[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 154 (Wednesday, August 12, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40572-40573]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-19245]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendation 2009-1]
Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities
AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice, recommendation.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
2286a(a)(5) which identifies the need for adequate policies and
associated standards and guidance on the use of quantitative risk
assessment methodologies at the Department of Energy's (DOE) defense
nuclear facilities.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
recommendation are due on or before September 11, 2009.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Faculties Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau
at the address above or telephone number (202-694-7000).
Dated: August 5, 2009.
Joseph F. Bader,
Acting Vice Chairman.
RECOMMENDATION 2009-1 TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286(a)(5), Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As
Amended
Dated: July 30, 2009.
Overview
Quantitative risk assessment techniques are widely used to
improve the safety of complex engineering systems. Such techniques
have been relied upon in the nuclear industry for decades. One of
the seminal documents, known as WASH-1400, used an event-tree,
fault-tree methodology to assess the risk of accidents at nuclear
power reactors operating in the United States.\1\ Today, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) employs a more sophisticated set
of risk assessment tools and methodologies.\2\ Likewise, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed
and implemented a detailed policy on the use of quantitative risk
assessment for its missions.\3\
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\1\ The Reactor Safety Study, October 1975 (sometimes known as
the ``Rasmussen Report'').
\2\ The NRC approach is summarized at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/risk-informed.html.
\3\ NASA's policies and methods can be found at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/risk/index.htm.
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The Department of Energy (DOE) has historically endorsed a
``bounding'' or deterministic approach to hazard and accident
analysis, which continues to have important applications at defense
nuclear facilities. Beginning in the early 1990s, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) observed increasing use of
quantitative risk assessment techniques by DOE. This increased use
was not viewed by the Board as objectionable in itself; the Board's
concern was that DOE was using quantitative risk assessment methods
without having in place a clear policy and set of procedures to
govern the application of these methods at facilities that perform
work ranging from assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons to
nuclear waste processing and storage operations. For this reason,
the Board wrote to the Secretary of Energy on April 5, 2004, and
made the following observation:
``[T]he Board has reviewed the DOE's use of risk management
tools at defense nuclear facilities. This review revealed that DOE
and its contractors have employed risk assessment in a variety of
activities, including the development of documented safety analyses
and facility-level decision making. The level of formality of these
assessments varies over a wide range. The Board's review also
revealed that DOE does not have mechanisms (such as standards or
guides) to control the use of risk management tools nor does it have
an internal organization assigned to maintain cognizance and ensure
the adequacy and consistency of risk assessments. Finally, the
Board's review showed that other Federal agencies involved in
similar high-risk activities (e.g., National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) have, to varying
degrees, formalized the use of quantitative risk assessment in their
operations and decision-making activities. These agencies have
relevant standards and defined organizational elements, procedures,
and processes for the development and use of risk management
tools.''
On this basis, the Board requested that the Secretary ``brief
the Board within 60 days of receipt of this letter as to DOE's
ongoing and planned programs and policies for assessing,
prioritizing, and managing risk.''
The Board's initial concerns on this issue have been reiterated
in letters dated November 23, 2005, and May 16, 2007. In the Board's
2006 Annual Report to Congress, the section on Risk Assessment
Methodologies noted ``the slow pace of its development,'' and the
2008 report noted that ``all progress [has come] to a halt.'' The
Board's most recent annual report stated that at ``a time when
governments, financial institutions and industries worldwide are
expediting the implementation of enterprise-wide risk governance
programs, DOE's slow pace for developing a policy is of serious
concern.''
DOE's most recent correspondence on this issue, dated January 9,
2007, outlined plans
[[Page 40573]]
and progress toward developing a policy and accompanying guidance
document on the use of risk assessment at defense nuclear
facilities. This DOE letter indicated that the draft policy and
guidance document would be ready for submittal to the DOE directives
system in March 2007. Despite periodic meetings with the Board's
staff and briefings to the Board, as of July 2009, the draft policy
and guidance document has not been entered into the DOE Directives
system, and near-term resolution of the issue is not evident.
Without such a policy, DOE has little basis to accept the validity
of existing risk management tools that use quantitative risk
assessment. This is particularly important since the managers of
DOE's field elements are allowed to accept the safety risks that
high-hazard operations pose toward workers and the public based on
widely varying levels of assessments.
Though Title 10, Part 830 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management) and its associated quality
assurance considerations govern nuclear safety evaluations at a
fundamental level, these existing requirements are not of sufficient
specificity to guide the use of complex quantitative risk
assessments. The continued pursuit of ad hoc applications of risk
assessment in the absence of adequate DOE policy and guidance is
contrary to the standards-based approach to nuclear safety espoused
by DOE and endorsed by the Board.\4\
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\4\ The Board's Recommendation 2008-1 is similarly directed at
DOE's use of a safety methodology (in this case, classifying fire
protection systems as safety-class or safety-significant) in advance
of developing criteria and guidance.
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Recommendation
Therefore, the Board recommends that DOE:
1. Establish a policy on the use of quantitative risk assessment
for nuclear safety applications.
2. Consistent with this policy, establish requirements and
guidance in a DOE directive or directives that prescribe controls
over the quality, use, implementation, and applicability of
quantitative risk assessment in the design and operation of defense
nuclear facilities.
3. Evaluate current ongoing uses of quantitative risk assessment
methodologies at defense nuclear facilities to determine if interim
guidance or special oversight is warranted pending the development
of formal policy and guidance.
4. Establish a requirement to identify deficiencies and gaps in
ongoing applications of quantitative risk assessment along with the
additional research necessary to fill those gaps in support of the
development and implementation of the final policy and guidance.
A. J. Eggenberger,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. E9-19245 Filed 8-11-09; 8:45 am]
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