[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 123 (Monday, June 28, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 36579-36581]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-15653]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2010-0553; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-070-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model DC-
10-30, DC-10-30F, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F,
and MD-10-30F Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain Model DC-10-30, DC-10-30F, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-
10-40, DC10-40F, and MD-10-30F airplanes. This proposed AD would
require doing a one-time inspection of the wire bundles to determine if
wires touch the upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank,
and marking the location if necessary; a one-time inspection for
splices and damage of all wire bundles routed above the center upper
auxiliary fuel tank; a one-time inspection for damage to the fuel vapor
barrier seal and upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank;
and corrective actions, if necessary. This proposed AD would also
require installing non-metallic barrier/shield sleeving to the wire
harnesses, new clamps, new attaching hardware, and new extruded
channels. This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews conducted
by the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent the potential
of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and
consequent loss of the airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by August 12, 2010.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
3855 Lakewood Boulevard, MC D800-0019, Long Beach, California 90846-
0001; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 2; fax 206-766-5683; e-mail
[email protected]; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may
review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425-227-1221.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137;
telephone (562) 627-5262; fax (562) 627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2010-0553;
Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-070-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It
[[Page 36580]]
requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes
and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel
tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we
intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found
necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these
reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer have determined
that wires routed above the center upper auxiliary fuel tank are in
close proximity to the upper surface of the tank. In addition, some
wire harness mounts may have loosened, allowing the wires to contact
the tank. This condition can cause wire damage or chafing that could
lead to possible arcing and sparking on the fuel tank upper surface. If
not corrected, wires in contact with the fuel tank could become
damaged, and the possible resulting arcing and sparking could lead to
burn-through of the upper surface of the fuel tank.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-244, dated
February 25, 2010. The service bulletin describes procedures for the
following actions.
Doing a one-time general visual inspection of the wire
bundles to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center
upper auxiliary fuel tank, and marking the location(s) where the wire
bundle(s) contacts the upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel
tank.
Doing a one-time detailed inspection of all wire bundles
routed above the center upper auxiliary fuel tank for splices and
damage (such as wire chafing, arcing, or broken insulation or burn
marks), and corrective actions, which include repairing or replacing
damaged wires, and relocating any splice; and repairing or replacing
wires causing damage.
Doing a one-time detailed inspection for damage (burn
marks) on the upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank and
fuel vapor barrier seal, and doing corrective actions, which include
repairing the vapor barrier seal, and contacting Boeing for repair
instructions and doing the repair.
Installing non-metallic barrier/shield sleeving to the
wire harnesses, new clamps, new attaching hardware, and new extruded
channels to raise the wire harnesses off the upper surface of the
center upper auxiliary fuel tank.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant
information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is
likely to exist or develop in other products of these same type
designs. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions
specified in the service information described previously.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 166 airplanes of
U.S. registry. The following table provides the estimated costs for
U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.
Table--Estimated Costs
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Number of U.S.-
Inspection and installation Work hours Average labor Parts Cost per registered Fleet cost
rate per hour product airplanes
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Group 1 Inspection...................................... 16 $85 $0 $1,360 75 $102,000
Group 1 Installation.................................... 200 85 13,309 30,309 75 2,273,175
Group 2 Inspection...................................... 16 85 0 1,360 58 78,880
Group 2 Installation.................................... 232 85 16,660 36,380 58 2,110,040
Group 3 Inspection...................................... 16 85 0 1,360 18 24,480
Group 3 Installation.................................... 200 85 12,258 29,258 18 526,644
Group 4 Inspection...................................... 16 85 0 1,360 15 20,400
Group 4 Installation.................................... 200 85 12,372 29,372 15 440,580
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Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866,
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
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You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of
compliance in the AD Docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
McDonnell Douglas Corporation: Docket No. FAA-2010-0553; Directorate
Identifier 2010-NM-070-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by August 12, 2010.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model DC-
10-30, DC-10-30F, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC10-40F,
and MD-10-30F airplanes, certificated in any category; as specified
in Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-244, dated February 25, 2010.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.
Unsafe Condition
(e) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD
to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks,
which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in
fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Actions
(g) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD do the
actions specified in paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4)
of this AD, as applicable, and do all applicable corrective actions,
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin DC10-28-244, dated February 25, 2010, except as required by
paragraph (h) of this AD. Do all applicable corrective actions
before further flight.
(1) Do a one-time general visual inspection of the wire bundles
to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center upper
auxiliary fuel tank, and mark the location as applicable.
(2) Do a one-time detailed inspection for splices and damage of
all wire bundles between Stations Y=1219.000 and Y=1381.000 between
X=-40 to X=-90 (right side) and X=15 to X=85 (left side) above the
center upper auxiliary fuel tank.
(3) Do a one-time detailed inspection for damage (burn marks) on
the upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank and to the
fuel vapor barrier seal.
(4) Install non-metallic barrier/shield sleeving to the wire
harnesses, new clamps, new attaching hardware, and new extruded
channels.
(h) Where Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-244, dated February
25, 2010, specifies to contact Boeing for repair instructions:
Before further flight, repair the center upper auxiliary fuel tank
using a method approved in accordance with the procedures specified
in paragraph (i) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(i)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send
information to ATTN: Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion
Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5262; fax (562)
627-5210.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO to
make those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair
must meet the certification basis of the airplane and the approval
must specifically refer to this AD.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 16, 2010.
Robert D. Breneman,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-15653 Filed 6-25-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P