[Federal Register: May 12, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 91)]
[Notices]
[Page 26733-26738]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr12my10-35]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
[Docket No. 100504212-0212-01]
Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons
AGENCY: National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA) seeks comment on technical
approaches to preventing contraband cell phone use in prisons. Congress
tasked NTIA with developing, in coordination with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a plan to investigate and
evaluate how wireless jamming, detection and other technologies might
be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in Federal
and State prison facilities. To assist in its evaluation of these
technologies, NTIA requests information from the public on technologies
that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use
without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety
services (including 911 calls and other government radio services) in
areas surrounding prisons.
DATES: Comments are requested on or before June 11, 2010.
ADDRESSES: Parties may mail written comments to Richard J. Orsulak,
Emergency Planning and Public Safety Division, Office of Spectrum
Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 600B,
Washington, DC 20005, with copies to Edward Drocella, Spectrum
Engineering and Analysis Division, Office of Spectrum Management,
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue, NW., Room 6725,
Washington, DC 20230. Alternatively, comments may be electronically
submitted in Microsoft Word format to
contrabandcellphones@ntia.doc.gov. Comments will be posted on NTIA's
Web site for viewing at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/
contrabandcellphones/.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard J. Orsulak, Emergency Planning
and Public Safety Division, Office of Spectrum Management, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 600B, Washington, DC 20005;
telephone (202) 482-9139 or e-mail rorsulak@ntia.doc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Overview
The mobile phone industry has enjoyed significant growth since the
inception of the analog wireless cell phone network in the early
1980s.\1\ The 1990s saw the development of digital networks, and
thereafter, high-speed data networks became available to consumers. The
growth of the mobile phone industry has been fueled, in part, by
consumer demand for instant access anywhere and anytime. Features such
as data, image, and video communications have also contributed to the
overwhelming demand for mobile
[[Page 26734]]
services and applications. As of December 2009, there were
approximately 286 million wireless subscriber connections in the United
States compared to nearly 208 million in December of 2005, which
represents an increase of 38 percent.\2\ During this same time period,
the number of minutes used (on an annual basis) increased by 150
percent, while the wireless penetration (as a percentage of total U.S.
population) increased from 69 percent to 91 percent.\3\ These trends
indicate that more people are relying on wireless mobile devices to
communicate for their daily business and personal needs.
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\1\ For the purpose of this Notice of Inquiry (NOI), the use of
the word ``cell phone'' will refer to any wireless, portable device
that is available to the public on a subscription or prepaid basis
for delivering voice and/or data services such as text messages. It
includes, for example, phones operating within the Cellular Radio
Service in the 800 MHz bands; broadband Personal Communications
Services (PCS) in the 1.9 GHz bands; the Advanced Wireless Services
(AWS) in the 1.7 GHz band; Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) services
in the 800 and 900 MHz bands; and any future mobile wireless devices
that plan to operate in bands such as the 700 MHz band.
\2\ CTIA Wireless Quick Facts, available at http://www.ctia.org/
advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10323.
\3\ Id.
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The use of contraband cell phones by inmates has risen as the U.S.
prison population continues to expand.\4\ The number of cell phones
confiscated by prison officials has dramatically increased in only a
few years. For example, during 2006 California correctional officers
seized approximately 261 cell phones in the State's prisons and camps;
by 2008, that number increased ten fold to 2,811.\5\ Maryland and other
States have also seen a rise in the number of confiscated cell phones
in their State prisons. In 2009, Maryland prison officials confiscated
nearly 1,700 phones, up from approximately 1,200 phones the year
before.\6\ This increase in cell phone use by inmates is a mounting
concern among correctional administrators across the country.\7\
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\4\ At the end of 2008, Federal and State correctional
authorities had jurisdiction over roughly 1.6 million prisoners, of
which over 200,000 (about 13 percent) were housed in Federal
facilities. The Federal and State prison population rose by
approximately 1 percent from year-end 2007 to 2008. See Sabol,
William J., Heather C. West, and Matthew Cooper, ``Prisoners in
2008,'' Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Dec. 2009, page 16, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p08.pdf.
\5\ Special Report, Inmate Cell Phone Use Endangers Prison and
Public Safety, Office of the Inspector General, State of California,
May 2009, available at http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/BCI/
Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate%20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf.
\6\ State of Maryland Fact Sheet, Keeping Communities Safe,
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Feb.
2010.
\7\ See, e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, National Institute of Justice, Cell Phones Behind Bars,
Dec. 2009, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
227539.pdf; Washington Examiner, Drug Dealer Who Planned Murder Gets
Life Sentence, Scott McCabe, May 4, 2009, available at http://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime/Drug-dealer-who-planned-
murder-gets-life-sentence-44327767.html; Wired Magazine, Prisoners
Run Gangs, Plan Escapes, and Even Order Hits With Smuggled
Cellphones, Vince Beiser, May 22, 2009, available at http://
www.wired.com/politics/law/magazine/17-06/ff_prisonphones.
Contraband cell phone use is a problem in Federal prison facilities
as well. See Testimony of Harley J. Lappin, Director, U.S. Bureau of
Prisons before the U.S. Congress, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009
Budget Request for the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshal Service,
and the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, available at http:/
/www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking08/LappinTestimony.html.
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Recognizing the need to take action to curb contraband cell phone
use, the United States Senate passed a bill in 2009 that would amend
the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize the FCC to permit the
supervisory authority of a correctional facility to operate a system
within the facility to prevent, jam, or otherwise interfere with
unauthorized wireless communications by individuals held in the
facility.\8\ Also, legislation has been introduced and passed in the
U.S. Senate that would prohibit Federal prisoners from possessing or
using cell phones and similar wireless devices.\9\
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\8\ S. 251, Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
cong_bills&docid=f:s251es.txt.pdf. The Bill is under consideration
in the House.
\9\ S. 1749, The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
cong_bills&docid=f:s1749is.txt.pdf.
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In December 2009, Congress inserted language in the Conference
Report to the Department of Commerce FY 2010 Appropriations tasking
NTIA, in coordination with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, to develop a plan to
investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other
technologies might be utilized for law enforcement and corrections
applications in Federal and State prison facilities.\10\ Congress also
asked that the plan consider the adverse effects that these
technologies impose on commercial wireless and public safety services
in areas surrounding the prisons.\11\ This NOI seeks public input to
assist NTIA with its evaluation of technologies to prevent the use of
contraband cell phones in Federal and State facilities.\12\
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\10\ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-336 (2009), Division B, Title 1,
Page 619, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:hr366.111.pdf. The
language specifically refers to methods of preventing contraband
cell phone use within prison facilities. Jamming and detecting cell
phone uses for other applications (such as within movie theaters)
are not germane to either this NOI or NTIA's evaluation.
\11\ Id.
\12\ Although other contraband interdiction technologies may
help to prevent the use of, or access to, contraband cell phones in
prisons (such as x-rays, dogs, body scanning imagery, and other
methods which detect contraband phones hidden on prison employees,
visitors, and inmates), this NOI and NTIA's subsequent report will
be limited to radio frequency (RF)-based, wireless technology
solutions.
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NTIA understands that a number of technological approaches exist
that could help prison officials block or reduce unauthorized use of
cell phones by inmates provided that these approaches could be legally
implemented. NTIA, in coordination with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, have
preliminarily identified three categories of contraband cell phone
intervention: jamming, managed network access, and detection.
Jamming
Radio jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or
reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of disrupting use
of electronic devices, equipment, or systems--in this case, mobile
devices such as cell phones. A cell phone works by communicating with
its service network through a cell tower or base station. These cell
towers divide an area of coverage into cells, which range in size from
a few city blocks to hundreds of square miles. The base station links
callers into the local public switched telephone network, another
wireless network, or even the Internet.
A jamming device transmits on the same radio frequencies as the
cell phone, disrupting the communication link between the phone and the
cell phone base station, essentially rendering the hand-held device
unusable until such time as the jamming stops. Jamming devices do not
discriminate among cell phones within range of the jamming signal--both
contraband and legitimate cell phones are disabled. Currently, the
operation by non-Federal entities of transmitters designed to jam or
block wireless communications violates the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended.\13\ Nonetheless, several groups have filed with the FCC
petitions for waivers to permit the use of cell phone jammers in
prisons.\14\ Groups such as
[[Page 26735]]
the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials
International, Inc. and CTIA have opposed the use of jamming for fear
of interference to critical public safety operations and legitimate
cell phone use in and around prisons.\15\ Others, however, have
supported its use in prisons.\16\ Stating that it did not have the
authority to permit such jamming, the FCC has denied the petitions.\17\
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\13\ 47 U.S.C. Sections 301, 302a, 333. The FCC had reiterated
this fact in a Public Notice, Sale or Use of Transmitters Designed
to Prevent, Jam or Interfere with Cell Phone Communications is
Prohibited in the United States, DA-05-1776, June 27, 2005,
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-
05-1776A1.pdf.
\14\ See, e.g., Letter from Devon Brown, Director, District of
Columbia Department of Corrections, to Michael Copps, Acting
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Feb. 2, 2009; Letter
from Howard Melamed, CEO, CellAntenna Corporation, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, March 3, 2009.
The cellular radio service and other commercial wireless services
fall under the auspices of the FCC rules and regulations, which are
promulgated in Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).
See http://wireless.fcc.gov/index.htm?job=rules_and_regulations.
\15\ Letter from Chris Fischer, President, Association of Public
Safety Communications Officials International, Inc. to Michael
Copps, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, March 13,
2009, available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Position_
Papers_Letter_APCO_Re_cell_phone_jamming_3_13_09.pdf; CTIA
Policy Topics, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons, available at
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/policy_topics/topic.cfm/TID/58.
\16\ See, e.g., Wired, Prison Mobile Phone Debate Jammed up in
the System, Ryan Singel, March 15, 2010, available at http://
www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/03/prison-mobile-phone-debate-jammed-
up-in-the-system/. Also, a recent survey at the International CTIA
Wireless Conference showed that nearly three-quarters of respondents
favor jamming of cell phones in prisons. See http://
www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/survey-at-international-ctia-
wireless,1231800.shtml#ixzz0ju7Exz3B.
\17\ See, e.g., Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission to Devon Brown, Director, District of Columbia Department
of Corrections, DA 09-354, Feb. 18, 2009, available at http://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-354A1.pdf; Letter
from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission to Howard Melamed, CEO,
CellAntenna Corporation, DA 09-622, March 17, 2009, available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-622A1.pdf.
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Managed Access
Managed access systems intercept calls in order to allow
corrections officials to prevent inmates from accessing carrier
networks. The cell signal is not blocked by a jamming signal, but
rather, is captured (or re-routed) and prevented from reaching the
intended base station, thereby disallowing the completion of the call.
This technology permits calls by known users (i.e., prison-authorized
cell phone numbers) by handing them off to the network, and prevents
others by denying access to the network. It is unclear whether or how
well these systems can discriminate among prison-authorized cell phone
numbers and ``unknown'' phones to avoid capturing/cancelling calls that
do not involve inmates.
As a tool to deal with contraband cell phone use, some of these
systems employ passive technology that detects cell phone use and
collects data from active cell phones. Some systems deny access to
calls from numbers they do not recognize. Other techniques redirect
cell phone transmissions to portable antennas set up specifically
around the prison, and only allow communication from prison-authorized
cell phones to be forwarded to carrier cell towers. Denial of service
approaches use electronic hardware located in the vicinity of the cell
phone user to ``spoof'' the cell phone into thinking it is
communicating with the carrier tower. The cell phone user receives a
message that indicates that there is no service available. This type of
denial of service system operates independently of the carrier and
spoofs all cell calls.
In an effort to eliminate the unauthorized use of cell phones in
Maryland State prisons, in 2009 the Maryland Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services hosted a demonstration of various non-
jamming technologies, including managed access systems.\18\ In January
2010, they issued a follow-on report.\19\ The demonstration showed,
among other things, that: (1) Several intelligence gathering abilities
could be implemented depending upon specific laws governing each State;
and (2) the types of technology tested could allow certain phones to
operate and allow 911 calls to be processed.\20\
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\18\ Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services, Overview of Cell Phone Demonstration, available at http://
www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/media/pdf/FinalReport_2008-09-
10.pdf. One managed access technology was demonstrated and operated
pursuant to an experimental license granted by the FCC for this
occasion.
\19\ Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services, Non-Jamming Cell Phone Pilot Summary, Jan. 20, 2010,
available at http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/media/Cell-Phone-Pilot-
Summary_Final.pdf.
\20\ Supra note 18 at page 5. The conclusions reached from the
demonstrations were that each State will have to identify its own
specific needs since the technology is such that one solution may
not work for every facility within a given State. Supra note 18 at
page 6.
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Detection
Detection is the process of locating, tracking, and identifying
various sources of radio transmissions--in this case, cell phone
signals. Detection, or direction finding, is used in a wide variety of
applications including, for example, cell phone assignments, the
location of 911 emergency calls and marine distress calls. For accurate
position location in an environment such as within a prison facility,
detection technology triangulates a cell phone signal and requires the
use of correctional staff to physically search a small area (such as a
prison cell) and seize the identified cell phone. This may involve
placing direction-finding antennas or sensors (connected wire-line or
wirelessly) to a computer to identify a cell phone call and locate the
origin of the call. Additionally, hand-held cell phone detectors are
able to scan frequencies within correctional facilities and detect the
location of the caller. These systems can only detect a cell phone when
it is in use--either placing or receiving a call. The devices are
generally ``passive'' receive-only devices, and do not necessarily
require any authorization or license for the equipment or the user to
operate.
Additionally, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services demonstration included a number of detection
technologies, and the report concluded that there were varying degrees
of accuracy in terms of cell phone detection based upon each vendor's
technological abilities.\21\
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\21\ Id.
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Request for Comments
NTIA requests comment on the questions below in order to assist in
evaluating technology solutions to prevent contraband cell phone use in
prisons. These questions are not a limitation on comments that may be
submitted. When making reference to studies, research, and other
empirical data that are not widely published, commenters should provide
copies of the referenced material with the submitted comments. Comments
will be posted on the NTIA Web site for viewing at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov.
1. Technologies or Approaches
We have initially identified three broad categories of approaches
that provide solutions for preventing contraband cell phone use:
jamming, managed access, and detection. Are these characterizations
accurate and complete? Are there technologies other than these
categories, and if so, how do they work? What approaches can be taken
to jam within irregular structures such as prisons, within indoor and
outdoor areas and within rural versus urban settings? What specific
types of managed access and detection techniques are available? What
risk does each system pose to legitimate cell phone use by the general
public outside the prison? What risk does each system pose to public
safety and government use of spectrum? How can any of the foregoing
risks be mitigated or eliminated? What are the benefits and drawbacks
of implementing these techniques? Are certain systems more suitable for
certain prison environments or locations? To what extent does the
installation of each system require a
[[Page 26736]]
customized approach for each prison? How disruptive is the installation
process? What approaches can be used in the implementation of systems
employing detection techniques? How does each system provide for
completion of critical calls or radio communications such as those from
public safety officers (including use of handheld two-way radios) or
911? What ability does each of these technologies possess for upgrades
to include new frequency bands, technologies, modulation techniques,
etc. as they are introduced into the marketplace? How quickly can they
be upgraded?
2. Devices and Frequency Bands
Many types of wireless mobile devices are available to consumers
from a plethora of commercial carriers (e.g., push-to-talk, cell
phones, smart phones, personal digital assistants). These devices
operate, consistent with FCC rules, in a number of frequency bands
depending upon the types of services and capabilities/features that the
wireless carriers offer. To eliminate contraband cell phone use in
prisons, techniques must be identified that have the capability to
thwart the use from the gamut of devices and spectrum bands/frequencies
in which these phones operate. These devices and associated frequency
bands are: Cellular (824-849/869-894 MHz); PCS (1850-1990 MHz); AWS
(1710-1755/2110-2170 MHz); and SMR (806-824 and 851-869; 896-901 and
935-940 MHz). Additionally, spectrum bands, such as the 698-806 MHz
(700 MHz) band, 2110-2170 MHz, and the 2500-2690 MHz band, will soon
offer newer, faster, and more bandwidth-intensive features to the
public. Further, other devices that operate in such radio services as
the Family Radio (462.5625-467.7125 MHz band) and General Mobile Radio
(462--467 MHz band) Services present possible avenues for illegal or
unauthorized communications by inmates. While the range of these two
services is relatively small, both use handsets for two-way voice
communication and could be attractive to inmates in urban environments.
Undoubtedly, any of these devices could find their way to prison
inmates as well. What other frequency bands could be used by
technologies that inmates could acquire with which to communicate?
Do, or will, the technologies identified above effectively cover
all of the bands likely to be used for commercial wireless services and
how do, or will, they do so? Specifically, which frequency bands does
each approach currently best address, and which could they best address
in the future? How can the technologies prevent an inmate from
communicating with a device employing proprietary technology (e.g., SMR
radios)? Will the technologies deal with phones that plan to operate in
other bands where new services will be offered in the future, such as
in the 700 MHz band? What will be necessary to extend the capabilities
of the technologies to new bands (new hardware or software, new
antennas, agreements, etc.)?
3. Interference to Other Radio Services
Avoiding interference to authorized cell phone reception E83A; as
well as other radio services outside the cell phone bands E83A; is a
critical element in evaluating the various technologies. The
longstanding radio spectrum regulation principle, embodied in the
Communications Act of 1934, is to preclude harmful interference and not
to block access to or receipt of information transmitted
wirelessly.\22\ In addition to producing emissions in specific bands
and within specific areas to deny service, jamming systems also produce
unwanted signals outside of their intended operating bands and are not
naturally confined to a prescribed area. These signals have the
potential to produce interference to other radio services operating in
numerous frequency bands (including Federal Government operations) and
outside of the prison facility.
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\22\ Supra note 13.
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If jamming configurations are set up properly (that is, based upon
site-specific radio frequency (RF) engineering), can these unwanted
emissions be reduced or eliminated at a distance that is based on
jammer and site parameters at each individual prison? Is the location
of the prison (rural versus urban) also a factor, and if so, why and
how would that affect the feasibility or implementation of a jamming
system?
What jammer system parameters (e.g., power levels, modulation,
antennas) can be used to control out-of-band (OOB) and unwanted
emissions? Which of these parameters have the greatest impact on the
effectiveness of the jammer transmitter? Swept frequency techniques are
often employed in jamming systems.\23\ What other jamming techniques
can be employed to disrupt wireless communication systems? Are filters
commercially available that could be used to reduce the OOB and
unwanted emission levels from jammer transmitters? Commenters should
provide details on the specifications for the filter (e.g.,
manufacturer, model number). Will jamming multiple frequency bands
simultaneously affect the emission characteristics of the jammer
transmitter (e.g., generation of intermodulation products)?
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\23\ A swept frequency jammer transmitter operates by
repetitively frequency-sweeping (referred to as chirping) a carrier
wave signal across the bands to be jammed.
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NTIA also seeks comment on other techniques that cell phone jammers
can implement to reduce interference to other radio services. Can
spectrum sensing be used in conjunction with jamming techniques to
reduce the transmit duty cycle of the jammer transmitter? \24\ Are
there variable strength cell phone jammers that are capable of
dynamically adjusting their strength? What are the factors that can
vary the signal strength of the jammer if it is putting out too much
power?
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\24\ The duty cycle is the fraction of time that a transmitter
is in an ``active'' state.
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The emissions from jammer transmitters can potentially cause
interference to receivers beyond the intended jamming area. A critical
parameter necessary to assess the potential impact to a receiver is the
interference protection criteria (IPC).\25\ There are currently no
industry-adopted or Federally-mandated standards for in-band
interference from other systems to wireless mobile handset receivers.
How should the IPC for these handsets be established? What IPC values
should be used for assessing potential interference to these handset
receivers?
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\25\ The IPC is a relative or absolute interfering signal level
at the receiver input, under specified conditions, such that the
allowable performance degradation is not exceeded.
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An approach to regulating jammer transmitters could be to establish
a distance at which the jammer signal must be below a specified level
necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers. An alternative
approach could be to specify maximum allowable equivalent isotropically
radiated power (EIRP) limits necessary to protect in-band and out-of-
band receivers as a function of frequency. Since the variations in the
jammer configurations, effects of multiple jamming transmitters,
structural characteristics of buildings, and propagation factors will
be different depending on the installation and the facility, can
analytical analysis techniques be used to develop the distances or EIRP
limits necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers? If
analytical analysis techniques can be employed, explain the methodology
to be used and all appropriate conditions considered in the analysis,
including, but not limited to, propagation loss modeling and
[[Page 26737]]
building attenuation modeling. How should the effect of multiple jammer
transmitters and antennas be taken into consideration? Are there other
approaches that can be used to regulate jammer systems?
The impact of jamming signals would also depend on the prison
environment. Outside of the facility, will the variations in the
measured levels of the jammer transmitter signal make it difficult to
distinguish such a signal from the cellular and PCS signals in the
environment, for example? If so, is this problem exacerbated in areas
where there is a high density of cellular and PCS signals, such as in
and around an urban prison location. The variations in the measured
jammer transmitter signal levels could likely be due to propagation
effects and building attenuation losses that will be different at each
facility and for each jammer installation. Furthermore, depending on
the relative signal levels, it can be difficult to differentiate
between the measured jammer transmitter signal and the cellular and PCS
signals. Given variations in signal levels and the potential to
distinguish the jammer signal from the background signals, is it
possible to measure accurately the jammer transmitter signal outside of
a facility?
Within a facility, is it possible to distribute the jammer
transmitter power spatially across an array of antennas (or, in some
cases, lossy cables) in order to better control and provide lower power
density around individual antennas than could be produced if a single
antenna were used to radiate a high-power signal? What techniques can
be employed in the design of the jamming system to reduce the potential
for interference to in-band and out-of-band receivers? Can restrictions
be placed on the jammer transmitter antenna height to minimize the
potential for interference outside of the area that is being jammed? Is
it possible to employ directional or sector antennas to focus the
jammer transmitter signal in the intended areas within a facility while
minimizing the signal levels outside of the facility? Can down tilting
the antennas be used to minimize the jammer transmitter signal level at
the horizon? What restrictions can be placed on the antennas without
impacting the effectiveness of the jamming system?
Each prison is unique in size, location and structure. Jammer set-
up configurations cannot be applied broadly to all jammer systems in
all locations. The variations in the jammer transmitter signal levels
outside of the facility depend on a number of factors such as building
structures, antenna deployment, and background signals. These factors
could have an effect on the ability to measure accurately jammer
transmitter emission levels. Given all of the possible variations in a
jammer system installation, will operators need to conduct on-site
compliance measurements at each facility? What techniques should be
used to measure the emissions of a jammer system? Is it possible to
accurately measure the jammer transmitter signals in the presence of
other background signals? How shall an operator, in its request for
authorization of such equipment, be required to demonstrate that it
meets any interference protection requirements?
Do other technologies or approaches have the potential to interfere
with other authorized radio services within the same bands or adjacent
bands? If so, under what conditions and how can an operator mitigate
interference? In some of the bands identified above, public safety
frequencies are interleaved or operate in close proximity with
frequencies used by mobile devices, for instance in the 800 MHz SMR and
700 MHz bands. How will internal and external land mobile systems,
including systems used by the prisons themselves, as well as other
public safety operations, be protected? Are there other radio
communications systems within prisons that could also experience
interference, such as internal private land mobile systems used by
prison officials or medical telemetry devices in prison infirmaries?
\26\
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\26\ State governmental entities are eligible to hold
authorizations for frequencies in the Public Safety Pool to operate
radio stations for transmission of communications essential to its
official activities. See 47 CFR 90.20. BOP uses medical telemetry at
Federal Medical Centers and at some non-medical prisons.
Additionally, some inmates have devices that are monitored remotely
by local hospitals.
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4. Protecting 911 Calls and Authorized Users
The preservation and protection of calls to 911 from cell phones is
a paramount concern as more consumers rely on mobile devices.\27\ The
number of cell phones calling 911 has been steadily increasing as more
consumers are using them. The National Emergency Number Association
estimates that wireless telephone users account for nearly half of the
calls to 911.\28\ Jamming radio signals in and around prisons cannot
differentiate between normal cell phone traffic and 911 calls.\29\
Managed access systems, however, can be selective and designed to
ignore 911 calls (i.e., letting them connect to the network), and
detection systems typically use passive devices that do not affect
transmission or reception. How are 911 calls preserved in areas around
the prisons where the public is making a call to 911 if they come in
proximity to the prison? Are there any other technologies identified
that can protect 911 calls and how do they do so?
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\27\ More than one in five households have discontinued wireline
service (or chosen not to use it) and rely solely on wireless
communications as their primary telephone service. See Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Wireless Substitution: Early Release
of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, July-Dec.
2008, May 6, 2009, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/
earlyrelease/wireless200905.pdf.
\28\ National Emergency Number Association, Cell Phones and 911,
http://www.nena.org/cellular-wireless-911. See also FCC Consumer
Facts, Wireless 911 Services, available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/
consumerfacts/wireless911srvc.html. As a case-in-point, there has
been a sharp increase by residents of Jefferson County, Arkansas
dialing 911 from cell phones, where there are three State prisons.
Nearly 70 percent of calls to 911 in 2008 were made from a cell
phone. See Arkansas Daily-Gazette, Cell Phone Calls Place Burden on
Ark. 911 Dispatch Center, Mike Linn, Oct. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.firerescue1.com/fire-products/communications/articles/
595629-Cell-phone-calls-place-burden-on-Ark-911-dispatch-center/.
\29\ However, at some distance away from the prison which is
unique to each prison's features and jammer set-up, jamming
contraband cell phone signals should not affect authorized or 911
calls.
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Wireless consumers expect their wireless calls to be completed
without being dropped or busy. In and around prisons, consumers and
public safety officials, as authorized users of the system, will expect
their wireless devices to communicate. How are authorized users allowed
to make calls with the technologies described? If the caller passes
through a ``dummy'' cell site set-up within the prison vicinity, will
the call go through if a call is initiated within that cell (e.g., will
it result in a busy signal or a dropped call)? Are calls handed off to
the carrier cell site and network? How does managed access work if the
caller is an authorized user, but the phone number is not known (i.e.,
in the database of authorized users) to the managed access system?
5. Cost Considerations
The cost of preventing cell phone use in prisons is a factor that
must be considered and varies according to the type of technology, area
to be covered, and additional features. What factors impact the cost of
implementing each of the technologies as described above? Are there on-
going or recurring costs associated with each? To what extent will
installation costs vary in light of the particular characteristics of
each prison (e.g., geographic setting)? What
[[Page 26738]]
characteristics are most likely to affect costs? What are the ancillary
costs for each type of approach (e.g., maintaining network connectivity
for managed access systems, resources required to physically locate the
phone for detection/location systems such as canines, staff time,
etc.)? Are there typical costs or a range for each, and if so, what are
they? Is training required for prison staff to properly operate the
equipment? What staff costs are associated with each technology?
6. Locating Contraband Phones
In order to completely eradicate contraband cell phone use, the
cell phone must be physically located and removed, which can be labor-
intensive. Inmates may use them for a short period of time and turn
them off and then move them, making the devices more difficult to
locate. Jamming cannot identify the specific location of a contraband
cell phone. How do managed access and detection technologies locate a
cell phone caller? What software and hardware is needed? How accurate
are detection technologies? With the insertion of GPS chip-sets into
mobile devices, are cell phone locations easily identifiable through
managed access or are other means necessary (e.g., hardware or
software)? Do managed access and detection technologies have the
capability of providing intelligence-gathering information for prison
officials, and if so, what type of information? What other means are
necessary to physically locate the phones once a position is known?
7. Regulatory/Legal Issues
The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and set specific
rules on wireless radio services.\30\ Both the operation of mobile
wireless devices, and effective means and solutions to deny the use of
them have regulatory and legal implications. The FCC has primary
responsibility for regulating spectrum issues for the types of systems
typically used within the State and local prisons and jails (for
example, private internal radio communications and commercial systems
used by prison staff). NTIA, on behalf of the President, authorizes the
use of the radio frequencies for equipment operated by Federal
entities, including the BOP.\31\
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\30\ For example, cellular service rules are set forth in 47 CFR
parts 1 and 22; AWS in 47 CFR part 27; and SMR in 47 CFR part 90.
\31\ See generally, NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures
for Federal Radio Frequency Management, Sept. 2009, Section 1,
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/redbook/1.pdf.
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While the Communications Act prevents the FCC from authorizing
jamming or other acts of intentional interference to the radio
communications of authorized stations, those same provisions do not
apply to the Federal government itself. Therefore, NTIA is not limited
in its authority to permit jamming at Federal prison facilities. We
seek comment on State/local or Federal laws, rules, or policies that
need clarification or that may hinder deployment of any of these
technologies or others that may be raised by commenters. These might
include not only radio regulatory issues, such as the approval
necessary to operate or conduct experimentation and demonstration, but
also ancillary issues such as the privacy and legal implications of
trap-and-trace technologies? What agreements, agency relationships, or
licensing requirements between the prison, service provider, and access
provider would be required for temporary or experimental demonstration
or for permanent operation?
8. Technical Issues
The identification of technical issues is another factor in
investigating and evaluating contraband cell phone use in prisons. Are
there any technical issues to be considered for the technologies
identified above? For example, the actual range of a jammer depends on
its power, antenna orientation, and the local environment (size and
shape), which may include hills or walls of a building (that could be
made of a variety of materials) that block the jamming signal. How
accurate are the location technologies? Does each site need specific RF
engineering for each of the approaches? How do the technologies allow
authorized users, including 911 calls, to be protected? How are
different modulation schemes or channel access methods (for example,
Global System for Mobile Communications--GSM, or Code Division Multiple
Access--CDMA) handled for each category and does the solutions depend
on the type of access method that the wireless carrier is using?
Text-messaging continues to increase as a form of communication
from hand-held wireless devices.\32\ Wireless hand-held devices in the
possession of prison inmates afford them this option as an alternative
to talking. Is there a need to differentiate between voice and data,
such as text messages, and are the technologies discussed above
effective against data use by prison inmates? Does shorter air-time use
from text messaging present problems with detection and/or capturing
the call and ultimately locating the phone? Will the technologies
identified above be effective against high-speed, high-capacity data
formats, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) for devices that are
expected to operate in the 700 MHz band?
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\32\ CTIA estimates that the number of monthly text messages
sent increased from 9.8 billion in December 2005 to 152.7 billion in
December of 2009. Supra note 2. See also CNet News, U.S. Text Usage
Hits Record Despite Price Increases, Marguerite Reardon, Sept. 10,
2008, available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-10038634-
94.html.
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Please note that all comments received will be posted on NTIA's Web
site. Commenters that submit any business confidential or proprietary
information in response to this notice should clearly mark such
information appropriately. Commenters should also submit a version of
their comments that can be publicly posted on NTIA's Web site.
Dated: May 7, 2010.
Kathy D. Smith,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2010-11350 Filed 5-11-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-60-P