[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 198 (Thursday, October 14, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 63054-63058]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25458]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2009-1229; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-106-AD;
Amendment 39-16471; AD 2010-21-11]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19
(Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) and NLG door
selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid
Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly
lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This
condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent
damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve.
Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the
aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure,
including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can
result in an uncommanded NLG retraction and/or uncommanded opening
of the NLG doors. There have been six cases reported on CL[-]600-
2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted in the collapse of the NLG at
the departure gate.
* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe
condition on these products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective November 18, 2010.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of November 18,
2010.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Cesar Gomez, Aerospace Engineer,
[[Page 63055]]
Airframe and Mechanical Systems Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New
York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7318; fax (516) 794-5531.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on January 5, 2010 (75
FR 258). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:
A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) and NLG door
selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid
Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly
lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This
condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent
damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve.
Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the
aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure,
including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can
result in an uncommanded NLG retraction and/or uncommanded opening
of the NLG doors. There have been six cases reported on CL[-]600-
2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted in the collapse of the NLG at
the departure gate.
This [Canadian] directive mandates [an inspection of the NLG and
NLG selector valves to determine the serial number and marking of
the part and] a check [to determine the torque value and correct
lockwire installation] of the [affected] NLG and NLG door selector
valves installed on all aircraft in the Applicability section * * *.
Depending on the results, replacement, rework and/or additional
identification of the valves may be required.
You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD
docket.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We considered the comments received.
Request for Model Designation Consistency
Comair, Inc. states that in the NPRM, the Summary, Discussion, and
paragraph (e), refer to the airplanes as Model ``CL600-2B19'' instead
of ``CL-600-2B19.''
From this comment, we infer that Comair, Inc. requests that we
revise the identified sections of the NPRM for model designation
consistency. In the Summary, Discussion, and paragraph (e) of this AD,
we are quoting from Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2009-19, dated
April 29, 2009. However, for clarity, we have made the change to ``CL[-
]600-2B19'' in the specified sections of this AD.
Request To Revise Proposed Costs of Compliance
Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the Costs of Compliance section
of the NPRM indicates only the number of affected airplanes and does
not take into consideration that there are two units installed on each
airplane, making it a total of 1,304 affected components.
From these statements we infer that Air Wisconsin Airlines is
requesting that we revise the Costs of Compliance section of the AD to
include the actual number of affected valves. We agree with Air
Wisconsin Airlines that the Costs of Compliance needs to be revised to
include the cost for both the selector valve of the NLG and the door
selector valve. We have revised the cost of parts to $80 to reflect 2
valves per product ($40 per valve). For clarification, the term
``affected product'' in the Costs of Compliance section of this AD
refers to the affected number of airplanes of U.S. registry.
Request for Credit for Compliance With Bombardier Service Bulletin
601R-32-090
Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the problem of the door selector
valves of the NLG having their end caps incorrectly lock-wired and/or
incorrectly torqued during assembly first came to its attention through
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-090. Air Wisconsin Airlines states
that Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March 3, 2009, was
issued to supersede Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-090 to expand
the effectivity of the campaign. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the
proposed AD should give credit for those valves that have already
complied with Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-090.
We agree with Air Wisconsin Airlines request to receive credit for
actions completed in accordance with Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-
32-090, Revision B, dated December 12, 2006; and Revision C, dated
March 3, 2009. We have added new paragraph (f)(4) accordingly.
Request To Revise the Applicability
Air Wisconsin Airlines requests that we revise the applicability in
paragraph (c) of the proposed AD to ``NLG and NLG selector valves, P/N
750006000 (601R75146-1) identified in Bombardier S/B 601R-32-104 dated
March 3, 2009 when installed on Bombardier * * * Model CL-600-2B19 * *
* airplanes * * *'' The commenter provides no justification for this
requested change.
We disagree with Air Wisconsin Airlines' request to revise the
applicability in paragraph (c) of this AD. We have determined that
identifying each airplane by serial number and not by the valve serial
number is the best way to control the airworthiness of the fleet and to
ensure compliance with the AD.
According to general FAA policy, if an unsafe condition results
from the installation of a particular component in only one particular
make and model of airplane, the AD should apply to the airplane model,
not the component. The reason for this is simple: If the AD applies to
the airplane model equipped with the item, operators of those airplanes
will be notified directly of the unsafe condition and the action
required to correct it. While we assume that operators can identify the
airplane models they operate, they may not be aware of specific items
installed on the airplanes. Therefore, specifying the airplane models
in the applicability as the subject of the AD prevents an operator's
``unknowing failure to comply'' with the AD. We recognize that an
unsafe condition may exist in an item that is installed in many
different airplanes. In that case, we consider it impractical to issue
an AD against each airplane; in fact, many times, the exact models and
numbers of airplanes on which the item is installed may be unknown.
Therefore, in those situations, the AD would apply to the item and
usually indicates that the item is known to be ``installed on, but not
limited to,'' various airplane models. We have not changed the AD in
this regard.
Request To Extend the Compliance Time for the Inspection
Air Wisconsin Airlines requests that we extend the compliance time
for the inspection in the NPRM. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the
problem of the door selector valves of the NLG having their end caps
incorrectly lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly first
came to its attention in 2003 through Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-
32-090, which affected 645 units. Air Wisconsin Airlines also states
that Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March 3, 2009,
expanded the effectivity to include 2,126 units. Air Wisconsin Airlines
states that it has been working on this issue and it has a substantial
number of valves in compliance, but since this issue has been around
for almost 7 years without any regulatory influence, the short
compliance time of within 1,600 flight hours or 18 months after the
[[Page 63056]]
effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, cannot be justified.
Air Wisconsin Airlines states that a longer compliance window should be
given considering the number of units affected and the insufficient
amount of spares available to ensure compliance within the time
provided by a directive.
We disagree with Air Wisconsin Airlines' request to extend the
compliance time for the inspection. In developing an appropriate
compliance time for the inspection, we considered the safety
implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for
the timely accomplishment of the modification. We have determined that
the compliance time will ensure an acceptable level of safety and allow
the modification to be done during scheduled maintenance intervals for
most affected operators. In addition, Bombardier, Inc. recommends a
compliance time of 1,600 flight hours or 18 months. We have determined
that an adequate supply of valves is available in order for operators
to accomplish the required actions within the compliance time specified
in this AD. However, operators may apply for an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the provisions specified in
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD. We have not changed the AD in this regard.
Requests To Allow Review of Maintenance Records in Lieu of Inspection
Comair, Inc. and Air Wisconsin Airlines request that a review of
airplane maintenance records be acceptable in lieu of an inspection to
determine serial number and identification markings of the selector
valve. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that a records check is sufficient
to locate valves requiring inspection.
We agree with the commenters' request that a review of airplane
maintenance records is acceptable for determining the serial number and
identification markings of the selector valve. We have changed
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD to allow a review of maintenance records in
lieu of the inspection required by that paragraph.
Request To Clarify Paragraph (f)(2) of the NPRM
Comair, Inc. proposes revised wording for paragraph (f)(2) of the
NPRM. The suggested wording clarifies that either the selector valve of
the NLG or the door selector valve could have certain serial numbers or
identified markings since paragraph (f)(2) identifies both valves.
We agree with Comair, Inc. that the suggested wording is more
accurate. We have revised paragraph (f)(2) of this AD as suggested.
Request To Remove Compliance Time of Before Further Flight From
Paragraph (f)(3) of the NPRM
Comair, Inc. and Air Wisconsin Airlines request that the compliance
time of, ``before further flight,'' be removed from paragraph (f)(3) of
the NPRM.
Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the compliance time of ``before
further flight'' specified in paragraph (f)(3) of the NPRM is not in
Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2009-19, dated April 29, 2009, or
in any of the service information listed in that Canadian AD. Air
Wisconsin Airlines also states that there does not appear to be enough
time and available spare parts in order to do the inspections, remove
all the affected serial numbers which fail the test, and send them to
the vendor for repair.
Comair, Inc. states that a compliance time of ``before further
flight'' seems contrary or restrictive when the actions specified in
paragraph (f)(1) of the NPRM are done. Comair Inc. states that it has
already performed a records review and determined which valves have a
serial number range specified in Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-
104, dated March 3, 2009, and which valves do not have a suffix ``T''
or ``SB750006000-1'' marking, as documented on FAA Form 8130-3. Comair,
Inc. also states that a compliance time of ``before further flight''
would require it to ground its airplanes on the effective date of the
final rule because it has already determined which valves require
action.
We partially agree with the commenters. We agree that there could
be a misunderstanding in reading this AD based on the understanding
that paragraph (f)(3) of this AD is a stand-alone paragraph. However,
we disagree with Comair Inc.'s statement that the compliance time of
``before further flight'' would require Comair Inc. to ground its
airplanes. The intent of this AD is to permit operators to do the
identification check within the specified compliance time of ``within
1,600 flight hours or 18 months after the effective date of this AD,
whichever occurs first.'' We have revised paragraph (f)(3) of this AD
for clarity. In addition, operators may apply for an AMOC in accordance
with the provisions specified in paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
Request To Eliminate Ink Stamping of the Valve
Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the requirement in Tactair
Service Bulletin SB750006000-1, Revision E, dated July 31, 2008 (which
was referred to in Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March
3, 2009, as an additional source of guidance), includes an instruction
to ink stamp the service bulletin number on the valve. Air Wisconsin
states that this action does not provide an added level of safety, and
that this would only lead to confusion, and a meaningless issue of non-
compliance should the marking ever become eradicated. Air Wisconsin
also states that it is unnecessary to mark the valve.
From these statements, we infer that Air Wisconsin Airlines is
requesting that we revise the AD to eliminate unnecessary part
markings. We disagree. Valves that are not inked-stamped must be
inspected to fulfill the requirements of this AD. An ink-stamped valve
demonstrates that the valve has been inspected and modified. We have
not made changes to this AD in this regard.
Explanation of Change Made To This AD
We have revised this AD to identify the legal name of the
manufacturer as published in the most recent type certificate data
sheet for the affected airplane models.
Conclusion
We reviewed the available data, including the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We determined that these
changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or
increase the scope of the AD.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.
[[Page 63057]]
Explanation of Change to Costs of Compliance
Since issuance of the NPRM, we have increased the labor rate used
in the Costs of Compliance from $80 per work-hour to $85 per work-hour.
The Costs of Compliance information, below, reflects this increase in
the specified hourly labor rate.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 652 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 1 work-hour per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $85 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $80 per product (2
valves per product/$40 per valve). Where the service information lists
required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed
that there will be no charge for these parts. As we do not control
warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs
higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the
cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to be $107,580, or $165 per
product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
2010-21-11 Bombardier, Inc.: Amendment 39-16471. Docket No. FAA-
2009-1229; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-106-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective November
18, 2010.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19
(Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes, serial numbers 7003 and
subsequent; certificated in any category.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 32: Landing
Gear.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) and NLG door
selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid
Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly
lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This
condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent
damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve.
Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the
aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure,
including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can
result in an uncommanded NLG retraction and/or uncommanded opening
of the NLG doors. There have been six cases reported on CL[-]600-
2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted in the collapse of the NLG at
the departure gate.
This [Canadian] directive mandates [an inspection of the NLG and
NLG selector valves to determine the serial number and marking of
the part and] a check [to determine the torque value and correct
lockwire installation] of the [affected] NLG and NLG door selector
valves installed on all aircraft in the Applicability section * * *.
Depending on the results, replacement, rework and/or additional
identification of the valves may be required.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) Within 1,600 flight hours or 18 months after the effective
date of this AD, whichever occurs first: Do an inspection to
determine the serial number and identification markings on the
selector valve of the NLG and the door selector valve of the NLG, in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier
Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March 3, 2009. A review of
airplane maintenance records is acceptable in lieu of this
inspection if the serial number and identification markings of the
selector valve and the door selector valve can be conclusively
determined from that review.
(2) For any airplane having either the selector valve of the NLG
or the door selector valve of the NLG that have a serial number
outside the range 0001 through 2126 inclusive, suffix ``T''
identification, or ``SB750006000-1'' marking, no further action is
required for that valve.
(3) If, during any inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of
this AD, any selector valve of the NLG or any door selector valve of
the NLG is found that does not have any serial number or
identification marking specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD:
Before further flight after doing the inspection required by
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, inspect to determine the torque value
and correct lockwire installation of the valve, and modify (replace,
rework, or re-identify) the valve, as applicable, in accordance with
the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-
32-104, dated March 3, 2009.
(4) For airplanes having part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Tactair
P/N 750006000), serial
[[Page 63058]]
number 001 thru 0767: Modification of the valve accomplished before
the effective date of this AD in accordance with Bombardier Service
Bulletin 601R-32-090, Revision B, dated December 12, 2006; and
Bombardier Service Bulletin Revision C, dated March 3, 2009; are
considered acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this
AD for that valve.
FAA AD Differences
Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service
information as follows: No differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New
York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANE-170, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Program
Manager, Continuing Operational Safety, FAA, New York ACO, 1600
Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516)
228-7300; fax (516) 794-5531. Before using any approved AMOC on any
airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal
maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI),
as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight
Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must
specifically reference this AD.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
approved the information collection requirements and has assigned
OMB Control Number 2120-0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2009-19,
dated April 29, 2009; and Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104,
dated March 3, 2009; for related information.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated
March 3, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD
specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information under 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Bombardier, Inc., 400 C[ocirc]te-Vertu Road West, Dorval,
Qu[eacute]bec H4S 1Y9, Canada; telephone 514-855-5000; fax 514-855-
7401; e-mail [email protected]; Internet http://www.bombardier.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information that
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 29, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-25458 Filed 10-13-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P