[Federal Register: February 18, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 31)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 7549-7552]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr18fe09-2]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD;
Amendment 39-15813; AD 2009-04-07]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 Series
Airplanes, and Airbus Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 Series
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down
order [event] while in cruise. This order was preceded by an
automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of the ``NAV IR1
FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution.
Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air
Data Reference 1 (ADR) part
[[Page 7550]]
of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference Unit] was providing erroneous
and temporary wrong parameters in a random manner. This abnormal
behaviour of the ADR1 led to several consequences such as
unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss of attitude
information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and several ECAM
warnings. Among the abnormal parameters, the provided Angle of
Attack (AoA) value was such that the flight control computers
commanded a sudden nose down aircraft movement, which constitutes an
unsafe condition. * * *
* * * * *
These anomalies could result in high pilot workload, deviation from
the intended flight path, and possible loss of control of the airplane.
This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe
condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: This AD becomes effective March 5, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications, listed in the AD as of March 5,
2009.
We must receive comments on this AD by March 20, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA
Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-0012-E, dated January 15, 2009
(referred to after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe
condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:
An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down
order [event] while in cruise. This order was preceded by an
automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of the ``NAV IR1
FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution.
Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air
Data Reference 1 (ADR) part of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference
Unit] was providing erroneous and temporary wrong parameters in a
random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to several
consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss
of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and
several ECAM warnings. Among the abnormal parameters, the provided
Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such that the flight control
computers commanded a sudden [uncommanded] nose down aircraft
movement, which constitutes an unsafe condition. At this stage of
the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates that
ADIRU1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event. Due
to similar design, the A340 aircraft are also impacted by this
issue.
In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to
other aircraft systems, EASA [Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated
November 19, 2008] was issued to require, in case faulty Inertial
Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by
accomplishment of a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM)
operational procedure.
Since that AD [EASA AD 2008-0203-E, dated November 19, 2008] was
issued, it has been reported that the ``OFF'' light did not
illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons
to OFF. Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed
sometimes affected by another failure control.
To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been
updated to instruct the flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the
``OFF'' light is not illuminated after setting the IR and ADR
pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently, [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0225-E
[dated December 18, 2008], which superseded [EASA Emergency] AD
2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008], requires accomplishment of
the updated AFM operational procedure.
Since this second AD was issued [EASA Emergency AD 2008-0225-E,
dated December 18, 2008], a new service event has been reported
highlighting that, in some failure cases, even though the ``OFF''
light illuminates in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR
pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep providing erroneous data to
other systems.
In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing
the affected ADIRU must be done by setting the IR mode rotary
selector to OFF. Consequently, this AD, which supersedes AD 2008-
0225-E [dated December 18, 2008], requires accomplishment of the
updated AFM operational procedure.
The anomalies described above could result in high pilot workload,
deviation from the intended flight path, and possible loss of control
of the airplane. You may obtain further information by examining the
MCAI in the AD docket.
Relevant Service Information
Airbus has issued A330 Temporary Revision 4.02.00/46, Issue 3,
dated January 13, 2009, to the A330 (Airbus) Flight Manual; and A340
Temporary Revision 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009, to the
A340 (Airbus) Flight Manual. The actions described in this service
information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in
the MCAI.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined the unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.
Differences Between the AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a Note within the AD.
FAA's Determination of the Effective Date
An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of
this AD. The FAA has found that the risk to
[[Page 7551]]
the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to
adoption of this rule to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data
to other aircraft systems, which could result in high pilot workload,
deviation from the intended flight path, and possible loss of control
of the airplane. Therefore, we determined that notice and opportunity
for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and that
good cause exists for making this amendment effective in fewer than 30
days.
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight
safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public
comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under
the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; Directorate
Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We
specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all
comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of
those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this AD.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
2009-04-07 Airbus: Amendment 39-15813. Docket No. FAA-2009-0122;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective March 5,
2009.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330-200 and -300; and A340-
200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes, certificated in any
category, as listed in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -
322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 airplanes, all serial numbers,
equipped with Northrop-Grumman (formerly Litton) Air Data Inertial
Reference Units (ADIRUs), part number (P/N) 465020-0303-03ZZ (with
ZZ from 09 up to 16 inclusive).
(2) A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, -313, -541, and -642
airplanes, all serial numbers, equipped with Northrop-Grumman
(formerly Litton) ADIRUs, P/N 465020-0303-03ZZ (with ZZ from 09 up
to 16 inclusive).
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 34:
Navigation.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down
order [event] while in cruise. This order was preceded by an
automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of the ``NAV IR1
FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution.
Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air
Data Reference 1 (ADR) part of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference
Unit] was providing erroneous and temporary wrong parameters in a
random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to several
consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss
of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and
several ECAM warnings. Among the abnormal parameters, the provided
Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such that the flight control
computers commanded a sudden [uncommanded] nose down aircraft
movement, which constitutes an unsafe condition. At this stage of
the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates that
ADIRU1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event. Due
to similar design, the A340 aircraft are also impacted by this
issue.
In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to
other aircraft systems, EASA [Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated
November 19, 2008] was issued to require, in case faulty Inertial
Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by
accomplishment of a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM)
operational procedure.
Since that AD [EASA AD 2008-0203-E, dated November 19, 2008] was
issued, it has been reported that the ``OFF'' light did not
illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons
to OFF. Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed
sometimes affected by another failure control.
To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been
updated to instruct the flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the
``OFF'' light is not illuminated after setting the IR and ADR
pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently, [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0225-E
[dated December 18, 2008], which superseded [EASA Emergency] AD
2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008], requires accomplishment of
the updated AFM operational procedure.
Since this second AD was issued [EASA Emergency AD 2008-0225-E,
dated December 18, 2008], a new service event has been reported
highlighting that, in some failure cases, even though the ``OFF''
light illuminates in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR
pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep providing erroneous data to
other systems.
In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing
the affected ADIRU must
[[Page 7552]]
be done by setting the IR mode rotary selector to OFF. Consequently,
this AD, which supersedes AD 2008-0225-E [dated December 18, 2008],
requires accomplishment of the updated AFM operational procedure.
The anomalies described above could result in high pilot
workload, deviation from the intended flight path, and possible loss
of control of the airplane.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done: Within 14 days after the effective date
of this AD, revise the applicable section of the A330 or A340
(Airbus) Flight Manual (FM) by inserting a copy of A330 (Airbus)
Temporary Revision (TR) 4.02.00/46, or A340 (Airbus) TR 4.02.00/54,
both Issue 3, both dated January 13, 2009, as applicable.
Thereafter, operate the airplane according to the limitations and
procedures in the TRs. When information identical to that in the TR
has been included in the general revisions of the FM, the general
revisions may be inserted in the FM, and the TR may be removed.
FAA AD Differences
Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN:
Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Emergency
Airworthiness Directive 2009-0012-E, dated January 15, 2009; A330
(Airbus) TR 4.02.00/46, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009; and A340
(Airbus) TR 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009; for related
information.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use A330 (Airbus) Temporary Revision 4.02.00/46,
Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009, to the A330 (Airbus) Flight Manual;
or A340 (Airbus) Temporary Revision 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated
January 13, 2009, to the A340 (Airbus) Flight Manual; as applicable;
to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies
otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Airbus SAS--Airworthiness Office--EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice
Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; e-mail
airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; Internet http://www.airbus.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information that is
incorporated by reference at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information at the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or
go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_
regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 23, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-3020 Filed 2-17-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P