[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 200 (Monday, October 18, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 63774-63780]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-26006]
[[Page 63774]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 195
[Docket No. PHMSA-2010-0229]
RIN 2137-AE66
Pipeline Safety: Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM).
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SUMMARY: PHMSA is considering whether changes are needed to the
regulations covering hazardous liquid onshore pipelines. In particular,
PHMSA is seeking comment on whether it should extend regulation to
certain pipelines currently exempt from regulation; whether other areas
along a pipeline should either be identified for extra protection or be
included as additional high consequence areas (HCAs) for Integrity
management (IM) protection; whether to establish and/or adopt standards
and procedures for minimum leak detection requirements for all
pipelines; whether to require the installation of emergency flow
restricting devices (EFRDs) in certain areas; whether revised valve
spacing requirements are needed on new construction or existing
pipelines; whether repair timeframes should be specified for pipeline
segments in areas outside the HCAs that are assessed as part of the IM;
and whether to establish and/or adopt standards and procedures for
improving the methods of preventing, detecting, assessing and
remediating stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in hazardous liquid
pipeline systems. Comments should address the public safety and
environmental aspects of new requirements, as well as the cost
implications and regulatory burden.
DATES: Persons interested in submitting written comments on this ANPRM
must do so by January 18, 2011. PHMSA will consider late filed comments
so far as practicable.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number
PHMSA-2010-0229 by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
Mail: Hand Delivery: U.S. DOT Docket Management System,
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590-0001 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Instructions: If you submit your comments by mail, submit two
copies. To receive confirmation that PHMSA received your comments,
include a self-addressed stamped postcard.
Note: Comments are posted without changes or edits to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided.
There is a privacy statement published on http://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Israni, by telephone at 202-366-
4571, by fax at 202-366-4566, or by mail at U.S. DOT, PHMSA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., PHP-10, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Congress has authorized Federal regulation of the transportation of
hazardous liquid by pipeline under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. That authorization is codified in the Pipeline Safety
Laws (49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq.), a series of statutes that are
administered by the DOT, PHMSA. PHMSA has used that authority to
promulgate comprehensive minimum safety standards for the
transportation of hazardous liquid by pipeline.
Congress established the current framework for regulating hazardous
liquid pipelines in the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979,
Public Law 96-129 (HLPSA). That law, modeled on the Natural Gas
Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Public Law 90-481, delegated to DOT the
authority to develop, prescribe, and enforce minimum Federal safety
standards for the transportation of hazardous liquids by pipeline.
Congress has since enacted additional legislation that is currently
codified in the Pipeline Safety Laws, including:
In 1992, Congress added the environment to the list of
statutory factors that must be considered in establishing safety
standards for hazardous liquid pipelines, mandated that regulations be
issued to establish criteria for operators to use in identifying and
inspecting pipelines located in areas that are unusually sensitive to
environmental damage, that cross a navigable waterway, or that have a
high population density, and required regulations be issued to define
the term ``gathering line'' and establish safety standards for certain
``regulated gathering lines,'' Public Law 102-502.
In 1996, Congress limited the operator identification
requirement mandate to pipelines that cross a waterway where a
substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists, required that
certain areas where a pipeline rupture would likely cause permanent or
long-term environmental damage be considered in determining whether an
area is unusually sensitive to environmental damage, and mandated that
regulations be issued for the qualification and testing of certain
pipeline personnel, Public Law 104-304.
In 2006, Congress mandated that regulations be issued for
low-stress hazardous liquid pipelines and pipeline control room
management, Public Law 109-468.
PHMSA administers compliance with these statutes and has
promulgated comprehensive safety standards and regulations for the
transportation of hazardous liquid by pipeline. That includes
regulations for the:
Design and construction of new pipeline systems or those
that have been relocated, replaced, or otherwise changed (Subparts C
and D of 49 CFR Part 195).
Pressure testing of new pipelines (Subpart E of 49 CFR
Part 195).
Operation and maintenance of pipeline systems, including
for inspecting and reburying pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico and its
inlets, establishing programs for public awareness and damage
prevention, managing the integrity of pipelines in HCAs, and managing
the operation of pipeline control rooms (Subpart F of 49 CFR Part 195).
Protecting steel pipelines from the adverse effects of
internal and external corrosion (Subpart H of 49 CFR Part 195).
Integrity management (IM) in High Consequence Areas (HCAs,
49 CFR 195.452).
As a result of PHMSA's review of the performance of the hazardous
liquid IM program, PHMSA is considering new regulation in several
areas.
II. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Within this ANPRM, PHMSA is seeking public comment on six specific
topic areas:
Scope of the pipeline safety regulations and existing
regulatory exceptions,
The criteria for designation as a High Consequence Area
(HCA),
Leak detection and Emergency Flow Restricting Devices
(EFRD),
[[Page 63775]]
Valve spacing,
Repair criteria in non-HCA areas, and,
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC).
Each topic is discussed in more detail in this document.
A. Scope of the Pipeline Safety Regulations and Existing Regulatory
Exceptions
The Pipeline Safety Regulations apply to most onshore \1\ pipeline
facilities used for the transportation of hazardous liquids, as defined
in 49 CFR 195.2, to include petroleum, petroleum products, or anhydrous
ammonia. The Pipeline Safety Regulations apply to any pipeline that
transports a highly volatile liquid, the transportation of hazardous
liquid through a pipeline other than a gathering line that has a
maximum operating pressure (MOP) of greater than 20% of specified
minimum yield strength (SMYS), any hazardous liquid pipeline that
crosses a waterway used for commercial navigation, the transportation
of hazardous liquid through regulated onshore gathering lines, and the
transportation of hazardous liquid through certain low-stress
pipelines.
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\1\ The Pipeline Safety Statutes provide PHMSA with jurisdiction
over all offshore hazardous liquid pipelines. However, PHMSA does
not exercise the full measure of that authority for reasons of
policy. PHMSA allows States to regulate certain offshore hazardous
liquid pipelines in their own waters under 49 CFR 195.1(b)(5). PHMSA
also allows the Department of the Interior to regulate certain
hazardous liquid pipelines on the OCS under 49 CFR 195.1(b)(7), a
provision that codifies a 1996 Memorandum of Understanding between
PHMSA and DOI.
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The Pipeline Safety Regulations do not apply to all onshore
hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. Exceptions are provided where
required by statute, including for onshore production, refining, or
manufacturing facilities; storage or in-plant piping systems associated
with onshore production, refining, or manufacturing facilities; the
transportation of hazardous liquid through low-pressure rural gathering
lines that are less than 6-inches in diameter and not located in an
area that is unusually sensitive to environmental damage; and the
movement of hazardous liquid by non-pipeline modes of transportation.
Regulations associated with these statutory exemptions are not under
consideration in this ANPRM.
Regulatory exceptions also exist in the current Pipeline Safety
Regulations. These exceptions include facilities that were determined
to not pose a significant risk to public safety at the time the rule
was promulgated, for example: Pipelines used to transport hazardous
liquids by gravity, pipelines used to gather hazardous liquids in
certain rural areas, and pipelines used to move carbon dioxide beyond
certain points in production, injection, or recovery operations.
Regulatory exceptions also include facilities that are reserved for
regulation by the States or other Federal agencies, such as offshore
pipelines in State waters; producer-operated on the outer continental
shelf (OCS); breakout tanks that receive and store hazardous liquid,
but not for reinjection and continued transportation by pipeline; non-
transportation related onshore and offshore oil facilities; and
underground storage facilities.
PHMSA is seeking public comment on whether the regulatory
exceptions noted above should be repealed or modified. In particular:
A.1 Should PHMSA repeal or modify:
[cir] The exception in section 195.1(b)(2) of the Pipeline Safety
Regulations for the transportation of hazardous liquid through a
pipeline by gravity?
[cir] Any exception in sections 195.1(a)(4)(ii) or 195.11(a) for
the gathering of hazardous liquids by pipeline in rural areas?
[cir] The exception in section 195.1(b)(10) for the transportation
of carbon dioxide by pipeline downstream of certain points in injection
or recovery operations?
[cir] The exception in sections 195.1(b)(5) for the transportation
of hazardous liquid in offshore pipelines in State waters?
[cir] The exceptions in sections 195.1(b)(6) and (7) for the
transportation of hazardous liquid in a producer-operated pipeline on
the OCS?
[cir] The exception in section 195.2 for breakout tanks that are
not used to relieve surges in a hazardous liquid pipeline system or to
receive and store hazardous transported by pipeline for reinjection and
continued transportation by pipeline?
[cir] Any other exception or limitation in the Pipeline Safety
Regulations that applies to the transportation of hazardous liquid by
pipeline?
A.2 Should PHMSA promulgate new or additional safety standards for:
[cir] Underground hazardous liquid storage facilities?
[cir] Any other pipeline facility used in the transportation of
hazardous liquid by pipeline?
A.3 Should PHMSA take these actions in any particular order to best
protect the public, property, or the environment?
If commenters suggest modification, PHMSA requests specific
proposals for what elements of the exception should be modified. With
regards to questions A.1-A.2, PHMSA requests commenters to provide
information and supporting data related to:
The potential costs of repealing or modifying the existing
regulatory exceptions listed above.
The potential quantifiable safety and societal benefits of
repealing or modifying the exceptions listed above.
The potential impacts on small businesses of repealing or
modifying the existing regulatory exceptions listed above.
The potential environmental impacts of repealing or
modifying the existing regulatory exceptions listed above.
B. Definition of High Consequence Area
A High Consequence Area (HCA) is currently defined in Sec. 195.450
as a commercially navigable waterway, a high population area, or an
other populated area. Some of these HCAs include areas with high
population density, sole source drinking water supplies, and ecological
resources that are unusually sensitive to environmental damage. PHMSA
currently regulates approximately 173,000 miles of hazardous liquid
pipelines. Approximately 76,000, or 44%, of these miles are in areas
that could affect an HCA. The IM requirements specify how pipeline
operators must identify, prioritize, assess, evaluate, repair and
validate--through comprehensive analyses--the integrity of hazardous
liquid pipelines that, in the event of a leak or failure, could affect
HCAs within the United States.
Although operators may voluntarily apply IM practices to pipe line
segments that are deemed to not affect an HCA, the regulations do not
require operators to do so.
PHMSA is now considering what additional safety measures should be
taken to increase the level of safety for those pipelines that could
not affect HCA areas. PHMSA is considering whether the Integrity
Management (IM) requirements in Part 195 should be the model for adding
additional safety measures for pipelines that could not affect HCAs.
PHMSA is also considering expanding the definition of an HCA so that
more miles of pipe are subject to those requirements.
Questions
B.1 Should PHMSA amend the existing criteria for identifying high
consequence areas, to expand the miles of pipeline included in an HCA?
If so, what amendments to the criteria should PHMSA consider? Is there
information
[[Page 63776]]
or data that supports an amendment to the existing criteria? What are
the potential costs and benefits associated with an amendment to the
existing criteria? How would amendments to the current criteria impact
State and Local governments and other entities?
B.2 Does existing criteria capture any HCAs that, based on risk, do
not provide a substantial benefit for inclusion as an HCA? Should PHMSA
amend the existing criteria in any way which could better focus the
identification of an HCA based on risk? Would it be more beneficial to
include more miles of pipeline under existing HCA IM procedures, or, to
focus more intense safety measures on the highest risk, highest
consequence areas?
B.3 Should the phrase ``commercially navigable waterways'', as used
in the definition of an HCA, be revised to ``navigable waters'' or
``waters of the United States'' consistent with the Clean Water Act?
Are there any potential cost impacts or quantifiable benefits of such a
change?
B.4 What processes do pipeline operators undertake to determine
whether areas surrounding pipeline right of ways (ROWs) meet the HCA
criteria as set forth in 195.450? Are all areas that qualify as HCAs
based on proximity to ROWs properly identified? Are there ways that
PHMSA can improve the process of ROW HCA criteria determinations?
B.5 What, if any, input and/or oversight should the general public
and/or local communities play in the identification of HCAs? If
commenters believe that the public or local communities should provide
input and/or oversight, how should PHMSA gather information and
interface with these entities? Should State and Local governments be
involved in the HCA identification and oversight process?
B.6 Should PHMSA develop additional safety measures, including
those similar to IM, for areas outside of HCAs?
B.7 Should major road crossings and/or railway crossings be
included as HCAs?
B.8 If commenters suggest modification to the existing regulatory
requirements, PHMSA requests that commenters be as specific as
possible. In addition, PHMSA requests commenters to provide information
and supporting data related to:
The potential costs of modifying the existing regulatory
requirements.
The potential quantifiable safety and societal benefits of
modifying the existing regulatory requirements.
The potential impacts on small businesses of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
The potential environmental impacts of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
C. Leak Detection Equipment and Emergency Flow Restricting Devices
Better, more effective leak detection systems and technologies and
Emergency Flow Restriction Devices (EFRDs) are a key means to reducing
the consequences of hazardous liquid spills. EFRDs are ``check valves''
or remotely controlled valves (RCVs) that can be activated
automatically or remotely from a control room, to isolate sections of a
pipeline. The sooner these tools can detect a spill and isolate
pipeline segments, the lower the impact of a pipeline accident. Leak
detection can alert a pipeline operator to the presence and, with some
methods, the location of a leak. An effective leak detection system can
limit the consequences of a hazardous liquid spill by alerting the
operator to the leak in a timely manner and allowing for faster
response efforts. Leak detection systems may be incorporated into an
operator's Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system for
controlling the pipeline. EFRDs can limit the volume of hazardous
liquid released after the location of the release has been identified.
EFRDs are a critical means of reducing the consequences of a pipeline
accident.
PHMSA is seeking to increase and improve the use of leak detection
and EFRDs on hazardous liquids pipelines. To this end, PHMSA is
considering whether to establish and/or adopt standards and procedures,
through a rulemaking proceeding, for minimum leak detection
requirements for all pipelines. PHMSA is also considering whether to
require the installation of EFRDs in certain areas and/or provide
additional guidance to operators on installing EFRDs in the optimum
locations.
PHMSA has performed or sponsored numerous workshops and studies on
leak detection and EFRDs over the years. As a result of continued study
of leak detection issues, and the recommendations of the advisory
committee, the public and industry, PHMSA implemented specific leak
detection requirements in its IM rule for hazardous liquid pipelines
(65 FR 75378; December 1, 2000). Some methods of leak detection
include--Dynamic flow modeling, tracer chemical, release detection
cable, shut-in (static) release detection, and pressure point analysis
release detection software (See 65 FR 75378, 75398-99 for detailed
descriptions of these systems).
The regulation, 49 CFR 195.452(i)(3), requires an operator to have
a means to detect leaks on the sections of its pipeline system that
could affect HCAs. An operator must also evaluate and modify its leak
detection system to protect HCAs. An operator's evaluation must, at
least, consider the following factors--length and size of the pipeline,
type of product carried, the pipeline's proximity to the HCA, the
swiftness of leak detection, location of nearest response personnel,
leak history and risk assessment results. The IM regulations, Appendix
C to Part 195, also specify that the location of pipeline segments as
it relates to the ability of the operator to detect and respond to a
leak is a risk factor to be considered when establishing the frequency
of assessment.
Under Section 21 of the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Safety and
Enforcement Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-468), Congress directed PHMSA to
prepare a report on leak detection systems utilized by operators of
hazardous liquid pipelines. Specifically, Congress asked for a
discussion of the inadequacies of current leak detection systems,
including their ability to detect ruptures, small leaks that are
ongoing or intermittent, and what can be done to foster development of
better technologies as well as address existing technological
inadequacies. PHMSA completed the Leak Detection Technology Study on
December 31, 2007. The study can be found at: http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/ library. In short, the study found that no single solution
exists to effectively detect all hazardous liquid pipeline leaks and
few exist that reliably detect small leaks.
On January 26, 2010, PHMSA issued an advisory bulletin, ADB-10-01
(75 FR 4134), reminding operators of the importance of prompt and
effective leak detection capability in protecting public safety and the
environment. The bulletin advised operators of all hazardous liquid
pipelines, not just those subject to the IM rule, to perform an
engineering analysis to determine if a computer-based leak detection
system is necessary to improve leak detection performance and line
balance processes. In response to this bulletin and PHMSA's imposition
of leak detection requirements in the IM rule, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) closed an open safety recommendation
on the installation of computer-based leak detection systems.
In the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-508), Congress
directed the
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Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) to survey and assess the effectiveness
of EFRDs and other procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect
and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures, and to prescribe
regulations on the circumstances where an operator of a hazardous
liquid pipeline facility must use an EFRD or such other procedure,
system, or equipment. In response to the mandate, an NTSB
recommendation, and following a 1991 OPS report titled ``Emergency Flow
Restricting Devices Study,'' the agency issued an ANPRM soliciting
public input on EFRDs. (59 FR 2802; January 19, 1994). The ANPRM also
sought comments on leak detection.
OPS studied the issue for some time and explained in detail the
research it had performed in the NPRM for hazardous liquid IM. (See 65
FR 21695, 21700; April 24, 2000). In the final rule, OPS concluded that
the decision to install EFRDs should not be mandatory but should be
left to the operator, who must consider specific factors when making
the determination. The rule, 49 CFR 195.452(i)(4), requires an operator
to determine whether to install an EFRD based on the operator's risk
analysis. In making this determination, an operator must, at least,
consider the following factors: The swiftness of leak detection and
pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of commodity carried, the rate
of potential leakage, the volume that can be released, topography or
pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to power
sources, location of nearest response personnel, specific terrain
between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and
benefits expected by reducing the spill size. The rule, Appendix C to
part 195, also requires an operator to maintain certain records on the
criteria for determining EFRD installation.
There is currently no regulatory requirement to install EFRDs on
pipelines not subject to the IM rule. Although the pipeline safety
regulations, 49 CFR 195.260, require the installation of valves at
locations that will minimize damage or pollution from accidental
hazardous liquid discharges. Outside of HCA's, current regulations,
Sec. Sec. 195.134 and 195.444 require operators who choose to install
computational pipeline monitoring (CPM) leak detection systems to
comply with the American Petroleum Institute (API) standard API 1130
``Computational Pipeline Monitoring for Liquids: Pipeline Segment'' in
designing, operating, maintaining, testing, recordkeeping, and
dispatcher training on the system.
Questions
C.1 Should leak detection requirements be expanded to all hazardous
liquid pipeline systems under PHMSA's regulatory jurisdiction? Is there
a specific subset of hazardous liquid pipeline not currently subject to
leak detection requirements that should be? What are the potential
quantifiable costs and benefits of expanding existing hazardous liquid
pipeline leak detection requirements?
C.2 What additional industry practices or standards are available
for leak detection that PHMSA should consider for widespread adoption?
Is there new or existing leak detection technology that PHMSA should be
aware of and should consider for widespread adoption?
C.3 How do existing industry practices or standards for leak
detection address the following factors: Leak size and flow rate
sensitivity, response time, leak location accuracy, rates of false
alarms and misses, instrument accuracy, personnel training and
qualification requirements, system size and complexity (including batch
line factors), leak size or leak flow rate versus response time,
release volume estimation accuracy, detection of pre-existing leaks,
detection of a leak in a shut-in pipeline, detection of a leak in
pipelines under a slack line condition and/or during transient
conditions, sensitivity to flow conditions, sensitivity to multiphase
flow, retrofit feasibility, system testing and maintenance
requirements?
C.4 Should current state regulations inform PHMSA's consideration
of performance based leak detection standards? For example, the
regulations of The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, (18
Alaska Administrative Code 75.055), set out minimum detection
sensitivity based on a percentage of daily pipeline throughput. What
specific performance measures should PHMSA consider?
C.5 If PHMSA adopts new leak detection requirements, should there
be different performance standards for sensitive areas? For example,
should PHMSA require operators to install more sensitive leak detection
equipment, such as externally-based systems, in those areas?
C.6 If new leak detection standards were developed, what key issues
should they address?
C.7 Are there statistics available on the extent to which the
application of existing practices or standards has contributed to
reduced spill volumes and consequences?
C.8 What industry practices or standards are available for the
location and performance requirements of EFRDs?
C.9 Do such practices or standards, if any, set maximum spill
volume requirements, EFRD activation timing, or methods for integration
of EFRD operation with an operator's SCADA and leak detection systems?
C.10 Should PHMSA specify the criteria where an operator must
install an EFRD?
C.11 Should PHMSA mandate the use of EFRDs in all locations?
C.12 What leak detection methods or technologies require further
research and development in order to demonstrate their efficacy?
C.13 If commenters suggest modification to the existing regulatory
requirements, PHMSA requests that commenters be as specific as
possible. In addition, PHMSA requests commenters to provide information
and supporting data related to:
The potential costs of modifying the existing regulatory
requirements.
The potential quantifiable safety and societal benefits of
modifying the existing regulatory requirements.
The potential impacts on small businesses of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
The potential environmental impacts of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
D. Valve Spacing
Under Sec. 195.258, valves must be installed in a location that is
accessible to authorized employees. Under Sec. 195.260, a valve must
be installed on each mainline at locations along the pipeline system
that will minimize damage or pollution from accidental hazardous liquid
discharge, as appropriate for the terrain in open country, for offshore
areas, or for population areas. In addition, valves must be installed
on each side of a water crossing more than 100 feet wide from high-
water mark to high-water mark and valves must be installed on each side
of a reservoir holding water for human consumption. For areas covered
by IM requirements, Sec. 195.452(i)(4) states that an operator must
evaluate and, if appropriate, take additional measures to prevent and
mitigate the consequences of pipeline failures that could affect an
HCA. One of the actions that an operator may take to protect an HCA is
to install EFRDs. EFRDs are check valves or remote control valves that
are operated from a location remote from where the valve is located.
In addition, the standard for the installation of valves at water
crossings (100 foot wide bodies of water) may not adequately protect
certain bodies of
[[Page 63778]]
water that are less than 100 feet wide. The current standard, which
allows operators to make a subjective decision on the location of
valves, may be too subjective. PHMSA is therefore reviewing the
regulations to determine if the regulations should be revised to: (1)
Cover more bodies of water under the provisions of Sec. 195.260(e);
(2) require the installation of valves at specified locations
throughout each pipeline system; and (3) mandate the use of EFRDs, in
particular remote controlled valves, in all systems, not just in HCAs.
PHMSA believes that these actions are necessary to properly mitigate
the release of hazardous liquids after a failure of the pipeline system
has occurred.
Questions
D.1 What is the average distance between valves that are currently
installed according to the requirements in Sec. 195.260(c)? Are these
manually operated valves or are these valves controlled remotely?
D.2 Should PHMSA adopt standards by which operators evaluate valve
spacing and valve locations?
D.3 Should PHMSA specify the maximum distance between valves? If
so, is there an ideal spacing to reduce risks and potential
consequences? What projected costs and benefits would result from this
specification?
D.4 Should PHMSA prescribe additional requirements for locating
valves near HCAs beyond those currently prescribed for EFRDs?
D.5 Should PHMSA revise the standard in Sec. 195.260(e) to include
narrower bodies of water? If so, what projected costs and benefits
would result from this change?
D.6 Should PHMSA consider a requirement for all valves to be
capable of being controlled remotely? If so, what projected costs and
benefits would result from this requirement?
D.7 Should PHMSA require installation of EFRDs to protect HCAs? If
so, what projected costs and benefits would result from this
requirement?
D.8 If PHMSA proposes to revise the requirements relative to valve
location, should the change be applicable to all pipelines or should
PHMSA only apply this change to new construction? Could they also apply
any time a segment of pipe is repaired or replaced? If such a
requirement were to be adopted, under what circumstances should PHMSA
consider waiving this requirement? How would limitations to the
applicability of this requirement (such as, limitation to new
construction) impact the projected costs and benefits resulting from
the requirement?
D.9 What are the cost impacts relative to changes in the
requirements of valve location based on the type of valves installed?
D.10 If commenters suggest modification to the existing regulatory
requirements, PHMSA requests that commenters be as specific as
possible. In addition, PHMSA requests commenters to provide information
and supporting data related to:
The potential costs of modifying the existing regulatory
requirements.
The potential quantifiable safety and societal benefits of
modifying the existing regulatory requirements.
The potential impacts on small businesses of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
The potential environmental impacts of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
E. Repair Criteria
Operators have reported that up to 86 percent of all the pipelines
subject to the pipeline safety regulations have been inspected with an
in-line inspection tool (i.e., a ``smart pig''). Since the adoption of
the IM requirements into Part 195, approximately 32,000 repairs have
made to those pipelines that could affect an HCA, and over 67,000
repairs have been made in pipelines deemed to not affect an HCA. The IM
regulations (49 CFR 195.452(h)) require ``prompt action'' to address
all anomalous conditions discovered. More specifically, the IM
regulations mandate ``immediate'' pressure reduction, pipeline
shutdown, or repair of the following conditions: 80 percent or greater
wall loss; a predicted burst pressure less than the established maximum
allowable operating pressure (MAOP) at the location of the anomaly; a
dent located at the top of the pipeline (between the four and eight
o'clock positions) with any indication of metal loss, cracking, or a
stress riser or with a depth greater than six percent of the pipeline's
diameter; or any anomaly that in the judgment of the person designated
by the operator to evaluate assessment results requires immediate
action. Furthermore, operators must remediate dents at the top of the
pipeline with a depth greater than three percent of the pipeline
diameter and dents on the bottom of the pipeline that have any
indication of metal loss, cracking, or a stress riser.
Finally, the integrity management regulations in 49 CFR 195.452
require remediation within 180 days for various conditions, including:
A dent with a depth greater than two percent of a pipeline's diameter
that affects pipe curvature at a weld, a dent at the top of the
pipeline with a depth greater than two percent of the pipeline's
diameter, a dent at the bottom of the pipeline with a depth greater
than six percent of the pipeline's diameter, a calculated operating
pressure less than the current established MOP at the location of the
anomaly, 50 percent or greater wall loss, a determined crack, corrosion
along the longitudinal weld, or a gouge or groove deeper than 12.5
percent of the nominal wall.
The assessments operators have been conducting on their pipeline
segments that could affect HCAs have often extended to areas beyond the
HCAs. Up to now, PHMSA has enforced the IM repair criteria as only
applying to the anomalous conditions discovered in the HCAs. If through
the integrity assessment or information analysis, the operator
discovers anomalous conditions in the areas outside the HCA, PHMSA has
allowed operators to use the prompt remediation requirements in Sec.
195.422 rather than the IM repair time frames. PHMSA is now considering
if the IM repair time frames should also be enforced to apply to the
pipeline segments located in non-HCA areas when anomalous conditions in
these areas are discovered through the integrity assessment or
information analysis. This would provide greater assurance that defects
on non-HCA related areas are repaired in a timely manner. PHMSA would
like input from the public on the following:
E.1 Should anomalous conditions in non-HCA areas qualify as repair
conditions subject to the IM repair schedules? If so, which ones? What
projected costs and benefits would result from this requirement?
E.2 Should PHMSA consider a risk tiering--where the conditions in
the HCA areas would be addressed first, followed by the conditions in
the non-HCA areas? How should PHMSA evaluate and measure risk in this
context, and what risk factors should be considered?
E.3 What should be the repair schedules for anomalous conditions
discovered in non-HCA areas through the integrity assessment or
information analysis? Would a shortened repair schedule significantly
reduce risk? How should PHMSA determine guidelines for repair schedules
in non-HCA areas?
E.4 Have ILI tool capability advances resulted in a need to update
the ``dent with metal loss'' repair criteria?
E.5 Should PHMSA adopt explicit standards to account for the known
accuracy of in-line inspection tools when comparing in-line inspection
tool data with the repair criteria?
[[Page 63779]]
E.6 Should PHMSA adopt standards for conducting in-line inspections
using ``smart pigs,'' the qualification of persons interpreting in-line
inspection data, the review of ILI results including the integration of
other data sources in interpreting ILI results, and/or the quality and
accuracy of in-line inspection tool performance, in order to gain a
greater level of assurance that injurious pipeline defects are
discovered?
E.7 If commenters suggest modification to the existing regulatory
requirements, PHMSA requests that commenters be as specific as
possible. In addition, PHMSA requests commenters to provide information
and supporting data related to:
The potential costs of modifying the existing regulatory
requirements.
The potential quantifiable safety and societal benefits of
modifying the existing regulatory requirements.
The potential impacts on small businesses of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
The potential environmental impacts of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
F. Stress Corrosion Cracking
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) is the cracking induced from the
combined influence of tensile stress and a corrosive medium. SCC has
caused numerous pipeline failures on hazardous liquids pipelines,
including a 2003 failure on a Kinder Morgan pipeline in Arizona,a 2004
failure on an Explorer Pipeline Company pipeline in Oklahoma, a 2005
failure on an Enterprise Products Operating line in Missouri, and a
2008 failure on an Oneok NGL Pipeline in Iowa. Better, more effective
methods of preventing, detecting, assessing and remediating SCC in
pipelines are important to making further reductions in pipeline
failures.
PHMSA is seeking to improve understanding and mitigation of SCC
threats on hazardous liquids pipelines. To this end, PHMSA is
considering whether to establish and/or adopt standards and procedures,
through a rulemaking proceeding, for improving the methods of
preventing, detecting, assessing and remediating SCC in hazardous
liquid pipeline systems.
PHMSA has taken numerous steps over many years to improve the
understanding and mitigation of SCC hazardous liquids pipelines. These
have included public workshops and studies on SCC. Initiatives taken,
sponsored and/or supported by PHMSA designed to enhance understanding
of SCC include:
1999 and 2004 SCC Studies-- Two comprehensive studies on
SCC were conducted for PHMSA's predecessor agency, the Research and
Special Programs Administration (RSPA). First, ``Stress Corrosion
Cracking Study,'' Report No. DTRS56, prepared by General Physics
Corporation in May 1999. Second, ``Stress Corrosion Cracking Study,''
Report No. DTRS56-02-D-70036, submitted by Michael Baker Jr., Inc., in
September 2004. These studies sought to improve understanding of SCC
and to identify practical methods to prevent, detect and address SCC as
well as provide a framework for potential future research. The 2004
study is available at: http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/DocHome.mtg?doc=1.
Liquid IM Rules--The IM rule (65 FR 75378; December 1,
2000) for hazardous liquid pipelines in high consequence areas included
guidance on the types of internal inspection tools operators should use
for the integrity assessments required as part of their IM plans.
Appendix C to Part 195, ``Guidance for Implementation of an IM
Program,'' provides that crack detection tools should be used for
detecting cracks and crack-like features, including SCC, where such
features are a risk factor on the pipeline segment.
2003 Advisory Bulletin-- In response to three SCC-driven
failures of hazardous liquid pipelines in the US in 2003 and other SCC
incidents around the world, PHMSA issued an advisory bulletin, ``Stress
Corrosion Cracking Threats to Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines'' (68
FR 58166; October 8, 2003), urging all pipeline owners and operators to
consider SCC as a possible safety risk on their pipeline systems and to
include SCC assessment and remediation in their IM plans, for those
systems subject to IM rules. For systems not subject to the IM rules,
the bulletin urged owners and operators to assess the impact of SCC on
pipeline integrity and to plan integrity verification activities
accordingly.
2003 Public Workshop-- PHMSA sponsored a public workshop
on SCC on December 3, 2003, in Houston, TX. Numerous PHMSA
representatives, state officials, industry, consultants and officials
from the National Energy Board of Canada attended and shared their
respective experiences with SCC. The workshop also served as a forum
for identifying issues for consideration in the 2004 Baker SCC study.
2005 Rulemaking--PHMSA issued rules that covered direct
assessment, a process of managing the effects of external corrosion,
internal corrosion or SCC on pipelines made primarily of steel or iron.
``Standards for Direct Assessment of Gas and Hazardous Liquid
Pipelines'' (70 FR 61571; October 25, 2005). In the portion of the
proposed rulemaking applicable to direct assessment of SCC on hazardous
liquid pipeline facilities, PHMSA considered cross-referencing certain
existing Part 192 gas regulations, and the associated American Society
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.8S standard. B31.8S includes
specific standards for SCC. PHMSA later determined that such a cross-
reference would be problematic for a variety of reasons, including the
fact that B31.8S was developed for and limited to onshore gas pipeline
systems. At that time, the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety
Standards Committee (THLPSSC) recommended that PHMSA consider adopting
a standard that NACE International was developing for direct assessment
of SCC. PHMSA elected to consider the recently published NACE Standard
``RP0204-2004, Stress Corrosion Cracking Direct Assessment
Methodology'' for possible future rulemaking action.
Questions
Existing Standards:
F.1 Current Federal pipeline safety regulations for hazardous
liquids, Sec. 195.553, Appendix C to Part 195, and Sec. 195.588,
address direct assessment of SCC but do not set forth standards for
performing direct assessment, other types of assessments, or how to
prevent or remediate SCC. Does the NACE SP0204-2008 (formerly RP0204)
Standard ``Stress Corrosion Cracking Direct Assessment Methodology''
address the full lifecycle concerns associated with SCC? Should PHMSA
consider this, or any other standards to govern the SCC assessment
procedures? Do these standards vary significantly from existing
practices associated with SCC assessments?
F.2 Are there statistics available on the extent to which the
application of the NACE Standard, or other standards, have affected the
number of SCC indications operators have detected on their pipelines
and the number of SCC-related pipeline failures?
F.3 Are there practices or standards that address prevention,
detection, assessment, and remediation of SCC on hazardous liquid
pipeline systems?
F.4 If new standards were to be developed for SCC, what key issues
should they address?
Existing Industry Practices:
PHMSA is interested in the extent to which operators have
implemented Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) Stress
Corrosion Cracking,
[[Page 63780]]
Recommended Practices 2nd Edition, 2007, and what the results have
been.
F.5 Are there statistics available on the extent to which hazardous
liquid pipeline operators apply the CEPA practices?
F.6 Are there statistics available that compare the number of SCC
indications detected and SCC-related failures, between operators
applying the CEPA practices and those applying other SCC standards or
practices?
F.7 Do the CEPA practices address the full lifecycle concerns
associated with SCC?
F.8 Are there additional industry practices that address SCC?
The Effectiveness of SCC Detection Tools and Methods:
F.9 Are there statistics available on the extent to which various
tools and methods can accurately detect and determine the severity of
SCC?
F.10 Are tools or methods available to accurately detect and
determine the severity of SCC when it is associated with longitudinal
pipe seams?
F.11 Should PHMSA require that operators perform a critical
analysis of all factors that influence SCC to determine if SCC is a
credible threat for each pipeline segment? What experience-based
indications have proven reliable in determining whether SCC could be
present?
F.12 Should PHMSA require an integrity assessment using methods
capable of detecting SCC whenever a credible threat of SCC is
identified?
F.13 Should PHMSA require a periodic analysis of the effectiveness
of operator corrosion management programs, which integrate information
about cathodic protection, coating anomalies, in-line inspection data,
corrosion coupon data, corrosion inhibitor usage, analysis of corrosion
products, environmental and soil data, and any other pertinent
information related to corrosion management?
F.14 What further action should be taken to address corrosion
issues?
F.15 If commenters suggest modification to the existing regulatory
requirements, PHMSA requests that commenters be as specific as
possible. In addition, PHMSA requests commenters to provide information
and supporting data related to:
The potential costs of modifying the existing regulatory
requirements.
The potential quantifiable safety and societal benefits of
modifying the existing regulatory requirements.
The potential impacts on small businesses of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
The potential environmental impacts of modifying the
existing regulatory requirements.
III. Regulatory Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
E.O. 12866 requires agencies to regulate in the ``most cost-
effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,'' and to develop
regulations that ``impose the least burden on society.'' We therefore
request comments, including specific data if possible, concerning the
costs and benefits of revising the pipeline safety regulations to
accommodate any of the changes suggested in this advance notice.
B. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
Executive Order 13132 requires agencies to assure meaningful and
timely input by state and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that may have a substantial, direct effect on the
states, on the relationship between the national government and the
states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government. PHMSA is inviting comments on the effect
a possible rulemaking adopting any of the amendments discussed in this
document may have on the relationship between national government and
the states.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.), we must consider whether a proposed rule would have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
``Small entities'' include small businesses, not-for-profit
organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not
dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations under 50,000. If your business or organization is a small
entity and if adoption of any of the amendments discussed in this ANPRM
could have a significant economic impact on your operations, please
submit a comment to explain how and to what extent your business or
organization could be affected.
D. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires
Federal agencies to consider the consequences of Federal actions and
that they prepare a detailed statement analyzing if the action
significantly affects the quality of the human environment. Interested
parties are invited to address the potential environmental impacts of
this ANPRM. We are particularly interested in comments about compliance
measures that would provide greater benefit to the human environment or
on alternative actions the agency could take that would provide
beneficial impacts.
E. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian
Tribal Governments
Executive Order 13175 requires agencies to assure meaningful and
timely input from Indian tribal government representatives in the
development of rules that ``significantly or uniquely affect'' Indian
communities and that impose ``substantial and direct compliance costs''
on such communities. We invite Indian tribal governments to provide
comments on any aspect of this ANPRM that may affect Indian
communities.
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under 5 CFR Part 1320, PHMSA analyzes any paperwork burdens if any
information collection will be required by a rulemaking. We invite
comment on the need for any collection of information and paperwork
burdens, if any.
G. Privacy Act Statement
Anyone can search the electronic form of comments received in
response to any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting
the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act
Statement was published in the Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65
FR 19477).
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq.; 49 CFR 1.53.
Issued in Washington, DC, on October 8, 2010.
Jeffrey D. Wiese,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2010-26006 Filed 10-15-10; 8:45 am]
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