[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 6 (Monday, January 10, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1342-1346]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-32753]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2007-28435 Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-054-AD;
Amendment 39-16556; AD 2011-01-03]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; GROB-WERKE GMBH & CO KG Models G102
ASTIR CS, G102 CLUB ASTIR III, G102 CLUB ASTIR IIIb, and G102 STANDARD
ASTIR III Gliders
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
As a result of the replacement action of the G 103 TWIN ASTIR
spar spigot assemblies, the Gliding Federation of Australia issued a
directive to inspect the similar main spigots of single-seater
sailplanes.
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe
condition on these products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective February 14, 2011.
On February 14, 2011, the Director of the Federal Register approved
the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this
AD.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at Document Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC
20590.
For service information identified in this AD, contact Grob
Aircraft; Lettenbachstr. 9; Tussenhausen-Mattsies; Head of Customer
Service & Support, Germany; telephone: +49 (0) 8268 998 139; fax: +49
(0) 8268 998 200; E-mail: aircraft.com">productsupport@grob-aircraft.com; Web site:
http://www.grob-aircraft.com. You may review copies of the referenced
service information at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust,
Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 816-329-4148.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:
Jim Rutherford, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane
Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106;
telephone: (816) 329-4165; fax: (816) 329-4090.
Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane
Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106;
telephone: (816) 329-4130; fax: (816) 329-4090.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
History of AD Actions
When the State of Design issues MCAI against a product that is
certificated for operation in the United States, the FAA evaluates this
information and either issues a corresponding U.S. AD or completes a no
action required (NAR) form. In 1988, the FAA's Brussels, Belgium office
evaluated MCAIs. When the Brussels office determined an AD was
necessary, the corresponding Directorate issued an AD for the product.
NAR forms were completed by the Brussels office. When a NAR form was
completed, the Directorates did not always receive a copy since they
were not required to take action.
The Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA), which is the airworthiness authority
for Germany, issued AD 88-176 Grob, dated August 15, 1988, to apply to
the GROB-WERKE GMBH & CO KG G103 twin-seat gliders. That AD required
inspection and replacement of the spar spigot assembly to prevent
fatigue failure of the spigot. The FAA issued AD 90-02-09 (55 FR 269,
January 4, 1990), effective February 5, 1990, to mandate replacement of
the spigot assembly for the G103 twin-seat versions of the glider.
The LBA issued 91-5/2 Grob, dated February 1, 1991, to apply to the
GROB-WERKE GMBH & CO KG G102 single-seat gliders. The MCAI states:
As a result of the replacement action of the G 103 TWIN ASTIR
spar spigot assemblies, the Gliding Federation of Australia issued a
directive to inspect the similar main spigots of single-seater
sailplanes.
The MCAI requires you to inspect the wing main spigot assembly before
the next flight and replace it on the G102 single-seat gliders. You may
obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
The FAA inadvertently did not issue an AD on the single-seat
versions at the time the LBA issued AD 91-5/2 Grob. The FAA finds no AD
or NAR information to correspond with German AD 91-5/2 Grob from that
time period.
In 1997/1998, the responsibility to evaluate MCAIs transferred from
Brussels to the Directorates. The Directorates assimilated all of the
Brussels information into the Directorate information, identifying if
ADs were issued, if NAR forms were completed, or if neither action was
taken. During this time, the Small Airplane Directorate issued a total
of 310 AD actions in fiscal year (FY) 1998. This was an increase of 79
percent over the 173 total actions issued in FY-97, and a 121 percent
increase over the 140 total actions issued in FY-96. This workload
increase contributed to the FAA not identifying the German AD 91-5/2
Grob as an item without a U.S. AD or NAR correspondence associated with
it.
[[Page 1343]]
In early 2005, through discussions with Grob representatives, we
determined that we needed to address the unsafe condition for the G102
single-seat versions of the glider in the United States.
After further review of the data, we determined AD action is
necessary to correct an unsafe condition on the G102 versions of the
glider for the following reasons:
Cracks have been found on the wing spigot assemblies
installed on the G102 single-seat gliders. Several of these cracks were
internal to the spigot and were not visually detectable until the
component failed.
Cracks in the wing spigot assembly pin-to-plate interface
could cause the spar spigot to fail with little or no warning.
The manufacturer has maintained their position that the
original wing spigot assembly design is inadequate to sustain the
structure for the operational service life of the aircraft.
Consequently, we issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend
14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified
products. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on July 30,
2007 (72 FR 41466). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition
for the specified products.
The public responded to this published notice, and the FAA
appreciates the numerous comments submitted for consideration in
addressing this important airworthiness issue. Our comment disposition
took a considerable amount of time researching and organizing data to
adequately address those comments. Through the comment disposition
process, we found that the material required for the repair was not
available in the United States and an undue cost burden would have been
placed on operators to get the repair material from Germany. We
coordinated the use of an alternate resin/hardener for the repair that
is available in the United States.
History of the Unsafe Condition
The original design of the spar spigot utilizes a steel pin with a
welded steel plate adjacently attached. The welded interface between
the pin and the plate is the critical area subjected to structural
fatigue. This mode of failure has resulted in a redesign (design
enhancement) of the spar spigot assembly that uses no welds and has
additional filleting to increase part strength, durability, and
enhances reliability. Therefore, based on the potential severity of
failure, the FAA determined that the originally designed spar spigots
should be replaced.
When Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt (Grob) issued Service Bulletin TM
306-29; TM 320-5, issue date: October 11, 1990, there were no reports
of crack occurrences in Germany. However, Grob implemented this measure
to ensure the safety of their gliders.
The Gliding Federation of Australia's Airworthiness Directive
number 370, Issue 2, dated January 10, 1991, stated a large percentage
of their single-seat G102 series gliders, at that time, were found to
contain cracks. The exact figure for the number of occurrences is not
known. The results of one repair shop in Australia revealed that of 12
spigot assemblies replaced on the single-seat models, 7 were found to
have cracks. Several of these cracks were internal to the spigot.
Internal cracks located in this area would not be visually detectable
until the component failed.
The LBA issued AD 91-5/2 Grob to mandate the action from Grob's
service bulletin; this action was later adopted in Europe, New Zealand,
Canada, and Brazil.
After evaluating the crack findings from the Gliding Federation of
Australia, the position of Grob's technical advisors, and the actions
of the German airworthiness authority, we determined it necessary to
issue this AD action.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We considered the comments received.
Comment Issue No. 1: Proposed AD Lacks Supporting Evidence
Cindy Brickner, John H. Campbell, David Forrest, Hartley L.
Falbaum, Philippe C. Marchal, Bruce Stobbe, and the Soaring Society of
America (SSA) cite lack of rationale to mandate the unconditional
replacement of the wing main spigot assembly. The spar spigot assembly
is serviceable, and there is no evidence or history of problems for the
G102 series gliders. We infer the commenters want us to withdraw the
NPRM.
We disagree with the comment. Because a failure has not occurred is
no justification that imminent failure to this critical structure could
not happen. The Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin TM 306-29; TM
320-5, issue date: October 11, 1990, states that inspection and
replacement of the spar spigot assembly was due to an increased
occurrence of cracks found on Grob's single-seat Astir series that
operated in Australia. The Gliding Federation of Australia has
identified at least nine occurrences of cracks found during the
inspection of the single-seat gliders. Consequently, the occurrences of
cracked pins resulted in Australia issuing AD 370, Issue 2, dated
January 10, 1991.
Although a critical failure of the spar spigot assembly has not
been documented in the United States, Grob maintains that the original
design of the wing spar spigot assembly is inadequate to meet the
airframe life limits and can not be repaired as a long-term corrective
action.
We are not changing the final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Comment Issue No. 2: Request Repetitive Inspections Instead of a
Calendar-Based Replacement
Cindy Brickner, Robert DeFabio, David M. Forrest, Philippe C.
Marchal, Bruce Stobbe, and the SSA, request allowing frequent or annual
inspections in lieu of the required wing main spigot replacement citing
that inspections would provide adequate warning before spigot failure.
We disagree with the comment. Based on information from the
manufacturer, the original design of the wing main spigot assembly uses
materials and/or a configuration deemed inadequate to sustain the
structure for the operation and service life of the aircraft.
The critical failure mode of the wing spar spigot assembly is at
the weld of the steel pin-to-plate interface. Cracks in these welds
could cause the spar spigot to fail with little or no warning. If this
joint fails, then failure of the wing spar could occur. Considering
this situation, using an inspection to determine airworthiness is not a
comprehensive method for ensuring the safety of the airframe.
The spar spigot assembly is based on a safe-life design philosophy.
A safe-life design structure must be able to sustain a certain number
of events such as flights, landings, and/or flight hours with a low
probability that the strength will degrade below its design ultimate
value due to fatigue cracking. In this type of structural design, there
is no redundant or backup structural element to retain the structure's
residual strength after the failure or partial failure of the principle
structural element: the pin-to-plate interface.
From the FAA's perspective, in a safe-life designed structure, the
development of a detectable crack is considered fatigue failure. Since
a safe-life evaluation usually does not include demonstration of crack
growth rates or residual strength capability, we assume that the
development of a detectable
[[Page 1344]]
crack may result in a catastrophic failure of the structure. The
replacement spar spigot assembly has been redesigned to be more robust
due to the manufacturing process used along with additional filleting
which enhances fatigue resistance.
The new design also removes the critical failure mode and the
requirements for weld inspections. Therefore, at Grob's discretion, a
design enhancement, not a work-around solution, was implemented in
order to increase the safety of this structural interface.
We are not changing the final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Comment Issue No. 3: The German MCAI Is Less Severe Than the Proposed
AD
Hartley L. Falbaum and Bruce Stobbe interpret that the German AD
allows cracks to be blended out and the parts to remain in service.
Consequently, there is adequate warning prior to failure. They request
an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to the requirements of the
proposed AD.
We disagree with the comment and the interpretation. The MCAI
clearly states the requirements to inspect and replace the wing main
spigot assembly. The Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin TM 306-
29; TM 320-5, issue date: October 11, 1990, authorizes crack removal by
blending based on specific, detailed criteria. Regardless, if the
criterion is or is not met, the wing main spigot assembly must be
replaced within a given time. Finally, cracks in the welds of the pin-
to-plate interface could cause the spar spigot to fail with little or
no warning.
We are not changing this final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Comment Issue No. 4: Limited Number of Repair Facilities
Cindy Brickner, John H. Campbell, Robert DeFabio, David Forrest,
Hartley L. Falbaum, Bruce Stobbe, and the SSA express concerns that an
adequate repair facility may not be available to do the repair.
We partially agree with this comment. The closing of Grob's repair
facility in Bluffton, Ohio, leaves few repair facilities with direct
experience in doing this work. However, 14 CFR part 65 provides that an
appropriately rated mechanic with an inspection authorization or an
appropriately rated mechanic under the oversight of a mechanic with an
inspection authorization is approved for this level of repair. We are
aware of the cost and travel impacts of this AD on the gliding
community. However, this does not diminish the need to do the repair,
and a glider that has not had the replacement of the wing main spigot
assembly has a corresponding reduction in its value.
We are not changing the final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Comment Issue No. 5: Risk With the Proposed Repair
Robert DeFabio, Hartley L. Falbaum, Philippe C. Marchal, and Bruce
Stobbe express concerns that fewer repair stations with less
experienced personnel to do the repair will create a greater risk than
the one the glider is currently exposed to.
We disagree with the comment. We issued AD 90-02-09, effective
February 5, 1990, for the twin-seat version of the glider, which
mandated replacement of the spigot assembly. Approximately 120 of the
repairs have been made for this AD, all without incident or failure
attributed to this rework. Further, the mandatory repair implemented
worldwide has had no known failure.
We are not changing the final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Comment Issue No. 6: Parts, Tools, and Repair Skills Needed May Not Be
Available
Cindy Brickner and David Forrest express concern that since the
closing of Grob's repair facility in Ohio, the parts, tools, and repair
skills needed may not be available to do the proposed AD.
We disagree with the comment. Parts are available for the
replacement of the wing main spigot assembly from Fiberglas-technik,
Rudolph Linder GmbH & Co. KG; Steige 3, 88487 Walpertshofen; telephone:
+49 7353 2243; fax: +49 7353 3096; e-mail: [email protected];
Internet: http://www.LTB-Lindner.com. There is also a limited supply of
parts from Composite Aircraft Repair, P.O. Box 2010, Moriarty, New
Mexico 87035; telephone (505) 269-8234; e-mail: [email protected].
An appropriately rated mechanic with an inspection authorization or an
appropriately rated mechanic under the oversight of a mechanic with an
inspection authorization is approved to do this repair. Also,
approximately 120 of the repairs have been made for a similar AD, all
without incident or failure attributed to this rework. Further, the
mandatory repair implemented worldwide has had no known failure.
After the NPRM was issued, we found that the material required for
the repair was not available in the United States and an undue cost
burden would have been placed on operators to get the repair material
from Germany. This final rule AD action adds Grob Aircraft Repair
Instructions No. RI-GROB-001, dated May 14, 2009, that lists an
alternate resin/hardener available in the United States.
We are not changing the final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Comment Issue No. 7: Extend All Compliance Times To Allow Time To Get
Parts and Schedule Spar Spigot Assembly Replacement
The SSA requests FAA extend all compliance times to allow time to
procure parts and schedule replacement of the wing main spigot assembly
with a qualified repair facility.
The FAA agrees with the SSA's proposal to extend the compliance
time for the initial inspection from 10 to 25 hours time-in-service
after the effective date of the AD and, if no cracks are found,
increase the replacement time for the wing main spigot assembly from 12
to 15 months after the effective date of the AD.
Comment Issue No. 8: The Design Defect Found on the Twin-Seat Glider Is
Not Applicable to the Single-Seat Glider
John H. Campbell writes that the perceived defect is centered on
the twin-seat version of the glider. This perceived defect should not
include the single-seat version of this glider. He also writes that the
twin-seat glider is certificated under the aerobatic category; the
single-seat glider is certificated under the utility category. We infer
that, based on the design and operation of the affected single-seat
glider, the commenter wants the proposed AD withdrawn.
We disagree with this comment. The fact that the single-seat glider
is lighter and certificated in the utility category is not relevant.
The original design of the wing spar spigot assembly of the single-seat
and twin-seat gliders is insufficient to meet the airframe life limits.
The type design of the G102 series gliders is similar to the type
design of the G103 series gliders. As a result, the German
airworthiness authority issued its ADs. We concur with Grob and the
German airworthiness authority that this is a required AD action.
We are not changing the final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Comment Issue No. 9: Withdraw the Proposed AD
John Campbell writes that this issue was addressed more than 20
years ago and that many Grob sailplanes now have thousands of flight
hours. The MCAI statement from the manufacturer
[[Page 1345]]
in the NPRM is based on a decision made in Australia. Campbell asks why
the FAA is addressing this now and what prompted action on this issue.
He notes that the gliders made in the 1980s are bargain investments.
The cost to repair is a large part of the total value of the glider.
Although no specific change is requested, based on the comment, we
infer that the commenter wants the NPRM withdrawn.
For unknown reasons, the FAA did not issue an AD on the single-seat
versions of these gliders at the time the German airworthiness
authority issued its AD. Further, a review of our records finds no
explanation for the delay in addressing this issue. Nevertheless, a
safety issue exists that must be addressed.
The Gliding Federation of Australia noted that in Australia, the
single-seat G102 series gliders, which have a similar type design to
the twin-seat versions, had reports of cracking in the welds of the
pins. Consequently, the occurrences of cracked pins in several gliders
resulted in Australia issuing AD 370, Issue: 2, dated January 10, 1991.
We recognize that doing this AD to maintain the glider's
airworthiness is a financial burden. However, a glider that has not had
the replacement of the wing main spigot assembly has a corresponding
reduction in its value.
We are not changing the final rule AD action as a result of this
comment.
Conclusion
We reviewed the available data, including the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We determined that these
changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or
increase the scope of the AD.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a Note within the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 79 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 25 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $85 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $840 per product.
Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the U.S.
operators to be $234,235 or $2,965 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866;
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after
receipt.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
2011-01-03 GROB-WERKE GMBH & CO KG: Amendment 39-16556; Docket No.
FAA-2007-28435; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-054-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective February
14, 2011.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to the GROB-WERKE GMBH & CO KG gliders Model
G102 ASTIR CS, serial numbers (SNs) 1001 through 1536; Model G102
CLUB ASTIR III, SNs 5501 (suffix C) through 5652 (suffix C); Model
G102 CLUB ASTIR IIIb, SNs 5501 (suffix Cb) through 5652 (suffix Cb);
and Model G102 STANDARD ASTIR III, SNs 5501 (suffix S) through 5652
(suffix S), that are:
(1) Equipped with any wing spar spigot assembly that has not
been replaced following Grob Luft-und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin TM
306-29; TM 320-5, issue date: October 11, 1990; and
(2) Are certificated in any category.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 57: Wings.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
As a result of the replacement action of the G 103 TWIN ASTIR
spar spigot assemblies, the Gliding Federation of Australia issued a
directive to inspect the similar main spigots of single-seater
sailplanes.
[[Page 1346]]
The MCAI requires you to inspect the wing main spigot assembly
before the next flight and replace it.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, do the following actions:
(1) Within the next 25 hours time-in-service (TIS) after
February 14, 2011 (the effective date of this AD), inspect both wing
spar spigot assemblies for cracks using a dye-penetrant or magnetic-
particle method following Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin
TM 306-29; TM 320-5, issue date: October 11, 1990. The use of the
magnification method is prohibited.
Note 1: If dye-penetrant method is used, great care should be
exercised when cleaning and/or etching the surfaces and interpreting
surface faults.
(2) Replace the wing main spigot assembly following Grob Luft-
und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin TM 306-29; TM 320-5, issue date:
October 11, 1990; and Grob Aircraft Repair Instructions No. RI-GROB-
001, dated May 14, 2009, using whichever of the following compliance
times that apply:
(i) If cracks are found during the inspection required in
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before further flight; or
(ii) If no cracks are found during the inspection required in
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, within the next 15 months after
February 14, 2011 (the effective date of this AD).
FAA AD Differences
Note 2: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service
information as follows:
(1) The MCAI compliance time required the wing main spigot
assembly to be inspected before the next flight and replacement of
the wing spar spigot assembly no later than December 31, 1992. This
AD requires inspection within the next 25 hours TIS after February
14, 2011 (the effective date of this AD), and replacement prior to
further flight after the inspection where cracks are found or 15
months after February 14, 2011 (the effective date of this AD), if
no cracks are found.
(2) In lieu of authorizing a 10x magnifier for inspection as
specified in the MCAI, this AD requires you use either a dye-
penetrant or magnetic-particle inspection method.
(3) After the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) was issued,
we found that the material required for the repair was not available
in the United States and an undue cost burden would have been placed
on operators to get the repair material from Germany. This AD adds
Grob Aircraft Repair Instructions No. RI-GROB-001, dated May 14,
2009. This repair instruction lists an alternate resin/hardener that
is available in the United States.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
Standards Staff, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this
AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Before
using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies,
notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
Send information to ATTN of one of the following individuals:
(i) Jim Rutherford, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane
Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106;
telephone: (816) 329-4165; fax: (816) 329-4090; or
(ii) Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane
Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106;
telephone: (816) 329-4130; fax: (816) 329-4090.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, a Federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person
is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a
penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information
subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless
that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control
Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is
2120-0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is
estimated to be approximately 5 minutes per response, including the
time for reviewing instructions, completing and reviewing the
collection of information. All responses to this collection of
information are mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this
burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to
the FAA at: 800 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn:
Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI Federal Republic of Germany Luftfahrt-
Bundesamt AD 91-5/2 Grob, dated February 1, 1991; Grob Luft- und
Raumfahrt Service Bulletin TM 306-29; TM 320-5, issue date: October
11, 1990; and Grob Aircraft Repair Instructions No. RI-GROB-001,
dated May 14, 2009, for related information.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use Grob Luft-und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin TM
306-29; TM 320-5, issue date: October 11, 1990; and Grob Aircraft
Repair Instructions No. RI-GROB-001, dated May 14, 2009, to do the
actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Grob
Aircraft; Lettenbachstr. 9; Tussenhausen-Mattsies; Head of Customer
Service & Support, Germany; telephone: +49 (0) 8268 998 139; fax:
+49 (0) 8268 998 200; E-mail: aircraft.com">productsupport@grob-aircraft.com; Web
site: http://www.grob-aircraft.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information
incorporated by reference for this AD at the FAA, Central Region,
Office of the Regional Counsel, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri
64106. For information on the availability of this material at the
Central Region, call (816) 329-3768.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information
incorporated by reference for this AD at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on December 21, 2010.
Earl Lawrence,
Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-32753 Filed 1-7-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P