[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 125 (Wednesday, July 1, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31420-31424]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15534]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Finding of No Significant Impact: Disposition of DOE Excess
Depleted Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Finding of No Significant Impact.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, the Department) has
completed an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the Disposition of DOE
Excess Depleted Uranium (DU), Natural Uranium (NU), and Low-Enriched
Uranium (LEU) (DOE/EA-1607). Based on the analysis in the EA, the
Department has determined that the proposed action, DOE dispositioning
its excess uranium inventory using one or a combination of two
methods--(1) enrichment to either NU or LEU product and subsequent
storage or sale of the resultant NU or LEU product (Enrichment
Alternative), and (2) direct sale to appropriately licensed entities
(Direct Sale Alternative)--does not constitute a major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the
context of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
Therefore, the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
is not required and the Department is issuing this Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI).
ADDRESSES: Single copies of the EA and FONSI may be obtained from:
Mr. Ronald Hagen, NEPA Document Manager, NE-6, Forrestal Building, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC
20585-0113, Phone: (202) 586-1381, Facsimile: (202) 287-3701,
Electronic mail: [email protected].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. Ronald Hagen, Phone: (202) 586-1381, Electronic mail:
[email protected].
For information on DOE's NEPA process:
Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, NEPA Policy and Compliance, GC-20,
Forrestal Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585-0113, Phone: (202) 586-4600,
Facsimile: (202) 586-7031.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background: DOE owns and manages an
inventory of excess DU, NU, and LEU. This inventory is currently stored
in large cylinders as depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6),
natural uranium hexafluoride (NUF6), and low-enriched
uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) at the DOE Paducah site in
western Kentucky (DOE Paducah) and the DOE Portsmouth site near Piketon
in south-central Ohio (DOE Portsmouth). This inventory exceeds DOE's
current and projected energy and defense program needs. The Secretary
of Energy policy statement on the management of DOE excess uranium
inventory issued on March 11, 2008, commits DOE to managing all of its
excess uranium inventory in a manner that (1) is consistent with all
applicable legal requirements; (2) maintains sufficient uranium
inventory at all times to meet the current and reasonably foreseeable
needs of Departmental missions; (3) undertakes transactions involving
non-U.S. Government entities in a transparent and competitive manner,
unless the Secretary determines in writing that overriding Departmental
mission needs dictate otherwise; and (4) is consistent with and
supportive of the maintenance of a strong domestic nuclear industry.
In conformance with the requirements of the Council on
Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA
Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021), the Department prepared a
draft EA which was issued for public review on December 24, 2008.
Comments were received from potentially affected states, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and uranium industry organizations. The draft EA
was revised in response to the comments, as appropriate.
Alternatives and Environmental Impacts: The potential environmental
impacts associated with the proposed disposition of excess uranium
inventory were analyzed for the following alternatives:
No Action Alternative: DOE would continue with existing plans to
convert DU to a more stable chemical form at the two new conversion
facilities and would not enrich or sell any of its excess DU inventory
as proposed in this EA. DOE would also continue to store excess NU and
LEU in their current configurations at Portsmouth and Paducah.
Alternative 1--Enrichment: DOE would contract for enrichment of
excess DU, NU, and LEU and subsequent storage or sale of the resultant
NU or LEU product. DOE would ship by commercial carriers (truck, rail,
barge, and/or ship) excess DU, NU, and LEU to one or more of four
enrichment facilities (three domestic and one foreign). LEU product
could be stored at up to three U.S. commercial nuclear fuel fabrication
facilities in North Carolina, South Carolina, and/or Washington State,
and/or at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. NU product could be stored
at enrichment facilities in Kentucky, New Mexico, and/or Ohio, and/or
at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. DOE would contract with the
enrichment facility to store and/or dispose of the DU tails or, in the
case of domestic enrichment facilities, to ship the DU tails to DOE
Paducah and/or DOE Portsmouth for storage.
Alternative 2--Direct Sale: DOE would introduce excess DU, NU, and
LEU into the commercial market through direct sales to appropriately
licensed entities. The licensed purchasers would take delivery,
transport and enrich the excess inventory, and transport and store the
NU or LEU product in essentially the same manner and using essentially
the same facilities as would DOE under the Enrichment Alternative.
The potential environmental impacts of all aspects of enrichment
operations and the conversion of DU tails have been previously analyzed
in existing NEPA documents and have been summarized and incorporated by
reference in the EA. In addition, the EA analyzed (1) previously
unanalyzed impacts on health and safety from transportation of the
excess inventory, LEU product, NU, and DU tails, (2)
[[Page 31421]]
impacts associated with accidents and intentional destructive acts
(terrorism, sabotage), and (3) economic impacts of the proposed action
on the domestic uranium industry. In general, the impacts identified
for the Enrichment and Direct Sale Alternatives are similar if not
identical. The attached Summary of the EA provides a summarization of
the alternatives and the impacts.
Mitigation: The Mitigation Action Plan (MAP), which follows this
determination and is an integral part of this FONSI, specifies the
analyses the Department would undertake prior to sales and transfers of
excess NU, DU, and LEU and commits the Department to implement
appropriate mitigation measures to avoid or minimize any potentially
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry.
Conclusion: The potential environmental impacts of the proposed
action have been analyzed in the EA. The analysis shows that no
significant impacts are likely to occur as a result of the Department
undertaking the proposed action. Further, no adverse impacts on the
uranium industry are expected as the Department has committed to
conduct analysis prior to each transaction and to take appropriate
action to mitigate any adverse impacts on the uranium industry.
Determination: Based on the analysis in the subject EA and the
commitments in the Mitigation Action Plan outlined below, the
Department has determined that the proposed disposition of the excess
uranium inventory of DU, NU, and LEU using one or a combination of two
methods--(1) enriching it and then storing or selling the resultant
product, and/or (2) selling excess DU, NU, and LEU inventory to
appropriately licensed entities--would not have significant
environmental impacts, including impacts on the domestic uranium
mining, conversion or enrichment industry (domestic uranium industry)
and is not a major Federal action that would significantly affect the
quality of the human environment within the context of NEPA. Therefore,
the preparation of an EIS is not required.
Mitigation Action Plan for the Disposition of DOE Excess Depleted
Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium
Purpose: This Mitigation Action Plan will be implemented by DOE to
mitigate any potentially significant impacts on the domestic uranium
industry from DOE's decision to disposition the excess NU, DU, and LEU
inventory at DOE's Paducah and Portsmouth sites by enriching it, and
then storing or selling the resultant product, and/or selling excess
NU, DU, and LEU inventory to appropriately licensed entities, as
analyzed in the Environmental Assessment for the Disposition of DOE
Excess Depleted Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium.
Mitigation Action Plan: The DOE NEPA requirements governing
mitigation action plans are set forth at 10 CFR 1021.331. This
regulation specifies at 10 CFR 1021.331(b) that, in cases where an EA
supports a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), DOE shall also
prepare a MAP for commitments to mitigation that are essential to
render the impacts of the proposed action not significant. In such
cases, the MAP must address all commitments to such necessary
mitigations and explain how mitigation will be planned and implemented.
The MAP must be prepared before the FONSI is issued, and referenced in
the FONSI. In addition, the MAP must be as complete as possible,
commensurate with the information available regarding the action to be
covered by the FONSI, and may be revised as more specific and detailed
information becomes available. 10 CFR 1021.331(c).
This MAP addresses the DOE commitments that are necessary and how
they will be planned or implemented to mitigate any potentially
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry from DOE's
Proposed Action. In the EA, DOE identified two mitigation measures that
underlie its analysis and would be utilized to mitigate any potentially
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry from its Proposed
Action: (1) Prior to particular sales or transfers of NU and LEU, as
applicable, a Secretarial Determination pursuant to section 3112(d) of
the USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-134) would be prepared to
determine that there is no adverse material impact from the sale or
transfer on the domestic uranium industry; and (2) prior to particular
sales or transfers of DU, DOE would conduct an analysis to ensure there
would be no potentially significant impacts from the sale or transfer
on the domestic uranium industry (EA, Section 4.3.2).
The first mitigation measure is required under the USEC
Privatization Act for certain sales or transfers of NU and LEU and DOE
would plan and implement that measure consistent with existing law \1\
and policy. That is, DOE would conduct a market impact analysis to
determine the potential impacts of the proposed sale or transfer on the
domestic uranium industry taking into account the sales of uranium
under the Russian HEU Agreement and the Suspension Agreement, and other
uranium sales or transfers by the DOE (including the National Nuclear
Security Administration). Among other things, the market impact
analysis would consider, as appropriate, current and projected uranium
prices, enrichment capacity, uranium mining activities, and commercial
contracting practices. Should the market impact analysis indicate
adverse material impacts on the domestic uranium industry, the proposed
sale or transfer would be adjusted as necessary to ensure that such
adverse impacts are avoided or mitigated. The sale or transfer may be
approved and implemented only if the Secretary determines that the sale
or transfer would not have adverse material impacts on the domestic
uranium industry.
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\1\ Although DOE compliance with the requirements of section
3112(d) of the USEC Privatization Act is included in this MAP as a
mitigation measure, it should be noted that it is an integral
element of the Proposed Action and, as such, need not be included or
described in this MAP. However, it has been included herein to
provide a comprehensive explanation of the actions that would be
undertaken by DOE to mitigate any potentially significant impacts on
the domestic uranium industry from the Proposed Action.
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The second mitigation measure applies to DU and is not required
under the USEC Privatization Act; however, as indicated in the EA, DOE
would conduct an analysis prior to particular sales or transfers of DU
to ensure there would be no potentially significant impacts to the
domestic uranium industry. Conducting such an analysis would be
consistent with DOE policies for uranium management as outlined in the
Secretarial Policy Statement, and is a commitment DOE will undertake
and include in this MAP in order to mitigate any potentially
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry from DOE's
proposed sale or transfer of DU. The market impact analysis would be
prepared prior to a particular sale or transfer, and would be similar
in form and content to the market impact analysis that underlies a
Secretarial Determination pursuant to the USEC Privatization Act. That
is, DOE would conduct a market impact analysis to determine the
potential impacts of the proposed sale or transfer on the domestic
uranium industry, taking into account the sales of uranium under the
Russian HEU Agreement and the Suspension Agreement, and other uranium
sales or transfers by the DOE (including the National Nuclear Security
Administration). Among other things, the market impact analysis would
consider, as appropriate, current
[[Page 31422]]
and projected uranium prices, enrichment capacity, uranium mining
activities, and commercial contracting practices. Should the market
impact analysis indicate potentially significant impacts on the
domestic uranium industry, the proposed sale or transfer would be
adjusted as necessary to ensure that such potentially significant
impacts are avoided or mitigated. The sale or transfer of DU may be
approved and implemented only if the market impact analysis indicates
that the sale or transfer would not result in potentially significant
impacts on the domestic uranium industry.
With these commitments in place, the Proposed Action would be
implemented by DOE in a manner that would avoid or mitigate any
potentially significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry. This
MAP may be revised in the future as more specific and detailed
information becomes available.
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 24, 2009.
R. Shane Johnson,
Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Nuclear Energy.
Final Environmental Assessment Disposition of DOE Excess Depleted
Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium (DOE/EA-1607)
Summary
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owns and manages an inventory
of depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NU), and low-enriched
uranium (LEU) that is currently stored in large cylinders as depleted
uranium hexafluoride (DUF6), natural uranium hexafluoride
(NUF6), and low-enriched uranium hexafluoride
(LEUF6) at the DOE Paducah site in western Kentucky (DOE
Paducah) and the DOE Portsmouth site near Piketon in south-central Ohio
(DOE Portsmouth)\2\. This inventory exceeds DOE's current and projected
energy and defense program needs.
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\2\ DOE also has additional uranium of varying levels of
enrichment that, in the future, may be added to the excess DU, NU,
and LEU inventory (e.g., uranium that could be recovered during
facility decontamination and decommissioning [D&D]). In addition,
the DOE uranium inventory includes quantities of highly enriched
uranium (HEU), which is being dispositioned through an ongoing
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) program and is not
addressed in this EA.
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On March 11, 2008, the Secretary of Energy issued a policy
statement (the Secretarial Policy Statement) on the management of DOE's
excess uranium inventory (Appendix A). The policy statement commits DOE
to manage all of its excess uranium inventories in a manner that (1) is
consistent with all applicable legal requirements; (2) maintains
sufficient uranium inventories at all times to meet the current and
reasonably foreseeable needs of Departmental missions; (3) undertakes
transactions involving non-U.S. Government entities in a transparent
and competitive manner, unless the Secretary of Energy determines in
writing that overriding Departmental mission needs dictate otherwise;
and (4) is consistent with and supportive of the maintenance of a
strong domestic nuclear industry.
In accordance with this policy, DOE proposes to disposition part of
its excess uranium inventory using one or a combination of two methods:
(1) Enrichment to either NU or LEU product, and subsequent storage or
sale of the resultant NU or LEU product (the Enrichment Alternative),
and (2) direct sale \3\ to appropriately licensed entities (the Direct
Sale Alternative). Under the Enrichment Alternative, DOE could enrich
DU to the \235\U content of NU (i.e., 0.711 percent \235\U), and DOE
could enrich DU, NU, and/or LEU (with a current \235\U content of less
than 4.95 percent) up to 4.95 percent \235\U content. This
environmental assessment (EA) assumes that the Proposed Action would
result in the annual enrichment and/or sale of amounts of the excess
inventory that, combined with other DOE sales or transfers to the
market, generally would not exceed 10 percent of the total annual fuel
requirements of all licensed U.S. nuclear power plants--that is,
approximately 2,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). In some years, the
annual amount enriched and/or sold could be greater than 2,000 MTU (for
example, due to startup of new reactors, which requires approximately
two times the amount of natural uranium needed for subsequent routine
re-loads).
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\3\ In this EA, the term ``sale'' includes direct sales,
transfers, or other transactions the Department may undertake to
disposition its excess uranium inventory.
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As mentioned previously, the excess inventory that DOE currently
proposes to disposition is stored as UF6 at the DOE
Portsmouth site in Ohio and the DOE Paducah site in Kentucky. DOE also
anticipates the potential identification of additional amounts of LEU
with a \235\U content of less than 4.95 percent. Under the Enrichment
Alternative, the uranium could be transported by truck or rail to one
or more of three enrichment facilities in the United States or to a
foreign enrichment facility. A facility in France is identified as a
representative foreign facility for the purposes of assessing potential
impacts. Shipments to France could be via any of several east-coast or
gulf-coast U.S. ports; however, this EA assumes, for purposes of
analysis, that the uranium would be transported by barge to New
Orleans, Louisiana, then by ship to France. The LEU product could be
stored at up to three U.S. commercial nuclear fuel fabrication
facilities (FFFs) in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Washington
State, and/or at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. When DU is enriched
to NU, it would be stored at enrichment facilities in Kentucky, New
Mexico, and/or Ohio, and/or at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. The
DU that would result from the enrichment process, called ``DU tails'',
would be stored and managed at the enrichment facility or be
transported to and stored and managed at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah
sites.
In this EA, DOE assesses the potential environmental impacts
associated with this Proposed Action and a No Action Alternative. The
potential impacts of all aspects of enrichment operations and the
conversion of DU tails, per se, have been previously addressed in
existing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents. This EA
focuses on previously unanalyzed impacts: (1) Health and safety impacts
from transportation of the excess inventory, LEU product, NU, and DU
tails; (2) impacts associated with accidents and intentional
destructive acts (terrorism, sabotage); and (3) economic impacts of the
Proposed Action on the domestic uranium industry.
In general, the impacts identified for the Enrichment and Direct
Sale Alternatives are similar if not identical. The potential impacts
are summarized as follows:
For all truck, rail, and barge transport options, for all
domestic and foreign enrichment facility locations, and for all storage
options, transportation of the entire inventory of DU, NU, and LEU
subject to this EA is estimated to result in up to 3 transportation-
related fatalities \4\ over approximately 25 years \5\. For overseas
transportation, this includes impacts from sea transit, U.S. port
operations, and overland transport. These transportation impacts
include the
[[Page 31423]]
radiological and nonradiological impacts from incident-free
transportation and transportation accidents. The range in impacts
presented in this EA is primarily due to differences in the amounts of
materials that would be shipped for each case analyzed and differences
in the distances over which the materials would be shipped.
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\4\ For perspective, over the period 2002 to 2006, about 43,000
people were killed each year in motor vehicle accidents and about
900 people were killed each year in railroad accidents and incidents
in the United States (DOT 2007).
\5\ Because the actual annual amounts of excess inventory
enriched would likely be less than the maximum annual amount, and
because it would probably change from year to year, DOE is not
limiting the Proposed Action to a particular number of years.
However, for purposes of modeling the impacts of processing the
entire inventory, 25 years is used.
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For enrichment at the National Enrichment Facility (NEF)
near Eunice, New Mexico, the truck or rail transportation impacts would
be higher than for enrichment at Paducah, Kentucky, or Portsmouth,
Ohio, because the NU, LEU, or DU feed would be shipped greater
distances; the DU tails and NU product, could be stored/dispositioned
by NEF, or could be shipped back to Paducah or Portsmouth.
The probability of a latent cancer fatality (LCF) for the
maximally exposed individual (MEI) along the truck transportation
routes was estimated to range from 8.3 x 10-\8\ to 5.3 x
10-\7\ over 25 years. For the analysis, the MEI was located
30 meters from the highway and was exposed to all truck shipments. The
shipments are assumed to travel at a speed of 24 kilometers (15 miles)
per hour, which is representative of speeds in urban areas.
The probability of an LCF for the MEI along the rail
transportation routes was almost identical to truck transport, ranging
from 8.2 x 10-\8\ to 5.2 x 10-\7\ over 25 years.
For the analysis, the MEI was located 30 meters from the railroad and
was exposed to all rail shipments. The shipments are assumed to travel
at a speed of 24 kilometers (15 miles) per hour, which is
representative of speeds in urban areas.
The transportation-related impacts of transporting the
uranium to New Orleans by barge would be less than the impacts of
transporting the uranium there by truck or rail due to the fewer number
of required shipments and the fact that the exposed population would be
smaller for barge transport.
Severe rail accidents would have higher consequences than
truck accidents because each railcar would carry four cylinders of DU,
NU, or LEU (feed), compared with only one for each truck. For LEU
product, each railcar would carry 12 cylinders, compared with 3 to 5
for each truck.
DOE estimated that the radiological risks of
transportation accidents for truck shipments (probability of occurrence
x consequence summed over a complete spectrum of accidents, including
the severe accidents discussed below) ranged from 0.042 to 0.96 LCFs
over 25 years.
DOE also estimated the consequences of severe truck
accidents. For a severe truck accident involving one cylinder of
depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6), the population
radiation dose could be as high as 32,000 person-rem in an urban area
if stable atmospheric conditions existed at the time of the accident.
Based on this population radiation dose, it was estimated that there
could be 20 LCFs in the assumed exposed population of about 3 million
people. The radiation dose for the MEI was estimated to be as high as
0.91 rem and the probability of an LCF for this individual was
estimated to be 0.0005. The probability of this accident ranged from
8.1 x 10-\4\ to 0.016 over 25 years.
If the severe transportation accident involved NU feed or product,
the radiological consequences would be higher--about 28 LCFs in the
assumed exposed population. For the MEI, the probability of an LCF
would be 8 x 10-\4\. The probability of this accident ranged
from 1.5 x 10-\4\ to 0.0055 over 25 years for those cases
where NU is shipped. However, for several cases, NU would not be
shipped and the probability of this accident would be zero.
If the severe transportation accident involved LEU product, the
radiological consequences would range from about 75 to 125 LCFs in the
assumed exposed population, assuming that all three or five 30B
cylinders, respectively, in a truck shipment were breached during the
severe accident. For the MEI, the probability of an LCF would be 0.002
or 0.0036 if three or five 30B cylinders, respectively, were breached
during the severe accident. If three 30B cylinders were involved in the
accident, the probability of the accident would range from 2.2 x
10-\4\ to 9 x 10-\4\ over 25 years for those
cases where LEU is shipped. If five 30B cylinders were involved in the
accident, the probability would range from 1.3 x 10-\4\ to
5.4 x 10-\4\ over 25 years for those cases were LEU is
shipped. However, for several cases, LEU would not be shipped and the
probability of this accident would be zero. In addition, the
probability associated with this accident does not incorporate the
effects of the protective overpack surrounding the 30B cylinders, which
would reduce the probability of the accident to a range of 4.4 x
10-\5\ to 1.8 x 10-\4\ over 25 years if three 30B
cylinders were involved or a range of 2.7 x 10-\5\ to 1.1 x
10-\4\ over 25 years if five 30B cylinders were involved
DOE estimated that the radiological risks of
transportation accidents for rail shipments (probability of occurrence
x consequence summed over a complete spectrum of accidents, including
the severe accidents discussed below) ranged from 0.051 to 0.97 LCFs
over 25 years. The radiological risks for rail and truck transportation
accidents are similar because the total number of cylinders shipped by
rail and truck is the same.
DOE also estimated the consequences of severe rail
accidents. For a severe rail accident involving four cylinders of
DUF6, the population radiation dose could be as high as
130,000 person-rem in an urban area if stable atmospheric conditions
existed at the time of the accident. Based on this population radiation
dose, it was estimated that there could be 80 LCFs in the assumed
exposed population of about 3 million people. Under this scenario, the
radiation dose for the MEI was estimated to be as high as 3.7 rem, and
the probability of an LCF for this individual was estimated to be
0.002. The probability of this accident ranged from 2.4 x
10-\4\ to 0.003 over 25 years.
If the severe transportation accident involved NU feed or product,
the radiological consequences would be higher--about 110 LCFs in the
assumed exposed population and the probability of an LCF for the MEI
would be 0.003. The probability of this accident ranged from 4.4 x
10-\5\ to 0.0011 over 25 years for those cases where NU is
shipped. However, for several cases, NU would not be shipped and the
probability of this accident would be zero.
If the severe transportation accident involved LEU product, the
radiological consequences would be about 310 LCFs in the assumed
exposed populations, assuming that all twelve 30B cylinders in a rail
shipment were breached during the severe accident. For the MEI, the
probability of an LCF would be 0.009. The probability of this accident
ranged from 4.3 x 10-\5\ to 2.6 x 10-\4\ over 25
years for those cases where LEU is shipped. However, for several cases,
LEU would not be shipped and the probability of this accident would be
zero. In addition, the probability associated with this accident does
not incorporate the effects of the protective overpack surrounding the
30B cylinders, which would reduce the probability of the accident to a
range of 4.3 x 10-\6\ to 2.6 x 10-\5\ over 25
years.
For both the truck and rail severe transportation
accidents, the accidents were assumed to take place in an urban area
with a population density of 1,600 people per square kilometer.
Potential consequences were estimated for the population within a 50-
mile (80-kilometer) radius, assuming that this population density
extended out to 50
[[Page 31424]]
miles (80 kilometers). It is important to note that according to the
2000 census, the average population density within 50 miles of the
center of the 20 highest population urbanized areas in the United
States is about 380 people per square kilometer, so the consequences
would likely be lower if a severe truck or rail accident took place in
an urban area. In addition, the severe accidents were assumed to take
place during stable atmospheric conditions. As illustrated in Table 4-
13, if the accidents took place during neutral atmospheric conditions,
the consequences would be substantially lower. For example, if the
severe truck accident involving LEU product occurred during neutral
atmospheric conditions, the consequences would range from 3 to 5 LCFs,
substantially lower than 75 to 125 LCFs. If the severe rail accident
involving LEU product occurred during neutral atmospheric conditions,
the consequences would be about 12 LCFs, substantially lower than 310
LCFs.
Three individuals could suffer irreversible health effects
from severe truck accidents and four individuals could suffer
irreversible health effects from severe rail accidents due to the
chemical toxicity associated with UF6, hydrogen fluoride
(HF), and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). No fatalities
are estimated to result from chemical exposure.
Although it is not possible to predict the probability of
an intentional destructive act, implementation of elements identified
in the Department of Transportation-required security plan (personnel
security, unauthorized access, and en route security) are judged to
make these occurrences very unlikely. The consequences of such acts
would be similar to the consequences discussed above for severe truck
and rail accidents involving DU, NU, and LEU.
If a severe accident involving stored LEU product were to
occur, the accident would result in an estimated population dose. For
example, at Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas (GNF-A), a severe accident was
estimated to result in a population dose of 29,000 person-rem. In the
assumed exposed population around the GNF-A facility, this radiation
dose is estimated to result in 17 LCFs. The radiation dose for an
individual located 2 kilometers from the facility was estimated to be 5
rem. The probability of an LCF for this person is estimated to be
0.003. If this accident occurred at other sites, the results would vary
depending on the amount of material involved in the accident; the
enrichment of the UF6; the release fractions, aerosolized
fractions, and respirable fractions; release assumptions such as
whether the release was elevated or from ground level; the number of
people exposed; atmospheric conditions; and radiation dosimetry
assumptions.
The potential market impacts (including socioeconomic
impacts) on the domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment
industries (i.e., domestic uranium industry) from direct sales or
transfers of uranium under the Proposed Action are expected to be
small. In any event, DOE has prepared a mitigation action plan (MAP) to
mitigate any potentially significant impacts on the domestic uranium
industry from DOE decisions to disposition the excess NU, DU, and LEU
inventory at DOE's Paducah and Portsmouth sites as analyzed in this EA.
Cumulative impacts under the Enrichment Alternative would
essentially be the same as those previously evaluated for the sites
involved because DOE's uranium inventory would not increase the sites'
enrichment capacity or throughput. Under the Direct Sale Alternative,
DOE assumes that actions by the purchasers would be essentially the
same as DOE under the Enrichment Alternative. For that reason, DOE
finds that the cumulative transportation, enrichment, and storage
impacts of the Direct Sale Alternative would be essentially identical
to those of the Enrichment Alternative. The cumulative impacts that
would occur under the No Action Alternative assessed in this EA are the
same as the cumulative impacts identified for the two new conversion
facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth.
[FR Doc. E9-15534 Filed 6-30-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P