[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 133 (Tuesday, July 13, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 39804-39811]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-17046]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2008-0274; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-038-AD;
Amendment 39-16367; AD 2010-15-01]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 757 Airplanes,
Model 767 Airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300 Series Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Model 757 airplanes, Model 767 airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300
series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for damage of
the electrical terminal at the left and right flightdeck window 1, and
corrective actions if necessary. This AD also allows for replacing the
flightdeck window 1 with a new improved flightdeck window equipped with
different electrical connections, which terminates the repetitive
inspections for that flightdeck window 1. This AD results from several
reports of electrical arcs at the terminal blocks of the electrically
heated flightdeck window 1. We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke and
fire in the cockpit, which could lead to loss of visibility, and
injuries to or incapacitation of the flightcrew.
DATES: This AD is effective August 17, 2010.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of August 17,
2010.
[[Page 39805]]
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-
544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail [email protected];
Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The address for the
Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is the Document Management
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30,
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Louis Natsiopoulos, Aerospace
Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; telephone (425) 917-6478; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to
certain Model 757 airplanes, Model 767 airplanes, and Model 777-200 and
-300 series airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register
on March 13, 2008 (73 FR 13483). That NPRM proposed to require
repetitive inspections for damage of the electrical terminal at the
left and right flightdeck window 1, and corrective actions if
necessary. That NPRM also proposed to allow for replacing the
flightdeck window 1 with a new improved flightdeck window equipped with
different electrical connections, which would terminate the repetitive
inspections for that flightdeck window 1.
Explanation of Revised Service Information
After the NPRM was issued, Boeing issued the following service
bulletins:
Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019,
Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010, for Model 757-200, -200CB, and -200PF
series airplanes.
Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020,
Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, for Model 757-300 series airplanes.
We referred to Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-
0019, and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, both
Revision 1, both dated December 19, 2007, as appropriate sources of
service information for doing the actions proposed in the NPRM.
The actions specified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins
757-30-0019 and 757-30-0020, both Revision 2, include an additional
inspection of the J1 and J4 (upper) terminals; however, the inspection
of the upper connections is not included in this AD. We find that to
delay this action to include the inspection of the J1 and J4 terminals
and to ensure that the public has sufficient time to consider and
comment on the additional actions, would be inappropriate in light of
the unsafe condition identified on the J5 terminal. We are considering
additional rulemaking to require the inspection of the J1 and J4
terminals.
Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins 757-30-0019 and 757-30-
0020, both Revision 2, include a reduced compliance time of 500 flight
hours or 150 days, whichever occurs first, for the detailed inspection
for damage specified in paragraph (f) of this AD (paragraph (g) of the
NPRM). We have not changed this AD to include the reduced compliance
time. We have determined that the compliance time, as proposed,
represents an appropriate interval of time in which the required
actions can be performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet,
while still maintaining an adequate level of safety. We find that to
delay this action to ensure that the public has sufficient time to
consider and comment on the reduced compliance time, would be
inappropriate in light of the identified unsafe condition.
For Model 757 airplanes, Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins
757-30-0019 and 757-30-0020, both Revision 2, also include a revised
interval for repeating the detailed inspection for damage specified in
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD (paragraphs (g) and (h) of the NPRM).
We have determined that extending the repetitive intervals, as
recommended by the manufacturer, is consistent with data on in-service
failure reports and will not adversely affect safety for the affected
airplane models. Therefore, we have changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of
this AD (paragraphs (g) and (h) of the NPRM), to include the revised
interval. For windows manufactured by GKN Aerospace Transparency
Systems (GKN), the inspection is now specified at intervals not to
exceed 12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever occurs later. For
windows manufactured by PPG Aerospace (PPG), the inspection is now
specified at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months,
whichever occurs later. We have also revised this same repetitive
interval for Model 767 airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300 series
airplanes, as explained under ``Requests to Extend Repetitive
Inspection Interval'' below.
The Compliance paragraphs (1.E.) of Boeing Special Attention
Service Bulletins 757-30-0019 and 757-30-0020, both Revision 2, give
additional time for doing the corrective action if the screw is cross
threaded and the terminal lug is tight. We have added paragraph (h)(1)
to this AD to specify doing the corrective action within 150 days or
500 flight hours after the inspection, whichever occurs first, rather
than before further flight.
We have changed Table 1 of this final rule to refer to Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019, Revision 2, dated April
19, 2010; and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020,
Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010; as appropriate sources of service
information. We have also changed Table 2 of this final rule to state
that actions done before the effective date of this AD in accordance
with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019 or Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, both Revision 1, both
dated December 19, 2007, are acceptable for compliance with the
corresponding requirements of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We considered the comments received from the 10 commenters.
Support for the NPRM
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) fully supports the
proposed action for the lower (J5) terminal.
Issue a Supplemental NPRM or Withdraw the NPRM
Air Transport Association (ATA) agrees with the intent of the
proposal, but specifies that the NPRM, as written, has fundamental and
detailed flaws that may not resolve the unsafe condition; instead, the
NPRM focuses on electrical connections on another side of the terminal
block, which likely are not the cause of the unsafe condition. ATA
recommends that we instead issue a
[[Page 39806]]
supplemental NPRM that takes into consideration the comments of member
airlines.
American Airlines (AAL) indicates that the proposed rule is
premature and should be withdrawn until the NTSB has completed its
investigation of an incident of window heat arcing on a Model 757
airplane at the J1 and J4 terminals. The NTSB also encourages amending
the NPRM (we infer by supplemental NPRM) to include inspections of the
J1 and J4 terminals on all of the affected flightdeck windows. The NTSB
states that in a small number of cases it determined that a loose or
inadequate connection at the J1 terminal or J4 terminal is the most
likely cause of the smoke and/or fire in the cockpit.
AAL, Continental Airlines (CAL), Delta Airlines (DAL), and United
Airlines (UAL) request we withdraw the NPRM until we do further
investigation to identify the root cause of the window arcing events.
The commenters state that the proposed AD should mandate a
comprehensive and worthwhile solution; that a credible analysis
providing the true root cause of the failure must be completed first;
and that further investigation could alter or add to the solution, thus
rendering it more meaningful. Certain commenters suggest what the root
causes might be, including the following:
AAL contends that material design choices contribute to
unintended cross threading and apparent lack of screw retention over
time; and that under-torque of the connector screw as the lone primary
failure is speculative and that a more likely source of heating is
arcing along the braided power wire downstream of the window heat
connector. In addition, AAL service history shows the primary cause of
failure to be arcing at the heat braided power wire at the lower window
along with delamination between the window heat layer and the outer
glass.
CAL states that it appears the root cause attributed to
cross threading might actually be faulty solder joints, and that
stripping of the tapped brass block due to repetitive application of
current torque requirements could be a driving force behind in-service
failures.
DAL notes that poor design/manufacture of the flightdeck
window 1 terminal contributes to arcing events and that the design does
not support a long-term robust connection to the screw.
We disagree with the requests to withdraw the NPRM or issue a
supplemental NPRM.
The incident of window heat arcing at the J1 and J4 terminals that
was investigated by the NTSB is related to the unsafe condition
addressed by the NPRM that preceded this final rule. We have reports of
four events involving arcing of the flightdeck window heat system at
the upper aft (J1) and upper forward (J4) terminals on the first
officer's flightdeck window that caused the inner pane of glass to
fracture. The events, which occurred between January 2001 and August
2008, all occurred on Model 757 airplanes. Withdrawing the NPRM to
include the upper terminals for Model 757 airplanes would be
inappropriate as it would delay this AD action, which addresses
failures of the lower (J5) terminal for Model 757 airplanes, Model 767
airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. However, we are
considering additional rulemaking to address arcing at the upper (J1
and J4) terminals on Model 757 airplanes only.
Regarding the requests to determine the root causes, we disagree
with withdrawing the NPRM until a different root cause is identified.
Although we agree with the commenters that the failure mode that causes
a significant arcing event is the melting of solder or the de-soldering
of the terminal connection, we disagree as to the cause of the de-
soldering of the terminal connection and subsequent arcing.
We have received reports that attribute the primary cause of the
overheating of the terminal to a cross-threaded screw, a loose screw,
or an incorrectly installed screw. We have also found that the majority
of the arcing events happened within 500 flight hours after the
flightdeck window was replaced or had undergone maintenance. The
unintended cross threading and apparent lack of screw retention over
time have been reported on flightdeck windows manufactured by both GKN
and PPG. The failure of the moisture seal and the delamination of the
flightdeck window plies are addressed by other ADs and other service
bulletins; but we point out that such failures are detectable.
We find that the actions required by this AD will identify failures
of the electrical terminals, regardless of the root cause, and that the
corrective actions apply to all detected failures. However, if new
information becomes available to justify revising this AD, we will
consider further rulemaking.
For the above reasons, no change has been made to the AD in
response to the requests to withdraw the NPRM or issue a supplemental
NPRM.
Requests To Extend Repetitive Inspection Interval
Air France, ATA, and Northwest Airlines (NWA) request that we
extend the interval for the repetitive inspection from 6,000 flight
hours to 7,800 flight hours (Air France) or 8,000 flight hours (ATA and
NWA). Air France contends that the inspections should be matched with
the schedule for light maintenance checks. ATA recommends that we
extend the interval based on service experience. NWA indicates there
would not be an appreciable effect on safety in extending the
inspection to an interval where the task can be performed during a
scheduled ``C'' check in an environment more conducive to such
maintenance.
We partially agree with the requests to extend the repetitive
inspection interval. We agree with the request to extend the interval
for GKN flightdeck windows. As explained previously under ``Explanation
of Revised Service Information,'' for windows manufactured by GKN, the
inspection is now specified in this AD at intervals not to exceed
12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever occurs later. According to
reports the failure rate of GKN flightdeck windows seems to be
substantially lower than the failure rate of the PPG flightdeck
windows, and the severity of events of the GKN flightdeck windows is
less.
We disagree with extending the inspection interval for PPG
flightdeck windows from 6,000 flight hours; however, we have determined
that specifying the compliance time as 6,000 flight hours or 24 months,
whichever occurs later, will provide relief to operators. In
establishing the 6,000-flight-hour interval for those flightdeck
windows, we considered not only the frequency of occurrence of the
electrical connection failures, the time required to perform the
inspection, and the consequent risk of uncorrected unsafe conditions,
but also the scheduling of the inspections so they can be accomplished
during regular maintenance down time. We determined that an interval of
6,000 flight hours would give the operators ample time to schedule the
proposed actions at a routine scheduled maintenance and detect an
unsafe condition before an event.
We have changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD (paragraphs (g)
and (h) of the NPRM) to include the revised intervals.
Requests To Clarify Intent of 500 Flight Hours for Inspection
AAL, DAL, and UAL request that we clarify the intent of the initial
repetitive inspection that is proposed within 500 flight hours after
the corrective action for certain airplanes. DAL points out that as
written in the NPRM an operator
[[Page 39807]]
could accomplish the detailed inspection after one flight hour and be
in compliance with the proposed rule. UAL would like to know if the
intent is to perform a quality check (which could be performed shortly
after the replacement), or if the intent is to check for degradation of
the torque value over time. UAL states that if the intent is the
latter, the wording should be ``after 500 flight hours'' instead of
``within 500 flight hours.'' AAL also states that the inspection could
be done within an hour after the corrective action and asks if the
intent is simply to do a quality check.
We agree that the 500-flight-hour compliance time for the initial
repetitive inspection for certain airplanes, as required by paragraph
(g) of this AD (paragraph (h) of the NPRM), should be clarified. The
intent of the inspection of certain airplanes ``within 500 flight hours
after the corrective action,'' as specified in paragraph (g) of this
AD, is a quality assurance check. The phrase ``within 500 flight hours
after the corrective action'' correctly allows for doing the initial
repetitive inspection before further flight following accomplishment of
the corrective action. According to the majority of the reported arcing
events, the result of an incorrectly assembled screw/lug electrical
connection (a heated terminal and the possibility of subsequent arcing)
occurred in-service after the assembly of the electrical connection.
Additionally, the phrase ``within 500 flight hours after the corrective
action'' would also provide sufficient time for operators of mixed or
large fleets to do the inspection without compromising safety. We have
not changed the AD in this regard.
Requests To Exclude Certain Window From Proposed Actions
ATA, on behalf of its member AAL, requests that part number (P/N)
141T4800 flightdeck windows be excluded from the actions proposed in
the NPRM. AAL has data that confirm it has not experienced what they
deemed a ``catastrophic'' arcing or smoke event on a flightdeck window,
P/N 141T4800. All of the ``catastrophic'' arcing and smoke events AAL
has experienced have occurred on flightdeck window P/N 141T4801 with
lug and screw electrical connections. AAL states that the P/N 141T4800
terminal blocks might show minor damage; however, the damage is limited
and contained. AAL further asserts that the connection found in the
terminating action proposed in the NPRM is exactly the P/N 141T4800
connection; therefore, the AD should exclude flightdeck windows that
currently have P/N 141T4800.
We partially agree with the commenters. We agree that the
performance of the P/N 141T4800 flightdeck window appears to be better
than the P/N 141T4801 flightdeck window with lug and screw electrical
connections; its failure rate is lower and the failures are not as
severe. We disagree with excluding the P/N 141T4800 flightdeck windows
from the AD because we have received reports of arcing events with the
P/N 141T4800 flightdeck windows that require corrective action.
However, we find that some mitigation is appropriate because the
failure rate of the screw/lug terminal equipped PPG windshields to
screw/lug equipped GKN flightdeck windows is about 2 to 1. Therefore,
we have changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD (paragraphs (g) and
(h) of the NPRM) to specify a repetitive interval of 12,000 flight
hours or 48 months, whichever occurs later, for screw/lug terminal
equipped GKN flightdeck windows.
Requests To Include Certain P/N as Terminating Action
GKN and AAL state that flightdeck window P/N 141T800-13/-14 should
be included as a terminating action in the NPRM. The commenters state
that service information points to damaged solder joints as the primary
cause of the electrical arcs and point out that the P/N 141T800-13/-14
flightdeck windows do not incorporate the design feature that causes
extreme arcing, an ignition source, and melting of the glass; and that
the design does not incorporate features that are subject to assembly
error. Specifically, the commenters state that at the cockpit side, the
flightdeck window P/N 141T800-13/-14 uses a screw connector which is
seen as superior to the pin and socket connector used on the proposed
terminating action windshield; this superiority is due to the high
clamping pressure and ability to re-tighten or replace the screw in
addition to the excellent material choice for the threaded insert.
We disagree with the request to include flightdeck window P/N
141T800-13/-14 as a terminating action. While we agree that damaged
solder joints are the primary cause for the electrical arcs, we point
out that the primary cause of loose connections is the incorrect torque
of the screw or an incorrectly installed screw. A loose connection
increases the heat at the terminal, which can cause damage to the
internal solder joint. A loose screw or an incorrectly installed screw
is due to limited access on the airplane. The pin/socket connector,
which is the design proposed as the optional terminating action in the
NPRM, is assembled in a controlled environment on a bench and with full
access. The screw/lug design proposed by the commenters does not
provide an equivalent level of safety to that of the pin/socket design,
which is not subject to the same assembly errors. Therefore, we have
not changed the AD in this regard.
Request for Further Analysis Before Terminating Action
CAL, DAL, and ATA on behalf of its member AAL, request that we and
the manufacturer perform an engineering analysis to determine whether
pin and socket connections, proposed as an optional terminating action,
offer any advantage over screw and lug connections. AAL has had
considerable experience with pin and socket connections and states that
carrying any appreciable current through a pin and socket connection is
less reliable than a ring terminal and screw connection. CAL states
that it has had problems with pin and socket connections; however, it
applauds the mechanical joining at the mesh to block interface. CAL
considers that more time is needed to determine if the pin and socket
design is more reliable. DAL is unaware of any destructive testing that
has been performed to substantiate the use of the new design as the
corrective action for flightdeck window arcing events.
We disagree with the need for further study. The pin and socket
connection of the electrical heat terminal was designed and
qualification tested for contact retention and current-carrying
capacity by the suppliers as part of the certification process of the
block. The testing verified the integrity of the design and showed it
not to have nuisance failures. Further, the pin and socket technology
is well-established and used in a significant number of electrical
applications on the airplane. The pin and socket connectors for the
flightdeck window heat terminal have been in service since 2004 without
any reported failures. The failures that the commenters referred to
were due to manufacturing error rather than a design defect. We have
not changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Make Terminating Action Mandatory
The NTSB asks that we make the installation of a new flightdeck
window mandatory rather than optional and states that the installation
would prevent similar events of smoke or fire in the cockpit. The NTSB
notes that the NPRM proposes installation of a new
[[Page 39808]]
flightdeck window that incorporates the pin and socket electrical
connection that provides a more secure connection and is less
susceptible to installation errors. This new flightdeck window design
also uses a crimped ring terminal that is internal to the terminal
block; the crimped ring terminal connects the flightdeck window heat
braid wire to the terminal, which addresses some of the solder issues
suspected in the NTSB's investigations around the J1 and J4 terminals.
We partially agree. While we agree with the commenter that the
installation of the new flightdeck window with the pin and socket
electrical connection is more robust because it is not as susceptible
to assembly errors as is the flightdeck window with the screw/lug
connection, we disagree with the request to make the installation of
the flightdeck window with the new pin and socket electrical connection
mandatory. The repetitive inspections and corrective actions required
by this AD provide adequate means to maintain the safety of the screw/
lug flightdeck windows. Requiring the replacement of the flightdeck
windows is not necessary to address the unsafe condition. We have not
changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Improve Access to Terminal Block
CAL notes that access to the terminal block on Boeing Model 757
airplanes is ``atrocious''; even with small hands it cannot be held.
CAL does not consider it a coincidence that this connection is the
``problem child'' because access is so poor. This limited access,
coupled with poor ``view-ability'' turns a simple installation into a
very complex installation. CAL requests that certain aircraft
improvements and modifications be addressed, as well as human factor
items such as special tooling to be developed.
We infer that the commenter asks us to address this issue in the
AD. We partially agree with the request. The commenter is correct in
saying that access to the electrical terminal block makes it difficult
to achieve the torque limits outlined in the airplane maintenance
manual and that this could be the primary reason for incorrectly
assembled electrical terminations. We note that the optional
terminating action of this AD (pin and socket design) is much easier to
accomplish in the existing limited space. In addition, we find that to
delay this action to allow time for modifications and human factor
changes would be inappropriate in light of the identified unsafe
condition. The commenter should note that under the provisions of
paragraph (k) of the final rule, we will consider requests for approval
of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) if sufficient data are
submitted to substantiate that the design change would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
We have not changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Service Bulletins
AAL requests revisions to the service bulletins listed in the table
titled ``Requested revisions.''
Requested Revisions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing special attention
service bulletin-- Revision-- Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-30-0019.................. 1.............. December 19, 2007.
757-30-0020.................. 1.............. December 19, 2007.
767-30-0041.................. Original....... December 5, 2007.
777-30-0012.................. 2.............. December 19, 2007.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AAL lists several editorial changes in the service bulletins in its
comments, and specifies that revisions would reduce the burden of
processing numerous requests for AMOCs.
UAL requests that we revise Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 777-30-0012, Revision 2, dated December 19, 2007, to clarify
the following statement: ``There is a time limit on how long the old
number 1 flightdeck window can be used.'' UAL would like to know if the
time limit refers to the serviceability limit of the old flightdeck
window, or the availability of the flightdeck window, or to future
spares.
We have discussed AAL's concerns with Boeing. In addition, we agree
with UAL that the statement about the time limit is in error and should
not be included in the service bulletin. We have also referred this
concern to Boeing. We have not changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Add Reference to Table 1
Boeing asks that we add a reference to Table 1 of the NPRM in the
paragraph titled ``Actions Accomplished Previously,'' for the latest
revision of the released service bulletins. Boeing points out that the
service bulletins listed in both Table 1 and Table 2 are acceptable
before the effective date of the AD.
We disagree with the request to refer to Table 1 in the ``Credit
for Actions Accomplished Previously'' paragraph of this AD. The intent
of the ``Credit for Actions Accomplished Previously'' paragraph is to
list service bulletins that are acceptable for compliance before the
effective date of the AD, but not after the effective date of the AD.
The service bulletins listed in Table 1 of the AD are acceptable for
compliance both before and after the effective date of the AD. The
acceptable use of the service bulletins listed in Table 1 of this AD
before the effective date is covered by the statement in paragraph (e)
of this AD that says, ``Comply with this AD within the compliance times
specified, unless already done.'' We have not changed the AD in this
regard.
Request To Add Statement to AD Regarding Window Manufacturer
Boeing asks that we add the following statement to the
``Alternative Methods of Compliance'' paragraph of the NPRM: ``These
inspections are for the 1 flight deck windows regardless of
window manufacturer.'' Boeing explains that there are two different
suppliers for the flightdeck windows, but each flightdeck window is
connected to the airplane side wiring in the same manner and requires
the specified inspections.
We disagree with the request to change this AD to add the
statement. The AD requires inspection of the flightdeck windows
according to the Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable service
bulletin. The service bulletins listed in this AD apply to all
flightdeck windows, regardless of manufacturer. We have not changed the
AD in this regard.
Request To Take Similar Action for Model 747 Series Airplanes
The NTSB believes that we should take similar action for Model 747
series airplanes because a similar condition exists on those airplanes.
We agree with the NTSB and are considering rulemaking to address a
similar unsafe condition on Model 747 series airplanes. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
[[Page 39809]]
Clarification of Service Bulletin Information
The last column in the table in paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of
Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2,
dated March 31, 2010, specifies repeating the inspection for damage at
``intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months.'' The intent
of that column is to specify an interval ``not to exceed 6,000 flight
hours or 24 months, whichever occurs later.'' We have included the
correct interval in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD.
In several places of the Compliance paragraph (1.E.) of Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March
31, 2010; and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019,
Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010; the ``Action'' column implies that
both the left and right windows must be replaced. For example, ``* * *
replace windshield in accordance with Work Package 1, step 3. and Work
Package 2, step 3.'' The intent is to state, ``* * * Work Package 1,
step 3. or Work Package 2, as applicable * * *.'' Operators are to use
one or the other (or both) work instruction, as applicable, to replace
the window(s) that need replacing. We have included this information in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD.
The Action column for Inspection Condition 4 in the table in
paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, states ``3. If
terminal lug is still loose.'' That statement should be ``3. If
terminal lug is still loose then disassemble, inspect and reassemble
the electrical connection.''
Explanation of Additional Changes
We have clarified paragraph (f) of this AD (paragraph (g) of the
NPRM) to specify that Work Packages 1 and 2 apply to the J5 terminal.
As stated previously, the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special
Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31,
2010, and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019,
Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010, include an inspection of the J1 and
J4 (upper) electrical connections; however, the inspection of these
connections is not included in this AD.
We have clarified paragraph (g) of this AD (paragraph (h) of the
NPRM) to remove the phrase ``or tightening a loose screw'' from the
description of corrective actions that requires additional inspection
within 500 flight hours. The only corrective action after which the
inspection is necessary is replacement.
After the NPRM was issued, we reviewed the figures we have used
over the past several years to calculate AD costs to operators. To
account for various inflationary costs in the airline industry, we find
it necessary to increase the labor rate used in these calculations from
$80 per work hour to $85 per work hour. The cost impact information,
below, reflects this increase in the specified hourly labor rate.
We have removed the ``Service Bulletin Reference'' paragraph from
this AD. That paragraph was identified as paragraph (f) in the NPRM.
Instead, we have provided the full service bulletin citations
throughout this AD.
We also have revised this final rule to identify the legal name of
the manufacturer as published in the most recent type certificate data
sheet for the affected airplane models.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that
these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or
increase the scope of the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 1,212 airplanes of U.S. registry.
The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to
comply with this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work hour.
Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Work hours Parts Cost per product Fleet cost
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection.......................... 1 None.................. $85, per inspection cycle.. $103,020, per inspection cycle.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of
compliance in the AD Docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, 44701.
[[Page 39810]]
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
2010-15-01 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-16367. Docket No. FAA-
2008-0274; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-038-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective August 17,
2010.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to the airplanes identified in Table 1 of
this AD, certificated in any category.
Table 1--Airplanes Affected by This AD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Boeing Company Model- As identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-200, -200CB, and -200PF series 757-30-0019, Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010.
airplanes.
757-300 series airplanes............. 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010.
767-200, -300, and -300F series 767-30-0039, dated December 5, 2007.
airplanes.
767-400ER series airplanes........... 767-30-0041, dated December 5, 2007.
777-200 and -300 series airplanes.... 777-30-0012, Revision 2, dated December 19, 2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from several reports of electrical arcs at
the terminal blocks of the electrically heated flightdeck window 1.
We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke and fire in the cockpit,
which could lead to loss of visibility, and injuries to or
incapacitation of the flightcrew.
Compliance
(e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Inspection and Corrective Actions
(f) Within 500 flight hours after the effective date of this AD,
do a detailed inspection for damage (including arcing, loose
terminal, or heat damage) of the electrical terminal (J5 terminal)
at the left and right flightdeck window 1, and do all applicable
corrective actions, by accomplishing all the actions for the J5
terminal specified in Work Packages 1 and 2 of the applicable
service bulletin specified in Table 1 of this AD, except as provided
by paragraph (h) of this AD. Except as provided by paragraph (h) of
this AD, do all applicable corrective actions before further flight.
Except as provided by paragraph (g) of this AD, repeat the detailed
inspection at the applicable interval specified in paragraph (f)(1)
or (f)(2) of this AD. Doing the replacement specified in paragraph
(i) of this AD terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of
this paragraph for the replaced flightdeck window 1.
(1) For flightdeck windows manufactured by GKN with SCREW/LUG
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever
occurs later.
(2) For flightdeck windows manufactured by PPG with SCREW/LUG
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months, whichever
occurs later.
(g) For airplanes on which replacement with a new window 1 that
uses screws and lugs for the electrical connections is done in
accordance with Work Package 1 or 2 of the applicable service
bulletin specified in Table 1 of this AD: Do the next detailed
inspection within 500 flight hours after the corrective action, and
repeat the inspection thereafter at the applicable interval
specified in paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD. Doing the
replacement specified in paragraph (i) of this AD terminates the
repetitive inspection requirements of this paragraph for the
replaced flightdeck window 1.
(1) For flightdeck windows manufactured by GKN with SCREW/LUG
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever
occurs later.
(2) For flightdeck windows manufactured by PPG with SCREW/LUG
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months, whichever
occurs later.
Exceptions
(h) Do the applicable actions specified in paragraph (f) of this
AD except as provided by paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD.
(1) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (f) of this
AD, the screw is cross threaded and the terminal lug is tight, do
the applicable corrective action within 150 days or 500 flight hours
after the inspection, whichever occurs first.
(2) Where paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, and Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019, Revision 2, dated
April 19, 2010, states in the ``Action'' column to (for example) ``
* * * replace windshield in accordance with Work Package 1, step 3.
and Work Package 2, step 3,'' the intent of the applicable service
bulletin is to state, `` * * * Work Package 1, step 3. or Work
Package 2, as applicable * * *.'' Operators are to use one or the
other (or both) work instruction, as applicable, to replace the
window(s) that need replacing.
Optional Terminating Action
(i) Replacing a flightdeck window 1 that uses screws and lugs
for the electrical connections with a flightdeck window that uses
pins and sockets for the electrical connections in accordance with
Work Packages 3 or 4 of the applicable service bulletin specified in
Table 1 of this AD ends the repetitive inspection requirements of
this AD for that window 1.
Credit for Actions Accomplished Previously
(j) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the applicable service bulletin specified in Table 2
of this AD are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding
requirements of this AD.
Table 2--Acceptable Service Bulletins
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing Special Attention
Service Bulletin-- Revision-- Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-30-0019.................. Original....... July 19, 2006.
757-30-0019.................. 1.............. December 19, 2007.
757-30-0020.................. Original....... July 19, 2006.
757-30-0020.................. 1.............. December 19, 2007.
777-30-0012.................. Original....... April 15, 2004.
777-30-0012.................. 1.............. June 2, 2006.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 39811]]
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(k)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to
ATTN: Louis Natsiopoulos, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment
Branch, ANM-130S, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; telephone (425) 917-6478; fax (425) 917-6590. Information may
be e-mailed to: [email protected].
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(l) You must use the applicable service information contained in
Table 3 of this AD to do the actions required by this AD, unless the
AD specifies otherwise. If you accomplish the optional actions
specified by this AD, you must use the applicable service
information specified in Table 3 of this AD to perform those
actions, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone
206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail
[email protected]; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information that
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Table 3--Material Incorporated by Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing Special Attention
Service Bulletin-- Revision-- Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-30-0019.................. 2.............. April 19, 2010.
757[dash]30[dash]0020........ 2.............. March 31, 2010.
767[dash]30-0039............. Original....... December 5, 2007.
767-30-0041.................. Original....... December 5, 2007.
777-30-0012.................. 2.............. December 19, 2007.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 6, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-17046 Filed 7-9-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P