[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 151 (Friday, August 6, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 47499-47503]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-19376]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10-17-000]
Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of
Technical Conference.
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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is issuing a
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) and Notice of
Technical Conference to provide additional opportunity for comment on
issues related to the March 18, 2010 NOPR, 75 FR 15362 (March 29,
2010), regarding the appropriate compensation to be paid to demand
response resources in organized wholesale electric markets administered
by Independent System Operators or Regional Transmission Organizations.
The Commission proposed an approach for compensating demand response
resources in order to improve the competitiveness of organized
wholesale energy markets and thus ensure just and reasonable wholesale
rates. The Supplemental NOPR seeks comment on whether the Commission
should adopt requirements related to two issues addressed in comments:
If the Commission were to adopt a net benefits test for determining
when to compensate demand response providers, what, if any,
requirements should apply to the methods for determining net benefits;
and what, if any, requirements should apply to how the costs of demand
response are allocated. The Commission invites all interested persons
to submit comments in response to the issues discussed herein.
DATES: A technical conference will be held at the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, no
later than 45 days following the publication of this document in the
Federal Register. The exact date of the conference will be provided in
a subsequent Commission publication in the Federal Register.
Comments on the NOPR will be due 30 days following the technical
conference announced herein. The Commission will announce the comment
close date in a subsequent publication in the Federal Register.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number by any
of the following methods:
Agency Web Site: http://ferc.gov. Documents created electronically
using word processing software should be filed in native applications
or print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format.
Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments
electronically must mail or hand deliver an original and 14 copies of
their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of
the Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Comment
Procedures Section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
David Hunger (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8148, [email protected].
Helen Dyson (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502-8856, [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Technical
Conference
Table of Contents
Paragraph
Nos.
I. Background............................................... 2
II. Net Benefits............................................ 4
A. The March NOPR....................................... 4
B. Comments............................................. 5
C. Discussion........................................... 8
III. Cost Allocation........................................ 9
A. Comments............................................. 9
B. Discussion........................................... 12
IV. Technical Conference.................................... 13
V. Comment Procedures....................................... 19
VI. Document Availability................................... 23
Issued August 2, 2010.
1. In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) issued in this
proceeding on March 18, 2010 (March NOPR),\1\ the Commission proposed
to require Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) \2\ with tariff provisions allowing
demand response \3\ resources \4\ to participate in wholesale energy
markets by reducing consumption of electricity from expected levels in
response to price signals, to pay those demand response resources, in
all hours, the market price of energy (also referred to as the
``locational marginal price'' or ``LMP'') for such reductions. In light
of matters elucidated in responsive comments to the March NOPR, the
Commission seeks additional comments on whether the Commission should
adopt requirements related to two issues: (1) If the Commission were to
adopt a net benefits test for determining when to compensate demand
response providers, what, if any, requirements should apply to the
methods for
[[Page 47500]]
determining net benefits; and (2) what, if any, requirements should
apply to how the costs of demand response are allocated. The Commission
also directs staff to hold a technical conference on these issues no
later than 45 days following publication of this notice in the Federal
Register. The exact date of the technical conference will be provided
in a subsequent notice.
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\1\ Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 FR 15362 (March 29,
2010), 130 FERC ] 61,213 (March 18, 2010).
\2\ The following RTOs and ISOs have organized wholesale
electricity markets: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM); New York
Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO); Midwest Independent
Transmission System Operator, Inc. (Midwest ISO); ISO New England,
Inc. (ISO-NE); California Independent System Operator Corp. (CAISO);
and Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP).
\3\ Demand response means a reduction in the consumption of
electric energy by customers from their expected consumption in
response to an increase in the price of electric energy or to
incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric
energy. 18 CFR 35.28(b)(4) (2010).
\4\ Demand response resource means a resource capable of
providing demand response. 18 CFR 35.28(b)(5) (2010).
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I. Background
2. In the March NOPR, the Commission proposed to add section
35.18(g)(1)(v) to its regulations to establish a specific compensation
approach for demand response resources participating in organized
wholesale energy markets, i.e., the day-ahead and real-time markets
administered by ISOs and RTOs. Under the proposed section, each
Commission-approved ISO and RTO that has a tariff provision providing
for participation of demand response resources in its organized
wholesale energy market would pay demand response resources, in all
hours, the market price for energy, i.e., the LMP,\5\ for demand
reductions made in response to price signals.\6\
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\5\ LMP refers to the price calculated by the ISO or RTO at
particular locations or electrical nodes within the ISO or RTO
footprint and is used as the market price to compensate generators.
There are variations in the way ISOs and RTOs calculate LMP;
however, each method establishes the marginal value of resources in
that market. Nothing here or in the March NOPR is intended to change
ISO and RTO methods for calculating LMP.
\6\ The proposed provision applies only to demand response
acting as a resource in organized wholesale energy markets. The
provision will not apply to demand response under programs that ISOs
and RTOs administer for reliability or emergency conditions, such
as, for instance, Midwest ISO's Emergency Demand Response; NYISO's
Emergency Demand Response Program; PJM's Emergency Load Response;
and ISO-NE's Real-Time 30-Minute Demand Response Program, Real-Time
and 2-Hour Demand Response Program, and Real-Time Profiled Response
Program. The provision also will not apply to compensation in
ancillary services markets, which the Commission has addressed
elsewhere. See, e.g., Wholesale Competition in Regions with
Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 FR 64100 (Oct. 28,
2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. P 31,281 (2008) (Order No. 719).
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3. Numerous comments were filed in response to the NOPR, many of
which support the proposed demand response compensation level.\7\
However, other comments support payment of LMP only when the benefits
of demand response compensation outweigh the costs of paying demand
response resources, as determined by some type of net benefits test.\8\
Still other comments argue that, in order to determine the justness and
reasonableness of the proposed compensation level, the corresponding
cost allocation must be considered.\9\ More specifically, these
comments raise concerns regarding how the costs associated with direct
payment of LMP for demand response will be allocated, or assigned,
within an ISO or RTO. Several commenters assert that the issues of cost
allocation and net benefits are inherently linked, so that the
Commission must address both issues together.\10\ Comments regarding
net benefits and cost allocation issues are discussed below.
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\7\ See Comments of Illinois Citizens Utility Board at 2;
Comments of Industrial Energy Consumers of America at 3; Comments of
National Energy Marketers Association at 3-4; Comments of National
League of Cities; Comments of New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
at 2; Comments of North America Power Partners at 4; Comments of
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection at 5; Comments
of Price Responsive Load Coalition at 2; Comments of Schneider
Electric USA at 2; Comments of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at 4; Comments
of Virginia Committee for Fair Utility Rates at 7.
\8\ See generally, Comments of New York State Consumer
Protection Board; New England Consumer Advocates; Capital Power;
Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA); Exelon Corporation
(Exelon); PJM Power Providers Group; New England Conference of
Public Utility Commissioners (NECPUC); Maryland Public Service
Commission (Maryland Commission); New York State Public Service
Commission (New York Commission); NSTAR Electric Company; National
Grid USA (National Grid); PPL Parties; New England Public Systems;
Viridity Energy, Inc.; and Charles Cicchetti.
\9\ Comments of ISO-NE at 39-40. See also, Comments of American
Electric Power Service Corp. at 6-10; Comments of CAISO at 6;
Comments of Consolidated Edison Company at 2; Comments of Hess
Corporation at 3; Comments of the Illinois Commerce Commission at
12; Comments of PJM at 8; Comments of Potomac Economics at 3;
Comments of Massachusetts Attorney General and Maine Public Advocate
at 11; Comments of Midwest ISO Transmission Owners at 5-6; Comments
of Midwest TDUs at 13; Comments of Edison Electric Institute at 5;
Comments of NECPUC at 12, 22; Comments of New England Consumer
Advocates at 11; Comments of RRI Energy, Inc. at 6; Comments of San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. at 3-4.
\10\ As further addressed below, several commenters assert that
the costs of demand response compensation should be borne by only
those market participants determined to have benefitted from the
subject load reduction, as determined by some type of net benefits
test. See, e.g., Comments of ISO-NE at 5-6; Comments of NECPUC at
22; Comments of PJM at 12-14; Comments of PJM Power Providers Group
at 37-38.
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II. Net Benefits
A. The March NOPR
4. In the March NOPR, the Commission proposed to require ISOs and
RTOs to pay LMP to demand response providers in all hours, but the
Commission also sought comment on, among other things, whether payment
of LMP should indeed apply in all hours and, if not, the criteria that
should be used for establishing the hours when LMP should apply.\11\
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\11\ March NOPR, 130 FERC ] 61,213 at P 20.
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B. Comments
5. As noted above, numerous commenters, primarily industrial
consumers and some consumer advocates, agree with the Commission's
proposal to pay LMP to demand response providers in all hours.\12\ They
argue that, regardless of the hour or season, all consumers share in
the benefits demand response resources provide, including lowering the
clearing price.\13\ They also argue that, regardless of the hour or
season, both demand response providers and generators provide a
comparable service in terms of balancing supply and demand and
therefore should be paid on a comparable basis, i.e., LMP.\14\
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\12\ See Comments of Steel Manufacturers Association at 12;
Comments of Consumer Demand Response Initiative at 12; Comments of
Joint Consumer Advocates at 11-12.
\13\ Comments of Alliance for Clean Energy New York at 2-3;
Comments of American Chemistry Council at 3; Comments of American
Forest & Paper Association at 3; Comments of Crane & Co. at 2-3;
Comments of Industrial Energy Consumers of America at 2; Comments of
Industrial Energy Consumers of Pennsylvania at 3; Comments of
Madison Paper Industries at 2-3.
\14\ Comments of Steel Manufacturers Association at 12.
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6. At the same time, a diverse group of commenters maintain that
paying LMP for demand response in all hours, including off-peak hours,
might not result in net benefits to customers, because the payments
might be substantially more than the savings created by reducing the
clearing price at that time.\15\ According to these commenters, net
benefits are most likely to be positive and greatest when the supply
curve is steepest, which typically occurs in highest-cost, peak
hours.\16\ Some commenters suggest that paying LMP in all hours might
make more difficult, and less accurate, the establishment of baselines
for measuring whether a demand response provider has, in fact,
responded.\17\
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\15\ Comments of Capital Power Corporation at 5; Comments of PJM
Power Providers Group at 5.
\16\ Comments of NECPUC at 13.
\17\ Comments of ISO-NE at 32-33; Comments of California
Department of Water Resources at 11; Comments of National Grid USA
at 8.
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7. Many commenters who oppose paying LMP in all hours for demand
response suggest approaches, or net benefits tests, for determining
when LMP should apply. These commenters state that the purpose of these
tests would be to determine the point at which the incremental payment
for demand response equals the incremental benefit of the reduction in
load; payment of LMP would apply only
[[Page 47501]]
up to that point.\18\ To achieve that end, some comments advocate a net
benefits trigger based on a particular price or period of hours.\19\
While some proposals would utilize a static bid threshold, such as $75/
MWh,\20\ other proposals would utilize a dynamic bid threshold, which
could be based upon fuel prices and heat rates of marginal
generation.\21\ Still other commenters urge compensating demand
response during an ISO- or RTO-defined period of critical high-cost
hours in which it is cost-effective to pay the full LMP.\22\ In
addition to advancing net benefits tests, some commenters suggest
implementation of an ISO- or RTO-developed mechanism to determine
whether a net customer benefit would occur in advance of dispatch.\23\
Some commenters, however, state that it would be difficult to prescribe
by regulation the hours in which demand response provides net benefits
because system conditions and load patterns change across seasons and
over time.\24\
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\18\ Comments of New England Consumer Advocates at 11; Comments
of NYSCPB at 5; Comments of National Grid at 4-5.
\19\ For example, National Grid states that the threshold could
be triggered by a particular price on the supply offer curve at
which the additional cost of paying LMP to demand response resources
is most likely to be outweighed by LMP reductions in the wholesale
energy market as a result of the demand reductions produced by these
resources. Comments of National Grid at 6.
\20\ Comments of the New York Commission at 10. According to the
New York Commission, a static bid threshold helps prevent demand
response providers from gaming the system by seeking compensation
for reducing electricity consumption for reasons other than market
prices, but can also limit participation in a demand response
program because prices might not exceed the threshold on a
consistent basis.
\21\ Comments of National Grid at 6; Comments of the New York
Commission at 10; Comments of Viridity at 24.
\22\ Comments of the Maryland Commission at 4-5.
\23\ Comments of NYSCPB at 5.
\24\ Midwest ISO Transmission Owners at 16.
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C. Discussion
8. Due to matters raised in responsive comments to the March NOPR,
the Commission seeks further information regarding the net benefits
issue. Accordingly, the Commission seeks additional comments and
directs staff to hold a technical conference regarding various net
benefits tests.\25\ Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on the
following issues, as well as any other issues:
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\25\ As noted above, the exact date of the technical conference
will be provided in a subsequent notice and will be no later than 45
days following publication of this notice in the Federal Register.
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(1) Some commenters address the need for a net benefits test.
Address why the Commission should adopt a net benefits test for
determining demand response compensation, and what the objectives of
any such test would be.
(2) How to define benefits, including whether the benefits
associated with demand response should account only for lower market-
clearing prices in the day-ahead and real-time markets or should also
include consideration of operational benefits (e.g., lower reserve
requirements), societal benefits or another measure.
(3) In addition to the payments received from the wholesale market,
what are the costs demand response providers and load serving entities
incur and should these be included for purposes of a net benefits test.
(4) How to identify the beneficiaries of demand response, and how
the allocation of costs related to demand response compensation affect
the beneficiaries, if at all.
(5) Whether any net benefits methodology adopted should be the same
for all ISOs and RTOs or whether the individual circumstances or
configuration of each ISO and RTO would support a different net
benefits methodology.
(6) Proposed methodologies for implementing a net benefits test.
Comments also should consider whether a net benefits threshold should
be established up front based on static measures, such as a specific
price or number of peak hours, or established on a dynamic basis, such
as a price threshold based on a pre-set heat rate and daily updated
fuel price; and similarly, whether the net benefits should be an
explicit test run by the ISO or RTO either after bids have been
received or each hour prior to accepting demand response bids. Comments
should also describe the advantages and limitations of any proposed net
benefits methodologies.
III. Cost Allocation
A. Comments
9. Comments concerning cost allocation essentially ask how the
proposed demand response compensation level will be funded.\26\ These
commenters argue that, if not structured correctly, demand response
compensation methodologies can increase, rather than decrease costs to
end-users.\27\ Some commenters further contend that requiring payment
of LMP for demand response will require ISOs and RTOs to reopen cost
allocation issues that have previously been settled based on varying
ISO- and RTO-specific demand response compensation levels.\28\
Additional commenters assert that demand response compensation and a
method for allocating the associated costs are so inextricably entwined
that the two issues must be simultaneously addressed as part of an
integrated demand response regime.\29\
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\26\ ISO-NE Comments at 5, 40; Comments of PJM at 8; Comments of
Potomac Economics at 3.
\27\ Comments of Massachusetts Attorney General and Maine Public
Advocate at 11 (arguing that spreading the costs of demand response
over a smaller amount of load is cost-effective only so long as the
remaining load pays a lower price than it would have paid if the
demand response had not participated).
\28\ Comments of Midwest TDUs at 13.
\29\ Id.; Comments of ISO-NE at 4-5; Comments of Edison Electric
Institute (EEI) at 5; Comments of Charles Cicchetti at 26-27;
Comments of CAISO at 6.
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10. Another group of commenters endorse the position that demand
response compensation and cost allocation are necessarily related, but
they contend that resolution of cost allocation issues can await the
final rule on demand response compensation. These commenters maintain
that any cost allocation approach will depend on the outcome of the
final demand response compensation rule \30\ and, in any case, should
first be addressed through stakeholder discussions at the regional
level.
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\30\ Comments of New England Consumer Advocates at 11.
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11. Several commenters advocate a specific approach or discuss the
pros and cons of alternative approaches for allocating the costs
associated with demand response compensation. Potential approaches
raised in comments include:
(1) Allocating the costs across the entire relevant ISO or RTO
market, based upon the rationale that there are system-wide benefits to
demand response, including reducing the market price for energy.\31\
Conversely, some commenters argue that, while this approach might
increase the amount of demand response provided to the market, it might
also result in some market participants paying costs associated with
demand response for which they do not receive equivalent benefit.\32\
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\31\ See Comments of NECPUC at 22.
\32\ Comments of Midwest ISO Transmission Owners at 5.
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(2) Allocating the costs to only the load-serving entity of record,
i.e., the load-serving entity that would have served the load providing
the demand response. According to commenters, this option assumes that
the deemed full benefit of demand response is only received by the
load-serving entity of record and that demand response does
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not impact other load-serving entities across the ISO or RTO.\33\
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\33\ Comments of PJM at 15.
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(3) Uplifting the costs locally to all load-serving entities within
the zone impacted by the demand response reduction, based on a load
ratio share. Commenters assert that this approach theoretically
allocates the cost of demand response compensation to only those load-
serving entities that benefitted from the demand response provided.\34\
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\34\ Comments of PJM at 14; Comments of NECPUC at 22; Comments
of Midwest ISO Transmission Owners at 6.
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(4) Recovering the costs through a surcharge added to the LMP for
customers purchasing from the relevant energy market in the hour when
the demand response resource is committed or dispatched. The rationale
for this approach is that it allocates the costs of demand response
resource procurement on the basis of cost-causation, i.e., demand
response resource costs are allocated directly to those energy market
consumers who benefitted from the demand response resource provided. To
implement this proposal, an adjustment to the market price paid by
customers would be calculated.\35\
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\35\ Comments of NECPUC at 22, 23.
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(5) Utilizing a hybrid approach, in a manner intended to minimize
cost impacts on final customers.\36\ Hybrid approaches include
splitting the costs between load-serving entities and transmission
owners,\37\ and allocating part of the costs to the demand response
provider's load-serving entity and part to all of the load-serving
entities in the zone where the load reduction occurred, based on a load
ratio share.\38\
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\36\ Comments of ISO-NE at 40.
\37\ ISO-NE suggests charging the difference between LMP and the
generation (or ``G'') portion of the retail rate (i.e., LMP-G) to
the load-serving entity that is providing the energy, and charging
the remainder (i.e., ``G'') to network load, which would be billed
to transmission owners. Comments of ISO-NE at 5.
\38\ As described by PJM, the ``[load-serving entity] of record
will receive a direct allocation of direct payments made for the
demand response MWh reduction multiplied by the difference between
the appropriate wholesale market price and the retail rate, and the
cost associated with the MWh reduction multiplied by the retail rate
allocated to all [load-serving entities] in the zone where the load
reduction occurred based on a load ratio share.'' Comments of PJM at
10.
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B. Discussion
12. From the comments received, issues concerning cost allocation
may be integrally related to the proposal relating to demand response
compensation, and we believe such issues should be explored further. In
addition, the diversity of comments relating to cost allocation leave
open the question of whether a singular cost allocation approach should
be determined by the Commission for all ISOs and RTOs or whether
differing cost allocation approaches should be developed regionally and
reviewed by the Commission on an ISO- and RTO-specific basis.
Accordingly, the Commission seeks additional comments on whether the
Commission should consider a generic approach to allocating the costs
of demand response compensation required by the final rule in this
proceeding, and if so, what approach the Commission should adopt. Such
issues also will be explored at the staff technical conference.
Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on the following issues, as
well as any other issues:
(1) Whether standardizing demand response compensation among ISOs
and RTOs requires simultaneous standardization of a method for
allocating the costs associated with such compensation. In addition,
whether standardizing demand response compensation among ISOs and RTOs
requires consideration of corresponding settlements and other impacts
associated with the compensation mechanism.
(2) If the Commission standardizes an approach for allocating the
costs associated with requiring payment for demand response, what type
of approach is appropriate. Comments should address the specific
approaches delineated above, and may address other broad principles the
Commission could use to determine the cost allocation method.
(3) How the use of a net benefits test would affect the need for
and methodologies for determining cost allocation.
IV. Technical Conference
13. The exact date of the Commission staff technical conference
directed herein will be provided in a subsequent notice and will be no
later than 45 days following publication of this notice in the Federal
Register. The conference will be held in the Commission Meeting Room at
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426. All interested persons are invited to participate
in the conference.
14. Those interested in speaking at the conference should notify
the Commission by August 10, 2010 by completing an online form
describing the topics that they will address: http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/registration/demand-RM10-17-000-speaker-form.asp. Due to
time constraints, we may not be able to accommodate all individuals
interested in speaking, so multiple persons sharing the same position
are encouraged to have one representative speak on their behalf. A
detailed agenda, including panel speakers, will be published at a later
date.
15. The technical conference will be transcribed. Transcripts of
the conference will be immediately available for a fee from Ace-Federal
Reporters, Inc. ((202) 347-3700 or 1-800-336-6646). The transcript will
be available for free on the Commission's eLibrary system and on the
Calendar of Events approximately one week after the conference.
16. A free webcast of the technical conference directed herein will
be available. Anyone with Internet access interested in viewing this
conference can do so by navigating to http://www.ferc.gov's Calendar of
Events and locating the appropriate event in the Calendar. The events
will contain a link to the applicable webcast option. The Capitol
Connection provides technical support for the webcasts and offers the
option of listening to the conferences via phone-bridge for a fee. If
you have any questions, visit http://www.CapitolConnection.org or call
(703) 993-3100.
17. There is an ``eSubscription'' link on the Web site that enables
subscribers to receive email notification when a document is added to a
subscribed docket(s). For assistance with any FERC Online service,
please e-mail [email protected], or call (866) 208-3676 (toll
free). For TTY, call 202 502-8659.
18. Commission conferences are accessible under section 508 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For accessibility accommodations, please
send an e-mail to [email protected] or call toll free (866) 208-
3372 (voice) or (202) 208-1659 (TTY), or send a FAX to (202) 208-2106
with the required accommodations.
V. Comment Procedures
19. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish
to discuss. Comments are due 30 days following the technical conference
announced above. Comments must refer to Docket No. RM10-17-000, and
must include the commenter's name, the organization the commenter
represents, if applicable, and the commenter's address.
20. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically
via the eFiling link on the Commission's
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Web site at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard
word processing formats. Documents created electronically using word
processing software should be filed in native applications or print-to-
PDF format and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing
electronically do not need to make a paper filing.
21. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically
must send an original and 14 copies of their comments to: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
22. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.
VI. Document Availability
23. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
24. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
25. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's
website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35
Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
By direction of the Commission. Commissioner Moeller is
concurring, in part and dissenting, in part with a separate
statement attached.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
MOELLER, Commissioner, concurring, in part and dissenting, in part:
While I support the decision to supplement the record and convene a
technical conference, for the reasons set forth in my concurring and
dissenting statement on the NOPR that initiated this proceeding on
March 18, I continue to concur and dissent, in part.
Philip D. Moeller,
Commissioner.
[FR Doc. 2010-19376 Filed 8-5-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P