the CMRR-NF at LANL, NNSA considered the
analyses in the CMRR EIS and the 2008 LANL SWEIS, as well as those
in the SPEIS.
\9\ NNSA evaluated various sizes for facilities analyzed in the
SPEIS to determine if smaller facilities should be considered in
detail for the Distributed and Consolidated Centers of Excellence
Alternatives. NNSA evaluated the programmatic risk, cost
effectiveness, and environmental impacts of smaller facilities and
concluded that smaller facilities were not reasonable for some of
these alternatives (see Section 3.15 of the SPEIS). Smaller
facilities were considered for the Capability-Based Alternative.
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Plutonium Operations
With respect to plutonium manufacturing, NNSA is not making any new
decisions regarding production capacity until completion of a new
Nuclear Posture Review in 2009 or later. NNSA does not foresee an
imminent need to produce more than 20 pits per year to meet national
security requirements. This production level was established almost 10
years ago in the ROD (64 FR 50797, Sept. 20, 1999) based on the Site-
wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (1999 LANL SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0238). The ROD
based on the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0380) continued this limit on
production (73 FR 55833; Sept. 26, 2008). NNSA will continue design of
a CMRR-NF that would support a potential annual production (in LANL's
TA-55 facilities) of 20-80 pits. The design activities are sufficiently
flexible to account for changing national security requirements that
could result from a new Nuclear Posture Review, further changes to the
size of stockpile, or future Federal budgets. Furthermore, because
NNSA's sensitivity analyses have shown that there is little difference
in the size of a facility needed to support production rates between 1
and 80 components per year, the future production capacity is not
anticipated to have a significant impact on the size of the CMRR-
NF.\10\ With a new CMRR-NF providing support, the existing plutonium
facility at LANL will have sufficient capability to produce between 1
and 80 pits per year. A new CMRR-NF will also allow NNSA to better
support national security missions involving plutonium and other
actinides (including, e.g., the plutonium-238 heat source program
undertaken for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA); non-proliferation programs, including the sealed source
recovery program; emergency response; nuclear counter-terrorism;
nuclear forensics; render safe program (program to disable improvised
nuclear devices); material disposition; and nuclear fuel research and
development).
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\10\ See note 9 supra.
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Uranium Operations
With respect to uranium manufacturing, NNSA will maintain the
current capacity in existing facilities at Y-12 as discussed in Section
3.5 of the SPEIS and within the planning basis discussed in Section
3.1.2 of the 2001 Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-12
National Security Complex (2001 Y-12 SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0309). NNSA is
preparing a new SWEIS for Y-12 (Site-wide Environmental Impact
Statement for the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
(Y-12 SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0387)), which will evaluate site-specific issues
associated with continued production operations at Y-12, including
issues related to construction and operation of a UPF such as its
location and size. The Y-12 SWEIS will consider any new information
(such as a new Nuclear Posture Review or further changes to the
stockpile) that becomes available during the preparation of that
document.
Assembly and Disassembly of Weapons and High Explosives Production
NNSA will continue to conduct these operations at Pantex as
announced in the ROD (62 FR 3880; Jan. 27, 1997) for the Environmental
Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and
Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components (DOE/EIS-0225, 1996).
Production Rates and New Facilities
While NNSA is not making any new decisions regarding the production
rates of plutonium or uranium components, it has decided that a CMRR-NF
and UPF are essential to its ability to meet national security
requirements regarding the nation's nuclear deterrent. The existing
facilities where these operations are now conducted cannot be used much
longer and cannot be renovated in a manner that is either affordable or
acceptable (from ES&H, security, and production perspectives). As NNSA
continues the design and, in the case of a UPF, NEPA analysis of these
facilities, it can modify them to reflect changing requirements such as
those resulting from a new Nuclear Posture Review, further changes to
stockpile size, and future federal budgets. In short, a CMRR-NF and UPF
are needed for NNSA to maintain its basic nuclear weapons capabilities
because they would replace outdated and deteriorating facilities. These
facilities are needed regardless of how many or what types of weapons
may be called for in the future.
National Security Requirements and Stockpile Size
In making these decisions, NNSA considered its statutory
responsibilities to support the nuclear weapons stockpile as determined
by the President and the Congress. President Bush's goal is to achieve
a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear
warheads consistent with
[[Page 77649]]
national security needs. In 2002, he and Russia's President Putin
signed the Moscow Treaty, under which the United States and Russia will
each reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. In 2004, President Bush issued a
directive to cut the entire U.S. stockpile--both deployed and reserve
warheads--in half by 2012. This goal was later accelerated and achieved
in 2007, five years ahead of schedule. At the end of 2007, the total
stockpile was almost 50 percent below what it was in 2001. On December
18, 2007, the White House announced the President's decision to reduce
the entire nuclear weapons stockpile by another 15 percent by 2012.
This means the U.S. nuclear stockpile will be less than one-quarter its
size at the end of the Cold War--the smallest stockpile since the
Eisenhower Administration.
NNSA's analyses in the SPEIS are based on current national policy
regarding stockpile size (1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads by 2012) with flexibility to respond to future
Presidential direction to make further changes in the numbers of
weapons. Maintaining a stockpile requires the ability to detect aging
effects and other changes in weapons (a surveillance program), the
ability to fix identified problems without nuclear testing (the
stockpile stewardship program), and the ability to produce replacement
components and reassemble weapons (a fully capable set of production
facilities).
NNSA understands that at least two major reviews of the
requirements for the future nuclear weapons program are expected during
the next year. These reviews may influence the size and composition of
the future nuclear weapons stockpile, and the nuclear infrastructure
required to support that stockpile. First, the Congress has established
the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States. This commission is to conduct a review of the strategic posture
of the United States, including a strategic threat assessment and a
detailed review of nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force
structure. Its recommendations, currently scheduled for completion in
the spring of 2009, are expected to address the size and nature of the
future nuclear weapons stockpile, and the capabilities required to
support that stockpile. Second, Congress has directed the
Administration to conduct another Nuclear Posture Review in 2009 to
clarify the United States' nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for
the near term (i.e., the next 5-10 years). A report on this Nuclear
Posture Review is due on December 1, 2009.
NNSA has structured its programs and plans in a manner that allows
it to continue transforming the complex and to replace antiquated
facilities while retaining the flexibility to respond to evolving
national security requirements, which is essential for a truly
responsive infrastructure. The decisions in this ROD allow NNSA to
continue to rely on LANL facilities (with a new CMRR-NF) to provide
maximum flexibility to respond to future changes in plutonium
requirements.
Costs, Technical Risks, and Other Factors
NNSA prepared detailed business case studies of the programmatic
alternatives. These studies are available at http://www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com. They provide a cost comparison of
the alternatives and include costs associated with construction,
transition, operations, maintenance, security, decontamination and
decommissioning, and other relevant factors.\11\ Based on these
studies, NNSA determined that the costs through 2030 for the
consolidation alternatives would be approximately 20-40 percent greater
than for the alternatives that would maintain the three major
capabilities--plutonium operations, uranium operations, and A/D/HE
operations--at their current sites. Additionally, NNSA's analysis found
that, through 2060, the costs for the consolidation alternatives would
be greater than those for the alternatives that maintain the three
capabilities where they are currently located.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The cost analyses considered both life-cycle costs (i.e.,
the cumulative costs over an approximately 50-year life) and
discounted cash flows (i.e., a net present value in which all future
costs are reduced by a common factor (generally the cost of
capital)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to technical risk, as part of the business case
studies, NNSA evaluated five types of risk: (1) Engineering and
construction; (2) implementation; (3) program; (4) safety and
regulatory; and (5) security. These analyses balance nearer-term risks
incurred while transitioning to an alternative with longer-term
operational risks. For example, consolidation alternatives would have
higher risks during the transition due to the challenges associated
with mission relocations, but could have lower long-term operational
risks because of reduced safety, regulatory, or security risks. All
risk criteria were rated equally (20 percent each); a sensitivity
analysis determined that the conclusions were not significantly
affected by adjustments of plus or minus five percent in risk rating
criteria.
The risk assessment was performed by a group of NNSA and contractor
employees who are subject-matter experts, site experts, or both. The
least risky options are those where the sites have previous experience
with the mission or the nuclear material used in that mission.
Alternatives that would locate the plutonium mission at LANL or SRS,
the uranium mission at Y-12, and the weapons assembly and disassembly
mission at Pantex, were determined to pose the lowest risk. Overall,
the consolidation alternatives were judged to have 25-160 percent more
technical risk than alternatives that would not consolidate or relocate
missions.
With respect to plutonium R&D and manufacturing, the cost and risk
analyses showed that keeping this mission at LANL has the least cost
and poses the lowest risk. This results primarily from the fact that
plutonium facilities are very expensive to construct and LANL has
existing facilities, infrastructure, and trained personnel that can be
used for this mission.
The CMRR-NF was analyzed in the Environmental Impact Statement for
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (DOE/EIS-0350,
Nov. 2003). The CMRR EIS evaluated potential environmental impacts of
the proposed relocation of analytical chemistry and materials
characterization activities and associated R&D to a new CMRR. Following
completion of that EIS, NNSA announced its decision to construct and
operate a CMRR consisting of two main buildings, one of which was the
CMRR-NF (69 FR 6967; Feb. 12, 2004). The second building--providing
laboratory, administrative, and support functions--currently is under
construction at LANL. However, NNSA decided to defer a decision
regarding construction and operation of the CMRR-NF until it completed
the Complex Transformation SPEIS (see Section 1.5.2.1, Volume 1 of the
SPEIS).
Analyses of the potential impacts of constructing and operating the
CMRR-NF were updated in the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement
for Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico (2008 LANL SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0380, May 2008) as part of the
Expanded Operations and the No Action Alternatives. In a ROD based on
the 2008 LANL SWEIS, NNSA announced its decision to continue to
implement the No Action Alternative with the
[[Page 77650]]
addition of some elements of the Expanded Operations Alternative. NNSA
did not make any decision related to the CMRR-NF. It explained in the
SWEIS ROD that it would not make any decisions regarding proposed
actions analyzed in the SPEIS prior to completion of the SPEIS (73 FR
55833; Sept. 26, 2008). NNSA considered the analyses in the CMRR EIS
and the 2008 LANL SWEIS, as well as those in the SPEIS in deciding to
construct the CMRR-NF.
With respect to uranium manufacturing and R&D, the cost analyses
indicated that building a UPF at Y-12, eliminating excess space, and
shrinking the security area at the site will significantly reduce
annual operational costs. The UPF at Y-12 will replace 50-year-old
facilities, providing a smaller and modern production capability. It
will enable NNSA to consolidate enriched uranium operations from six
facilities at Y-12, and to reduce the size of the protected area at
that site by as much as 90 percent. A new UPF will also allow NNSA to
better support broader national security missions. These missions
include providing fuel for Naval Reactors; processing and down-blending
incoming HEU from the Global Threat Reduction Initiative; down-blending
HEU for domestic and foreign research reactors in support of
nonproliferation objectives; providing material for high-temperature
fuels for space reactors (NASA); and supporting nuclear counter-
terrorism, nuclear forensics, and the render safe program (program to
disable improvised nuclear devices).
The life cycle cost analysis predicts an average annual savings
over the 50-year facility life of approximately $200 million in FY 2007
dollars. The risk analysis found that moving the uranium mission to a
site other than Y-12 would more than double the technical risks. The
site-specific impacts for a UPF, including issues such as its location
and size, will be analyzed in a new SWEIS for Y-12 that NNSA is
currently preparing.
With respect to weapons assembly and disassembly and high
explosives production, NNSA's decision to keep that mission at Pantex
will result in the least cost and pose the lowest programmatic risk
because the facilities necessary to conduct this work safely and
economically already exist. Although no further NEPA analysis is
required to continue these missions at Pantex, NNSA will continue to
evaluate and update site-specific NEPA documentation as required by DOE
regulations (10 CFR Part 1021).
With respect to SNM removal from LLNL, transferring Category I/II
SNM to other sites and limiting LLNL operations to Category III/IV SNM
will achieve a security savings of approximately $30 million per year
at LLNL.
Potential Environmental Impacts
As described in greater detail in the following paragraphs, NNSA
considered potential environmental impacts in making these decisions.
It analyzed the potential impacts of each alternative on land use;
visual resources; site infrastructure; air quality; noise; geology and
soils; surface and groundwater quality; ecological resources; cultural
and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health impacts;
environmental justice; and waste management. NNSA also evaluated the
impacts of each alternative as to irreversible or irretrievable
commitments of resources, the relationship between short-term uses of
the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and cumulative impacts. In addition, it evaluated impacts
of potential accidents on workers and surrounding populations. The
SPEIS includes a classified appendix that assesses the potential
environmental impacts of a representative set of credible terrorist
scenarios.
The environmental impacts of the alternatives are analyzed in
Chapter 5 of the SPEIS. The impacts of the alternatives NNSA has
decided to pursue are summarized as follows:
Land Use--Minor land disturbance during construction of new
facilities (approximately 6.5 acres at LANL for a CMRR-NF and 35 acres
at Y-12 for a UPF); less area would be disturbed after construction is
complete. At Y-12, construction of a UPF will allow NNSA to reduce the
protected area by as much as 90 percent, which will improve security
and reduce costs. At all sites, land uses will remain compatible with
surrounding areas and with land use plans. At LANL and Y-12, the land
required for operations will be less than 1 percent of the sites' total
areas.
Visual Resources--Changes consistent with currently developed
areas, with no changes in the Visual Resource Management
classification. All sites will remain industrialized.
Infrastructure--Existing infrastructure is adequate to support
construction and operating requirements at all sites. During
operations, any changes to power requirements would be less than 10
percent of the electrical capacity at each site.
Air Quality--During construction, temporary emissions will result,
but National Ambient Air Quality Standards will not be exceeded as a
result of this construction. Operations will not introduce any
significant new emissions and will not exceed any standards.
Water Resources--Water use will not change significantly compared
to existing use and will remain within the amounts of water available
at the NNSA sites. Annual water use at each site will increase by less
than 5 percent.
Biological Resources--No adverse effects on biota and endangered
species. Consultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have
been completed for the CMRR-NF. Consultations with the Fish and
Wildlife Service will be conducted for a UPF during preparation of the
Y-12 SWEIS.
Socioeconomics--Short-term employment increases at LANL and Y-12
during construction activities. The selected alternatives will have the
least disruptive socioeconomic impacts at all sites. At Y-12, the total
workforce will be reduced by approximately 750 workers (approximately
11 percent of the site's workforce) after UPF becomes operational.
Employment at all other sites will change by less than 1 percent
compared to any changes expected under the No Action Alternative.
Environmental Justice--No disproportionately high and adverse
effects on minority or low-income populations will occur at any
affected site; therefore, no environmental justice impacts will occur.
Health and Safety--Radiation doses to workers and the public will
remain well below regulatory limits at all facilities and at all sites.
Doses to the public and workers will cause less than one latent cancer
fatality annually at all sites. Conducting future operations in the
CMRR-NF and UPF will reduce the dose to workers compared to the doses
they receive in existing facilities.
Accidents--The risk of industrial accidents is expected to be low
during construction of the new facilities. Radiological accident risks
will be low (i.e., probabilities of less than one latent cancer
fatality) at all sites. The CMRR-NF and a UPF are expected to reduce
the probability and impacts of potential accidents.
Intentional Destructive Acts--Construction of a UPF and CMRR-NF
will provide better protection to the activities conducted in these
facilities, as it is generally easier and more cost-effective to
protect new facilities because modern security features can be
incorporated into their design. Although the results of the intentional
destructive acts analyses cannot be disclosed, the following general
conclusion can be drawn: The potential consequences of
[[Page 77651]]
intentional destructive acts are highly dependent upon distance to the
site boundary and size of the surrounding population--the closer and
higher the surrounding population, the higher the potential
consequences. Removal of SNM from LLNL will reduce the potential
impacts of intentional destructive acts at that site.
Waste Management--Waste generation will remain within existing and
planned management capabilities at all sites. Existing waste management
facilities are sufficient to manage these wastes and maintain
compliance with regulatory requirements.
Cumulative Impacts--The cumulative environmental impacts of the
alternatives are analyzed in Chapter 6 of the SPEIS. The impacts of the
alternatives when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions will be within all regulatory standards and not result
in significant new impacts.
Mitigation Measures
As described in the SPEIS, NNSA operates in compliance with
environmental laws, regulations, and policies within a framework of
contractual requirements; many of these requirements mandate actions to
control and mitigate potential adverse environmental effects. Examples
include site security and threat protection plans, emergency plans,
Integrated Safety Management Systems, pollution prevention and waste
minimization programs, cultural resource and protected species
programs, and energy and water conservation programs (e.g., the
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Program). Any
additional site-specific mitigation actions would be identified in
site-specific NEPA documents.
Comments Received on the Final SPEIS Related to the Programmatic
Alternatives
During the 30-day period following the EPA's notice of availability
for the Final SPEIS (73 FR 63460; Oct. 24, 2008), NNSA received written
comments from the following groups: Alliance for Nuclear
Accountability, Project on Government Oversight, National Radical
Women, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Oak Ridge Environmental
Peace Alliance, Tri-Valley CAREs, the Union of Concerned Scientists,
Nuclear Watch New Mexico, the Arms and Security Initiative of the New
America Foundation, Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Embudo
Valley Environmental Group, Ecology Ministry, Loretto Community, Aqua
es Vida Action Team, Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping,
and Tewa Women United. Written comments were also received from
approximately 30 individuals. The comments NNSA received related to the
programmatic alternatives and NNSA's responses follow.
Some commenters substantively reiterated comments that they had
provided earlier on the Draft SPEIS, including comments that suggested:
1. NNSA should make no decisions on Complex Transformation until a
new Nuclear Posture Review has been completed by the newly elected
administration and the report issued by the Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the United States.
Response: NNSA believes the SPEIS analysis is consistent with and
supports national security requirements and policies. It is
unreasonable to assume that nuclear weapons would not be a part of this
nation's security requirements over the time period analyzed in the
SPEIS and beyond. The range of alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS
covers the range of national security requirements that NNSA believes
could reasonably evolve from any changes to national policy with regard
to the size and number of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, there is no reason to delay the decisions announced in
this ROD on complex transformation pending a new Nuclear Posture Review
or the recommendations of the Bipartisan Panel reevaluating the United
States' Nuclear Strategic Posture (see Comment Response 1.C, Volume
III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). This ROD fully explains why NNSA is
making these programmatic decisions, why it is appropriate to make
these decisions at this time, and the flexibility NNSA has to adapt to
any changes in national security requirements that may occur in the
near term.
2. The United States does not need nuclear weapons or the
infrastructure that produces and maintains them and should pursue
disarmament consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Response: Decisions on whether the United States should possess
nuclear weapons and the type and number of those weapons are made by
the President and the Congress. As long as this nation has nuclear
weapons, a Complex must exist to ensure their safety, security and
reliability. NNSA believes the SPEIS analysis is consistent with and
supports national security requirements and policies (see Comment
Responses 1.0, 2.K.12, and 3.0, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
3. There is no need to produce new pits (or no need for certain
production rates).
Response: While pits may have extremely long lifetimes and there
may ultimately be no need to produce many additional ones, prudence
requires that the nation have the capability to produce pits should the
need arise. NNSA is not proposing to manufacture any pits unless they
are needed to meet national security requirements. A need to produce
pits could arise due to the effects of aging on existing pits or
changes to our national security policies that could require more pits
than the few NNSA is currently manufacturing for stockpile surveillance
(see Comment Responses 2.K.16, 2.K.22, and 5.C.1, Volume III, Chapter
III of the SPEIS). Until completion of a new Nuclear Posture Review in
2009 or later, the net production at LANL will be limited to a maximum
of 20 pits per year.
4. NNSA should undertake further efforts at compliance with Article
VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (or, Complex
Transformation violates this treaty).
Response: The United States has made significant progress toward
achieving the nuclear disarmament goals set forth in the NPT, and is in
compliance with its Article VI obligations. The NPT does not mandate
disarmament or specific stockpile reductions by nuclear states, and it
does not address actions they take to maintain their stockpiles. NNSA
disagrees with the assertion that Complex Transformation violates the
NPT (see Comment Response 1.F, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
5. NNSA should have included Stockpile Curatorship as a reasonable
alternative fully considered in the SPEIS.
Response: The Curatorship Alternative as proposed by comments on
the Draft SPEIS would have required NNSA to give up the capabilities to
design and develop replacement nuclear components and weapons, forcing
it to rely solely on the surveillance and non-nuclear testing program
to maintain weapons and identify when they need repairs. NNSA believes
it is unreasonable to give up these capabilities in light of the
uncertainties concerning the aging of weapons and changing national
security requirements. As explained in the SPEIS in Section 3.15, this
would impair NNSA's ability to assess and, if necessary, address issues
regarding the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons (see
Comment
[[Page 77652]]
Responses 2.H.2, 5.H.2, and 7.O, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
6. The transformed complex should not support design or production
of new design or modified nuclear weapons.
Response: NNSA is required to maintain nuclear weapons
capabilities, including the capability to design, develop, produce, and
certify new warheads. Maintenance of the capability to certify weapons'
safety and reliability requires an inherent capability to design and
develop new weapons. NNSA has not been directed to produce newly
designed weapons (see Comment Responses 1.B, Volume III, Chapter III of
the SPEIS).
7. NNSA should provide additional information on epidemiological
studies of radiation health of workers and communities.
Response: Many of the workers at DOE's 20 major sites have been
studied epidemiologically, some for decades. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health continues to update these studies as
warranted by public health and scientific considerations. As more
powerful epidemiological study designs become available, new studies of
these workers may provide better information about health risks
associated with radiation exposure (see Comment Responses 14.K.5 and
14.K.6, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). Many of the
epidemiological studies and other related studies are available at
http://cedr.lbl.gov.
8. NNSA should focus on clean-up of its sites rather than building
new facilities to make weapons.
Response: DOE has a large remediation program and is aggressively
addressing past contamination issues at each of its sites. This program
is conducted in accordance with federal and state regulatory
requirements and includes administrative and engineered controls to
minimize releases, as well as surveillance monitoring of the
environment and reporting of exposure assessments. These remediation
activities are directed by federal and state regulators, have their own
schedule and funding, and are separate from actions proposed in the
SPEIS (see Comment Responses 7.J and 9.B, Volume III, Chapter III of
the SPEIS). It is inaccurate to suggest that cleanup and transformation
are mutually exclusive.
9. NNSA should consolidate special nuclear material from LLNL
faster than its current schedule.
Response: NNSA has begun the removal of Category I/II SNM from
LLNL, and plans to complete it by 2012. NNSA will continue to give this
action the high priority requested by the commenter. Safety, security,
and logistical issues associated with preparing SNM for shipment;
shipping the materials; and storage at the receiving sites determine
the schedule for completing this removal (see Comment Response 5.N.4,
Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
10. The modernization of the Kansas City Plant should have been
included in the SPEIS.
Response: The activities of the Kansas City Plant were not
included in the SPEIS because NNSA concluded that decisions regarding
the consolidation and modernization of the Kansas City Plant's
activities (the production and procurement of electrical and mechanical
non-nuclear components) would not affect or limit the programmatic
alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS, or the decisions NNSA makes
regarding these alternatives (see Comment Response 12.0, Volume III,
Chapter III of the SPEIS).
11. The SPEIS is not written in plain language and lacks a clear
format.
Response: NNSA prepared the SPEIS in accordance with the
requirements of NEPA and the DOE and CEQ NEPA regulations. NNSA
believes that the SPEIS is clearly written and organized in light of
the highly technical subject matter and complex nature of the
alternatives (see Comment Response 2.A, Volume III, Chapter III of the
SPEIS).
12. NNSA inadequately addressed the environmental impacts of
intentional destructive acts. NNSA must disclose the potential impacts
of successfully executed credible terrorist attack scenarios at sites
in the nuclear weapons complex and make this information available to
the public.
Response: A classified appendix to the Complex Transformation
SPEIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of credible
terrorist attacks that NNSA assumed (for purposes of analysis pursuant
to NEPA) were successful at specific existing and proposed facilities.
The appendix is classified both because the scenarios evaluated contain
classified information and because there is a risk that these scenarios
and their potential impacts could be exploited by terrorists or others
contemplating harmful acts. Therefore, the SPEIS provides limited
information about these acts and their potential consequences (see
``Potential Environmental Impacts'' above and Comment Responses 13.B
and 13.D, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
13. NNSA failed to consider long-acting consequences of nuclear
weapons production, including the impacts that result from every year
of operation. NNSA also failed to consider the deployment or potential
use of the nation's nuclear arsenal.
Response: The SPEIS assesses the direct, indirect, and cumulative
environmental impacts of the No Action Alternative and reasonable
alternatives for the proposed action. Impacts are assessed for both
construction and operations. For operations, the SPEIS focuses on the
steady-state impacts of operations. Those annual operational impacts
are assumed to occur year-after-year. Now that NNSA has made decisions
regarding programmatic alternatives, it may need to prepare additional
NEPA documents such as site- or facility-level analyses (e.g., the
ongoing Y-12 SWEIS for a UPF now that NNSA has decided to locate it at
Y-12) (see Comment Response 11.0, Volume III, Chapter III of the
SPEIS). NNSA does not make decisions concerning the size, deployment or
potential use of the nation's nuclear arsenal, and therefore the
consequences of these decisions are not appropriate for analysis in the
SPEIS.
14. NNSA inadequately addressed the cumulative impacts of the
alternatives, including a detailed and careful analysis of the
cumulative impacts of major nuclear-related facilities in New Mexico.
Additionally, Comment Response 14.J.4 incorrectly states that Appendix
C and D include information about an analysis of cumulative impacts
with an extended region of influence of 100 miles.
Response: NNSA addressed potential cumulative impacts resulting
from Complex Transformation and ongoing and reasonably anticipated
actions of NNSA, other agencies and private developers. In response to
public comments, NNSA added a detailed analysis of the cumulative
impacts of major nuclear-related facilities in New Mexico. NNSA thinks
that analysis is appropriately detailed. The assessment of cumulative
impacts is in Chapter 6 of Volume II of the SPEIS (see Comment
Responses 2.I and 14.O, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). With
respect to the analysis of cumulative impacts with an extended region
of influence of 100 miles, NNSA agrees that the Final SPEIS incorrectly
referred the reader to Appendix C and D. NNSA intended to refer the
reader to the LANL SWEIS, which shows that extending the region of
influence out another 50 miles increases the affected population by 300
percent, while the population dose increases by only 13 percent. NNSA
regrets this error.
15. NNSA inadequately addressed Environmental Justice, including a
more detailed analysis of transportation impacts and waste disposal.
[[Page 77653]]
Response: Under Executive Order 12898, NNSA is responsible for
identifying and addressing potential disproportionately high and
adverse human health and environmental impacts on minority or low-
income populations. Based on the SPEIS's analyses, NNSA concluded that
there would not be any disproportionately high and adverse human health
and environmental impacts on minority or low-income populations. In
response to public comments received, NNSA also included information
regarding a ``special pathways analysis'' for operations at LANL for
the purpose of assessing how impacts would change compared to standard
modeling results. The special pathway analysis is identified in Volume
II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.10 of the SPEIS, and the results of that
analysis are presented in Comment Response 14.J, Volume III, Chapter
III of the SPEIS.
16. NNSA inadequately addressed the impacts associated with design
and production of Reliable Replacement Warheads.
Response: The continuing transformation of the complex is
independent of decisions regarding Reliable Replacement Warheads that
the Congress and President may make. At present, the Congress has
declined to provide additional funding for development of these
warheads (see Comment Responses 2.K.19 and 8.0, Volume III, Chapter III
of the SPEIS).
17. NNSA has provided an inadequate basis to decide to locate a UPF
at Oak Ridge and there is insufficient information in the SPEIS to
select a site for a UPF.
Response: Programmatic alternatives regarding a UPF are analyzed
in the SPEIS. The SPEIS is the appropriate document to analyze and
support programmatic decisions related to major uranium missions and
facilities. The Y-12 SWEIS, currently under preparation, will evaluate
site-specific issues associated with continued production operations at
Y-12, including issues related to construction and operation of a UPF
such as its location and size. NNSA will make decisions regarding the
specific location and size based on the more detailed analysis that
will be in the Y-12 SWEIS (see Comment Response 5.C.2, Volume III,
Chapter III of the SPEIS).
18. Commenters said that NNSA should accelerate consolidation of
excess SNM and down-blend hundreds of metric tons of excess HEU, which
is highly desirable to nuclear terrorists who could use it to quickly
and easily create a crude nuclear device.
Response: Disposal of excess SNM is addressed by the Material
Disposition Program. NNSA has an ongoing program to down-blend HEU for
disposition, as described in the ROD (61 FR 40619; August 5, 1996) for
the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Environmental Impact
Statement (DOE/EIS-0240, 1996). The potential environmental impacts of
an intentional destructive act, such as terrorism or sabotage, are
addressed in a classified appendix to the SPEIS (see Comment Responses
5.M, 5.N, and 13.0, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
19. NNSA should not move forward with the construction of the CMRR-
NF at LANL because of problems with NNSA construction projects, the
federal government's limited economic resources, and adequate existing
space at the LANL PF-4. Another commenter asked why the CMRR-NF is
needed.
Response: As explained in detail in this ROD, the CMRR-NF is a
needed modernization of LANL's plutonium capabilities. Continued use of
the existing CMR facility is inefficient and poses ES&H and security
concerns that cannot be addressed by modifying the CMR. The CMRR-NF
will be safer, seismically robust, and easier to defend from potential
terrorist attacks (see Comment Responses 3.0, 5.C.1, 5.C.6, and 9.0,
Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
20. The potential environmental impacts of postulated accidents are
not adequately addressed in the SPEIS, including the potential impacts
to air, land, and water resulting from postulated accidents.
Response: Accidents are addressed in the Health and Safety
Sections for each site and include analyses for a full spectrum of
accidents with both high and low probabilities (see Comment Response
14.N, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). The accident analysis
focused on human health impacts, which NNSA decided was a reasonable
metric for comparing the programmatic alternatives.
21. A new, more thorough, more transparent cost analysis needs to
be done before Complex Transformation plans are allowed to proceed.
Response: The purpose and need for complex transformation result
from NNSA's need for a nuclear weapons complex that can be operated
less expensively. NNSA prepared business case analyses to provide cost
information on the alternatives considered in the SPEIS. NNSA
considered these studies, the analyses in the SPEIS, and other
information to make these decisions regarding transforming the complex.
The business case analyses are available to the public on the project
Web site: http://www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com (see Comment
Response 9.0, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). NNSA believes
these studies are adequate for making programmatic and project-specific
decisions.
22. NNSA failed to consider an alternative that truly consolidates
the nuclear weapons complex.
Response: The SPEIS analyzes alternatives that would make the
complex more efficient and responsive than it would be under the No
Action Alternative. Consolidation alternatives were formulated with
that purpose and need in mind. The SPEIS assesses a range of reasonable
alternatives for the future weapons complex that includes alternatives
that, if they had been selected, would have eliminated one or more
nuclear weapons complex sites (see Comment Responses 7.A.5, 7.A.6, and
7.A.7, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). As this ROD explains,
relocating uranium, plutonium, and A/D/HE capabilities would be too
expensive and risky.
23. Complex Transformation endangers human health.
Response: New facilities would be designed and operated to
minimize risk to both workers and the general public during normal
operations and in the event of an accident. Benefiting from decades of
experience, NNSA employs modern processes; manufacturing technologies;
and safety, environmental, security, and management procedures to
protect against adverse health impacts (see Comment Response 14.K,
Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
24. NNSA has not adequately addressed public comments about water
usage, radioactive and toxic air emissions, impacts to humans, and
impacts to agricultural lands or prime farmlands surrounding LANL
resulting from past, current, and future operations of LANL.
Response: The environmental impacts of operating LANL are
described in Chapter 4, Section 4.1 of Volume 1 of the SPEIS. The
analysis examined surrounding land uses, water availability and usage,
air quality and airborne emissions, surface and groundwater quality and
discharges, human health, waste management, visual resources, noise,
and other impacts of operating LANL. Chapter 5, Section 5.1 of Volume
II of the SPEIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts of the
alternatives evaluated in the SPEIS in the same media areas. See
Comment Responses 14.E.11 through 14.E.14, Volume III, Chapter III of
the SPEIS. For example, comment response
[[Page 77654]]
14.E.11 states that ``due to concern expressed for the quality of
agriculture in the LANL region, NMED (New Mexico Environment
Department) collects and analyzes foodstuff samples as part of its
surveillance program to ensure quality standards are met.'' The 2008
LANL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0380), and the ROD (73 FR 55833; Sept. 26, 2008)
based on the analyses in it, presented NNSA's responses to similar
comments in more detail. NNSA based its programmatic decisions
affecting LANL on both the SPEIS and the SWEIS.
25. Albuquerque will begin drinking water from the Rio Grande on
December 5, 2008. The Albuquerque Water Utility Authority (WUA), which
oversees the project, has detected long-lived alpha-emitting
radionuclides in the river. Although the levels of these radionuclides
are below regulatory concern, the research shows that the current EPA
standards for long-lived alpha-emitting radionuclides are not
protective of the fetus and the young child. The WUA has asked LANL to
reveal the extent of the radiation on the plateau and canyons that
contribute to the river to no avail.
Response: Water quality and use at LANL are addressed in the SPEIS
at Section 4.1.5 of Volume I. Impacts of complex transformation on
water resources at LANL are addressed in Section 5.1.5 of Volume II.
There is no indication that contamination from LANL is affecting
Albuquerque's drinking water supply. According to a 2007 water quality
report, gross alpha particle activity, radium-228, radium-226, and
uranium were among regulated substances that were monitored but not
detected (Albuquerque Bernilillo County Water Utility Authority, 2007
Drinking Water Quality Report). The 2007 water quality report may be
accessed at http://www.abcwua.org/content/view/280/484/ (see Comment
Response 14.E, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
26. NNSA failed to address comments concerning elevated levels of
radionuclides in the Rio Embudo Watershed.
Response: The levels of radionuclides from the fallout produced by
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons (e.g., cesium-137, strontium-90,
and plutonium-239) are expected to be elevated at Trampas Lake and in
the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in which the Embudo Valley lies. The
Trampas Lake data agree with expectations for global fallout at this
location and are not a result of LANL activities (see Comment Response
14.K.8, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
27. Seismic fasteners, ties, and other protections should be used
in the construction of the Radiological Laboratory, Utility, and Office
Building (RLUOB) within the CMRR project.
Response: NNSA is building the RLUOB to the highest applicable
seismic standards. Even though the structure is a radiological
laboratory and would not normally be constructed to the same standards
as a high hazard nuclear facility, NNSA is nevertheless constructing it
to those higher standards (see Comment Response 14.K.7, Chapter III,
Volume III of the SPEIS).
28. NNSA did not respond to the comment that it must expand air
monitoring in downwind communities and should no longer hide under the
grandfather clause for air emissions from its old facilities at LANL.
Response: Operating permits issued pursuant to Title V of the Clean
Air Act at NNSA sites include requirements for monitoring emissions
from sources and keeping records concerning those sources and their
emissions. Monitoring of the environment in and around NNSA sites
generally includes air, water, soil, and foodstuffs, and monitoring
results are reported in annual environmental surveillance reports.
Chapter 10 of Volume II of the SPEIS describes permits issued by
regulatory authorities for NNSA facilities and operations. At LANL,
NNSA complies with the Clean Air Act and its emissions are regulated by
the New Mexico Environment Department (see Comment Response 14.D.2,
Chapter III, Volume III of the SPEIS).
29. Will LANL become the second Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
site in New Mexico under the Complex Transformation proposal?
Response: This comment concerns the disposal path for newly
generated transuranic waste that could result from decisions made on
complex transformation. The alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS could
generate transuranic waste after WIPP's scheduled closure in 2035. At
this time, DOE is not considering any legislative changes to extend
WIPP's operation or to develop a second repository for transuranic
waste. Any transuranic waste that is generated without a disposal
pathway would be safely stored until disposal capacity becomes
available (see Comment Response 14.M.4, Chapter III, Volume III of the
SPEIS).
30. LANL has failed to install a reliable network of monitoring
wells at the laboratory.
Response: LANL's groundwater monitoring program was discussed in
the 2008 LANL SWEIS. Groundwater monitoring at LANL is conducted in
compliance with the ``Order on Consent for Los Alamos National
Laboratory'' (Consent Order), and consistent with the Interim Facility-
wide Groundwater Monitoring Plan that was approved by the New Mexico
Environment Department in June 2006. Some of the groundwater data at
LANL are being reassessed due to potential residual drilling fluid
effects. Drilling fluid effects are quantitatively assessed in LANL's
Well-Screen Analysis Report, Rev. 2 (LA-UR-07-2852; May 2007). Fifty-
two percent of the well screens evaluated in this report produce
samples that are not significantly impacted by drilling fluids. LANL
has initiated a program to better evaluate the wells and to
rehabilitate wells that may be producing suspect results. LANL is using
the results of a pilot study to develop a proposed course of action for
approval by the New Mexico Environment Department. The process is
established by and in compliance with the Consent Order (see Comment
Responses 14.E.2 and 14.E.1, Chapter III, Volume III of the SPEIS).
31. The existing CMR facility is not safe and the seismic hazards
at LANL are uncertain. The commenters assert that many of their
specific comments concerning seismic issues at LANL were not properly
addressed. The commenters also state that due to seismic risks, all
plutonium operations at LANL should immediately cease.
Response: Section 4.1.6 of Volume I of the SPEIS addresses seismic
issues at LANL and Comment Responses 7.0, 14.F.1, 14.K.12, 14.N.8 and
19.E provide additional information on the seismic issues at LANL and
the Justification for Continued Operation under which the laboratory's
facilities operate. NNSA decided to construct the CMRR-NF largely
because the CMR facility cannot be modified to safely operate for many
more years (see the basis for decision for plutonium research and
development and operations above).
In addition to the comments that were essentially identical to ones
submitted on the Draft SPEIS and to which NNSA responded to in the
Final SPEIS, NNSA received the following new comments.
1. Some commenters stated they were unable to identify responses in
the Final SPEIS to some of their comments.
Response: NNSA reviewed the comments it received to ensure that
responses had been included in the Final SPEIS. Based on this review,
NNSA concluded that it had provided appropriate responses for all
comments and that responses to these commenters' submissions were
included in the Final SPEIS.
[[Page 77655]]
2. The April 9, 2008, comments of the New Mexico Conference of
Catholic Bishops, in a letter signed by Most Rev. Michael J. Sheehan,
Archbishop of Santa Fe, and Most Rev. Ricardo Ramirez, CSB, Bishop of
Las Cruces, were omitted from the SPEIS's text and compact disc (CD).
Response: NNSA does not have any record of receiving the letter
identified above prior to issuing the Final SPEIS. However, NNSA
contacted the commenter and requested a copy of the letter. That letter
raised questions and issues related to: Potential violations of
treaties; an international arms race; whether transformation of LANL
will result in a more responsive infrastructure; whether the proposed
transformation of the complex is based on a Nuclear Posture Review
conducted before or after September 11, 2001; the type of Congressional
support that has been received; and the costs and funding source for
decontamination and decommissioning. NNSA reviewed these comments and
concluded that the Final SPEIS addresses each of them.
3. A commenter asserted that the Scarboro community, within 5 miles
of the Y-12 facility, is disproportionately impacted, historically and
currently, by the pollutants released on the Oak Ridge Reservation.
This commenter also urged NNSA to refrain from issuing a ROD for the
SPEIS until it commissions and receives an independent study of canned
subassembly/secondary reliability, indicating whether a UPF is actually
necessary; and until NNSA prepares a supplemental EIS considering the
nonproliferation impacts of the proposed action.
Response: NNSA conducted its Environmental Justice analysis
consistent with the requirements of the applicable Executive Order and
related guidance. Section 14.J of Volume III, Chapter III, addresses
the Environmental Justice comments received during the comment period.
The Scarboro community is identified as the closest developed area to
Y-12 (see Volume II, Chapter 4, Section 4.9.2 of the SPEIS). The
analysis in the SPEIS did not result in any disproportionately high and
adverse impacts on any minority or low-income populations at Y-12 (see
Volume II, Chapter 5, Sections 5.9.10, 5.9.11, and 5.9.12 of the
SPEIS). The reasons for NNSA's decision to proceed with a UPF are set
forth above in the discussion of uranium manufacturing and research and
development. Comment Response 1.F, Volume III, Chapter III, addresses
the nonproliferation impacts of Complex Transformation.
4. The Comment Response Document does not include several public
petitions, including one from members of Santa Clara Pueblo supporting
the comments made by the Tribal Council of Santa Clara Pueblo. Another
petition circulated by youth in the Espanola Valley by the Community
Service Organization del Norte (CSO del Norte) is also omitted. Many of
the individual comment letters from people living in the Rio Embudo
Watershed are missing as well. There is no listing of the names of
these commenters in Tables 1.3-3, 1.3-4, 1.3-5 or 1.3-6. The listing of
the ``Campaign Comment Documents'' fails to give any indication of the
leaders of the campaigns or any geographic reference, unless one flips
through that section of the document.
Response: NNSA received approximately 100,000 comment documents on
the Draft SPEIS from federal agencies; state, local, and tribal
governments; public and private organizations; and individuals. In
addition, during the 20 public hearings that NNSA held, more than 600
speakers made oral comments. NNSA made every effort to include all
comment documents in the SPEIS and to identify and to address every
comment. Because it would be impractical to list the names of all
commenters who submitted campaign e-mails, letters, and postcards,
those names are provided electronically in the CD version of the SPEIS
and on the project Web site (http://www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com). In addition, the CD contains
additional information on the public comment period and includes
meeting transcripts and signatories for campaign documents and
petitions. With regard to the petition from members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo, NNSA believes this petition was submitted as a comment on the
2008 LANL SWEIS and not as a comment on the SPEIS. NNSA responded to
the petition in the ROD it issued in September that was based on the
SWEIS. If any comment documents or petitions were omitted from the
SPEIS, NNSA regrets that.
5. In Comment Response 14.K.11, Chapter III, Volume III of the
SPEIS, NNSA, in response to a comment related to under-reported
historic radiation emissions, stated that it was ``unaware of any
published CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] study with
findings as described by the commenter.'' The commenter had provided a
reference to a Los Alamos Historical Document Retrieval and Assessment
Project report for documentation of their claim that ``DOE has grossly
under-reported historic radiation emissions by nearly 60-fold.''
Response: NNSA reviewed the Los Alamos Historical Document
Retrieval and Assessment Project report, and NNSA stands by Comment
Response 14.K.11, Chapter III, Volume III of the SPEIS, which states
that, ``Chapter 4, Section 4.6.1, of the LANL SWEIS (LANL 2008) shows
the radiation doses received over the past 10 years from LANL
operations by the surrounding population and hypothetical maximally
exposed individual (MEI). The annual dose to the hypothetical MEI has
consistently been smaller than the annual 10-millirem radiation dose
limit established for airborne emissions by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. The final LANL Public Health Assessment, by the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, reports that ``there
is no evidence of contamination from LANL that might be expected to
result in ill health to the community,'' and that ``overall, cancer
rates in the Los Alamos area are similar to cancer rates found in other
communities'' (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Public
Health Assessment, Final, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2006).
6. A commenter noted that Comment Response 14.J.4, Chapter III,
Volume III, of the SPEIS incorrectly refers the reader to Appendix D
for a description of the accident analysis.
Response: The reference to Appendix D is incorrect. The correct
reference should have been to Appendix C. NNSA regrets the confusion
caused by this error.
7. A commenter stated that NNSA made a commitment to refrain from
making a siting decision on the UPF until the Y-12 SWEIS is completed.
Response: NNSA did not make such a commitment. This ROD explains
NNSA's decision to construct a UPF at Y-12 based on the analysis
contained in the SPEIS and other factors. This decision is not a
decision as to where at Y-12 the new facility would be located or its
size. Those decisions will be made based on the more detailed analysis
in the Y-12 SWEIS. Additionally, the Y-12 SWEIS will include one or
more alternatives that do not include a UPF. The public will have the
opportunity to review and comment on the Draft SWEIS when it is
prepared.
8. With respect to the new section (Section 6.4) that NNSA added to
the Final SPEIS to provide more information on the potential cumulative
impacts of nuclear activities in New Mexico, one commenter stated that
Pantex should be added to that cumulative assessment because it is just
[[Page 77656]]
as close to WIPP and to LANL as WIPP and LANL are to each other.
Another commenter stated that the impacts of the WSMR should be
included in that assessment.
Response: NNSA added Section 6.4 in response to public comments on
the Draft SPEIS that requested an analysis of cumulative impacts for
the three DOE nuclear Facilities in New Mexico, as well as other major
planned or proposed nuclear facilities in the state. In part, these
comments stated that the regions of influence for LANL and SNL/NM
overlap and that all three DOE sites are along the Rio Grande corridor
in New Mexico. NNSA believes that Section 6.4 is adequate and
responsive to public comments received regarding the cumulative impact
assessment of nuclear activities in New Mexico. As Pantex is not
located in New Mexico, and its region of influence does not extend into
New Mexico, it was not included in Section 6.4. Also, because the WSMR
does not conduct nuclear activities, it was not included in Section
6.4.
9. A commenter stated that the socioeconomic impacts described in
the SPEIS are ``incomplete and vague,'' and asked for an explanation
regarding the economic multiplier used in the analysis.
Response: NNSA reviewed this comment and believes that the
socioeconomic analyses contained in the SPEIS are appropriate and
comply with NEPA's requirements. The economic multipliers used in the
SPEIS vary by location and are consistent with the multipliers
estimated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and multipliers used
in other NEPA documents.
10. The SPEIS failed to address impacts on global warming.
Response: The SPEIS assesses the direct, indirect, and cumulative
environmental impacts of the No Action Alternative and reasonable
alternatives for the proposed action. The assessment of impacts
includes, where appropriate, the direct and indirect contributions to
the emission of greenhouse gases resulting from operation and
transformation of the nuclear weapons complex. As to the programmatic
alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS, the direct impacts would result
from the construction and operation of major facilities involved in
operations using SNM (e.g., a CPC, CNPC, CMRR-NF, UPF), and from the
transportation of components, materials and waste. The emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2) from construction and operation of
proposed major facilities are estimated in Chapter 5 (see Tables 5.1.4-
1 and 5.1.4-3 in Section 5.1.4 of Chapter 5, Volume II of the SPEIS).
The potential emissions from transportation are a direct function of
numbers of trips and their distances. The significant differences among
the various programmatic alternatives as to transportation also appear
in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.10 of Chapter 5, Volume II of the SPEIS).
The indirect impacts of the programmatic alternatives would result
primarily from the use of electricity that is generated from the mix of
generating capacities (gas, coal, nuclear, wind, geothermal, etc.)
operated by the utilities NNSA purchases power from; these utilities
may alter that mix in the future regardless of the decisions NNSA makes
regarding transformation of the complex. The use of electricity under
the programmatic alternatives is shown in Chapter 5 (see Tables 5.1.3-1
and 5.1.3-2 in Section 5.1.3 of Chapter 5, Volume II of the SPEIS).
Overall, the release of greenhouse gases from the nuclear weapons
complex constitutes a miniscule contribution to the release of these
gases in the United States and the world. Overall U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions in 2007 totaled about 7,282 million metric tons of
CO2 equivalents, including about 6,022 million metric tons
of CO2. These emissions resulted primarily from fossil fuel
combustion and industrial processes. About 40 percent of CO2
emissions come from the generation of electrical power (Energy
Information Administration, ``Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the
United States 2007,'' DOE/EIA-0573 [2007]).
As the impacts of greenhouse gas releases on climate change are
inherently cumulative, NNSA, and the DOE as a whole, strive to reduce
their contributions to this cumulatively significant impact in making
decisions regarding their ongoing and proposed actions. DOE's efforts
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases extend from research on carbon
sequestration and new energy efficient technologies to making its own
operations more efficient in order to reduce energy consumption and
thereby decrease its contributions to greenhouse gases.
NNSA considers the potential cumulative impact of climate change in
making decisions regarding its activities, including decisions
regarding continuing the transformation of the nuclear weapons complex.
Many of these decisions are applicable to the broad array of NNSA's
activities, and therefore are independent of decisions regarding
complex transformation. For example, NNSA (and other elements of the
Department) are entering into energy savings performance contracts at
its sites, under which a contractor examines all aspects of a site's
operation for ways to improve energy use and efficiency. Also, NNSA
seeks to reduce its contribution to climate change through decisions
regarding individual actions, such as pursuing LEED certification for
its new construction and refurbishment of its aging infrastructure.
Examples of these decisions include projects that replace aging boilers
and chillers with equipment that is more energy efficient. Such
projects are underway at Y-12, SNL/NM, and LANL (``DOE Announces
Contracts to Achieve $140 Million in Energy Efficiency Improvements to
DOE Facilities,'' August 4, 2008, available at: http://www.energy.gov/6449.htm).
NNSA considered its contributions to the cumulative impacts that
may lead to climate change in making the programmatic decisions
announced in this ROD. These decisions will allow NNSA to reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions by consolidating operations, modernizing its
heating, cooling and production equipment, and replacing old facilities
with ones that are more energy efficient. Many of these actions would
not be feasible if NNSA had selected the No Action Alternative, which
would have required it to maintain the Complex's outdated
infrastructure. Federal regulations and DOE Orders require the
Department of Energy to follow energy-efficient and sustainable
principles in its siting, design, construction, and operation of new
facilities, and in major renovations of existing facilities. These
principles, which will apply to construction and operation of a UPF at
Y-12 and the CMRR-NF at LANL, as well as to other facilities, include
features that conserve energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Issued at Washington, DC, this 15th day of December 2008.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Administration.
[FR Doc. E8-30193 Filed 12-18-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P