[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 76 (Wednesday, April 21, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 20790-20792]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-9111]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2010-0384; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-003-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model DC-
10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10),
DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-
10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and
MD-11F airplanes. This proposed AD would require installing an in-line
fuse in certain float level switches and sleeving the wires between the
fuel tank and the in-line fuse. For certain airplanes this proposed AD
would also require installing an in-line fuse in certain fuel pump
pressure switches. This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews
conducted by the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent fuel
tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 7, 2010.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
3855 Lakewood Boulevard, MC D800-0019, Long Beach, California 90846-
0001; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 2; fax 206-766-5683; e-mail
[email protected]; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may
review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425-227-1221.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip Kush, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137;
telephone (562) 627-5263; fax (562) 627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2010-0384;
Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-003-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in
combination with latent condition(s),
[[Page 20791]]
and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the
evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may
mitigate the need for further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this proposed AD
are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
An investigation conducted by the airplane manufacturer has
revealed that float level switch wires located on the left and right
wing forward spar, right main landing gear wheel well, horizontal
stabilizer front spar, empennage, forward and aft cargo compartments,
and fuel pump pressure switch wires located in the aft cargo
compartment, are routed in the same bundles as power wires. If a short
circuit between a float level switch wire and a power wire occurs, an
over-current can cause excessive temperatures in the float level switch
wires, which could damage the float level or fuel pump pressure switch
wire, and become a potential ignition source for the fuel tank. Adding
an in-line fuse as a self-contained component in each float level and
pressure switch circuit, and sleeving the wires between the fuel tank
and the in-line fuse, will minimize the possibility of excessive
temperatures in the float level or pressure switch wires. If a short
circuit between a float level switch wire and a power wire occurs, the
result could be a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-252, Revision 1,
dated January 6, 2010 (for Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-
30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, and
MD-10-30F airplanes). This service bulletin describes procedures for
installing an in-line fuse in each float level switch and a pressure
switch circuit in-line fuse in the fuel tanks listed below, as
applicable.
Fuel tanks 1, 2, and 3
Upper and lower auxiliary fuel tanks
Center wing fuel tanks
Forward and aft auxiliary fuel tanks
Procedures for installing the in-line fuses include sleeving the
wires between the fuel tank and the in-line fuse.
We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin MD11-28-132, dated
November 25, 2008 (for Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes). This service
bulletin describes procedures for installing an in-line fuse in each
float level switch in the fuel tanks listed below, as applicable.
Fuel tanks 1, 2, and 3
Upper and lower auxiliary fuel tanks
Forward auxiliary fuel tanks
Center wing fuel tanks
Tail fuel tank
Procedures for installing the in-line fuses include sleeving the wires
between the fuel tank and the in-line fuse.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant
information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is
likely to exist or develop in other products of these same type
designs. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions
specified in the service information described previously.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 281 airplanes of
U.S. registry. The following table provides the estimated costs for
U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.
Table--Estimated Costs
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Number of
Average U.S.-
Action Work hours labor rate Parts Cost per product registered Fleet cost
per hour airplanes
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Installation/Sleeving............ Between 64 and 136 $85 Between $3,139 and Between $8,579 and 281 Between $2,410,699 and
\1\ $5,598 \1\ $17,158 $4,821,398
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\1\ Depending on airplane configuration.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866,
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of
compliance in the AD Docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator,
[[Page 20792]]
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
McDonnell Douglas Corporation: Docket No. FAA-2010-0384; Directorate
Identifier 2010-NM-003-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by June 7, 2010.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to the airplanes identified in paragraphs
(c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-
10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F,
MD-10-10F, and MD-10-30F airplanes; certificated in any category; as
identified in Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-252, Revision 1, dated
January 6, 2010.
(2) McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model MD-11 and MD-11F
airplanes; certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing
Service Bulletin MD11-28-132, dated November 25, 2008.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.
Unsafe Condition
(e) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD
to prevent fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Action
(g) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD do the
actions specified in paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD, as
applicable.
(1) For Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F
(KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, and MD-10-30F
airplanes: Install an in-line fuse in each float level switch and
pressure switch, including sleeving the wires between the fuel tank
and the in-line fuse, in fuel tanks 1, 2, and 3; upper and lower
auxiliary fuel tanks; forward and aft auxiliary fuel tanks; and
center wing fuel tanks; as applicable; in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-252,
Revision 1, dated January 6, 2010.
(2) For Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes: Install an in-line
fuse in each float level switch, including sleeving the wires
between the fuel tank and the in-line fuse, in fuel tanks 1, 2, and
3; upper and lower auxiliary fuel tanks; forward auxiliary fuel
tank; center wing fuel tanks; and tail fuel tank; as applicable; in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin MD11-28-132, dated November 25, 2008.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(h)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send
information to ATTN: Philip Kush, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion
Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,
3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone
(562) 627-5263; fax (562) 627-5210.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 9, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-9111 Filed 4-20-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P