[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 96 (Wednesday, May 19, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 27961-27964]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-11904]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2010-0479 Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-220-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark
0070 and 0100 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
[[Page 27962]]
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as: Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a
ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused
damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its
components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must
have been present close to the affected brake creating enough internal
pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario for the
hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected) brake QD
[quick-disconnect] coupling. Further investigation of the service
experience files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have
occurred on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration. The
unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible brake
fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to safely land
the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions that are intended
to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by July 6, 2010.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 231, 2150 AE
Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands; telephone +31 (0)252-627-350; fax +31
(0)252 627 211; e-mail [email protected];
Internet http://www.myfokkerfleet.com. You may review copies of the
referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information
on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2010-0479;
Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-220-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
We have lengthened the 30-day comment period for proposed ADs that
address MCAI originated by aviation authorities of other countries to
provide adequate time for interested parties to submit comments. The
comment period for these proposed ADs is now typically 45 days, which
is consistent with the comment period for domestic transport ADs.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2009-0176, dated August 6, 2009 (referred to
after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:
During 1995, several reports were received of brake QD [quick-
disconnect] couplings loosened and/or disconnected during operation.
In a few cases, residual brake pressure was trapped in the affected
brake, causing asymmetric braking and/or resulting in hot brakes.
Loosened couplings may cause a hydraulic leak with the risk of a
brake fire. Investigation revealed that the installation of the
brake QD couplings must be done with care and that the locking teeth
on the light alloy sleeve are prone to wear. The Fokker 70/100
Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) has been revised to include
additional information to ensure correct removal and installation of
the couplings.
In 1997, Fokker Services issued SBF100-32-106, recommending the
introduction of QD couplings with corrosion resistant steel (CRES)
sleeves that would prevent excessive wear of the locking teeth on
the light alloy sleeve. In response to more reported cases of
loosened QD couplings resulting in brake problems, further improved
QD couplings were introduced in 2001 through SBF100-32-127. These
couplings increase the reliability of the brake system.
Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a
ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused
damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its
components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must
have been present close to the affected brake creating enough
internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario
for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected)
brake QD coupling. Further investigation of the service experience
files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have occurred
on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration.
In order to reduce the probability of a fluid fire as described
in CS (certification specification) 25.863, additional action is
deemed necessary.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive
[detailed] inspections [for wear] of the affected brake QD couplings
and replacement of the QD couplings with improved units.
Installation of the improved QD couplings terminates the repetitive
inspections requirements.
The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible brake
fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to safely land
the airplane. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI
in the AD docket.
Relevant Service Information
Fokker Services B.V. has issued Service Bulletin SBF100-32-156,
Revision 1, dated June 29, 2009. The actions described in this service
information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in
the MCAI.
[[Page 27963]]
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a Note within the proposed AD.
Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect about 16 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that
it would take about 4 work-hours per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $85 per
work-hour. Required parts would cost about $4,814 per product. Where
the service information lists required parts costs that are covered
under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these
costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties,
some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these
figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to
be $82,464, or $5,154 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
Fokker Services B.V.: Docket No. FAA-2010-0479; Directorate
Identifier 2009-NM-220-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by July 6, 2010.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070
and 0100 airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial
numbers, with any brake quick-disconnect (QD) coupling having part
number (P/N) AE70690E, AE70691E, AE99111E, or AE99119E installed.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 32: Landing
Gear.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
During 1995, several reports were received of brake QD couplings
loosened and/or disconnected during operation. In a few cases,
residual brake pressure was trapped in the affected brake, causing
asymmetric braking and/or resulting in hot brakes. Loosened
couplings may cause a hydraulic leak with the risk of a brake fire.
Investigation revealed that the installation of the brake QD
couplings must be done with care and that the locking teeth on the
light alloy sleeve are prone to wear. The Fokker 70/100 Aircraft
Maintenance Manual (AMM) has been revised to include additional
information to ensure correct removal and installation of the
couplings.
In 1997, Fokker Services issued SBF100-32-106, recommending the
introduction of QD couplings with corrosion resistant steel (CRES)
sleeves that would prevent excessive wear of the locking teeth on
the light alloy sleeve. In response to more reported cases of
loosened QD couplings resulting in brake problems, further improved
QD couplings were introduced in 2001 through SBF100-32-127. These
couplings increase the reliability of the brake system.
Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a
ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused
damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its
components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must
have been present close to the affected brake creating enough
internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario
for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected)
brake QD coupling. Further investigation of the service experience
files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have occurred
on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration.
In order to reduce the probability of a fluid fire as described
in CS (certification specification) 25.863, additional action is
deemed necessary.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive
[detailed] inspections [for wear] of the affected brake QD couplings
and replacement of the QD couplings with improved units.
Installation of the improved QD couplings terminates the repetitive
inspections requirements.
[[Page 27964]]
The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible
brake fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to
safely land the airplane.
Compliance
(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Actions
(g) Do the following actions.
(1) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, do a
detailed inspection for wear of the brake QD couplings by measuring
dimension ``A,'' in accordance with Part 1 of the Accomplishment
Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-32-156, Revision 1,
dated June 29, 2009. Repeat the inspection thereafter at the
applicable intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD, except as
required by paragraph (g)(2) of this AD.
Table 1--Repetitive Inspection Intervals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repeat the inspection at intervals
If dimension ``A'' is-- not to exceed--
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Greater than or equal to 0.76 mm.... 6 months.
Less than 0.76 mm but greater than 3 months.
or equal to 0.72 mm.
Less than 0.72 mm but greater than 30 days.
or equal to 0.68 mm.
Less than 0.68 mm but greater than 7 days.
or equal to 0.61 mm.
Less than 0.61 mm but greater than 24 hours.
0.53 mm.
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(2) If, during any inspection required by paragraph (g)(1) of
this AD, dimension ``A'' on any brake QD coupling is less than or
equal to 0.53 mm, before further flight, replace the affected brake
QD coupling with an improved unit having P/N AE73059E or P/N
AE73091E, as applicable, in accordance with Part 2 of the
Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-32-
156, Revision 1, dated June 29, 2009.
(3) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD,
replace all remaining brake QD couplings having P/N AE70690E, P/N
AE70691E, P/N AE99111E, and P/N AE99119E with improved units, in
accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker
Service Bulletin SBF100-32-156, Revision 1, dated June 29, 2009.
(4) Installation of brake QD couplings with an improved unit
having P/N AE73059E or P/N AE73091E at all locations terminates the
repetitive inspections required by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
(5) Replacing the brake QD couplings is also acceptable for
compliance with the corresponding requirements of paragraphs (g)(1),
(g)(2), and (g)(3) of this AD if done before the effective date of
this AD, in accordance with any of the service bulletins specified
in Table 2 of this AD:
Table 2--Fokker Credit Service Bulletins
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fokker Service Bulletins Revision Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fokker Service Bulletin Original........ July 20, 2001.
SBF100-32-127.
Fokker Service Bulletin 1............... March 6, 2009.
SBF100-32-127.
Fokker Service Bulletin Original........ March 6, 2009.
SBF100-32-156.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA AD Differences
Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service
information as follows: No differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(h) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom
Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
approved the information collection requirements and has assigned
OMB Control Number 2120-0056.
Related Information
(i) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2009-0176, dated
August 6, 2009; and Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-32-156, Revision
1, dated June 29, 2009; for related information.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 4, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-11904 Filed 5-18-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P