[Federal Register: July 19, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 137)]
[Notices]
[Page 41850-41853]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr19jy10-53]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Amended Notice of Intent to Modify the Scope of the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and
Conduct Additional Public Scoping
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration.
ACTION: Amended Notice of Intent.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to
modify the scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/EIS-0283-S2)
and to conduct additional public scoping. DOE issued its Notice of
Intent \1\ (NOI) to prepare the SPD Supplemental EIS on March 28, 2007
(72 FR 14543). DOE now intends to revise the scope of the SPD
Supplemental EIS to refine the quantity and types of surplus weapons-
usable plutonium material, evaluate additional alternatives, and no
longer consider in detail one alternative identified in the NOI
(ceramic can-in-canister immobilization). Also, DOE had identified a
glass can-in-canister immobilization approach as its preferred
alternative in the NOI; DOE will continue to evaluate that alternative
but currently does not have a preferred alternative.
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\1\ The NOI identified the title of the document as the
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Surplus Plutonium
Disposition at the Savannah River Site.
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DOE now proposes to analyze a new alternative to install the
capability in K-Area at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to, among other
things, disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and
convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed
uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility (MFFF); under this alternative, DOE would not
build the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which DOE
previously decided to construct. This K-Area project also would provide
capabilities needed to prepare plutonium for other disposition
alternatives evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS and to support the
ongoing plutonium storage mission in K-Area. DOE also proposes to
evaluate a new alternative to dispose of some surplus non-pit plutonium
as transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New
Mexico, provided the plutonium would meet the criteria for such
disposal. In addition, DOE will analyze the potential environmental
impacts of using MOX fuel in up to five reactors owned by the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) at the Sequoyah (near Soddy-Daisy, TN) and
Browns Ferry (near Decatur and Athens, AL) nuclear stations. TVA will
be a cooperating agency with DOE for preparation and review of the
sections of the SPD Supplemental EIS that address operation of TVA
reactors.
DATES: DOE invites Federal agencies, state and local governments,
Native American tribes, industry, other organizations, and members of
the public to submit comments to assist in identifying environmental
issues and in determining the scope of the SPD Supplemental EIS. The
public scoping period will end on September 17, 2010. DOE will consider
all comments received or postmarked by September 17, 2010. Comments
received after that date will be considered to the extent practicable.
Also, DOE asks that Federal, state, and local agencies that desire to
be designated cooperating agencies on the SPD Supplemental EIS contact
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Document Manager at the
addresses listed under Addresses by the end of the scoping period. DOE
will hold five public scoping meetings:
August 3, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Calhoun Community
College, Decatur Campus, Aerospace Building, 6250 Highway 31 North,
Tanner, AL 35671
August 5, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Chattanooga
Convention Center, 1150 Carter Street, Chattanooga, TN 37402
August 17, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at North Augusta
Municipal Center, 100 Georgia Avenue, North Augusta, SC 29841
August 24, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Best Western
Stevens Inn, 1829 S. Canal Street, Carlsbad, NM 88220
August 26, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Courtyard by
Marriott Santa Fe, 3347 Cerrillos Road, Santa Fe, NM 87507
ADDRESSES: Please direct written comments on the scope of the SPD
Supplemental EIS to Ms. Sachiko McAlhany, SPD Supplemental EIS NEPA
Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 2324, Germantown,
MD 20874-2324. You may also send comments on the scope of the SPD
Supplemental EIS via e-mail to spdsupplementaleis@saic.com, or via the
Web site, http://www.spdsupplementaleis.com; or by toll-free fax to
877-865-0277. DOE will give equal weight to written, e-mail, fax, and
oral comments. Questions regarding the scoping process and requests to
be placed on the distribution list for this Supplemental EIS should be
directed to
[[Page 41851]]
Ms. McAlhany by any of the means given above or by calling toll-free
877-344-0513.
For general information concerning the DOE NEPA process, contact:
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-
54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, D.C. 20585-0103; telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message
at 1-800-472-2756; fax 202-586-7031; or send an e-mail to
AskNEPA@hq.doe.gov. This Amended NOI will be available on the Internet
at nepa.energy.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
To reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, DOE is
engaged in a program to disposition its surplus, weapons-usable
plutonium in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner by
converting such plutonium into proliferation-resistant forms that can
never again be readily used in nuclear weapons. The SPD Supplemental
EIS will analyze the potential environmental impacts of reasonable
alternatives \2\ to disposition approximately 7 metric tons (MT) \3\ of
additional plutonium from pits (``pit plutonium''; a pit is the core of
a nuclear weapon) which were declared surplus to national defense needs
after publication of the NOI and were not included in DOE's prior
decisions. The SPD Supplemental EIS also will analyze reasonable
disposition alternatives for approximately 6 MT \4\ of non-pit
plutonium. DOE also intends to evaluate the potential impacts
associated with disposition of additional plutonium to account for the
possibility that the United States may declare additional plutonium to
be surplus in the future and, as analyzed in the Environmental
Assessment for the U.S. Receipt and Storage of Gap Material--Plutonium
(DOE/EA-1771, May 2010), small quantities of plutonium (totaling up to
100 kilograms) that the United States may accept from at-risk foreign
locations as part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
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\2\ The disposition alternatives to be analyzed in the SPD
Supplemental EIS are not expected to change the type of material to
be processed into MOX fuel or to change the annual throughput,
annual environmental impacts, or the types of waste generated by the
MFFF.
\3\ In 2007, the United States declared 9 MT of pit plutonium as
surplus to U.S. defense needs. Approximately 2 MT are included in
the 34 MT of surplus and future-declared surplus plutonium that DOE
previously decided to fabricate into MOX fuel (68 FR 20134, April
24, 2003), leaving approximately 7 MT of additional surplus pit
plutonium for disposition.
\4\ The 2007 NOI for the SPD Supplemental EIS stated that the
scope would include up to 13 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium that
DOE had previously planned to immobilize, although of that 13 MT,
DOE had decided in 2003 to fabricate approximately 6.5 MT of this
non-pit plutonium into MOX fuel (68 FR 20134, April 24, 2003). Since
publication of the NOI in 2007, DOE has decided to disposition
approximately 0.6 MT of non-pit plutonium via H-Canyon and the
Defense Waste Processing Facility (see footnote 6). Thus, DOE now
plans to analyze disposition options for approximately 6 MT of
surplus non-pit plutonium.
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The SPD Supplemental EIS will not reconsider decisions already made
to disposition surplus plutonium, other than the decision discussed
below to construct a stand-alone PDCF. DOE already has decided to
fabricate 34 MT of surplus plutonium into MOX fuel in the MFFF (68 FR
20134, April 24, 2003), currently under construction at SRS, and to
irradiate the MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors used to generate
electricity, thereby rendering the plutonium into a spent fuel form not
readily usable in nuclear weapons. DOE has set aside approximately 4 MT
of surplus plutonium in the form of unirradiated reactor fuel for non-
defense programmatic use (e.g., reactor fuels research and development)
as explained in the 2007 NOI (72 FR 14543, March 28, 2007), and
approximately 7 MT of surplus plutonium is contained in irradiated
reactor fuel and, thus, already is in a proliferation-resistant form
(see 65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000). Finally, DOE already has disposed
of approximately 3 MT of surplus plutonium scrap and residues at WIPP
as transuranic waste \5\ and has decided to process approximately 0.6
MT at SRS through the H-Canyon, ultimately to be incorporated into
vitrified high-level waste at the Defense Waste Processing Facility
(DWPF).\6\
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\5\ Disposal of certain plutonium scrap and residues at WIPP was
undertaken pursuant to several records of decision (63 FR 66136,
December 1, 1998; 64 FR 8068, February 18, 1999; 64 FR 47780,
September 1, 1999; 66 FR 4803, January 18, 2001; 68 FR 44329, July
28, 2003).
\6\ The decisions to process approximately 0.6 MT of surplus
non-pit plutonium through H-Canyon and DWPF are contained in two
interim action determinations approved at SRS on December 8, 2008,
and September 25, 2009.
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Previously Completed NEPA Analyses and Decisions Made
In the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229, December
1996), DOE evaluated six candidate sites for plutonium disposition
facilities and three categories of disposition technologies that would
convert surplus plutonium into a form that would meet the Spent Fuel
Standard.\7\ The three categories were: Deep Borehole Category (two
options); Immobilization Category (three options); and Reactor Category
(four options). DOE also analyzed a No Action Alternative. DOE selected
a dual-path strategy for disposition that would allow immobilization of
some or all of the surplus plutonium in glass or ceramic material for
disposal in a geologic repository, and fabrication of some surplus
plutonium into MOX fuel for irradiation in existing domestic commercial
reactor(s), with subsequent disposal of the spent fuel in a geologic
repository \8\ (62 FR 3014, January 21, 1997). DOE also decided that an
immobilization facility would be located either at the Hanford Site in
Washington or at SRS.
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\7\ Under that standard, the surplus weapons-usable plutonium
should be made as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as
the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in
spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
\8\ DOE has since decided to terminate the program to develop a
Yucca Mountain repository for geologic disposal of spent nuclear
fuel and high-level waste. DOE has established a Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future (Blue Ribbon Commission) to
develop and recommend alternative storage and disposal approaches
for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. Notwithstanding
termination of the Yucca Mountain program, DOE remains committed to
meeting its obligations to manage and ultimately dispose of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level waste. The Blue Ribbon Commission will
conduct a comprehensive review of the back-end of the fuel cycle and
evaluate alternative approaches for meeting these obligations. The
Blue Ribbon Commission will provide the opportunity for a meaningful
dialogue on how best to address this challenging issue and will
provide recommendations to DOE for developing a safe, long-term
solution to managing the Nation's spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste.
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In November 1999, DOE issued the Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS
(SPD EIS, DOE/EIS-0283). The SPD EIS tiered from the Storage and
Disposition PEIS and included an analysis of the potential
environmental impacts associated with alternative technologies and
sites to implement the dual-path plutonium disposition strategy. The
SPD EIS also analyzed the impacts of using MOX fuel in certain domestic
commercial reactors to generate electricity. In January 2000, DOE
decided to construct and operate three disposition facilities at SRS:
(1) the MFFF to fabricate up to 33 MT of surplus plutonium into MOX
fuel \9\; (2)
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a PDCF to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium
metal to an oxide form for use as feed material for the MFFF; and (3)
an immobilization facility using ceramic can-in-canister technology
that would allow for the immobilization of approximately 17 MT of
surplus plutonium (65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000). Using the can-in-
canister technology, DOE was to immobilize plutonium in a ceramic form,
seal it in cans, and place the cans in canisters to be filled with
borosilicate glass containing intensely radioactive high-level waste at
DWPF.
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\9\ In the 2000 Record of Decision (ROD), DOE noted that it had
awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and
Stone & Webster (known as DCS) that included reactor irradiation of
MOX fuel at Duke Energy's Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations. The
SPD EIS and ROD also addressed two Virginia Power reactors at the
North Anna Nuclear Station in Virginia. Virginia Power's involvement
in the MOX program ended soon thereafter.
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In 2002, DOE cancelled the immobilization portion of the plutonium
disposition strategy (67 FR 19432, April 19, 2002). In 2003, DOE
affirmed the MOX-only approach for plutonium disposition, in which 34
MT (increased from 33 MT) of surplus plutonium, including approximately
6.5 MT of the non-pit plutonium originally intended for immobilization,
would be dispositioned by fabrication into MOX fuel for use in power
reactors (68 FR 20134, April 24, 2003).
In 2005, DOE completed an Environmental Assessment for the
Safeguards and Security Upgrades for Storage of Plutonium Materials at
SRS (DOE/EA-1538, 2005) and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact.
Among other things, this Environmental Assessment analyzed impacts
associated with installation of a Container Surveillance and Storage
Capability (CSSC) in an existing facility in K-Area at SRS. The CSSC
capabilities are encompassed within what DOE refers to as the Plutonium
Preparation Project (PuP). One phase of the PuP would provide
stabilization and packaging capabilities, including direct metal
oxidation, to fulfill plutonium storage requirements pursuant to DOE-
STD-3013, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing
Materials.
In 2007, DOE decided to consolidate surplus non-pit plutonium
stored separately at the Hanford Site, the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL) to a single storage location in K-Area at SRS, pending
disposition (72 FR 51807, September 11, 2007). Shipments from Hanford
have been completed, and shipments from LANL and LLNL to SRS for
consolidated storage are continuing.
In 2008, DOE completed a supplement analysis (DOE/EIS-0283-SA-2)
related to the treatment and solidification of certain liquid low-level
radioactive waste and transuranic waste to be generated by the MFFF and
PDCF. DOE decided to construct and operate a stand-alone waste
solidification building in the F-Area at SRS (73 FR 75088, December 10,
2008); this facility is now under construction.
2007 Notice of Intent and Public Scoping Comments
On March 28, 2007, DOE issued an NOI (72 FR 14543) to prepare the
SPD Supplemental EIS in order to evaluate the potential environmental
impacts of disposition alternatives for up to approximately 13 MT of
surplus, non-pit weapons-usable plutonium originally planned for
immobilization. In the 2007 NOI, DOE stated that its preferred
alternative was to construct and operate a new vitrification facility
within an existing building at SRS to immobilize some of the surplus,
non-pit plutonium, and to process some of the surplus, non-pit
plutonium in the existing H-Canyon and DWPF at SRS. That NOI also
explained that DOE would analyze the impacts of fabricating some (up to
approximately one-third) of the surplus, non-pit plutonium into MOX
fuel.
The original scoping period for the SPD Supplemental EIS began on
March 28, 2007, and ended on May 29, 2007. Scoping meetings were held
in Aiken, SC, and in Columbia, SC, on April 17 and 19, 2007,
respectively. Some commentors favored the glass can-in-canister
alternative for the entire surplus plutonium inventory, while others
favored use of as much surplus plutonium as possible as feed material
for the MFFF. One commentor asked that DOE identify the quantities of
surplus plutonium by form and proposed disposition pathway. DOE will
consider these comments, and others received during the upcoming
scoping period, when preparing the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS.
Purpose and Need for Action
DOE's purpose and need remains, as stated in the SPD EIS, to reduce
the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by conducting
disposition of surplus plutonium in the United States in an
environmentally safe and timely manner. Comprehensive disposition
actions are needed to ensure that surplus plutonium is converted into
proliferation-resistant forms.
Proposed Action and Alternatives
In the SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE will analyze the potential
environmental impacts of alternatives for the disposition of
approximately 7 MT of surplus pit plutonium and approximately 6 MT of
surplus non-pit plutonium. DOE also will analyze the impacts of
irradiating MOX fuel in TVA reactors at the Sequoyah and Browns Ferry
nuclear stations and will analyze options for the construction and
operation of the PDCF and PuP capabilities at SRS. Brief descriptions
of the alternatives DOE proposes to evaluate in the SPD Supplemental
EIS are provided below.
PDCF--DOE would construct and operate a stand-alone PDCF
facility in F-Area at SRS to convert plutonium pits and other plutonium
metal to an oxide form suitable for feed to the MFFF, as described in
the SPD EIS and consistent with DOE's decision announced in the 2000
Record of Decision (ROD) for that EIS (65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000).
PuP--DOE would install and operate the plutonium
processing equipment required to store and prepare non-pit plutonium
for disposition through any of the alternative pathways (MOX fuel, H-
Canyon/DWPF, Glass Can-in-Canister, and WIPP). Differences in required
capabilities for the alternatives will be evaluated in the SPD
Supplemental EIS. The PuP project would be installed in K-Area at SRS.
Combined PDCF/PuP Capability--DOE would install and
operate a capability in K-Area at SRS necessary to perform the
functions of both PDCF and PuP. The analysis will include
reconfiguration of ongoing K-Area operations necessary to accommodate
construction and operation of the combined capability.
H-Canyon/DWPF--DOE would use the H-Canyon facility to
process surplus non-pit plutonium for disposition. Plutonium materials
would be dissolved, and the resulting plutonium-bearing solutions would
be sent to a sludge batch feed tank and then to DWPF for vitrification.
Within this alternative, DOE will analyze the potential environmental
impacts of adding additional plutonium to the DWPF feed, which may
increase the amount of plutonium in some DWPF canisters above
historical levels.
Glass Can-in-Canister--DOE would establish and operate a
glass can-in-canister capability in K-Area at SRS. The analysis will
assume that both surplus pit and non-pit plutonium would be vitrified
within small cans, which would be placed in a rack inside a DWPF
canister and surrounded with vitrified high-level waste. This
alternative is similar to one evaluated in the SPD EIS, except that the
capability would be installed in an existing rather than a new
facility. Within this alternative DOE will analyze the potential
environmental impacts of adding cans of vitrified plutonium to some of
the DWPF canisters, which would increase the amount of
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plutonium in those DWPF canisters above historical levels.
WIPP--DOE would establish and operate a capability to
prepare and package non-pit plutonium using PuP (or the combined PDCF/
PuP capability) and other existing facilities at SRS for disposal as
transuranic waste at WIPP, provided that the material would meet the
WIPP waste acceptance criteria. This alternative may include material
that, because of its physical or chemical configuration or
characteristics, could not be prepared for MFFF feed material.
MOX Fuel--PDCF, PuP, or the combined PDCF/PuP capabilities
would be used to prepare some surplus plutonium as feed for the MFFF,
and the resultant MOX fuel would be irradiated in commercial nuclear
reactors. The analysis will assume that all of the surplus pit and some
of the surplus non-pit plutonium would be dispositioned in this manner.
Reactor Operations--DOE will evaluate the impacts of
construction of any reactor facility modifications \10\ necessary to
accommodate MOX fuel operation at five TVA reactors--the three boiling
water reactors (BWRs) at Browns Ferry and the two pressurized water
reactors (PWRs) at Sequoyah. DOE will evaluate the impacts of operation
of these reactors using a core loading with the maximum technically and
economically viable number of MOX fuel assemblies.
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\10\ The SPD Supplemental EIS also will evaluate environmental
impacts from potential minor modifications to the MFFF that may be
needed to accommodate fabrication of TVA reactor MOX fuel.
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DOE no longer proposes to evaluate in detail the ceramic can-in-
canister alternative identified in the 2007 NOI for the SPD
Supplemental EIS. In the SPD EIS, DOE identified no substantial
differences between the ceramic can-in-canister and glass can-in-
canister approaches in terms of expected environmental impacts to air
quality, waste management, human health risk, facility accidents,
facility resource requirements, intersite transportation, and
environmental justice. DOE infrastructure and expertise associated with
the ceramic technology has not substantially evolved or matured since
2003. In contrast, DOE has maintained research, development, and
production infrastructure capabilities for glass waste forms.
Therefore, DOE has decided that the glass can-in-canister technology is
sufficiently representative of both technologies in terms of
understanding potential environmental impacts and that the relative
technical maturity of the glass can-in-canister approach gives it a
greater chance of meeting DOE mission needs.
Potential Decisions
Since initiating the SPD Supplemental EIS process in 2007, DOE has
continued to evaluate alternatives for disposition of surplus
plutonium. DOE is evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of
combining the PDCF and the PuP to accomplish the functions of both
projects in an existing facility in K-Area at SRS. DOE will decide,
based on programmatic, engineering, facility safety, cost, and schedule
information, and the environmental impact analysis in the SPD
Supplemental EIS, whether to implement the combined project in K-Area
at SRS (PDCF/PuP) or to separately construct and operate PDCF in F-Area
and PuP in K-Area at SRS.
DOE also will decide which alternatives to use for disposition of
approximately 7 MT of surplus weapons-usable pit plutonium and
approximately 6 MT of surplus weapons-usable non-pit plutonium for
which DOE has not made a disposition decision.
DOE is evaluating alternatives for surplus non-pit plutonium that
currently does not meet the specification for disposition through the
MFFF. While this material could be immobilized for disposition using
the glass can-in-canister alternative, DOE is evaluating three other
alternative disposition paths: processing through H-Canyon and
incorporation into vitrified high-level waste at DWPF; preparation for
disposal at WIPP; and pretreatment to make the material suitable as
feed for the MFFF.
In addition, the contract with Duke Energy Company to irradiate MOX
fuel in four of its reactors terminated in late 2008. At present, DOE
and TVA are evaluating use of MOX fuel in up to five TVA reactors at
the Sequoyah and Browns Ferry nuclear stations, near Soddy-Daisy, TN,
and Decatur and Athens, AL, respectively. DOE and TVA will determine
whether to pursue irradiation of MOX fuel in TVA reactors and will
determine which reactors to use initially for this purpose should DOE
and TVA decide to use MOX fuel in TVA reactors.
Potential Environmental Issues for Analysis
DOE has tentatively identified the following environmental issues
for analysis in the SPD Supplemental EIS. The list is presented to
facilitate comment on the scope of the SPD Supplemental EIS and is not
intended to be comprehensive or to predetermine the potential impacts
to be analyzed.
Impacts to the general population and workers from
radiological and nonradiological releases, and other worker health and
safety impacts.
Impacts of emissions on air and water quality.
Impacts on ecological systems and threatened and
endangered species.
Impacts from waste management activities, including from
storage of DWPF canisters and transuranic waste pending disposal.
Impacts from the transportation of radioactive materials,
reactor fuel assemblies, and waste.
Impacts of postulated accidents and from terrorist actions
and sabotage.
Potential disproportionately high and adverse effects on
low-income and minority populations (environmental justice).
Short-term and long-term land use impacts.
NEPA Process
Following the scoping period announced in this Amended Notice of
Intent, and after consideration of comments received during scoping,
DOE will prepare a Draft SPD Supplemental EIS. DOE will announce the
availability of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS in the Federal Register
and local media outlets. Comments received on the Draft SPD
Supplemental EIS will be considered and addressed in the Final SPD
Supplemental EIS. DOE will issue a ROD no sooner than 30 days after
publication by the Environmental Protection Agency of a Notice of
Availability of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.
Other Agency Involvement
The Tennessee Valley Authority will be a cooperating agency with
DOE for preparation and review of the sections of the SPD Supplemental
EIS that address operation of TVA reactors using MOX fuel assemblies.
DOE invites Federal and non-Federal agencies with expertise in the
subject matter of the SPD Supplemental EIS to contact the NEPA Document
Manager (see ADDRESSES) if they wish to be a cooperating agency in the
preparation of the SPD Supplemental EIS.
Issued in Washington, DC, on 13 July, 2010.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 2010-17519 Filed 7-16-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P