[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 219 (Monday, November 15, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69717-69722]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-28548]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-63276; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2010-138]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change
To Establish a Program for Managed Data Solutions
November 8, 2010.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\, and Rule 19b-4 thereunder, \2\ notice is hereby given
that on October 25, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq'' or
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in
Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by Nasdaq.
The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change
Nasdaq proposes to establish a program for Managed Data Solutions.
The text of the proposed rule change is below. Proposed new
language is italicized; proposed deletions are in [brackets].\3\
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\3\ Changes are marked to the rule text that appears in the
electronic Nasdaq Manual found at http://nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com.
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* * * * *
7026. Distribution Models [Reserved]
(a) Reserved
(b) Managed Data Solutions
[[Page 69718]]
The charges to be paid by Distributors and Subscribers of Managed
Data Solutions products containing Nasdaq Depth data shall be:
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Fee schedule for Managed Data
Solutions Price
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Managed Data Solution............ $1,500/mo Per Distributor.
Administration Fee (for the right
to offer Managed Data Solutions
to client organizations).
Nasdaq Depth Data................ $300/mo Per Subscriber.
Professional Subscriber Fee
(Internal Use Only and includes
TotalView, Level 2, OpenView).
Nasdaq Depth Data................ $60/mo Per Subscriber.
Non-Professional Subscriber
(Internal Use Only and includes
TotalView, Level 2, OpenView).
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(d) Reserved
* * * * *
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, Nasdaq included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. Nasdaq has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A,
B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
Nasdaq is proposing to create a new data distribution model (a
Managed Data Feed Solution) to further the distribution of Nasdaq
TotalView, Nasdaq OpenView and/or Nasdaq Level 2 Information
(collectively, ``Nasdaq Depth Information''). It offers a new delivery
method available to firms seeking simplified market data
administration. The Managed Data Solution may be offered by
Distributors to clients and/or client organizations that are using the
Nasdaq Depth Information internally. This new pricing and
administrative option is in response to industry demand, as well as due
to changes in the technology use [sic] to distribute market data.
Distributors offering Managed Data Solutions continue to be fee liable
for the applicable distributor fees for the receipt and distribution of
the Nasdaq Depth Information.
A Managed Data Solution is a delivery option that will assess a
new, innovative fee schedule to Distributors of Nasdaq Depth
Information that provide data feed solutions such as an Application
Programming Interface (API) or similar automated delivery solutions to
recipients with only limited entitlement controls (e.g., usernames and/
or passwords) (``Managed Data Recipients''). However, the Distributor
must first agree to reformat, redisplay and/or alter the Nasdaq Depth
Information prior to retransmission, but not to affect the integrity of
the Nasdaq Depth Information and not to render it inaccurate, unfair,
uninformative, fictitious, misleading, or discriminatory. A Managed
Data Solution is any retransmission data product containing Nasdaq
Depth Information offered by a Distributor where the Distributor
manages and monitors, but does not necessarily control, the
information. However, the Distributor does maintain contracts with the
Managed Data Recipients and is liable for any unauthorized use by the
Managed Data Recipients under a Managed Data Solution. The recipient of
a Managed Data Solution may use the information for internal purposes
only and may not distribute the information outside of their [sic]
organization.
In the past, Nasdaq has considered this type of retransmission to
be an uncontrolled data product if the Distributor does not control
both the entitlements and the display of the information. Over the last
ten years, Distributors have improved the technical delivery and
monitoring of data and the Managed Data Solution offering responds to
an industry need to administer these new types of technical deliveries.
Currently, Nasdaq charges Managed Data Recipients who receive a
Managed Data Solution the same distributor fees as a recipient of an
uncontrolled data product. Some Distributors believe that the Managed
Data Solution is a better controlled data product and as such should
not be subject to the same rates as a data feed. However, the
Distributors may only have contractual control over the data and may
not be able to verify how Managed Data Recipients are actually using
the data at least without involvement of the Managed Data Recipient.
Some Distributors have even held-off on deployment of new Nasdaq
product offerings, pending the resolution to this matter. Thus,
offering a Managed Data Solution fee schedule would not only result in
Nasdaq offering lower fees for existing Managed Data Recipients
utilizing a Managed Data Solution, but will allow new Distributors to
deliver Managed Data Solutions to new clients, thereby increasing
transparency of the market.
Nasdaq proposes to establish a program to offer the Managed Data
Solution to Distributors that assist in the management of the
uncontrolled data product on behalf of their Managed Data Recipients by
contractually restricting the data flow and monitoring the delivery.
2. Statutory Basis
Nasdaq believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\4\ in general, and with Section
6(b)(4) of the Act,\5\ in particular, in that it provides an equitable
allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of Nasdaq
data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-
regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and
flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was
believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available
to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the
provision of market data.
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\4\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\5\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
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The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of
facilitating efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.\6\
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\6\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70
FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability of
exchanges
[[Page 69719]]
to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of the Act
and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the free
market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to broker-
dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold
should be set by the market as well.
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law H.R. 4173,
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of
Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person,
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all SRO rule proposals
establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately
effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other
charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both.
Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the
Exchange Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any time within the 60-
day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule
change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section
19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in
the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes
such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should
be approved or disapproved.''
Nasdaq believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act
reflect Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the
forces of competition to ensure that fees for market data are
reasonable and equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly
authorized immediate effectiveness for a ``due, fee or other charge
imposed by the self-regulatory organization,'' the Commission adopted a
policy and subsequently a rule stipulating that fees for data and other
products available to persons that are not members of the self-
regulatory organization must be approved by the Commission after first
being published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the
adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike
members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization
governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the
opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and
that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees. Nasdaq
believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects Congress's
conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory organization
governance and competitive market structure have rendered the
Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete. Specifically,
many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-for-profit
corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or
subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no
longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive
benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the
appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or non-
members, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, we
believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the
Commission's determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an
appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply
put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be
permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are
constrained by competitive forces.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, No. 09-1042 (DC
Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the
effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance
upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees
for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history indicates that the
Congress intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.' ''
NetCoalition, at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court's conclusions about
Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees, including
market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior Commission
approval, and that the Commission should take action to suspend a fee
change and institute a proceeding to determine whether the fee change
should be approved or disapproved only where the Commission has
concerns that the change may not be consistent with the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
Nasdaq does not believe that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the
NetCoalition court found that the Commission had not, in that case,
compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the
market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. For the
reasons discussed above, Nasdaq believes that the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the Commission's
review of future market data filings, by creating a presumption that
all fees may take effect immediately, without prior analysis by the
Commission of the competitive environment. Even in the absence of this
important statutory change, however, Nasdaq believes that a record may
readily be established to demonstrate the competitive nature of the
market in question.
There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data
products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to
a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would
accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products
cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end users only insofar
as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or
their customers in making trading decisions.
[[Page 69720]]
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it.
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders
will become correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either
transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both
products. ``No one disputes that competition for order flow is
`fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 24. However, the existence of fierce
competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity
on the part of broker-dealers with order flow, since they may readily
reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues.
A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one platform to
another in response to order execution price differentials would both
reduce the value of that platform's market data and reduce its own need
to consume data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform
increases its market data fees, the change will affect the overall cost
of doing business with the platform, and affected broker-dealers will
assess whether they can lower their trading costs by directing orders
elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive data.
Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly
regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for
cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the
manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in
a vigorously competitive market.
Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their
order flow, including ten self-regulatory organization (``SRO'')
markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various
forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools
and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to
attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order
flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline
for the inputs of proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including Nasdaq, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by
publishing proprietary book data on the Internet. Second, because a
single order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary
product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in
proprietary products is exponentially greater than the actual number of
orders and transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of
access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their
business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Thomson
Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer
proprietary products that end
[[Page 69721]]
users will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such
as Google, impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable
them to attract ``eyeballs'' that contribute to their advertising
revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer
their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and
generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models
may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is the same: they can
simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to
provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other producers of proprietary
data products must understand and respond to these varying business
models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data
products successfully.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers
have previously published their proprietary data individually,
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including
Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed
to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the
depth-of-book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow.
Nasdaq believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly
demonstrates that availability of data attracts order flow. For
example, as of July 2010, 92 of the top 100 broker-dealers by shares
executed on Nasdaq consumed NQDS and 80 of the top 100 broker-dealers
consumed TotalView. During that month, the NQDS-users were responsible
for 94.44% of the orders entered into Nasdaq and TotalView users were
responsible for 92.98%.
Competition among platforms has driven Nasdaq continually to
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data
needs. For example, Nasdaq has developed and maintained multiple
delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable
customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the
lowest cost to them. Nasdaq offers front end applications such as its
``Bookviewer'' to help customers utilize data. Nasdaq has created new
products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and
Level 2, because offering data in multiple formatting allows Nasdaq to
better fit customer needs. Nasdaq offers data via multiple extranet
providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its
data products. Nasdaq has developed an online administrative system to
provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and
streamline data usage reporting. Nasdaq has also expanded its
Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and
costs to firms that purchase market data.
Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message
traffic, Nasdaq's fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as
a percent of total customer costs, Nasdaq data fees have fallen
relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth, programming,
and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true for execution
services; despite numerous enhancements to Nasdaq's trading platform,
absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition
has intensified as new entrants have emerged, constraining prices for
both executions and for data.
The vigor of competition for depth information is significant and
the Exchange believes that this proposal clearly evidences such
competition. Nasdaq is offering a new pricing model in order to keep
pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs. It is
entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new customers, as
well as retaining existing customers.
The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and
innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year.
Nasdaq continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of the
Exchange's explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees from
other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions on
how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total
cost of interacting with Nasdaq or other exchanges. Of course, the
explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis.
Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and
others are vice versa. The market for this depth information is highly
competitive and continually evolves as products develop and change.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were either solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\7\ At any time within 60 days of the filing
of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily
suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the
protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of
the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.
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\7\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an e-mail to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-138 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-138. This
[[Page 69722]]
file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used.
To help the Commission process and review your comments more
efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all
comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments,
all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that
are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating
to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person,
other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site
viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room on
official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies
of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the
principal offices of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted
without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying
information from submissions. You should submit only information that
you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-138, and should be submitted on or before
December 6, 2010.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\8\
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\8\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-28548 Filed 11-12-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P