Federal Register, Volume 76 Issue 8 (Wednesday, January 12, 2011)

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 8 (Wednesday, January 12, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 2200-2238]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-33244]

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Part II

Department of Transportation
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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Parts 229 and 238

Locomotive Safety Standards; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 8 / Wednesday, January 12, 2011 /
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229 and 238

[Docket No. FR-2009-0095; Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC16

Locomotive Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA proposes to revise the existing regulations containing
Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards. The proposed revisions would
update, consolidate, and clarify the existing regulations. The proposal
incorporates existing industry and engineering best practices related
to locomotives and locomotive electronics. This includes the
development of a safety analysis for new locomotive electronic systems.
FRA believes this proposal will modernize and improve its safety
regulatory program related to locomotives.

DATES: Comments: Written comments must be received by March 14, 2011.
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent
possible without incurring additional expenses or delays.
Hearing: FRA anticipates being able to complete this rulemaking
without a public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific
request for a public, oral hearing prior to February 11, 2011, one will
be scheduled and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal
Register to inform interested parties of the date, time, and location
of any such hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2009-0095, may
be submitted by any of the following methods: Web Site: Federal
eRulemaking Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online
instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without
change to http://www.regulation.gov including any personal information.
Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any
submitted comments or materials.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or to
Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Scerbo, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Motive Power & Equipment Division, RRS-14,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC (telephone 202-493-6249), or Michael Masci, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC (telephone 202-493-6037).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background

FRA has broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety. The
Federal railroad safety laws (formerly the Locomotive Boiler Inspection
Act at 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-
20703) prohibit the use of unsafe locomotives and authorize FRA to
issue standards for locomotive maintenance and testing. In order to
further FRA's ability to respond effectively to contemporary safety
problems and hazards as they arise in the railroad industry, Congress
enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (Safety Act) (formerly
45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq., now found primarily in chapter 201 of Title
49). The Safety Act grants the Secretary of Transportation rulemaking
authority over all areas of railroad safety (49 U.S.C. 20103(a)) and
confers all powers necessary to detect and penalize violations of any
rail safety law. This authority was subsequently delegated to the FRA
Administrator. (49 CFR 1.49) Until July 5, 1994, the Federal railroad
safety statutes existed as separate acts found primarily in title 45 of
the United States Code. On that date, all of the acts were repealed,
and their provisions were recodified into title 49 of the United States
Code. All references to parts and sections in this document shall be to
parts and sections located in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
Pursuant to its general statutory rulemaking authority, FRA
promulgates and enforces rules as part of a comprehensive regulatory
program to address the safety of, inter alia, railroad track, signal
systems, communications, rolling stock, operating practices, passenger
train emergency preparedness, alcohol and drug testing, locomotive
engineer certification, and workplace safety. In 1980, FRA issued the
majority of the regulatory provisions currently found at 49 CFR part
229 (``part 229'') addressing various locomotive related topics
including: Inspections and tests; safety requirements for brake, draft,
suspension, and electrical systems, and locomotive cabs; and locomotive
cab equipment. Since 1980, various provisions currently contained in
part 229 have been added or revised on an ad hoc basis to address
specific safety concerns or in response to specific statutory mandates.
Topics for new regulation typically arise from several sources. FRA
continually reviews its regulations and revises them as needed to
address emerging technology, changing operational realities, and to
bolster existing standards as new safety concerns are identified. It is
also common for the railroad industry to introduce regulatory issues
through FRA's waiver process. Several of FRA's proposed requirements
have been partially or previously addressed through FRA's waiver
process. As detailed in part 211, FRA's Railroad Safety Board (Safety
Board) reviews, and approves or denies, waiver petitions submitted by
railroads and other parties subject to the regulations. Petitions
granted by the Safety Board can be utilized only by the petitioning
party. By incorporating existing relevant regulatory waivers into part
229, FRA intends to extend the reach of the regulatory flexibilities
permitted under those waivers. Although, FRA is proposing to alter a
number of regulatory requirements, the comprehensive safety regulatory
structure would remain.
The requirement that a locomotive be safe to operate in the service
in which it is placed remains the cornerstone of Federal regulation.
Title 49 U.S.C. 20701 provides that ``[a] railroad carrier may use or
allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when
the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances: (1) Are in
proper condition and safe to operate

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without unnecessary danger of personal injury; (2) have been inspected
as required under this chapter and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Transportation under this chapter; and (3) can withstand
every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter.''
The statute is extremely broad in scope and makes clear that each
railroad is responsible for ensuring that locomotives used on its line
are safe. Even the extensive requirements of part 229 are not intended
to be exhaustive in scope, and with or without that regulatory
structure the railroads remain directly responsible for finding and
correcting all hazardous conditions. For example, even without these
proposed regulations, a railroad would be responsible for repairing an
inoperative alerter and an improperly functioning remote control
transmitter, if the locomotive is equipped with these devices.
On July 12, 2004, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), on
behalf of itself and its member railroads, petitioned the FRA to delete
the requirement contained in 49 CFR 229.131 related to locomotive
sanders. The petition and supporting documentation asserted that
contrary to popular belief, depositing sand on the rail in front of the
locomotive wheels will not have any significant influence on the
emergency stopping distance of a train. While contemplating the
petition, FRA and interested industry members began identifying other
issues related to the locomotive safety standards. The purpose of this
task was to develop information so that FRA could potentially address
the issues through the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC).
The locomotive sanders final rule was published on October 19, 2007
(72 FR 59216). FRA continued to utilize the RSAC process to address
additional locomotive safety issues. On September 10, 2009, after a
series of detailed discussions, the RSAC approved and provided
recommendations on a wide range of locomotive safety issues including,
locomotive brake maintenance, pilot height, headlight operation, danger
markings, and locomotive electronics. FRA is generally proposing the
consensus rule text for these issues with minor clarifying
modifications. The RSAC was unable to reach consensus on the issues
related to remote control locomotives, cab temperature, and locomotive
alerters. Based on its consideration of the information and views
provided by the RSAC Locomotive Safety Standards Working Group, FRA is
also proposing rule text related to the non-consensus items.

II. RSAC Overview

In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety
program issues. The Committee includes representation from interested
parties, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and
manufacturers, and other interested parties. A list of member groups
follows:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO)
American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials
(AASHTO)
American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA)
Amtrak
Association of American Railroads (AAR)
Association of Railway Museums (ARM)
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET)
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED)
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)*
High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA)
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA)*
League of Railway Industry Women*
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP)
National Association of Railway Business Women*
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*
Railway Supply Institute (RSI)
Safe Travel America (STA)
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte*
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
Transport Canada*
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC)
United Transportation Union (UTU)
*Indicates associate membership.

When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and after
consideration and debate, the RSAC may accept or reject the task. If
accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a
given task. The task force then provides that information to the
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to
the RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority
of the RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff
has played an active role at the working group level in discussing the
issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the
recommendation and the agency exercises its independent judgment on
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal. If the
working group or the RSAC is unable to reach consensus on
recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the issue
through conventional practices including traditional rulemaking
proceedings.

III. Proceedings to Date

On February 22, 2006, FRA presented, and the RSAC accepted, the
task of reviewing existing locomotive safety needs and recommending
consideration of specific actions useful to advance the safety of rail
operations. The RSAC established the Locomotive Safety Standards
Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task and develop
recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of the Working
Group, in addition to FRA, included the following:

APTA
ASLRRA
Amtrak
AAR
ASRSM
BLET
BMWE
BRS
BNSF Railway Company (BNSF)
California Department of Transportation
Canadian National Railway (CN)
Canadian Pacific Railway (CP)
Conrail
CSX Transportation (CSXT)

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Florida East Coast Railroad
General Electric (GE)
Genesee & Wyoming Inc.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
IBEW
Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS)
Long Island Rail Road
Metro-North Railroad
MTA Long Island
National Conference of Firemen and Oilers
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)
Public Service Commission of West Virginia
Rail America, Inc.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Agency
SMWIA
STV, Inc.
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
Transport Canada
Union Pacific Railroad (UP)
UTU
Volpe Center
Wabtec Corporation
Watco Companies

The task statement approved by the full RSAC sought immediate
action from the Working Group regarding the need for, and usefulness
of, the existing regulation related to locomotive sanders. The task
statement established a target date of 90 days for the Working Group to
report back to the RSAC with recommendations to revise the existing
regulatory sander provision. The Working Group conducted two meetings
that focused almost exclusively on the sander requirement. The meetings
were held on May 8-10, 2006, in St. Louis, Missouri, and on August 9-
10, 2006, in Fort Worth, Texas. Minutes of these meetings have been
made part of the docket in this proceeding. After broad and meaningful
discussion related to the potential safety and operational benefits
provided by equipping locomotives with operative sanders, the Working
Group reached consensus on a recommendation for the full RSAC.
On September 21, 2006, the full RSAC unanimously adopted the
Working Group's recommendation on locomotive sanders as its
recommendation to FRA. The next twelve Working Group meeting addressed
a wide range of locomotive safety issues. The meetings were held at the
following locations on the following days:

Kansas City, MS, October 30 & 31, 2006;
Raleigh, NC, January 9 & 10, 2007;
Orlando, FL, March 6 & 7, 2007;
Chicago, IL, June 6 & 7, 2007;
Las Vegas, NV, September 18 & 19, 2007;
New Orleans, LA, November 27 & 28, 2007;
Fort Lauderdale, FL, February 5 & 6, 2008;
Grapevine, TX, May 20 & 21, 2008;
Silver Spring, MD, August 5 & 6, 2008;
Overland Park, KS, October 22 & 23, 2008;
Washington, D.C., January 6 & 7, 2009; and
Arlington, VA, April 15 & 16, 2009.

At the above listed meetings, the Working Group successfully
reached consensus on the following locomotive safety issues: Locomotive
brake maintenance, pilot height, headlight operation, danger markings
placement, load meter settings, reorganization of steam generator
requirements, and the establishment locomotive electronics
requirements. Throughout the preamble discussion of this proposal, FRA
refers to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by
members of the Working Group. When using this terminology, FRA is
referring to views, statements, discussions, or positions identified or
contained in the minutes of the Working Group meetings. These documents
have been made part of the docket in this proceeding and are available
for public inspection as discussed in the ADDRESSES portion of this
document. These points are discussed to show the origin of certain
issues and the course of discussions on those issues at the task force
or working group level. We believe this helps illuminate factors FRA
has weighed in making its regulatory decisions, and the logic behind
those decisions.
The reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the full RSAC
makes recommendations to FRA, and it is the consensus recommendation of
the full RSAC on which FRA is primarily acting in this proceeding. As
discussed above, the Working Group reported its findings and
recommendations to the RSAC at its September 10, 2009 meeting. The RSAC
approved the recommended consensus regulatory text proposed by the
Working Group, which accounts for the majority of this NPRM. The
specific regulatory language recommended by the RSAC was amended
slightly for clarity and consistency. FRA independently developed
proposals related to remote control locomotives, alerters, and
locomotive cab temperature, issues that the Working Group discussed,
but ultimately did not reach consensus.

IV. General Overview of Proposed Requirements

Trends in locomotive operation, concern about the safe design of
electronics, technology advances, and experience applying Federal
regulations provide the main impetus for the proposed revisions to
FRA's existing standards related to locomotive safety. An overview of
some of the major areas addressed in this proposal is provided below.

A. Remote Control Locomotives

Remote control devices have been used to operate locomotives at
various locations in the United States for many years, primarily within
yards and certain industrial sites. Railroads in Canada have
extensively used remote control locomotives for more than a decade. FRA
began investigating remote control operations in 1994 and held its
first public hearing on the subject in mid-1990s to gather information
and examine the safety issues relating to this new technology. On July
19, 2000, FRA conducted a technical conference in which interested
parties, including rail unions, remote control systems suppliers, and
railroad representatives, shared their views and described their
experiences with remote control operations.
On February 14, 2001, FRA published a Safety Advisory in which FRA
issued recommended guidelines for conducting remote control locomotive
operations. See 66 FR 10340, Notice of Safety Advisory 2001-01, Docket
No. FRA-2000-7325. By issuing these recommendations, FRA sought to
identify a set of ``best practices'' to guide the rail industry when
implementing this technology. As this was an emerging technology, FRA
believed the approach served the railroad industry by providing
flexibility to both manufacturers designing the equipment and to
railroads using the technology in their operations, while reinforcing
the importance of complying with all existing railroad safety
regulations. All of the major railroads have adopted the
recommendations contained in the advisory, with only slight
modifications to suit their individual operations.
In the Safety Advisory, FRA addressed the application and
enforcement of the Federal regulations to remote control locomotives.
FRA discussed the existing Federal locomotive inspection requirements
and the application of those broad requirements to remote control
locomotive technology. The Safety Advisory explains that: ``although
compliance with this Safety Advisory is voluntary, nothing in this
Safety Advisory is meant to relieve a railroad from compliance with all
existing railroad safety regulations [and] [t]herefore, when procedures
required by regulation are cited in this Safety Advisory, compliance is
mandatory.'' Id. at 10343. For example, the Safety Advisory states that
the remote control locomotive ``system must be included as part of the
calendar day inspection required by section 229.21, since this
equipment becomes an appurtenance to the locomotive.'' Id. at 10344.
Another example of a mandatory requirement mentioned in the Safety
Advisory is that the remote control locomotive ``system components that
interface with the

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mechanical devices of the locomotive, e.g., air pressure monitoring
devices, pressure switches, speed sensors, etc., should be inspected
and calibrated as often as necessary, but not less than the
locomotive's periodic (92-day) inspection.'' Id.; see also 49 CFR
229.23. Thus, the Safety Advisory made clear that the existing Federal
regulations require inspection of the remote control locomotive
equipment.
The Safety Advisory also addressed the application of various
requirements related to the operators of remote control locomotives.
The Safety Advisory states that ``each person operating an RCL [remote
control locomotive] must be certified and qualified in accordance with
part 240 [FRA's locomotive engineer rule] if conventional operation of
a locomotive under the same circumstances would require certification
under that regulation.'' Id. at 10344. In 2006, FRA codified additional
requirements to address specific operational issues such as situational
awareness. See 71 FR 60372 (2006).
During several productive meetings, the Working Group identified
many areas of agreement regarding the regulation of remote control
locomotive equipment. On issues that produced disagreement, FRA
gathered useful information. Informed by the Working Group discussions,
this proposal would codify the industry's best practices related to the
use and operation of remote control locomotives.

B. Electronic Record-Keeping

The development and improved capability of electronic record-
keeping systems has led to the potential for safe electronic
maintenance of records required by part 229. Since April 3, 2002, FRA
has granted a series of waivers permitting electronic record-keeping
with certain conditions intended to ensure the safety, security and
accessibility of such systems. See FRA-2001-11014. Based on the
information gathered under the experiences of utilizing the electronic
records permitted under these existing waivers, the Working Group
discussed, and agreed to, generally applicable standards for electronic
record-keeping systems.

C. Brake Maintenance

Advances in technology have increased the longevity of locomotive
brake system components. In conjunction with several railroads and the
AAR, FRA has monitored the performance of new brake systems since the
Locomotive Safety Standards regulation was first published in 1980. See
45 FR 21092. The proposed revisions to locomotive air brake maintenance
are based on this extensive history of study and testing. Over the last
several decades, FRA has granted several conditional waivers extending
the air brake cleaning, repair, and test requirements of Sec. Sec.
229.27 and 229.29. These extensions were designed to accommodate
testing of the reliability of electronic brake systems and other brake
system components, with the intent of moving toward performance based
test criterion with components being replaced or repaired based upon
their reliability.
In 1981, FRA granted a test waiver (H-80-7) to eight railroads,
permitting them to extend the annual and biennial testing requirements
contained in Sec. Sec. 229.27 and 229.29, in order to conduct a study
of the safe service life and reliability of the locomotive brake
components. On January 29, 1985, FRA expanded the waiver to permit all
railroads to inspect the 26-L type brake equipment on a triennial
basis. In the 1990's, the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CP) and the
Canadian National Railroad (CN) petitioned the FRA to allow them to
operate locomotives into the United States that received periodic
attention every four years. The requests were based on a decision by
Transport Canada to institute a four-year inspection program following
a thorough test program in Canada. In November 2000, FRA granted
conditional waivers to both the CN and CP, extending the testing
interval to four years for Canadian-based locomotives equipped with 26-
L type brake systems and air dryers. The waiver also requires all air
brake filtering devices to be changed annually and the air compressor
to be overhauled not less than every six years. In 2005, this waiver
was extended industry-wide. See FRA-2005-21325.
In 2009, AAR petitioned for a waiver that would permit four year
testing and maintenance intervals for locomotives that are equipped
with 26-L type brake equipment and not equipped with air dryers. The
petition assumed that the testing and maintenance intervals that are
appropriate for locomotives equipped with air dryers are also
appropriate for locomotives without air dryers. FRA denied the request,
but granted a limited test program to determine whether the addition of
operative air dryers on a locomotive merits different maintenance and
testing requirements. FRA recognizes that the results of the test plan
may indicate that locomotives that are not equipped with air dryers
merit the same treatment as locomotives that operate without air
dryers. FRA solicits comments on this issue.
FRA also requests comments on what should constitute an operative
air dryer and how a locomotive with an inoperative air dryer should be
properly handled. FRA believes that these issues are essential to
enforcement of a requirement that includes the use of operative air
dryers. The proposed rule text does not address this issue. It is not
clear how many days an air dryer would need to stop performing to allow
contaminants in the brake line to adversely affect the brake valves to
the extent that the air dryer is no longer considered operative. It is
also unclear how many days an air dryer could be inoperative before it
needs to be repaired in order to preserve the four year testing and
maintenance schedule. FRA believes that one reasonable approach would
be to permit a locomotive with an inoperative air dryer to run to the
next periodic inspection to be repaired.
The New York Air Brake Corporation (NYAB) sought by waiver, and was
granted, an extension of the cleaning, repairing, and testing
requirements for pneumatic components of the CCBI and CCBII brake
systems (FRA-2000-7367, formerly H-95-3), and then modification of that
waiver to include its new CCB-26 electronic airbrake system. The
initial waiver, which was first granted on September 13, 1996, extended
the interval for cleaning, repairing, and testing pneumatic components
of the NYAB Computer Controlled Brake (CCB, now referred to as CCB-I)
locomotive air brake system under 49 CFR 229.27(a)(2) and 49 CFR
229.29(a) from 736 days to five years. The waiver was modified to
include NYAB's CCB-II electronic air brake system on August 20, 1998.
To confirm that the extended brake maintenance interval did not
have a negative effect on safety, FRA required quarterly reports
listing air brake failures, both pneumatic and electrical, of all
locomotives operating under the waiver including: Locomotive reporting
marks; and the cause and resolution of the problem. All verified
failures were required to be reported to FRA prior to disassembly, so
that NYAB, the railroad, and FRA could jointly witness the disassembly
of the failed component to determine the cause. The last quarterly
submission to FRA listed 1,889 CCBI and 1,806 CCBII equipped
locomotives in the United States, all of which were operating at high
levels of reliability and demonstrated safety. All past tests and
teardown inspections confirm the safety and reliability of the five
year interval.

[[Page 2204]]

Based on successful performance of the two NYAB electronic air
brake systems under the conditions of the 1996 and 1998 waivers, the
waiver was extended for another five years on September 10, 2001, and
the conditions of the waiver were modified on September 22, 2003. NYAB
described the new CCB-26 electronic air brake system as an adaptation
of the CCB-II system designed to be used on locomotives without
integrated cab electronics. It used many of the same sub-assemblies of
pneumatic valves, electronic controls and software (referred to as line
replaceable units or LRUs) as the CCB-II. Some changes were made to
simplify the system while maintaining or increasing the level of
safety. For example, the penalty brake interface was changed to mimic
the 26L system interface, allowing for a fully pneumatic penalty brake
application. Also, the brake cylinder pilot pressure development has
been simplified from an electronic control to a fully pneumatic version
based on proven components.
Much of the software and diagnostic logic which detects critical
failures and takes appropriate action to effect a safe stop has been
carried over from CCB-II. Overall, NYAB characterized the CCB-26 as
being more similar to CCB-II than CCB-II is to CCB-I. As a final check
on the performance of the CCB-26 system, it was included in the
existing NYAB failure monitoring and recording systems. For the reasons
above, FRA extended the waiver of compliance with brake maintenance
requirements to locomotives equipped with CCB-26 brake systems.
Similarly, WABCO Locomotive Products (WABCO), a Wabtec company,
sought and was granted an extension of the cleaning, repairing, and
testing requirements for pneumatic components of the EPIC brake systems
(FRA-2002-13397, formerly H-92-3), and then modification of that waiver
to include its new FastBrake line of electronic airbrake systems. The
initial waiver conditionally extended to five years the clean, repair
and test intervals for certain pneumatic air brake components contained
in Sec. Sec. 229.27(a)(2) and 229.29(a) for WABCO's EPIC electronic
air brake equipment. WABCO complied with all of the conditions of the
waiver. Specifically, WABCO provided regular reports to FRA including
summaries of locomotives equipped with EPIC brake systems and all
pneumatic and electronic failures. FRA participated in two joint
teardown inspections of EPIC equipment after five years of service in
June 2000 and May 2002. After five years of service, the EPIC brake
systems were found to function normally. No faults were found during
locomotive tests, and the teardown revealed that the parts were clean
and in working condition.
In support of its proposal to extend brake maintenance for
FastBrake brake systems, WABCO stated that virtually all of the core
pneumatic technology that has been service proven in EPIC from the time
of its introduction and documented as such under the provisions of the
above waiver and were transferred into FastBrake with little or no
change. They asserted that a further reduction of pneumatic logic
devices had been made possible by the substitution of compute based
logic. WABCO also provided a discussion of the similarities between the
EPIC and FastBrake systems as well as the differences, which are
primarily in the area of electronics rather than pneumatics. In
conclusion, WABCO stated that the waiver could be amended without
compromising safety. For the reasons above, FRA granted the waiver
petition.
Over time, several brake systems have been brought into a
performance based standard. FRA, along with railroads and brake valve
manufacturers, has participated in a series of brake valve evaluations.
Each evaluation was performed after extended use of a particular brake
valve system to determine whether it can perform safely when used
beyond the number of days currently permitted by part 229. The Working
Group agreed with the evidence of success and the overall approach
taken by FRA. As a result, the Working Group reached consensus on the
proposed brake maintenance standards.

D. Brakes, General

In December of 1999, a MP&E Technical Resolution Committee (TRC),
consisting of FRA and industry experts, met in Kansas City to consider
the proper application of the phrase ``operate as intended'' contained
in Sec. 229.46 when applied to trailing, non-controlling locomotives.
Extensive discussion failed to reach consensus on this issue, but
revealed valuable insight into the technical underpinnings and
operational realities surrounding the issue. The Working Group revived
this issue, and after lengthy discussion, reached consensus.
Generally, even if a locomotive has a defective brake valve that
prevents it from functioning as a lead locomotive, its brakes will
still properly apply and release when it is placed and operated as a
trailing locomotive. This situation can apply on either a pneumatic 26-
L application or on the electronic versions of the locomotive brake.
The electronic brake often will have the breaker turned off, thus
making the brake inoperative unless it is being controlled by another
locomotive.
Based on reading the plain language of the existing regulation it
is not clear under what conditions a trailing, non-controlling
locomotive operates as intended. The existing regulation provides that
``the carrier shall know before each trip that the locomotive brakes
and devices for regulating all pressures, including but not limited to
the automatic and independent brake valves, operate as intended * * *''
See 49 CFR 229.46. One could reasonably argue that a trailing non-
controlling locomotive is operating as intended when the brakes are
able to apply and release in response to a command from a controlling
locomotive, because the locomotive is not intended to control the
brakes when it is used in the trailing position. It could also be
argued that the trailing, non-controlling locomotive's automatic and
independent brake valves must be able to control the brakes whenever it
is called on to do so. Under this reading, a trailing, non-controlling
locomotive does not operate as intended when it is not able to control
the brakes.
At the TRC meeting, the representatives from NYAB Corporation, a
brake manufacturer, asserted that a problem with a faulty automatic or
independent brake valve will not create an unsafe condition when the
locomotive is operating in the trail position, provided the locomotive
consist has a successful brake test (application and release) from the
lead unit. The reason offered was that in order for a locomotive to
operate in the trailing position, the automatic and independent brake
valves must be cut-out. FRA agrees, and currently applies this
rationale in regards to performing a calendar day inspection. The
calendar day inspection does not require that the operation of the
automatic and independent brake controls be verified on trailing
locomotives. The Working Group agreed, and recommended adding a tagging
requirement to prevent a trailing, non-controlling locomotive with
defective independent or automatic brakes from being used as a
controlling locomotive.

E. Locomotive Cab Temperature

In 1998, FRA led an RSAC Working Group to address various cab
working condition issues. To aid the Working Group discussions, FRA
conducted a study to determine the average temperature in each type of
locomotive cab commonly used at the time. The

[[Page 2205]]

study concluded that at the location where the engineer operates the
locomotive, each locomotive maintained an average temperature of at
least 60 degrees. The window and door gaskets were maintained in proper
condition on the locomotives that were studied. In 1998, FRA believed
it was impractical to address the minimum temperature issue by
regulation, especially given that, the existing industry practice was
appropriate and revision of the regulation would have required
considerable resources. Now that the locomotive safety standards are in
the process of being revised, FRA proposes to incorporate existing
industry practice into the regulation in an effort to maintain the
current conditions. For review, the 1998 study has been included in the
public docket related to this proceeding.
In addition to proposing an increase in the minimum cab temperature
from 50 [deg]F to 60 [deg]F, FRA believes that establishing a maximum
cab temperature limit would result in improved locomotive crew
performance, which in turn would increase railroad safety. Current
literature regarding the effect of low temperature on human performance
indicates that performance decreases when the temperature decreases
below 60 [deg]F. Similarly, the literature regarding the effect of high
temperature and humidity indicates that performance decreases when
temperatures increase above 80[deg] F, and that performance decreases
to an even greater extent when the temperature increases above 90
[deg]F. Ergonomics, 2002 vol. 45, no. 10, 682-698.
Locomotive crew performance is directly linked to railroad safety
through the safe operation of trains. Locomotive engineers are
responsible for operating trains in a safe and efficient manner. This
requires the performance of cognitive tasks including the mathematical
information processing required for train handling, constant vigilance,
and accurate perception of the train and outside environment.
Conductors are responsible for maintaining accurate train consists,
including the contents and position of hazardous materials cars, for
confirming the aspects and indications of signals, and for ensuring
compliance with written orders and instructions. A decrease in
performance of any of these tasks that can be anticipated from relevant
scientific findings should be avoided where amelioration can be
applied.
In the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) literature, stressors are
considered to be important factors that can affect human performance
and produce errors. Such stressors are, in fact, labeled performance-
shaping factors (PSFs) and include external (or environmental) factors
such as temperature. In general, if one has an estimate of the human
error probability (HEP) associated with some generic or specific task,
the PSFs that exist are used to modulate the magnitude of that error.
For example, an estimate of HEP associated with simple calculations is
0.04, with a lower bound of 0.02 and an upper bound of 0.11. If stress
is introduced in a situation in which there is decision-making and
multi-tasking (all of which are typical of locomotive engineer work),
human factor experts recommend that HEP be increased five-fold for
skilled workers and ten-fold for novice workers. Consequently, mean HEP
would be estimated at 0.2 for skilled workers and at 0.4 for novices.
This same logic can be applied to estimate accident reduction. Accident
reduction estimates can be obtained under the assumption that accidents
are proportional to the task performance decrements that accrue due to
temperature stress. If a proportion of the task performance decrements
is eliminated, then accidents should also be proportionately decreased.
For example, in 1999, 16 of the human factors train accidents reported
to the FRA occurred when the ambient temperatures were 90 [deg]F or
above. Conservatively assuming that at least eight (50 percent) of the
locomotive cabs did not have operational air conditioning or other
measures in place to reduce in cab temperatures below the ambient
temperature and applying the overall task decrement of 0.148 as
described in the meta-analysis an estimate may be made that a 65/86
temperature rule would prevent more than one in eight of the 1999 human
factors train accidents that occurred when ambient and in cab
temperatures were 90 [deg]F or above. The results of applying task
decrements to human factors train accidents in specific temperature
ranges, however, can be considered conservative because the accidents
considered only include accidents for which the primary cause was
identified as ``Human Factors.'' Experts on accident causation indicate
that accidents very rarely have a single cause. Rather, there are
usually multiple factors that together contribute to the generation of
an accident.
In many occupational settings it is desirable to minimize the
health and safety effects of temperature extremes. Depending upon the
workplace, engineering controls may be employed as well as the
management of employee exposure to excess cold or heat using such
methods as work-rest regimens. Because of the unique nature of the
railroad operating environment, the locomotive cab can be viewed as a
captive workplace where the continuous work of the locomotive crew
takes place in a relatively small space. For this reason, in an
excessively hot cab, a locomotive crew member may have no escape from
extreme temperatures, since they cannot be expected to readily
disembark the train and rest in a cooler environment as part of a work-
rest regimen without prior planning by the railroad. As such, FRA
expects reliance upon engineering controls to limit temperature
extremes. When FRA considered controls for cold and hot temperature cab
environments, FRA learned that there is a range of engineering controls
available that can be employed. Some of these controls are presently
employed to affect the cab temperature environment. Controls include
isolation from heat sources such as the prime mover; reduced emissivity
of hot surfaces; insulation from hot or cold ambient environments;
radiation shielding including reflective shields, absorptive shielding,
transparent shielding, and flexible shielding; localized workstation
heating or cooling; general and spot (fan) ventilation; evaporative
cooling; chilled coil cooling systems.
As noted above, in 1998, FRA led an RSAC Working Group to address
various cab working condition issues. To aid the Working Group
discussions, FRA conducted a winter time study to determine the average
low temperature in each type of locomotive cab commonly used at the
time. The study concluded that at the location where the engineer
operates the locomotive, each locomotive maintained an average
temperature of at least 60 [deg]F. Ergonomics, 2002 vol. 45, no. 10,
682-698. The window and door gaskets were maintained in proper
condition on the locomotives that were studied. In 1998, FRA believed
it was impractical to address the minimum temperature issue by
regulation, especially given that, the existing industry practice was
appropriate and revision of the regulation would have required
considerable resources. Now that the locomotive safety standards are in
the process of being revised, FRA proposes to incorporate existing
industry practice into the regulation in an effort to maintain the
current minimum cab temperature conditions.
Based on the preceding discussion and its review of existing
literature on the subject, FRA believe it is appropriate to consider
not only

[[Page 2206]]

limiting minimum locomotive cab temperature but also limiting maximum
locomotive cab temperature. FRA believes that an appropriate maximum
temperature level for a locomotive cab is a wet bulb temperature (WBT)
somewhere between 80[deg] and 90 [deg]F. FRA recognizes that the
mechanical capabilities of cooling systems on both existing and new
locomotives are directly affected by the outside ambient temperature.
Thus, FRA expects that the maximum cab temperature limit may need to be
flexible in extreme weather conditions due to the limited ability of
existing cooling systems to produce a temperature a vast number of
degrees cooler than the external ambient temperature. FRA seeks comment
and information from interested parties regarding current practices
within the industry with regard to maintaining a maximum locomotive cab
temperature.
There are a number of factors and issues that must be considered
when imposing a maximum locomotive cab temperature. In an effort to
develop safe and cost-effective requirements related to establishing a
maximum locomotive cab temperature limit FRA seeks comments from
interested parties on the following issues:
1. To what locomotives should the maximum cab temperature limits apply?
FRA does not anticipate applying the maximum cab temperature limit
to all locomotives. Existing locomotives that are not equipped with air
conditioners would not be required to add air conditioning units. A
significant portion of the industry's existing locomotive fleet is
currently equipped with air conditioners. FRA believes that air
conditioning units should remain on locomotives that are currently so
equipped and would expect the maximum cab temperature limit to apply to
such units. FRA also expects that the maximum temperature limit would
be applicable to new locomotives, and remanufactured locomotives as
defined in Sec. 229.5. FRA believes that one of the reasons that
virtually all of these types of locomotives are constructed with air
conditioning units in order to ensure the proper operation of the on-
board electronic equipment. Thus, the locomotives are already equipped
with the facilities to maintain a cab temperature below the maximum
temperatures being contemplated. FRA also recognizes that at some
locations the ambient temperature may seldom or never rise above 90
[deg]F. Thus, FRA is considering an approach that might provide an
exception for these types of locations from the maximum cab temperature
limits. With the above discussion in mind, FRA seeks information and
comments from interested parties on the following:
What percentage of locomotives in the existing fleet are
equipped with air conditioning units?
What percentages of newly constructed or remanufactured
locomotives are equipped with air conditioning units?
What potential requirements could apply to locomotives
that spend the majority of their time in locations that rarely rise
above 90 [deg]F, but also operate in locations where the temperature
does rise above 90 [deg]F?
How could these locations be properly excluded from the
maximum temperature requirements?
Are there technologies other than air conditioning units
that could be utilized in these types of locations?
2. What are the capabilities of existing locomotive cab air
conditioning units?
Although FRA has not conducted tests to determine the effectiveness
of air conditioning systems, FRA's knowledge of HVAC capabilities and
experience riding locomotives with operative air conditioning units
indicates that such systems can hold cab temperatures below 90 [deg]F
under expected service conditions when properly maintained, as is the
case with rail passenger coaches, passenger MU locomotives, motorized
vehicles on the highway, and other means of conveyance. However, FRA
recognizes that existing air conditioners have technical limitations,
and that those limitations need to be considered when developing a
maximum cab temperature requirement. FRA seeks comment and information
on the following:
At what rate can air conditioning units currently being
used within the industry cool the interior of a locomotive cab?
What external conditions or factors affect an air
conditioning unit's ability to reduce the interior locomotive cab
temperature?
Would it be possible to modify an existing air
conditioning unit or interior of the locomotive cab to address the
conditions noted above?
3. What is the appropriate method for measuring maximum locomotive cab
temperature?
An effective and reliable method for measuring the maximum
locomotive cab temperature will need to be included in the final rule
in order to make any maximum temperature requirement enforceable.
Railroad management, train crews, and FRA will need to be able to
accurately measure the maximum cab temperature when a locomotive is in
use. The existing and proposed minimum locomotive cab temperature
requirement provides that the temperature be measured six inches above
each seat in the cab. FRA believes that a similar location for
measuring the maximum temperature would appear to be appropriate. FRA
also recognizes that any cooling system will require a sufficient
amount of time to adequately reduce the interior temperature of a
locomotive cab. Thus, the ability to test or measure the temperature
may not occur until a locomotive is already in use. In consideration of
the above, FRA seeks comment and information from interested parties on
the following:
How do railroads currently measure or monitor locomotive
cab temperatures to comply with the existing minimum temperature
requirements?
Do railroads measure cab temperature for other purposes?
If so, what are those purposes?
Could the same methods be used to monitor a maximum
temperature requirement?
Are there locations where testing or monitoring of air
conditioning units would be extremely burdensome or impossible?
The existing minimum cab temperature requirement is based
on measurement of the temperature six inches above each seat in the
cab. Would that also be an appropriate location in the cab to measure
temperature to determine compliance with a maximum temperature
requirement?
Is there an appropriate frequency at which air
conditioning units should be tested?
4. How should locomotive air conditioning units be maintained and
repaired when found defective or inoperative?
In order to ensure that locomotives to which the maximum cab
temperature limits would apply are generally capable of compliance, the
final rule would need to contain basic inspection, maintenance, and
repair provisions related to on-board cooling systems. FRA recognizes
that these maintenance and repair schedules and requirements would be
most applicable during those annual periods where extreme hot weather
is prevalent across most of the continental United States. Thus, FRA
expects to concentrate such provisions during these vital time periods.
Similarly, FRA recognizes that appropriate provisions related to the
handling and use of a locomotive with an inoperative cooling system
would

[[Page 2207]]

need to be provided. Under the existing part 229 movement for repair
provisions, if a locomotive were required to meet a maximum cab
temperature limit and was found unable to do so, then the locomotive
could only be moved to the next forward location or to its next
calendar day inspection where necessary repairs to the locomotive's
cooling system could be performed. FRA realizes such a stringent
requirement might unduly hinder a railroad's ability to operate trains
or have sufficient locomotive power in certain locations. With the
foregoing discussion in mind, FRA seeks comments from interested
parties on the following:
How frequently do railroads currently inspect locomotive
air conditioning units for proper operation?
What would an appropriate interval for testing and
maintaining locomotive equipped with air conditioning units?
What movement or use restrictions should be applied to a
locomotive equipped with an air conditioning unit when discovered with
a cab temperature that exceeds the maximum limit?
What maintenance or repair requirements would be
appropriate if a lead/occupied locomotive has an air conditioning unit
fail en route, when the ambient temperature exceeds a regulatory
requirement?
What maintenance or repair requirements would be
appropriate if an air conditioning unit in a lead or occupied
locomotive is found to be inoperative or operating insufficiently at
pre-departure (after the train has been made up and the air-brake test
has been performed)?
Should consistent management be a factor for determining
when an inoperative air conditioning unit will properly be repaired or
switched out? Why or why not?
5. What are the potential costs of complying with a maximum locomotive
cab temperature limit as described in the preceding discussions?
The cost implications of this proposal will depend on various
factors, including temperature requirements, maintenance requirements,
repair procedures, and the treatment of existing locomotives already
equipped with air conditioning units. The regulatory burden may result
from equipping new and remanufactured locomotives with air conditioning
units. However, because most, if not all, new locomotives are currently
purchased with air conditioning units already installed, the burden
would likely come from the testing and maintenance, including repair,
of air conditioning units.
FRA estimates that the railroad industry purchases approximately
600-700 new locomotives a year. Most of the new locomotives are
purchased by Class I freight railroads. Other railroads such as Alaska
Railroad, Amtrak, and some commuter railroads also purchase new
locomotives. Generally, FRA does not anticipate that Class III
railroads will purchase new locomotives, and thereby, be affected by
this proposal in the immediate or near future. FRA is considering
requiring air conditioning units on only new or remanufactured
locomotives. FRA believes that most, if not all, new and remanufactured
locomotives are manufactured with air conditioning units, and most
locomotives that receive life extending modifications are also likely
equipped. FRA requests information regarding the specifications for air
conditioning units currently installed on new, remanufactured, and
overhauled locomotives. Specifically, FRA seeks information regarding
temperature and humidity capabilities. FRA also seeks information
regarding the tolerances of the units in the locomotive running
environment, which may include over 12 hours of continuous operation at
high temperature and humidity levels. To the extent that new
locomotives are already equipped with air conditioning units that can
function well in the environment in which they operate, there would be
little or no additional regulatory cost associated with the basic
requirement to equip new locomotives with such units.
Requirements for periodic testing of air conditioning units could
also add regulatory cost. FRA believes that most railroads are
prudently testing the air conditioning units on their locomotives
annually or periodically at shorter intervals. These tests are most
likely conducted when the locomotive is already out of service for a 92
day inspection. FRA requests information on the frequency of testing
and the cost associated with conducting the tests. Requirements for
repairing air conditioning units could also add regulatory cost. In
order to develop a cost analysis of the maintenance and repairs that
would be needed to properly utilize the AC units, FRA requests
information regarding the frequency of air conditioning failures and
the nature of common defects as well as the costs associated with
making the repairs. FRA also requests information regarding reasonable
ways to address air conditioning units that are discovered defective
outside of the maintenance window. FRA estimates that an air
conditioning unit has a life-cycle of 8 and 10 years. The cost for
testing and repairing air conditioning units on locomotives is most
likely the highest cost element of this proposal. However, the
potential regulatory cost for such a proposal would depend on the
actual requirement that is promulgated. The cost would increase if a
lead locomotive is required to be switched out after the initial air-
brake test, or if the AC unit on the lead locomotive failed en route.
FRA seeks information and comments on the following issues related
to costs:
What are the costs associated with increased maintenance
and modifications to locomotive equipped with air conditioning units to
ensure they operate as intended?
What would be the expected costs to equip new and
remanufactured locomotives with air conditioners that are capable of
satisfying the type of maximum temperature limit discussed above?
How many new locomotives are currently equipped with air
conditioning units?
What operational burdens would be placed on the industry
should a maximum cab temperature limit be included in the final rule?

F. Headlights

The proposed revisions to the headlight provisions would
incorporate waiver FRA 2005-23107 into part 229. This would permit a
locomotive with one failed 350-watt incandescent lamp to operate in the
lead until the next daily inspection, if the auxiliary lights remain
continuously illuminated. Currently, a headlight with only one
functioning 200-watt lamp is not defective and does not affect the
permissible movement of a locomotive. However, a locomotive with only
one functioning 350-watt lamp in the headlight can be moved only
pursuant to section 229.9. The proposed treatment of locomotives with a
failed 350-watt lamp would allow flexibility, and be consistent with
the current treatment of 200-watt lamps.
Testing showed that production tolerances for the 350-watt
incandescent lamp cause most individual lamps to fall below the 200,000
candela requirement at the center of the beam. As such, two working
350-watt lamps are required to ensure 200,000 candela at the center of
the beam. Testing also showed that the 350-watt incandescent lamp
produced well over 100,000 candela at the center of the beam, and its
high power and the position of the filament within the reflector causes
the lamp to be brighter than the 200-watt

[[Page 2208]]

incandescent lamp at all angles greater than approximately 2.5 degrees
off the centerline. In other words, the only area in which the 350-watt
lamp produces insufficient illumination is within 2.5 degrees of the
centerline. The proposed requirement would compensate for the reduced
amount of illumination by requiring the auxiliary lights to be aimed
parallel to the centerline of the locomotive and illuminate
continuously.
Significantly, in 1980, when FRA promulgated the 200,000 candela
requirement it could not take into consideration the light produced by
auxiliary lights, because they were not required and not often used.
Today, there is light in front of a locomotive produced by both the
headlight and the auxiliary lights. When discussing AAR's request that
the final rule permit locomotives with a nonfunctioning 350-watt lamp
to operate without restriction, FRA stated that AAR's comments ``may
have merit when considering locomotives with auxiliary lights aimed
parallel to the centerline of the locomotive.'' See 69 FR 12533. While
the auxiliary lights on some locomotives are aimed parallel to the
centerline, on many others the auxiliary lights are aimed so that their
light will cross 400 feet in front of the locomotive. The regulations
only require auxiliary lights to be aimed within 15 feet of the
centerline. FRA is not aware of a basis for assuming that the light
from two auxiliary lights complying with the regulations in any fashion
would be insufficient, when combined with a 350-watt headlight lamp.

G. Alerters

Alerters are a common safety device intended to verify that the
locomotive engineer remains capable and vigilant to accomplish the
tasks that he or she must perform. An alerter will initiate a penalty
brake application to stop the train if it does not receive the proper
response from the engineer. As an appurtenance to the locomotive, an
alerter must operate as intended when present on a locomotive. Section
20701 of Title 49 of the United States Code prohibits the use of a
locomotive unless the entire locomotive and its appurtenances are in
proper condition and safe to operate in the service to which they are
placed. Under this authority, FRA has issued many violations against
railroads for operating locomotives equipped with a non-functioning
alerter.
Alerters are currently required on passenger locomotives by Sec.
238.237 (67 FR 19991 (2002)), and are present on most freight
locomotives. A long-standing industry standard currently contains more
stringent requirements than provisions being proposed in this document.
See AAR Standard S-5513, ``Locomotive Alerter Requirements,'' (November
26, 2007).
After several productive meetings, the Working Group reached
partial consensus on requirements related to the regulation of
alerters. For those areas where agreement could not be reached, FRA has
fully considered the information and views of the Working Group members
in developing the proposed requirements related to locomotive alerters.
The proposed provisions also take into consideration recommendations
made by the NTSB.
On July 10, 2005, at about 4:15 a.m., two Canadian National (CN)
freight trains collided head-on in Anding, Mississippi. The collision
occurred on the CN Yazoo Subdivision, where the trains were being
operated under a centralized traffic control signal system on single
track. Signal data indicated that the northbound train, IC 1013 North,
continued past a stop (red) signal at North Anding and collided with
the southbound train, IC 1023 South, about \1/4\ mile beyond the
signal. The collision resulted in the derailment of six locomotives and
17 cars. Approximately 15,000 gallons of diesel fuel were released from
the locomotives and resulted in a fire that burned for roughly 15
hours. Two crewmembers were on each train; all four were killed. As a
precaution, about 100 Anding residents were evacuated; fortunately,
they did not report any injuries. Property damages exceeded $9.5
million and clearing and environmental cleanup costs totaled
approximately $616,800.
The NTSB has issued a series of safety recommendations that would
require freight locomotives to be equipped with an alerter. On April
25, 2007, the NTSB determined that a contributing cause of the head-on
collision in Anding, Mississippi was the lack of an alerter on the lead
locomotive, which if present, could have prompted the crew to be more
attentive to their operation of the train. See Recommendation R-07-1.
That recommendation provides as follows: ``[r]equire railroads to
ensure that the lead locomotives used to operate trains on tracks not
equipped with a positive train control system are equipped with an
alerter.''
Another NTSB recommendation relating to locomotive alerters was
issued as a result of an investigation into the collision of two
Norfolk Southern Railway freight trains at Sugar Valley, Georgia, on
August 9, 1990. In that incident, the crew of one of the trains failed
to stop at a signal. The NTSB concluded that the engineer of that train
was probably experiencing a micro-sleep or was distracted. Based on
testing, it was determined that as the train approached the stop
signal, the alerter would have initiated an alarm cycle. The NTSB
concluded that the engineer ``could have cancelled the alerter system
while he was asleep by a simple reflex action that he performed without
conscious thought.'' As a result of the investigation, the NTSB made
the following recommendation FRA: ``[i]n conjunction with the study of
fatigue of train crewmembers, explore the parameters of an optimum
alerter system for locomotives. See NTSB Recommendation R-91-26.
Typically, alerter alarms occur more frequently as train speed
increases. Unlike the Sugar Valley, Georgia, accident in which the
train had slowed and entered a siding before overrunning a signal, the
northbound train in the Anding, Mississippi, remained on the main track
at higher speeds. Had an alerter been installed, there was a four
minute time period after passing the approach signal during which the
alerter would have activated four to five times. It seems unlikely that
the engineer could have reset the alerter multiple times by reflex
action without any increase in his awareness. Therefore, the NTSB
determined that an alerter likely would have detected the lack of
activity by the engineer and sounded an alarm that could have alerted
one or both crewmembers. Had the crew been incapacitated or not
responded to the alarm, the alerter would have automatically applied
the brakes and brought the train to a stop. The NTSB concluded that had
an alerter been installed on the lead locomotive of the northbound
train, it may have prevented the collision.
The NTSB also closely examined the use of locomotive alerters when
investigating the sideswipe collision between two Union Pacific
Railroad (UP) freight trains in Delia, Kansas, on July 2, 1997. In that
accident, a train entered a siding but did not stop at the other end,
and it collided with a passing train on the main track. The NTSB
concluded that ``had the striking locomotive been equipped with an
alerter, it may have helped the engineer stay awake while his train
traveled through the siding.'' As a result of its investigation, the
NTSB made the following recommendation to the FRA: ``[r]evise the
Federal regulations to require that all locomotives operating on lines
that do not have a positive train separation system be equipped with a
cognitive alerter system that cannot be

[[Page 2209]]

reset by reflex action.'' See NTSB Recommendation R-99-53.
FRA believes that the proposed provisions related to alerters
incorporate existing railroad practices and locomotive design and
address each of the NTSB recommendations discussed above.

F. Locomotive Electronics

After extensive discussion, the Working Group reached consensus on
the proposed requirements related to locomotive electronic systems.
Advances in electronics and software technology have resulted in
changes to the implementation of locomotive control systems. Technology
changes have allowed the introduction of new functional capabilities as
well as the integration of different functions in ways that advance the
building, operation, and maintenance of locomotive control systems. FRA
encourages the use of these advanced technologies to improve safe,
efficient, and economical operations. However, the increased
complexities and interactions associated with these technologies
increase the potential for unintentional and unplanned consequences,
which could adversely affect the safety of rail operations.
The proposed regulation would prescribe safety standards for
safety-critical electronic locomotive control systems, subsystems, and
components including requirements to ensure that the development,
installation, implementation, inspection, testing, operation,
maintenance, repair, and modification of those products will achieve
and maintain an acceptable level of safety. This proposal would also
prescribe standards to ensure that personnel working with safety-
critical products receive appropriate training. Of course, each
railroad would be able to prescribe additional or more stringent rules,
and other special instructions, provided they are consistent with the
proposed standards.
FRA also recognizes that advances in technology may further
eliminate the traditional distinctions between locomotive control and
train control functionalities. Indeed, technology advances may provide
for opportunities for increased or improved functionalities in train
control systems that run concurrent with locomotive control. Train
control and locomotive control, however, remain two fundamentally
different operations with different objectives. FRA does not want to
restrict the adoption of new locomotive control functions and
technologies by establishing regulations for locomotive control systems
intended to address safety issues associated with train control.

G. Periodic Locomotive Inspection

The Locomotive Safety Standards Working Group was unable to reach
consensus on whether current locomotive inspection intervals and
procedures are appropriate to current conditions. Recently, on June 22,
2009, FRA granted the Burlington Northern Santa Fe's (BNSF) request for
waiver from compliance with the periodic locomotive inspection
requirements. See Docket FRA-2008-0157. BNSF stated in their request
that each of the subject locomotives are equipped with new self-
diagnostic technology and advanced computer control, and that the
locomotives were designed by the manufacturer to be maintained at a six
month interval.
In the waiver petition, BNSF requested that the required 92-day
periodic inspection be performed at 184 day intervals on subject
locomotives, if qualified mechanical forces perform at least one of the
required daily inspections every 31 days and FRA non-complying
conditions that are discovered en-route or during any daily inspection
are moved to a mechanical facility capable of making required repairs.
This approach to conducting inspections based on current conditions may
be suitable to other similarly situated railroads. FRA seeks comment on
this issue.

H. Rear End Markers

In 2003, the U.S. DOT's Office of Governmental Affairs received a
letter from Senator Feinstein on behalf of her constituent, Mr. David
Creed. Mr. Creed suggested a revision to FRA's rear end marker
regulation, which is found in part 221. Specifically, Mr. Creed
suggested that Federal regulations should require trains with
distributive power on the rear to have a red marker, because a red
marker would make for a safer operating environment by giving a rail
worker a better indication of whether he or she is looking at the rear
or front end of the train. Mr. Creed made reference to a recent
fatality involving a BNSF conductor who jumped from his train because
he observed a headlight that he mistakenly believed was a train on the
same track, directly ahead of his train. As FRA is currently reviewing
its existing requirements for locomotive safety standards, FRA requests
comments on this rear end marker issue.

I. Locomotive Horn

FRA solicits comments regarding methods currently being used by
railroads to test locomotive horns as required by Sec. 229.129. More
than one method of testing will satisfy the current testing
requirements. FRA is considering whether certain current methods of
testing should be preferred, or additional methods should be permitted.

J. Risk Analysis Standardization and Harmonization

FRA has been actively implementing, whenever practical, performance
regulations based on the management of risk. In the process of doing
so, a number of different system safety requirements, each unique to a
particular regulation, have been promulgated. While this approach is
consistent with the widely, and deeply, held conviction that risk
management efforts should be specifically tailored for individual
situations, it has resulted in confusion regarding the applicable
regulatory requirements. This, in turn has defeated one of the primary
objectives of using performance based regulations, reduction in costs
from simplifying regulations.
The problem is not the concept of tailoring, but the lack of
standard terms, basic tools, and techniques. Numerous directives,
standards, regulations, and regulatory guides establish the authority
for system safety engineering requirements in the acquisition,
development, and maintenance of hardware and software-based systems.
The lack of commonality makes extremely difficult the task of training
system safety personnel, evaluating and comparing programs, and
effectively monitoring and controlling system safety efforts for the
railroads, their vendors, and the government. Even though tailoring
will continue to be an important system safety concept, at some point
FRA believes the proliferation of techniques, worksheets, definitions,
formats, and approaches has to end, or at least some common ground has
to be established.
To accomplish this, FRA proposes to harmonize risk management
process requirements across all regulations that have been promulgated
by the agency. This will implement a systematic approach to hardware
and software safety analysis as an integral part of a project's overall
system safety program for protecting the public, the worker, and the
environment. Harmonization enhances compliance and improves the
efficiency of the transportation system by minimizing the regulatory
burden. Harmonization also facilitates interoperability among products
and systems, which benefits all stakeholders. By overcoming
institutional and financial barriers to

[[Page 2210]]

technology harmonization, stakeholders could realize lower life-cycle
costs for the acquisition and maintenance of systems. To this end, FRA
requests comments on appropriate, cost effective, performance based
standards containing precise criteria to be used consistently as rules,
guidelines, or definitions of characteristics, to ensure that
materials, products, processes and services are fit for purpose, and
present an acceptable level of risk that are applicable across all
elements of the railroad industry.

K. MCB Contour 1904 Coupler

FRA believes that the existing requirement related to MCB contour
1904 couplers, contained in Sec. 229.61(a)(1), is out dated. The
existing regulation prohibits the use of a MCB contour 1904 coupler, if
the distance between the guard arm and the knuckle nose is more than 5
\1/8\ inches. FRA understands that the MCB contour 1904 coupler design
has not been used in the railroad industry since the 1930s. Most, if
not all, of the current locomotive fleet are equipped with Type E
couplers. For these couplers, the maximum distance permitted between
the guard arm and the knuckle nose is 5 \5/16\ inches, as identified in
Sec. 229.61(a)(1). FRA seeks comments as to whether any locomotives
are currently being operated with MCB contour 1904 couplers, and
whether the requirement related to MCB contour 1904 couplers should be
removed from the locomotive safety standards.

L. Locomotive Cab Securement

FRA is evaluating securement options for locomotive cab doors. Cab
securement can potentially prevent unauthorized access to the
locomotive cab, and thereby increase train crew safety. However, cab
securement demands a careful and balanced approach because when
emergencies requiring emergency egress or rescue access occur,
securement systems must not hinder rapid and easy egress by train crews
or access by emergency responders without undue delay. FRA is exploring
how to achieve greater safety by properly balancing these concerns.
On June 20, 2010, a CSX Conductor was shot and killed in the cab of
the controlling locomotive of his standing train in New Orleans, during
an attempted robbery. The Locomotive Engineer assigned to that train
was also wounded by gunfire during the incident. This incident was
particularly tragic, because it resulted in a fatality. By letter dated
September 22, 2010, in response to this incident, the BLET requested
that FRA require the use of door locks on locomotive cab doors. Under
current industry practice, many locomotive cab doors are not locked.
According to BLET's letter, requiring the use of door locks would
impede unauthorized access to the locomotive cab and reduce the risk of
violence to the train crew when confronted by a potential intruder. FRA
solicits comments regarding the impact that a locked door would have on
train crew safety. More specifically, FRA poses the following questions
regarding existing locomotive doors:
Can a door lock be broken when struck by a heavy, solid
object like a baseball bat, sledge hammer, or crowbar?
Can a door lock be broken by gunfire?
If a keyed lock is used, is it possible that the lock can
be picked by an unauthorized person?
If a keyed lock is used, is it possible for the key to be
lost, stolen, or duplicated without authorization?
If the door is locked, can a potential intruder gain
access to the cab by breaking through the door's window?
If the door is locked, can gunfire penetrate the door's
window, the door itself, or another portion of the car body?
In addition, FRA requests comments regarding the potential
effectiveness of using different locking mechanisms to secure the
locomotive cab. A portion of the industry is currently equipping new
locomotives with dead-bolt door locks. Door locks with quick release
mechanisms, keyed locks, and biometric locks could also potentially be
used to secure a locomotive cab. FRA seeks comments regarding the
potential benefits and concerns for each type of locking mechanism. FRA
also requests information concerning the effect of door locks during
emergency situations requiring rapid and easy evacuation of the
locomotive compartment or rescue access. After an accident or other
life threatening situation, a train crew may need to quickly exit a
locomotive cab, particularly in the event of a fire or a hazardous
materials release, and a train crew may require assistance from
emergency responders when injured or incapacitated. To help solicit an
abundance of information, FRA poses the following questions:
To what extent will the use of a door lock to secure the
locomotive cab hinder rapid and easy egress of the train crew?
If keyed locks are used, should emergency responders be
given keys?
To what extent will emergency responders' access to the
cab be unduly delayed by door locks?
Will door locks prohibit emergency responders' access to
the cab when the crew is incapacitated?
How can locomotive cab doors be secured without hindering
the crews' ability to egress rapidly and easily or emergency
responders' ability to gain access without undue delay?
FRA also requests information related to the costs associated with
installing and maintaining various locomotive cab locking mechanisms.
More specifically, for existing locomotives how many do not have
locking mechanisms? And, what type of locking device would be the most
cost effective to install and maintain and also adequately address the
three safety needs described above. Finally, are there any locomotives
in the US (existing or new) that would be particularly difficult or
expensive to equip with a locking mechanism? If so, which locomotives
are they, and how many of these locomotives exist? FRA also requests
comment as to how many locomotives are currently being manufactured for
domestic service with these devices? If FRA decides to establish a
uniform cab securement requirement for new locomotives, what type of
locking mechanism is recommended, and why? Finally, how much would such
a locking mechanism cost to install and maintain on new and existing
locomotives?

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

This section-by-section analysis of the proposed rule is intended
to explain the rationale for each section of the proposed rule. The
analysis includes the requirements of the proposal, the purpose that
the proposal would serve in enhancing locomotive safety, the current
industry practice, and other pertinent information. The proposed
regulatory changes are organized by section number. FRA seeks comments
on all proposals made in this NPRM.

A. Proposed Amendments to Part 229 Subparts A, B, and C

Section 229.5 Definitions
This section contains a set of definitions to be introduced into
the regulation. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the meaning of
important terms as they are used in the text of the proposed rule. The
proposed definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to minimize the
potential for misinterpretation of the rule. The definition of alerter
introduces an unfamiliar term which requires further discussion.
``Alerter'' means a device or system installed in the locomotive
cab to promote continuous, active locomotive

[[Page 2211]]

engineer attentiveness by monitoring select locomotive engineer-induced
control activities. If fluctuation of a monitored locomotive engineer-
induced control activity is not detected within a predetermined time, a
sequence of audible and visual alarms is activated so as to
progressively prompt a response by the locomotive engineer. Failure by
the locomotive engineer to institute a change of state in a monitored
control, or acknowledge the alerter alarm activity through a manual
reset provision, results in a penalty brake application that brings the
locomotive or train to a stop. For regulatory consistency FRA is
proposing the same definition as the one provided in part 238. FRA
intends for a device or system that satisfies an accepted industry
standard including, but not limited to, AAR Standard S-5513,
``Locomotive Alerter Requirements,'' dated November 26, 2007, to
constitute an alerter under this definition.
New definitions for terms related to remote control locomotives are
also being proposed. The proposed terms, ``Assignment Address,''
``Locomotive Control Unit,'' ``Operator Control Unit,'' ``Remote
Control Locomotive,'' ``Remote Control Operator,'' and ``Remote Control
Pullback Protection'' are common to the industry. On February 14, 2001,
FRA published a Safety Advisory in which FRA issued recommended
guidelines for conducting remote control locomotive operations. See 66
FR 10340, Notice of Safety Advisory 2001-01, Docket No. FRA-2000-7325.
The Safety Advisory includes definitions for each of the proposed
terms. FRA's proposed definitions for these terms are informed by the
Safety Advisory and Working Group discussions.
``Controlling locomotive'' means a locomotive from where the
operator controls the traction and braking functions of the locomotive
or locomotive consist, normally the lead locomotive. This proposed
definition is being added to help identify which locomotives are
required to be equipped with an alerter, and when the alerter is
required to be tested.
Section 229.7 Prohibited Acts and Penalties
Minimal changes are being proposed in this section to update the
statutory reference and the statutory penalty information.
Section 229.15 Remote Control Locomotives
After working with the railroad industry for many years to provide
a framework for the safe use, development, and operation of remote
control devices, FRA proposes to formally codify safety standards for
remote control operated locomotives. For convenience, FRA proposes to
divide the section into two headings: Design and operation, and
inspection and testing.
Generally, the proposed design and operation requirements are
intended to prevent interference with the remote control system,
maintain critical safety functions if a crew is conducting a movement
that involves the pitch and catch of control between more than one
operator, tag the equipment to notify anyone who would board the cab
that the locomotive is operating remote control, and bring the train to
a stop if certain safety hazards arise. The proposed inspection and
testing requirements are intended to ensure that each remote control
locomotive would be tested each time it is placed in use, and ensure
that the operator is aware of the testing and repair history of the
locomotive. It is FRA's understanding that virtually all railroads that
operate remote control locomotives have already adopted similar
standards, and that they have proven to provide consistent safety for a
number of years.
Section 229.19 Prior Waivers
FRA proposes to update the language in Sec. 229.19 to address the
handling of prior waivers of requirements in part 229 under the
proposed rule. A number of existing waivers are incorporated into the
proposed rule, others may no longer be necessary in light of the
proposal. The proposal allows railroads the opportunity to assert that
their existing waiver is necessary, and should be effective after the
proposed rule is adopted.
On February 28, 2007, in a notice, FRA proposed the sunset of
certain waivers granted for the existing locomotive safety standards.
72 FR 9059. The proposal urged grantees to submit existing waivers for
consideration for renewal in light of potential revisions to the
regulation, and explained FRA's interest in treating older waivers
consistently with newer waivers that were limited to five years. The
five year limitations were issued as far back as March of 2000. The
notice also established a docket to receive waivers for consideration.
In addition, the notice discussed the possibility of requiring
current grantees to re-register waivers. To streamline the process,
FRA's proposal does not include a re-registration requirement.
Section 229.20 Electronic Record-keeping
As explained in proposed paragraph (a), FRA would establish
standards for electronic record-keeping that a railroad may elect to
utilize to comply with many of the record-keeping provisions contained
in this part. As with any records, replacing a paper system that
requires the physical filing of records with an electronic system and
the large and convenient storage capabilities of computers, will result
in greater efficiency. Increased safety will also result, as railroads
will be able to access and share records with appropriate employees and
FRA quicker than with a paper system. To be acceptable, electronic
record-keeping systems must satisfy all applicable regulatory
requirements for records maintenance with the same degree of confidence
as is provided with paper systems. The proposed requirements would be
consistent with a series of waivers that FRA has granted since April 3,
2002 (Docket Number FRA-2001-11014), permitting electronic record-
keeping with certain conditions intended to ensure safety. In this
proposed section, FRA is adopting the Working Group's consensus
regulatory text for electronic record-keeping that was approved and
recommended to FRA by the RSAC on September 10, 2009. The proposed
standards are organized into three categories: (1) Design requirements,
(2) operational requirements, and (3) availability and accessibility
requirements.
(b) Design requirements. To properly serve the interest of safety,
records must be accurate. Inspection of accurate records will reveal
compliance or non-compliance with Federal regulations and general rail
safety practices. To ensure the authenticity and integrity of
electronic records it is important that security measures be in place
to prevent unauthorized access to the data in the electronic record and
to the electronic system. Proposed paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) are
intended to help secure the accuracy of the electronic records and the
electronic system by preventing tampering, and other forms of
interference, abuse, or neglect.
(c) Operational requirements. Proposed paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2)
are intended to utilize the improved safety capabilities of electronic
systems. The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) would cover both
inspection and repair records. In situations when the Hours of Service
laws would potentially be violated, the electronic system would be
required to prompt the person to input

[[Page 2212]]

the data as soon as he or she returns to duty.
(d) Access and availability requirements. To properly serve the
interest of safety, the electronic records and the electronic record-
keeping system must be made available and accessible to the appropriate
people. FRA must have access to the railroads' electronic records and
limited access to the electronic record-keeping systems to carry out
its investigative responsibilities. During Working Group discussions, a
member representing railroad management explained that his railroad
currently can produce an electronic record within ten minutes, but that
a paper record may take up to two weeks. As such, the proposal provides
up to fifteen days to produce paper copies and requires that the
electronic records will be provided upon request.
Section 229.23 Periodic Inspection: General
This section would require railroads that choose to maintain and
transfer records as provided for in proposed Sec. 229.20, to print the
name of the person who performed the inspections, repairs, or certified
work on the Form FRA F 6180-49A that is displayed in the cab of each
locomotive. This would allow the train crew to know who did the
previous inspection when they board the locomotive cab.
Section 229.25 Test: Every Periodic Inspection
Two additional paragraphs are proposed in this section to include
inspection requirements for remote control locomotives and locomotive
alerters during the 92-day periodic inspection. FRA is proposing new
regulations for remote control locomotives, see proposed Sec. 229.15,
and locomotive alerters, see proposed section Sec. 229.140. For
convenience, the maintenance for remote control locomotives and
locomotive alerters that would properly be conducted at intervals
matching the 92-day periodic inspection, are being incorporated into
this section. The existing paragraphs would also be reorganized for
convenience.
Section 229.27 Annual Tests
FRA proposes to amend this section by deleting the following
existing language from paragraph (b): ``The load meters shall be
tested'' from paragraph (b). The modification would clarify the
regulatory language to reflect the current understanding and
application of the load meter requirement. FRA issued a clarification
for load meters on AC locomotives on June 15, 1998. In a letter to GE
Transportation Systems in March 2005, FRA issued a similar
clarification of the requirements related to testing load meters on DC
locomotives. The letter explained that on locomotives that are not
equipped with load meters there are no testing requirements. Similarly,
if a locomotive is equipped with a load meter but is using a proven
alternative method for providing safety, and no longer needs to
ascertain the current or amperage that is being applied to the traction
motors, there are no testing requirements for the dormant load meter.
Load meters have been eliminated or deactivated on many locomotives
because the locomotives are equipped with thermal protection for
traction motors and no longer require the operator to monitor
locomotive traction motor load amps.
FRA also proposes removing existing paragraph (a) from this section
and merging it into the brake requirements contained in proposed Sec.
229.29. Proposed Sec. 229.29 concerns brake maintenance, and as
discussed below, would be reorganized by this proposal to consolidate
all existing locomotive brake maintenance into one regulation.
Section 229.29 Air Brake System Calibration, Maintenance, and Testing
This section would be re-titled, and existing requirements would be
consolidated and better organized to improve clarity. Because proposed
Sec. 229.29 concerns only brakes, it would be re-titled, ``Air Brake
System Calibration, Maintenance, and Testing'' to more accurately
reflect the section's content. Existing Sec. 229.27(a), which also
addresses brake maintenance would be integrated into this section for
convenience and clarity. Record-keeping requirements for this section
would be moved from existing paragraphs (a) and (b) and merged into a
single new proposed paragraph (g). The date of air flow method (AFM)
indicator calibration would also be required to be recorded and
certified in the remarks section of Form F6180-49A under paragraph (g).
The proposed brake maintenance in this section would extend the
intervals at which required brake maintenance is performed for several
types of locomotive brake systems. The length of the proposed intervals
reflects the results of studies and performance evaluations related to
a series of waivers starting in 1981 and continuing to present day.
Overall, the type of brake maintenance that would be required would
remain the same. The current regulation provides for two levels of
brake maintenance. Existing Sec. 229.27(a) requires routine
maintenance for filters and dirt collectors, and brake valves. Existing
Sec. 229.29(a) requires maintenance for certain brake components
including parts that can deteriorate quickly and pieces of equipment
that contain moving parts. To better tailor the maintenance
requirements to the equipment needs and based on information
ascertained from various studies and performance evaluations, filters
and dirt collector maintenance would be required more frequently than
brake valve maintenance. As a result, the proposal provides for three
levels of brake maintenance instead of two.
Studies and performance evaluations of brake systems continue, and
may reach conclusion by the publication of a final rule in this
proceeding. In an effort to incorporate FRA's findings in a timely
manner, and produce an up-to-date final rule, FRA will consider
adjusting the proposed regulations based on its findings. Specifically,
FRA is currently studying the effect, if any, that air dryers have on
the maintenance of brake systems. FRA seeks comment on this issue.
Proposed paragraph (f)(2) would set maintenance intervals at four
years for slug units that are semi-permanently attached to a host
locomotive. Slugs are used in situations where high tractive effort is
more important than extra power, such as switching operations in yards.
A railroad slug is an accessory to a diesel-electric locomotive. It has
trucks with traction motors but is unable to move about under its own
power, as it does not contain a prime mover to produce electricity.
Instead, it is connected to a locomotive, called the host, which
provides current to operate the traction motors.
FRA is proposing to incorporate conventional locomotive
requirements from part 238 into this section for convenience. FRA
believes that there may be some benefit to moving all of the locomotive
requirements, including MU locomotives, from part 238 to part 229. FRA
seeks comments on this issue.
FRA is also considering whether moving AFM indicator calibration
requirements from Sec. 232.205(c)(iii) into this section would be
appropriate. Currently, both the calibration and testing requirements
for the AFM are contained in part 232. While the testing requirements
are most closely related to the subject matter addressed by part 232,
power brakes; FRA believes that the calibration requirements are more
closely related to the locomotives. FRA requests comments on this
issue.

[[Page 2213]]

Section 229.46 Brakes: General
FRA proposes to clarify this section, and provide standards for the
safe use of a locomotive with an inoperative or ineffective automatic
or independent brake control system. The proposal would allow a
locomotive with a defective air brake control valve to run until the
next periodic inspection required by Sec. 229.23. However, the
requirement to place a tag on the isolation switch would notify the
crew that the locomotive could be used only according to Sec.
229.46(b) until it is repaired.
The proposal would also clarify what it means for the brakes to
operate as intended, as required by this section. Some Working Group
members asserted that the automatic and independent brake valves are
not intended to function on a trailing unit that is isolated from the
train's air brake system, therefore they were ``operating as intended''
when not operating at all. Generally, when a unit is found with an
automatic or independent brake defect, the railroad may choose to move
the unit to a trailing position, and because it is in a trailing
position, it may be dispatched without record of the need for
maintenance. Proposed paragraph (b)(1) would explicitly permit units
with defective independent brakes to be moved in the trailing position.
Proposed paragraphs (b)(2) through (b)(6) are intended to ensure that
the trailing unit is handled safely, and that appropriate records are
kept and repairs are made.
Section 229.85 High Voltage Markings: Doors, Cover Plates, or Barriers
FRA proposes to clarify this section. The purpose of this section
is to warn people of a potential shock hazard before the high voltage
equipment is exposed. A conspicuous marking on the last cover, door, or
barrier guarding the high voltage equipment satisfies the purpose of
this section. Many locomotives have multiple doors in front of high
voltage equipment. Often there is a door on the car body that provides
access to the interior of the car body which contains high voltage
equipment that is guarded be an additional door, for example, main
generator covers and electrical lockers. FRA's intent has been to
require the danger marking only on the last door that guards the high
voltage equipment. Thus, FRA is proposing to slightly modify the
language currently contained in this section to make this intent clear
and unambiguous. To further clarify the intent of this section, FRA is
also proposing to change the title.
Section 229.114 Steam Generator Inspections and Tests
FRA proposes to add this section in order to consolidate the steam
generator requirements contained in various sections of part 229 into a
single section. Currently, requirements related to steam generators can
be found in Sec. Sec. 229.23, 229.25, and 229.27. Consolidating the
requirements into one section will make them easier to find for the
regulated community, and help simplify and clarify each of the sections
that currently include a requirement related to steam generators. The
proposal is not intended to change the substance of any of the existing
requirements.
Section 229.119 Cabs, Floors, and Passageways
In this section, FRA proposes to raise the minimum allowable
temperature in an occupied locomotive cab from 50 degrees to 60
degrees. Each occupied locomotive cab would be required to maintain a
minimum temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit when the locomotive is in
use. FRA recognizes that it takes some time for the cab to heat up when
the locomotive is first turned on, and that some crew members may
prefer to work in slightly cooler temperatures and temporarily turn off
the heater. Thus, FRA would only apply this requirement in situations
where the locomotive has had sufficient time to warm-up and where the
crew has not adjusted that temperature to a personal setting.
Section 229.123 Pilots, Snowplows, End Plates
FRA proposes to clarify paragraph (a) of this section. Based on
experience applying the regulation, FRA recognizes that a reasonable,
but improper, reading of the existing language could lead to the
incorrect impression that a pilot or snowplow is not required to extend
across both rails. To prevent this misunderstanding and to clarify the
existing requirement, the phase ``pilot, snowplow or end plate that
extends across both rails'', would be substituted for ``end plate which
extends across both rails, a pilot, or a snowplow.'' FRA believes this
language makes clear that any of the above mentioned items must extend
across both rails.
Due to the height of retarders in hump yards, it is not uncommon
for the pilot, snowplow, or endplate to strike the retarder during
ordinary hump yard operations. To accommodate the retarders and prevent
unnecessary damage, FRA has issued waivers to permit more clearance
(the amount of vertical space between the bottom of the pilot,
snowplow, or endplate and the top of the rail) in hump yards, if
certain conditions are met. FRA proposes the addition of paragraph (b)
to this section to obviate the need for individual waivers by
incorporating these conditions into the revised regulation. The
conditions that were included in the waivers, are reflected in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5).
The clearance requirement is intended to ensure that obstructions
are cleared from in front of the locomotive and to prevent the
locomotive from climbing and derailing. In FRA's experience, hump yards
contain few obstructions that present this potential risk. The
protections provided by a pilot, snowplow, or endplate are most
desirable at grade crossings where the requirement would remain without
change. This section also proposes various requirements to ensure that
the train crew is notified of the increased amount of clearance and to
prevent the improper use of the locomotive. The proposed provisions
would require locomotives with additional clearance to be stenciled at
two locations, notification to the train crew of any restrictions being
placed on the locomotive, and noting the amount of clearance on the
Form FRA 6180-49a that is maintained in the cab of the locomotive.
Section 229.125 Headlights and Auxiliary Lights
To incorporate an existing waiver, this proposed section would
permit a locomotive to remain in the lead position until the next
calendar day inspection after an en route failure of one incandescent
PAR-56, 74-volt, 350-Watt lamp, if certain safety conditions are
satisfied. FRA also proposes to extend the existing auxiliary intensity
requirements at 7.5 degrees and 20 degrees to the headlight to clarify
the criteria by which equivalence of new design head light lamps will
be evaluated to achieve the same safety benefit.
Recently, information has been submitted by a manufacturer
asserting that a new Halogen PAR-56, 350-watt, 74-volt lamp is
equivalent to the incandescent PAR-56, 200-watt, 30-volt lamp mentioned
in the existing regulation. FRA believes this claim has merit, and the
Working Group concurred. Therefore, proposed references to that lamp
have been added at appropriate locations in this section.
When one of two lamps in a headlight utilizing PAR-56, 350-watt,
74-volt lamps is inoperative, the center beam illumination for that
headlight often drops below 200,000 candela due to manufacturing
tolerances. FRA issued a

[[Page 2214]]

waiver that allows a locomotive equipped with these lamps to continue
in service as a lead unit until the next calendar day inspection, when
one of the two lamps becomes inoperative. Alternatively, when
locomotives are handled under the general movement for repair provision
of Sec. 229.9, they are required to be repaired or switched to a
trailing position at the next forward location where either could be
accomplished. Proposed paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section,
incorporates the waiver into the regulation. Conditions listed in
paragraphs (a)(2)(i)(A), (B), and (C) ensure that neither locomotive
conspicuity at grade crossings, nor the illumination of the right of
way will be compromised.
Section 229.133 Interim Locomotive Conspicuity Measures--Auxiliary
External Lights
To update the regulations related to locomotive conspicuity, FRA
proposes to remove the ditch light and crossing light requirements in
Sec. 229.133 that have been superseded by similar requirements in
Sec. 229.125. Section 229.133 currently contains interim locomotive
conspicuity measures that were incorporated into the regulations in
1993 while the final provisions related to locomotive auxiliary lights
were being developed. See 58 FR 6899; 60 FR 44457; and 61 FR 8881. The
requirements related to ditch lights and crossing lights in Sec.
229.133 were later superseded by similar requirements in Sec. 229.125,
published in 1996, and revised in 2003 and 2004. See 68 FR 49713; and
69 FR 12532. In 1996, locomotives equipped with ditch lights or
crossing lights that were in compliance with the requirements of Sec.
229.133, were temporarily deemed to be in compliance by Sec. 229.125
(i.e., grandfathered into the new regulation). However, that provision
expired on March 6, 2000. As a result, ditch lights and crossing lights
that comply with Sec. 229.133 have not satisfied the requirements
Sec. 229.125 for more than 10 years. No substantive changes to the
auxiliary external light requirements are being proposed in this
section.
Section 229.140 Alerters
This section proposes to require locomotives that operate over 25
mph be equipped with an alerter and would require the alerter to
perform certain functions. Today, a majority of locomotives are
equipped with alerters. As an appurtenance to the locomotive, the
alerters are required to function as intended, if present. The proposed
requirements would increase the number of locomotives equipped with an
alerter, and would provide specific standards to ensure that the
alerters are used and maintained in a manner that increases safety.
During Working Group discussions, all parties agreed that an
alerter would be considered non-compliant if it failed to reset in
response to at least three of the commands listed in proposed
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6) of this section, in addition to the
manual reset. It is important that locomotives equipped with an alerter
adhere to minimum performance standards to ensure that the alerter
serves its intended safety function. Utilizing several different reset
options for the warning timing cycle increases the effectiveness of the
alerter, as it would require differentiated cognitive actions by the
operator. This will help prevent the operator from repeating the same
reset many times as a reflex, without having full awareness of the
action.
FRA believes that tailoring the alerter standard to a minimum
operational speed will permit operational flexibility while maintaining
safety. Many freight railroads only operate over small territories.
They generally move freight equipment between two industries or
interchange traffic with other, larger railroads. For these operations,
the advantages of and the ability to move at higher speeds are non-
existent. Moreover, movements at these lower speeds greatly reduce the
risk of injury to the public and damage to equipment. For these
reasons, there is a reduced safety need for requiring alerters on
locomotives conducting these shorter low speed movements.
Proposed paragraph (f) would ensure that the locomotive alerter on
the controlling locomotive is always tested prior to being used as the
controlling locomotive. The test would be required during the trip that
the locomotive is used as a controlling locomotive. This requirement
would allow the crew to know the alerter functions as intended each
time a locomotive becomes the controlling locomotive.

B. Proposed Part 229 Subpart E--Locomotive Electronics

Section 229.301 Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this subpart is to promote the safe design,
operation, and maintenance of safety-critical electronic locomotive
control systems, subsystems, and components. Safety-critical electronic
systems identified in proposed paragraph (a) would include, but would
not be limited to: directional control, graduated throttle or speed
control, graduated locomotive independent brake application and
release, train brake application and release, emergency air brake
application and release, fuel shut-off and fire suppression, alerters,
wheel slip/slide applications, audible and visual warnings, remote
control locomotive systems, remote control transmitters, pacing
systems, and speed control systems.
In proposed paragraph (b), FRA emphasizes that when a new or
proposed locomotive control system function interfaces or comingles
with a safety critical train control system covered by 49 CFR part 236
subpart H or I, the locomotive control system functionality would be
required to be addressed in the train control systems Product Safety
Plan or the Positive Train Control Safety Plan, as appropriate. FRA
recognizes that advances in technology may further eliminate the
traditional distinctions between locomotive control and train control
functionalities. Indeed, technology advances may provide for
opportunities for increased or improved functionalities in train
control systems that run concurrent with locomotive control. Train
control and locomotive control, however, remain two fundamentally
different operations with different objectives. FRA does not intend to
restrict the adoption of new locomotive control functions and
technologies by imposing regulations on locomotive control systems
intended to address safety issues associated with train control.
Section 229.303 Applicability
A safety analysis would be required for new electronic equipment
that is deployed for locomotives. However, FRA does not intend to
impose retroactive safety analysis requirements for existing equipment.
FRA recognizes that railroads and vendors may have already invested
large sums of time, effort, and money in the development of new
products that were envisioned prior to this proposed rule. Accordingly,
FRA intends to clarify that the proposed requirements of this subpart
are not retroactive and do not apply to existing equipment that is
currently in use. The rule would provide sufficient time for railroads
and vendors to realize profits on their investment in new technologies
made prior to the adoption of this rule. For that reason, FRA would
provide a grace period in proposed paragraphs (a) and (b) to allow the
completion of existing new developments. Any system that has not been
placed in use by the end of the proposed grace period would be required
to comply with the safety analysis requirements. Vendors would be
required to identify these projects to

[[Page 2215]]

FRA within 6 months after the effective date of this rule. FRA believes
this will avoid misunderstandings concerning which systems receive the
grace period. FRA would consider any systems not identified to FRA
within the 6-month window to be a new product start that would require
a safety analysis.
In proposed paragraph (d), FRA makes clear that the exemption is
limited in scope. Products that result in degradation of safety or a
material increase in safety-critical functionality would not be exempt.
Products with slightly different specifications that are used to allow
the gradual enhancement of the product's capabilities would not require
a full safety analysis, but would require a formal verification and
validation to the extent that the changes involve safety-critical
functions.
Section 229.305 Definitions
Generally, this proposed section standardizes similar definitions
between 49 CFR part 236 subpart H and I, and this part. Although 49 CFR
part 236 subpart H and I addresses train control systems, and this
subpart addresses locomotive control systems, both reflect the adoption
of a risk-based engineering design and review process. The definition
section, however, does introduce several new definitions applicable to
locomotive control systems.
The first new proposed definition is for ``New or next-generation
locomotive control system.'' This term would refer to locomotive
control products using technologies or combinations of technologies not
in use on the effective date of this regulation, or without established
histories of safe practice. Traditional, non-microprocessor systems, as
well as microprocessor and software based locomotive control systems,
are currently in use. These systems have used existing technologies,
existing architectures, or combinations of these to implement their
functionality. Development of a safety analysis to accomplish the
requirements of this part would require reverse engineering these
products. Reverse engineering a product is both time consuming and
expensive. Requiring the performance of a safety analysis on existing
products would present a large economic burden on both the railroads
and the original equipment manufacturers (OEM). The economic burden
would likely be significantly less for new combinations of technology
and architectures that either implement existing functionality, or
implement new functionality. These types of systems lack a proven
service history. The safety analysis would mitigate the lack of a
proven service history. The fundamental differences make it necessary
to clearly distinguished between the two classes of locomotive control
systems products.
``Product'' means any safety critical locomotive control system
processor-based system, subsystem, or component. The proposed
definition identifies the covered systems that would require a safety
analysis. Generally, locomotive manufactures consider their product to
be the entire locomotive. This includes systems and subsystems. In this
situation, the manufacturers' extensive knowledge of the product would
allow them to conduct a safety analysis on the safety critical
elements, including locomotive control systems. Similarly, major
suppliers to locomotive manufacturers are also familiar with their own
products. They too can clearly identify the safety critical elements
and conduct the safety analysis accordingly. However, the same is not
necessarily true for suppliers without extensive domain knowledge.
These suppliers may not understand that their product requires a safety
analysis, or may lack experience to recognize that the subsystems or
components of the product are subject to the safety analysis of this
part. Accordingly, the proposed definition of ``product'' indentifies
the covered systems requiring a safety analysis.
The proposed definition of ``Safety Analysis'' would refer to a
formal set of documentation that describes in detail all of the safety
aspects of the product, including but not limited to procedures for its
development, installation, implementation, operation, maintenance,
repair, inspection, testing and modification, as well as analyses
supporting its safety claims. A Safety Analysis (SA) is similar to the
Product Safety Plan (PSP) required by 49 CFR part 236 subpart H or the
Positive Train Control Safety Plan (PTCSP) required by 49 CFR part 236
subpart I for signal and train control systems. There is, however, a
fundamental difference between the PSP or PTCSP safety analysis, and
the SA proposed by this subpart. The PSP requires formal FRA approval
and is required prior to the product being placed in use. This
difference is rooted in fundamental differences between functionality
of signal and train control and locomotive control. Although developers
of an SA and a PSP or PTCSP may merge functions to operate together on
a common platform, different safety analyses would be required. In
order to ensure that there is no confusion between the safety analyses
required by 49 CFR part 236 subparts H or I, and the safety analysis
required in this subpart, a different definition is being proposed for
the SA in this part.
The proposed definition of ``Safety-critical,'' as applied to a
function, a system, or any portion thereof, would mean an aspect of the
locomotive electronic control system that requires correct performance
to provide for the safety of personnel, equipment, environment, or any
combination of the three; or the incorrect performance of which could
cause a hazardous condition, or allow a hazardous condition which was
intended to be prevented by the function or system to exist. This
definition is substantially similar to that found in 49 CFR part 236
subparts H and I. FRA recognizes that functionality differs between
locomotive control systems and signal and train control systems, and
further recognizes that the failure modes, the probabilities of
failure, and the specific consequences of a failure differ. Despite
these differences, the result is the same, creation of a hazardous
condition that could affect the safety of the personnel, equipment, or
the environment. The same is also true for systems designed to prevent
adverse hazards in either domain locomotive control systems, signal and
train control systems, or both. The failure of these types of systems
would either create a new hazard, or allow a system intended to prevent
a hazard to occur, regardless of domain.
Section 229.307 Safety Analysis
The proposed SA would serve as the principal safety documentation
for a safety-critical locomotive control system product. Engineering
best practice today recognizes that elimination of all risk is
impossible. It recognizes that the traditional design philosophy,
adversely affects a product's cost and performance. Consequently,
designers have adopted a philosophy of risk management. Under this
philosophy, designers consider both the consequences of a failure and
the probability of a failure. Designers then select the appropriate
risk mitigation technique. The risk mitigation philosophy reduces the
impact of risk mitigation on a cost and performance compared to risk
avoidance.
Fundamental to the execution of the risk management philosophy is
the development and documentation of a SA that closely examines the
relationship between consequences of a failure, probability of
occurrence, failure modes, and their mitigation strategies. Proposed
paragraph (a) of this section clearly recognizes this, and would
address this need by requiring the

[[Page 2216]]

development of the SA documentation. It also recognizes that some
developers of SAs may have little experience in risk-based design.
Appendix F, also being proposed in this proceeding, would offer one
approach. There are a number of equally effective or better approaches.
FRA encourages railroads and OEMs to select an approach best suited to
their business model. FRA would consider as acceptable any approach
that would be equal to, or more effective than, the one outlined in
proposed Appendix F.
Proposed paragraph (b), along with proposed paragraph (a) of this
section would further establish a regulatory mandate for risk
management design. FRA would require that railroads electing to allow a
locomotive control system to be placed in use on its property would be
required to ensure that an appropriate SA is completed first.
Generally, only a single SA would be required for a product.
Therefore, FRA would recognize as acceptable any appropriate SA done
under the auspices of one railroad, or a consortium of railroads. FRA
also recognizes that railroads may lack the necessary product
familiarity or technical expertise to prepare the SA. FRA anticipates
that vendors will accomplish the bulk of preparing the SA in the course
of the product development.
FRA also recognizes that product vendors may develop a product
prior to its procurement by a railroad. In this situation, FRA would
provide review and comment as requested by the vendor. This review by
FRA would not represent an endorsement of the product. FRA expects that
the vendor would work with a railroad, or a consortium of railroads,
for final review and approval of the SA. FRA also wishes to make clear
that the safety analysis would only be required for new or next
generation locomotive control systems, as defined in Sec. 229.305, or
for substantive changes to an existing product. A SA would only be
required when safety critical functionality is added or deleted from
the product, or if there has been a significant paradigm shift in the
underlying systems' architecture or implementation technologies, or a
significant departure from widely accepted and service proven industry
best past practices. The half-life of microprocessor-based hardware is
relatively short, and the associated software is subject to change as
technical issues are discovered with existing functionality. FRA
anticipates that there will be maintenance-related changes of software,
as well as replacement of functionally identical hardware components as
exiting hardware undergoes repair or reaches the end of its useful
service life. FRA emphasizes that the later type of changes to safety
critical products, and changes to non-safety critical products, would
not require a SA. The railroads and vendors have generally
demonstrated, with a high degree of confidence, that existing systems
can safely operate. In response to potential liability issues,
railroads have shown they carefully examine the safety of a product
prior to placing it in use. FRA fully expects that the railroads would
continue to apply the same due diligence to new or next generation
systems as they review the SA for these more complex products. Proposed
paragraph (b) is intended to limit FRA's review of the SAs. This of
course, would not restrict FRA where it appears that due diligence has
not been exercised, there are indications of fraud and malfeasance, or
the underlying technology and or architecture represent significant
departures from existing practice.
In paragraph (b), FRA proposes that the SA would be required to
establish with a high degree of confidence that safety-critical
functions of the product will operate in a fail-safe manner in the
operating environment in which it will be used. FRA anticipates that
the railroad and vendor community would exercise due diligence in the
design and review process prior to placing the product in use. Due
diligence would typically be demonstrated by the completion, review and
internal approval of the SA. The railroad would be required to
determine that this standard has been met, prior to a product change,
or placing a new or next generation product in use.
Paragraph (b) also proposes that the railroads identify appropriate
procedures to immediately repair safety-critical functions when they
fail. If the procedures are not followed, it would result in a
violation for failing to comply with the SA.
Section 229.309 Safety Critical Changes and Failures
Safety critical microprocessors, like any electronics available
today, are subject to significant change. To ensure that safe system
operations continue in the event of planned changes to the software or
hardware maintenance of hardware and software configurations is
necessary. Failure to maintain hardware and software configurations
increases the probability that unintended consequences will occur
during system operation. These unintended consequences do not
necessarily reveal themselves on initial installation and operation,
but may occur much later.
Not all railroads may experience the same software or hardware
faults. The SA developer's software and hardware development,
configuration management, and fault tracking play an important role in
ensuring system safety. Without an effective configuration management
and fault reporting system, it is difficult, if not impossible to
evaluate the associated risks. The number of failures experienced by
one railroad may not exceed the number of failures identified in the
SA, but the aggregate from multiple railroads may. The vendor is best
positioned to aggregate identified faults, and is best able to
determine that the design and failure assumptions exceed those
predicted by the safety analysis. An ongoing relationship between a
railroad and its vendor is therefore essential to ensure that problems
encountered by the railroad are promptly reported to the vendor for
correction, and that problems encountered and reported by other
railroads to the vendor are shared with other railroads. Furthermore,
changes to the system developed by the vendor must be promptly provided
to all railroads in order to eliminate the reported hazard. A formal,
contractual relationship would provide the best vehicle for ensuring
this relationship. This section proposes to clearly identify the
responsibility of railroads, and car owners, to establish such a
relationship for both reporting hazards.
In order to accomplish their responsibilities, FRA expects that
each railroad would have a configuration tracking system that will
allow for the identification and reporting of hardware and software
issues, as well as promptly implementing changes to the safety critical
systems provided by the vendor regardless of the original reporting
source of the problem. This section proposes to require railroads to
identify, and create such a system if they have not already done so.
Proposed paragraph (b) would require immediate notification to a
railroad of real or potential safety hazards identified by the private
car suppliers and private car owners. This would allow affected
railroads to take appropriate actions to ensure the safety of rail
operations.
In proposed paragraph (c) the private car owner's configuration/
revision control measures should be accepted by the railroad that would
be using the car and implementing the system. The private car owner may
have placed safety critical equipment on their car that is unfamiliar
to the railroad using

[[Page 2217]]

that car. And the necessary contractual relationship that would be
required in proposed paragraph (a)(3) of this section may not exist
because the equipment in question is not part of the railroad's
inventory. The private car owner would be expected to communicate with
the railroad. This proposed requirement is intended to ensure that the
safety-functional and safety-critical hazard mitigation processes are
not compromised by changes to software or hardware. Reporting
responsibilities, as well as the configuration management and tracking
responsibilities would also extend to private car owners.
Section 229.311 Review of SAs
In proposed paragraph (a), FRA would require railroads to notify
FRA before these locomotive electronic products are placed in use. As
discussed above, FRA anticipates that review of the SA and amendments
would be the exception, rather than the normal practice. However, FRA
believes it would be appropriate to have the opportunity to review
products and product changes to ensure safety. FRA would require the
opportunity to have products and product changes identified to it, and
the opportunity to elect a review. FRA also realizes that development
of these products represents a significant financial investment, and
that the railroad would like to utilize the products in order to
recover its investment.
Proposed paragraph (b) reflects the expectation that FRA would
decide whether to review an SA within 60 days after receipt of the
requested information. Based on the information provided to FRA, the
Associate Administrator for Safety would evaluate the need and scope of
any review. Within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in
paragraph (a), FRA will either decline to review or request to review.
Examples of causes for a review or audit prior to placing the product
in use would include products: With unique architectural concepts; that
use design or safety assurance concepts considered outside existing
accepted practices; and, products that appear to commingle the
locomotive control function with a safety-critical train control
processing function. FRA may convene technical consultations as
necessary to discuss issues related to the design and planned
development of the product. Causes for an audit of the SA would
include, but are not limited to, such circumstances as a credible
allegation of error or fraud, SA assumptions determined to be invalid
as a result of in-service experience, one or more unsafe events calling
into question the safety analysis, or changes to the product.
The following are some common reasons that FRA would likely need to
review a product after it is placed in use: There is a credible
allegation of error or fraud; SA assumptions are determined to be
invalid as a result of in-service experience; or, the occurrence of one
or more unsafe events related to that product.
If FRA elects not to review a product's SA, railroads would be able
to put the product immediately in use after notification that FRA
elects not to review. In the event that FRA would elect to review, FRA
would attempt to complete the review within 120 days. FRA's ability to
complete the review within 120 days would depend upon various factors
such as: The complexity of the new product or product change, its
deviation from current practice, the functionality, the architecture,
the extent of interfacing with other systems, and the number of
technical consultations required. Products reviewed by FRA under these
circumstances may not be placed in use until FRA's review is complete.
Section 229.313 Product Testing Results and Records
This section would require that records of product testing
conducted in accordance with this subpart be maintained. To effectively
evaluate the degree to which the SA reflects real, as opposed to
predicted performance, it is necessary to keep accurate records of
performance for the product. In addition to collecting these records,
it is also essential for regular comparison of the real performance
results with the predicted performance. Thus, in this section FRA
proposes that such records be maintained. Where the real performance,
as measured by the collected data, exceeds the predicted performance of
the SA, FRA proposes that no action would be required. If the real
performance is worse than the predicted performance, this section
proposes that the railroad take immediate action to improve performance
to satisfy the predicted standard. Prompt and effective action would be
required to bring the non-compliant system into compliance.
FRA would not expect a railroad to proactively evaluate their
systems, and take corrective action prior to the system becoming non-
compliant with the predicted performance standard. If an unpredicted
hazard would occur the system would be required to be immediately
evaluated, and the appropriate corrective action would need to be
taken. FRA would not expect a railroad to defer any corrective action.
In addition, FRA would not expect a railroad to proactively evaluate
their systems, and take corrective action prior to the system becoming
non-compliant with the designed performance specifications.
This section proposes to establish a requirement for a railroad to
keep detailed records to evaluate the system. However, the railroad may
elect to have the system supplier keep these records. There would be
many advantages to the later approach, primarily that the vendor would
receive an aggregate of the technical issues, making them better
positioned to analyze the system performance. Although a railroad may
delegate record keeping, the railroad would retain the responsibility
for keeping records of performance on their property. The railroads
would be responsible for ensuring the safe operation of systems on
their property, and would be required to have access to the performance
data if they are to carry out their responsibilities under this
proposed section.
This section also proposes detailed handling requirements for
required records. Proposed paragraph (a) would require specific content
in the record. FRA would accept paper records or electronic records.
Electronic record keeping would be encouraged as it reduces storage
costs, simplifies collection of information, and allows data mining of
the collected information. However, to ensure that the electronic
records would provide all required information, approval by the
Associate Administrator for Safety would be required.
Signatures on paper records would be required to uniquely identify
the person certifying the information contained in the record in such a
manner that would enable detection of a forgery. Proposed paragraph (a)
would also ensure that an electronic signature could be attributable to
single individual as reliably as paper records. It would be possible to
meet the storage requirement in several different ways. Physical paper
records would be expected to be kept at the physical location of the
supervising official. Electronic records would be permitted to be
either stored locally, or remotely. FRA would have no preference as
long as the records are accessible for FRA review.
Proposed paragraph (b) would specify the required retention period
for the records. FRA recognizes that retaining records involves a cost
to railroads, and appreciates their desire to minimize both the number,
and the required retention period. To this end, FRA has identified two
different categories of

[[Page 2218]]

records, and proposes differing retention periods for each. The first
category involves records associated with installation or modification
of a system and would contain data required for evaluating the
product's performance and compliance to the safety case conditions
throughout the life of the product. FRA would consider the life of the
product to begin when the product is first placed in use and end with
the permanent withdrawal of the product from service. In the event of
permanent transfer of the product to another, the receiving railroad
would become responsible for maintaining them. This responsibility
would continue until the product is completely withdrawn from rail
service. The second category of records would address periodic testing
and would have a retention period of at least one year, or the
periodicity of the subsequent test, whichever is greater. Results
obtained by subsequent a test would supersede the earlier test. The
earlier test results would be moot for evaluating the current
condition.
Regrettably, in some cases, the use of electronic records may not
meet the minimum standards required by FRA. Consequently, FRA is
proposing procedures for withdrawing authorization to use electronic
records in paragraph (c). If FRA finds it necessary to withdraw an
authorization, FRA would explain the reason in writing.
Section 229.315 Operation Maintenance Manual
This section proposes to require that each railroad have a manual
covering the requirements for the installation, periodic maintenance
and testing, modification, and repair of its safety critical locomotive
control systems. This manual could be kept in paper or electronic form.
It is recommended that electronic copies of the manual be maintained in
the same manner as other electronic records kept for this part and that
it be included in the railroad's configuration management plan (with
the master copy and dated amendments carefully maintained so that the
status of instructions to the field as of any given date can be readily
determined).
Proposed paragraph (a) would require that the manual be available
to both persons required to perform such tasks and to FRA. Proposed
paragraph (b) would require that plans necessary for proper maintenance
and testing of products be correct, legible, and available where such
systems are deployed or maintained. The paragraph also proposes that
the manual identify the current version of software installed,
revisions, and revision dates. Proposed paragraph (c) would require
that the manual identify the hardware, software, and firmware revisions
in accordance with the configuration management requirement. Proposed
paragraph (d) would require the identification, replacement, handling,
and repair of safety critical components in accordance with the
configuration management requirements. Finally, proposed paragraph (e)
would require the manual be ready for use prior to deployment of the
product, and that it is available for FRA review.
Section 229.317 Training and Qualification Program
This section proposes specific parameters for training railroad
employees and contractor employees to ensure they have the necessary
knowledge and skills to complete their duties related to safety-
critical products. Proposed paragraph (a) would require the training to
be formally conducted and documented based on educational best
practices. Paragraphs (b) and (c) propose that the employer identify
employees that will be performing inspection, testing, maintenance,
repairing, dispatching, and operating tasks related to the safety
critical locomotive systems, and develop a written task analysis for
the performance of duties. The employer to identify additional
knowledge and skills above those required for basic job performance
necessary to perform each task. Work situations often present
unexpected challenges, and employees who understand the context within
which the job is to be done would be better able to respond with
actions that preserve safety. Further, the specific requirements of the
job would be better understood; and requirements that are better
understood are more likely to be adhered to. Well-informed employees
would be less likely to conduct ad hoc troubleshooting; and therefore,
should be of greater value in assisting with troubleshooting.
Proposed paragraph (d) would require the employer to develop a
training curriculum that includes either classroom, hands-on, or other
formally-structured training designed to impart the knowledge and
skills necessary to perform each task.
Paragraph (e) proposes a requirement that all persons subject to
training requirements and their direct supervisors must successfully
complete the training curriculum and pass an examination for the tasks
for which they are responsible. Generally, giving appropriate training
to each of these employees prior to task assignment would be required.
The exception would be when an employee, who has not received the
appropriate training, is conducting the task under the direct, on-site
supervision of a qualified person.
Proposed paragraph (f) would require periodic refresher training.
This periodic training must include classroom, hands-on, computer-based
training, or other formally structured training. The intent would be
for personnel to maintain the knowledge and skills required to perform
their assigned task safely.
Paragraph (g) proposes a requirement to compare and evaluate the
effectiveness of training. The evaluation would first determine whether
the training program materials and curriculum are imparting the
specific skills, knowledge, and abilities to accomplish the stated
goals of the training program; and second, determine whether the stated
goals of the training program reflect the correct, and current,
products and operations.
Paragraph (h) proposes that the railroad must maintain records that
designate qualified persons. Records retention would be required until
recording new qualifications, or for at least one year after such
person(s) leave applicable service. The records would be required to be
available for FRA inspection and copying.
Section 229.319 Operating Personnel Training
This section contains proposed minimum training requirements for
locomotive engineers and other operating personnel who interact with
safety critical locomotive control systems. ``Other operating
personnel'' would refer to onboard train and engine crew members (i.e.,
conductors, brakemen, and assistant engineers).
Proposed paragraph (a) would require training to contain
familiarization with the onboard equipment and the functioning of that
equipment as part of and its relationship to other onboard systems
under that person's control. The training program would be required to
cover all notifications by the system (i.e., onboard displays) and
actions or responses to such notifications required by onboard
personnel. The training would also be required to address how each
action or response ensures proper operation of the system and safe
operation of the train.
During system operations emergent conditions could arise which
would affect the safe operation of the system. This section would also
require operating personnel to be informed as soon as practical after
discovery of the

[[Page 2219]]

condition, and any special actions required for safe train operations.
Paragraph (b) proposes that for certified locomotive engineers, the
training requirements of this section would be required to be
integrated into the training requirements of part 240. Although this
requirement would only address engineers, in the event of certification
of other operating personnel, the expectation that these requirements
would be included into their training requirements.
Appendix F--Recommended Practices for Design and Safety Analysis
Appendix F proposes a set of criteria for performing risk
management design of locomotive control systems. FRA recognizes that
not all safety risks associated with human error can be eliminated by
designs, no matter how well trained and skilled the designers,
implementers, and operators. The intention of the appendix would be to
provide one set of safety guidelines distilled from proven design
considerations. There are numerous other approaches to risk management-
based design. The basic principles of this appendix capture the lessons
learned from the research, design, and implementation of similar
technology in other modes of transportation and other industries. The
overriding goal of this appendix is to minimize the potential for
design-induced error by ensuring that systems are suitable for
operators, and their tasks and environment.
FRA believes that new locomotive systems will be in service for a
long period. Over time, there will be system modifications from the
original design. FRA is concerned subsequent modifications to a product
might not conform to the product's original design philosophy. The
original designers of products could likely be unavailable after
several years of operation of the product. FRA believes mitigating this
is most successful by fully explaining and documenting the original
design decisions and their rationale. Further, FRA feels that
assumption of a long product life cycles during the design and analysis
phase will force product designers and users to consider long-term
effects of operation. Such a criterion would not be applicable if, for
instance, the railroad limited the product's term of proposed use.
Translation of these guidelines into processes helps ensure the
safe performance of the product and minimizes failures that would have
the potential to affect the safety of railroad operations. Fault paths
are essential to establishing failure modes and appropriate
mitigations. Failing to identify a fault path can have the effect of
making a system seem safer on paper than it actually is. When an
unidentified fault path is discovered in service which leads to a
previously unidentified safety-relevant hazard, the threshold in the
safety analysis is automatically exceeded, and the both the designer
and the railroad must take mitigating measures. The frequency of such
discoveries relates to the quality of the safety analysis efforts.
Safety analyses of poor quality are more likely to lead to in-service
discovery of unidentified fault paths. Some of those paths might lead
to potential serious consequences, while others might have less serious
consequences.
Given technology, cost, and other constraints there are limitations
regarding the level of safety obtainable. FRA recognizes this. However,
FRA also believes that there are well-established and proven design and
analysis techniques that can successfully mitigate these design
restrictions. The use of proven safety considerations and concepts is
necessary for the development of products. Only by forcing conscious
decisions by the designer on risk mitigation techniques adopted, and
justifying those choices (and their decision that a mitigation
technique is not applicable) does the designer fully consider the
implications of those choices. FRA notes that in normal operation, the
product design should preclude human errors that cause a safety hazard.
In addition to documenting design decisions, describing system
requirements within the context of the concept of operations further
mitigates against the loss of individual designers. In summary, the
recommended approach ensures retention of a body of corporate knowledge
regarding the product, and influences on the safety of the design. It
also promotes full disclosure of safety risks to minimize or
eliminating elements of risk where practical.

C. Proposed Amendments to Part 238

Section 238.105 Train Electronic Hardware and Software Safety
This section proposes the incorporation of existing waivers and
addresses certain operational realities. Since the implementation of
the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, FRA has granted one waiver
from the requirements of Sec. 238.105(d) (FRA-2004-19396) for 26 EMU
bi-level passenger cars operated by Northeastern Illinois Regional
Commuter Railroad Corporation (METRA). FRA is in receipt of a second
waiver (FRA-2008-0139) for 14 new EMU bi-level passenger cars to be
operated by Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District. There
are over 1000 EMU passenger cars (M-7) being operated by Long Island
Railroad & Metro-North Commuter Railroad (MNCW) for the past five years
that FRA has discovered will need a waiver to be in compliance with
Sec. 238.105(d). The MNCW has placed an order for additional 300 plus
options, EMU passenger cars (M-8) that will also need a waiver from the
requirements of existing Sec. 238.105(d).
The portion of the requirements that these cars' brake systems
cannot satisfy is the requirement for a full service brake in the event
of hardware/software failure of the brake system or access to direct
manual control of the primary braking system both service and emergency
braking. The braking system on these cars does not have the full
service function but does default to emergency brake application in the
event of hardware/software failure of the brake system and the operator
has the ability to apply the brake system at an emergency rate from the
conductor's valve located in the cab. A slight change to the language
in Sec. 238.105 would alleviate the need for these waivers and would
not reduce the braking rate of the equipment or the stop distances.
Section 238.309 Periodic Brake Equipment Maintenance
For convenience and clarity, FRA proposes to consolidate locomotive
air brake maintenance for conventional locomotives into part 229. No
substantive change to the regulation would result. Currently, because
conventional locomotives are used in passenger service, certain air
brake maintenance requirements are included in the Passenger Equipment
Safety Standards contained in part 238. Placing all of the requirements
for conventional locomotives in part 229 would make the standards
easier to follow and avoid confusion.
The proposed brake maintenance in this section would also extend
the intervals at which required brake maintenance is performed for
several types of brake systems for non-conventional locomotives. The
length of the proposed intervals reflects the results of studies and
performance evaluations related to a series of waivers starting in 1981
and continuing to present day. Overall, the type of brake maintenance
that would be required would remain the same.

[[Page 2220]]

VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures, and determined to be non-significant under
both Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR
11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a
regulatory analysis addressing the economic impact of this proposed
rule. Document inspection and copying facilities are available at Room
W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
As part of the regulatory impact analysis FRA has assessed
quantitative measurements of cost and benefit streams expected from the
adoption of this proposed rule. This analysis includes qualitative
discussions and quantitative measurements of costs and benefits of the
proposed regulatory text in this rulemaking. The primary costs or
burdens in this proposed rule are from the alerter and revised minimum
(i.e., cold weather) cab temperature requirements. The savings will
accrue from fewer train accidents, future waivers, and waiver renewals.
In addition, savings would also accrue from a reduction in downtime for
locomotives due to proposed changes to headlight and brake
requirements. For the twenty year period the estimated quantified costs
have a Present Value (PV) 7% of $7 million. For this period the
estimated quantified benefits have a PV, 7% of $7.3 million.

Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and Executive
Order 13272 require a review of proposed and final rules to assess
their impacts on small entities. An agency must prepare an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) unless it determines and
certifies that a rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities. FRA is confident that
this proposed rule would not impose a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. However, FRA is reserving the
final decision on certification for the final rule. Hence, interested
parties are invited to submit data and information regarding the
potential economic impact that would result from adoption of the
proposals in the NPRM. Comments and input that FRA receives during the
comment period of this rulemaking will assist the agency in making its
final decision. FRA estimates that only 12 percent of the total cost
associated with implementing the proposed rule would be borne by small
entities and most of that will be the cost for the proposed cab
temperature change.
Below FRA provides the process it went through when assessing the
potential impacts of this rule on small entities.
1. Reasons for Considering Agency Action
As discussed in earlier sections of the preamble to this
rulemaking, in its efforts to update and re-evaluate its current
regulations FRA formed an RSAC Working Group to review 49 CFR part 229
and recommend revisions as appropriate. Thus the proposed revisions in
this rulemaking serve to update a regulation that was originally
promulgated prior to 1980. It will clarify some existing requirements,
and incorporate some existing industry standards. In addition it will
incorporate some current waivers that some members of the industry
have, and some engineering best practices. Most of these revisions add
clarity to the rule, reduce industry burden to comply with some
requirements, and in some cases streamline or consolidate the FRA
requirements. Some revisions are intended to enhance railroad safety.
2. Objectives and Legal Basis for the Proposed Rule
(a) Legal Basis for the Proposed Rule
Railroad locomotive inspection requirements are one of the oldest
areas of Federal safety regulations. The primary statutory authority,
The Locomotive Inspection Act, was enacted in 1911. Pursuant to that
authority, in the area of locomotive safety, FRA has issued regulations
found at part 229 addressing topics such as inspections and tests,
safety requirements for brake, draft, suspension, and electrical
systems, and cabs and cab equipment.
FRA has broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety. The
Locomotive Inspection Act (formerly 45 U.S.C. 22-34, now 49 U.S.C.
20701-20703) prohibits the use of unsafe locomotives and authorizes FRA
to issue standards for locomotive maintenance and testing. In order to
further FRA's ability to respond effectively to contemporary safety
problems and hazards as they arise in the railroad industry, Congress
enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (Safety Act) (formerly
45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq., now found primarily in chapter 201 of Title
49). The Safety Act grants the Secretary of Transportation rulemaking
authority over all areas of railroad safety (49 U.S.C. 20103(a)) and
confers all powers necessary to detect and penalize violations of any
rail safety law. This authority was subsequently delegated to the FRA
Administrator (49 CFR 1.49) (Until July 5, 1994, the Federal railroad
safety statutes existed as separate acts found primarily in title 45 of
the United States Code. On that date, all of the acts were repealed,
and their provisions were recodified into title 49 of the United States
Code).
(b) Objective of the Proposed Rule
This action is taken by FRA in an effort to enhance its safety
regulatory program. The proposed revision would update, consolidate,
and clarify existing rules, and incorporate existing industry and
engineering best practices.
3. Description and Estimate of Small Entities Affected
The ``universe'' of the entities to be considered generally
includes only those small entities that can reasonably be expected to
be directly regulated by this action. Two types of small entities are
potentially affected by this rulemaking: (1) Small railroads, and (2)
governmental jurisdictions of small communities.
``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601. Section 601(3) defines
a ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as ``small business
concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act. This includes any
small business concern that is independently owned and operated, and is
not dominant in its field of operation. Section 601(4) includes not-
for-profit enterprises that are independently owned and operated, and
are not dominant in their field of operations within the definition of
``small entities.'' Additionally, section 601(5) defines as ``small
entities'' governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages,
school districts, or special districts with populations less than
50,000.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates ``size
standards'' for small entities. It provides that the largest a for-
profit railroad business firm may be (and still classify as a ``small
entity'') is 1,500 employees for ``Line-Haul Operating'' railroads, and
500 employees for ``Short-Line Operating'' railroads.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ ``Table of Size Standards,'' U.S. Small Business
Administration, January 31, 1996, 13 CFR part 121. See also NAICS
Codes 482111 and 482112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SBA size standards may be altered by Federal agencies in
consultation with SBA, and in conjunction with public comment. Pursuant
to the authority

[[Page 2221]]

provided to it by SBA, FRA has published a final policy, which formally
establishes small entities as railroads that meet the line haulage
revenue requirements of a Class III railroad.\2\ Currently, the revenue
requirements are $20 million or less in annual operating revenue,
adjusted annually for inflation. The $20 million limit (adjusted
annually for inflation) is based on the Surface Transportation Board's
threshold of a Class III railroad carrier, which is adjusted by
applying the railroad revenue deflator adjustment.\3\ The same dollar
limit on revenues is established to determine whether a railroad
shipper or contractor is a small entity. FRA is proposing to use this
definition for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ See 68 FR 24891 (May 9, 2003).
\3\ For further information on the calculation of the specific
dollar limit, please see 49 CFR part 1201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(a) Railroads
There are approximately 685 small railroads meeting the definition
of ``small entity'' as described above. FRA estimates that all of these
small entities could potentially be impacted by one or more of the
proposed changes in this rulemaking. Note, however, that approximately
fifty of these railroads are subsidiaries of large short line holding
companies with the technical multidisciplinary expertise and resources
comparable to larger railroads. It is important to note that many of
the changes or additions in this rulemaking will not impact all or many
small railroads. The nature of some of the changes would dictate that
the impacts primarily fall on large railroads that purchase new and/or
electronically advanced locomotives. Small railroads generally do not
purchase new locomotives, they tend to buy used locomotives from larger
railroads. Also, two of the proposed requirements, i.e., requirements
for alerters and RCL standards, would burden very few if any small
railroads. The most burdensome requirement for small railroads would be
the proposed revisions to cab temperature since older locomotives are
less likely to meet the revised standards and small railroads tend to
own older locomotives. It is also important to note that the proposed
changes only apply to non-steam locomotives. There are some small
railroads that own one or more steam locomotives which these changes
will not impact. There are a few small railroads that own all or almost
all steam locomotives. Most of these entities are either museum
railroads or tourist railroads. For these entities this proposed
regulations would have very little or no impact. FRA estimates that
there are about five small railroads that only own steam locomotives.
(b) Governmental Jurisdictions of Small Communities
Small entities that are classified as governmental jurisdictions
would also be affected by the proposals in this rulemaking. As stated
above, and defined by SBA, this term refers to governments of cities,
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts with populations of less than 50,000. FRA does not expect
this group of entities to be impacted.
The rule would apply to governmental jurisdictions or transit
authorities that provide commuter rail service--none of which is small
as defined above (i.e., no entity serves a locality with a population
less than 50,000). These entities also receive Federal transportation
funds. Intercity rail service providers Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad
Corporation would also be subject to this rule, but they are not small
entities and likewise receive Federal transportation funds. While other
railroads are subject to this final rule by the application of Sec.
238.3, FRA is not aware of any railroad subject to this rule that is a
small entity that will be impacted by this rule.
4. Description of Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements and Impacts on Small Entities Resulting From Specific
Requirements
The impacts to small railroads from this rulemaking would primarily
result from proposed alerter requirements and cold weather cab
temperature change. The rulemaking should result in regulatory relief
for many railroads. The proposed rule clarifies some existing sections,
adds some existing industry standards, and it incorporates some current
waivers.
(a) Remote Control Locomotives Sec. 229.15
FRA proposes to formally codify safety standards for remote control
operated locomotives. Such standards should not impact any small
railroads. FRA does not know of any small railroads that use RCL
operations. In addition, RCL operations are not required to operate a
railroad. The conduction of future RCL operations by small railroads
would be is a business decision that takes into consideration
regulatory costs.
(b) Electronic Recordkeeping Sec. 229.20
This proposed section permits the use of electronic recordkeeping
systems related to the maintenance of records related to locomotives.
This proposed section does not require electronic recordkeeping. FRA is
not aware of any small railroads that would utilize this proposed
provision. FRA also anticipates cost savings for any railroad that
would utilize the provisions.
(c) Periodic Inspection: General Sec. 229.23
This section would require railroads that choose to maintain and
transfer records electronically as provided for in Sec. 229.20, to
print the name of the person who performed the inspections, repairs, or
certified work on the Form FRA F 6180-49A that is displayed in the cab
of each locomotive. As small railroads are not likely to maintain
records electronically, the proposed changes to this section would not
impact any small railroads.
(d) Test: Every Periodic Inspection Sec. 229.25
Two additional paragraphs are proposed in this section to include
inspection requirements for remote control locomotives and locomotive
alerters during the 92-day Periodic Inspection. Since almost no small
railroads utilize RCL or have locomotives and many small railroad
operations would not require alerters, these new paragraphs are not
expected to have a significant impact on small railroads. In general,
older locomotives, which are less likely to be equipped with alerters,
are used for lower speed operations. Small railroads commonly engage in
such operations and thus a substantial number would probably not be
impacted by the proposed alerter inspection requirement.
(e) Air Brake System Maintenance and Testing Sec. 229.29
This section would be re-titled, and consolidate and better
organize existing requirements to improve clarity. Because 49 CFR
229.29 concerns only brakes, it would be re-titled, ``Air Brake System
Maintenance and Testing'' to more accurately reflect the section's
content. In addition, the proposed changes to this section would fold
the current waivers for air brakes into the regulation. Thus, these
changes may seem to add more to the section, but they actually provide
longer inspection periods for some air brake systems. This will
produces two benefits. First it will produce a cost savings for future
waivers and waiver renewals. Second, it will produce a benefit for
other entities that happen to have one of these types of air brake
systems, and do not currently have a waiver. The length of the proposed
intervals reflects the results of studies and performance

[[Page 2222]]

evaluations related to a series of waivers starting in 1981 and
continuing to present day. The proposed changes for this section will
not impact many, if any, small railroads. The air brake systems that
the proposed provisions cover are systems used by newer locomotives.
Since most small railroads do not own newer locomotives, the proposed
changes to this section should have no impact on any small entities.
(f) Brakes General Sec. 229.46
FRA proposes to clarify this section, and provide standards for the
safe use of a locomotive with an inoperative or ineffective automatic
or independent brake. The proposal would not require the automatic or
independent brake to be repaired. However, the requirement to place a
tag on the isolation switch would notify the crew that the locomotive
could be used only according to Sec. 229.46(b) until it is repaired.
Basically under the current rule such a locomotive could only be moved
under the requirements of Sec. 229.9, until the next daily inspection
or a location where repairs could be made. With the proposed
requirement the locomotive can continue to be utilized in a non-lead
position until repaired or until it receives a periodic inspection.
This proposed change is expected to produce cost savings for railroads
and therefore is not expected to impose any negative burdens on small
railroads.
(g) Steam Generator Inspections and Tests Sec. 229.4
This proposed section is being added to consolidate the steam
generator requirements of part 229 into a single section. The proposal
would not change the substance of the requirements. Therefore no small
railroads will be negatively impacted by the proposed change.
(h) Locomotive Cab Temperature Sec. 229.119
This rulemaking includes a revision to paragraph (d) of Sec.
229.119, Cab Temperature. The proposed rule is increasing the minimum
temperature that must be maintained in the locomotive cab from 50
degree to 60 degrees. This proposed change is not one that the RSAC
Working Group agreed to. It is based on an FRA recommendation.
FRA estimates that two percent of the locomotive fleet for the
industry will need improved maintenance of their heaters. Also FRA
estimates that one percent of the locomotive fleet for the industry
will require additional heaters installed to meet the proposed
requirement. This represents 530 and 265 locomotives, respectively.
This requirement would likely affect many yard/switching locomotives of
various size railroads. Such locomotives generally tend to be older
than most road locomotives. Small railroads would also be impacted
because they generally operate older locomotives as well. The cost of
adding a heater to a locomotive is about $500. Annual maintenance cost
to ensure heaters work as necessary to comply with the higher minimum
temperature requirements is estimated at $100 per locomotive per year.
The average life expectancy of a heater is about 10 years and many
older locomotives could be retired before replacement is necessary. FRA
estimates that approximately 60 percent of this cost would be borne by
small railroads. This is the most significant cost that would burden
small railroads.
(i) Pilots, Snowplows and End Plates; and Headlights Sec. Sec. 229.123
through 229.125
The proposed rule includes changes to Sections 229.123 for
snowplows and endplates and Sec. 229.125 for headlights. The proposed
changes for both sections are more permissive, increase the flexibility
of the rule, and will serve to decrease the number of waiver requests
that the railroad industry submits to FRA. FRA does not see any
negative impact being imposed on small entities by the proposed changes
in these sections.
(j) Alerters Sec. 229.140
Alerters are common safety devices intended to verify that
locomotive engineers remain capable and vigilant to accomplish the
tasks that he or she must perform. This proposed section would require
locomotives that operate over 25 mph to be equipped with an alerter,
and would require the alerter to perform certain functions. FRA is
estimating that there will be a regulatory impact from this proposal.
However, very few, if any, shortline railroads operate trains at speed
that exceed 25 mph. Therefore this proposal is not expected to have an
impact on small entities. FRA specifically requests comments regarding
this estimate.
(k) Locomotive Electronics, Subpart E
FRA is proposing a new Subpart titled ``locomotive electronics.''
The purpose of this subpart is to promote the safe design, operation,
and maintenance of safety-critical electronic locomotive systems,
subsystems, and components. It is important to first note that these
proposed requirements only apply to new locomotives. Second, the
effective date for products in development is delayed by a few
additional years. As a practical matter, there are no costs for the
requirements of this proposed subpart because it is simply codifying
good engineering practices. Since generally small railroads do not
purchase new locomotives this proposed new subpart is not expected to
have an impact on any small railroads.
5. Identification of Relevant Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting
Federal Rules
There are no Federal rules that would duplicate, overlap, or
conflict with this proposed rule.
6. Alternatives Considered
FRA has identified no significant alternative to the proposed rule
which meets the agency's objective in promulgating this rule, and that
would minimize the economic impact of the proposed rule on small
entities. As in all aspects of this IRFA, FRA requests comments on this
finding of no significant alternative related to small entities. The
process by which this proposed rule was developed provided outreach to
small entities. As noted earlier in sections I, II, and III of this
preamble, this notice was developed in consultation with industry
representatives via the RSAC, which includes small railroad
representatives. On September 21, 2006, the full RSAC unanimously
adopted the Working Group's recommendation on locomotive sanders as its
recommendation to FRA. The next twelve Working Group meeting addressed
a wide range of locomotive safety issues. Minutes of these meetings
have been made part of the docket in this proceeding. On September 10,
2009, after a series of detailed discussions, the RSAC approved and
provided recommendations on a wide range of locomotive safety issues
including, locomotive brake maintenance, pilot height, headlight
operation, danger markings, and locomotive electronics.

Paperwork Reduction Act

The information collection requirements in this proposed rule have
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
The sections that contain the new and current information collection
requirements and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as
follows:

[[Page 2223]]

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent Total annual Average time per Total annual
CFR Section universe responses response burden hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.9-Movement of Non-Complying 44 Railroads....... 21,000 tags........ 1 minute........... 350
Locomotives.
229.15--Remote Control
Locomotives (RCL)--(New
Requirements).
--Tagging at Control Stand 44 Railroads....... 3,000 tags......... 2 minutes.......... 100
Throttle.
--Testing and Repair of 44 Railroads....... 200 testing/repair 5 minutes.......... 17
Operational Control Unit (OCU) records.
on RCL--Records.
229.17--Accident Reports......... 44 Railroads....... 1 report........... 15 minutes......... .25
229.20--Electronic Recordkeeping-- 44 Railroads....... 21,000 1 second........... 6
Electronic Record of Inspections notifications.
and Maintenance and Automatic
Notification to Railroad that
Locomotive is Due for Inspection
(New Requirement).
229.21--Daily Inspection......... 720 Railroads...... 6,890,000 records.. 16 or 18 min....... 1,911,780
--MU Locomotives: Written Reports 720 Railroads...... 250 reports........ 13 minutes......... 54
Form FRA F 6180.49A Locomotive 720 Railroads...... 4,000 forms........ 2 minutes.......... 133
Inspection/Repair Record.
210.31--Main Reservoir Tests-- 720 Railroads...... 19,000 tests/forms. 8 hours............ 152,000
Form FRA F 6180.49A.
229.23/229.27/229.29/229.31-- 720 Railroads...... 19,000 records..... 2 minutes.......... 633
Periodic Inspection/Annual
Biennial Tests/Main Res. Tests--
Secondary Records of Information
on Form FRA F 6180.49A.
--List of Defects and Repairs on 720 Railroads...... 4,000 lists + 4,000 2 minutes.......... 266
Each Locomotive and Copy to copies.
Employees Performing Insp. (New
Requirement).
Document to Employees Performing 720 Railroads...... 19,000 documents... 2 minutes.......... 633
Inspections of All Tests Since
Last Periodic Inspection (New
Requirement).
229.33--Out-of Use Credit........ 720 Railroads...... 500 notations...... 5 minutes.......... 42
229.25(1)--Test: Every Periodic 720 Railroads...... 200 amendments..... 15 minutes......... 50
Insp.--Written Copies of
Instruction.
229.25(2)--Duty Verification 720 Railroads...... 4,025 records...... 90 minutes......... 6,038
Readout Record.
229.25(3)--Pre-Maintenance Test-- 720 Railroads...... 700 notations...... 30 minutes......... 350
Failures.
229.135(A.)--Removal From Service 720 Railroads...... 1,000 tags......... 1 minute........... 17
229.135(B.)--Preserving Accident 720 Railroads...... 10,000 reports..... 15 minutes......... 2,500
Data.
229.27--Annual Tests............. 720 Railroads...... 700 test records... 90 minutes......... 1,050
229.29--Air Brake System 720 Railroads...... 88,000 tests/ 15 seconds......... 367
Maintenance and Testing (New records.
Requirement)--Air Flow Meter
Testing--Record.
229.46--Brakes General--Tagging 720 Railroads...... 2,100 tags......... 2 minutes.......... 70
Isolation Switch of Locomotive
That May Only Be Used in
Trailing Position (New
Requirement).
229.85--Danger Markings on All 720 Railroads...... 1,000 decals....... 1 minute........... 17
Doors, Cover Plates, or Barriers.
229.123--Pilots, Snowplows, End 720 Railroads...... 20 stencilling..... 2 minutes.......... 1
Plates--Markings--Stencilling
(New Requirement).
--Notation on Form FRA F 6180.49A 720 Railroads...... 20 notations....... 2 minutes.......... 1
for Pilot, Snowplows, or End
Plate Clearance Above Six Inches
(New Requirement).
229.135--Event Recorders......... 720 Railroads...... 1,000 Certified 2 hours............ 2,000
229.135(b)(5)--Equipment Memory Modules.
Requirements--Remanufactured
Locomotives with Certified
Crashworthy Memory Module.
NEW REQUIREMENTS--SUBPART E--
LOCOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS
229.303--Requests to FRA for 720 Railroads...... 20 requests........ 8 hours............ 160
Approval of On-Track Testing of
Products Outside a Test Facility.
--Identification to FRA of 720 Railroads/3 20 products........ 2 hours............ 40
Products Under Development. Manufacturers.
229.307--Safety Analysis by RR of 720 Railroads...... 300 analyses....... 240 hours.......... 72,000
Each Product Developed.
229.309--Notification to FRA of 720 Railroads...... 10 notification.... 16 hours........... 160
Safety-Critical Change in
Product.
Report to Railroad by Product 3 Manufacturers.... 10 reports......... 8 hours............ 80
Suppliers/Private Equipment
Owners of Previously
Unidentified Hazards of a
Product.
229.311--Review of Safety
Analyses (SA).
--Notification to FRA of Railroad 720 Railroads...... 300 notifications.. 2 hours............ 600
Intent to Place Product In
Service.
--RR Documents That Demonstrate 720 Railroads...... 300 documents...... 2 hours............ 600
Product Meets Safety
Requirements of the SA for the
Life-Cycle of Product.
--RR Database of All Safety 720 Railroads...... 300 databases...... 4 hours............ 1,200
Relevant Hazards Encountered
with Product Placed in Service.
--Written Reports to FRA If 720 Railroads...... 10 reports......... 2 hours............ 20
Frequency of Safety-Relevant
Hazards Exceeds Threshold.
--Final Reports to FRA on 720 Railroads...... 10 reports......... 4 hours............ 40
Countermeasures to Reduce
Frequency of Safety-Relevant
Hazard(s).
229.313--Product Testing Results-- 720 Railroads...... 120,000 records.... 5 minutes.......... 10,000
Records.

[[Page 2224]]

229.315--Operations and 720 Railroads...... 300 manuals........ 40 hours........... 12,000
Maintenance Manual--All Product
Documents.
--Configuration Management 720 Railroads...... 300 plans.......... 8 hours............ 2,400
Control Plans.
--Identification of Safety- 720 Railroads...... 60,000 components.. 5 minutes.......... 5,000
Critical Components.
229.317--Product Training and 720 Railroads...... 300 programs....... 40 hours........... 12,000
Qualifications Program.
--Product Training of Individuals 720 Railroads...... 10,000 trained 30 minutes......... 5,000
employees.
--Refresher Training............. 720 Railroads...... 1,000 trained 20 minutes......... 333
employees.
--RR Regular and Periodic 720 Railroads...... 300 evaluations.... 4 hours............ 1,200
Evaluation of Effectiveness of
Training Program.
--Records of Qualified 727 Railroads...... 10,000 records..... 10 minutes......... 1,667
Individuals.
Appendix F--Guidance for 720 Railroads/3 1 assessment....... 4,000 hours........ 4,000
Verification and Validation of Manufacturers.
Product--Third Party Assessment.
--Reviewer Final Report.......... 720 Railroads/3 1 report........... 80 hours........... 80
Manufacturers.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: Whether these
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of FRA, including whether the information
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of
the paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Mr. Robert Brogan,
Office of Safety, Information Clearance Officer, at 202-493-6292, or
Ms. Kimberly Toone, Office of Information Technology, at 202-493-6139.
Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the
collection of information requirements should direct them to Mr. Robert
Brogan or Ms. Kimberly Toone, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also
be submitted via e-mail to Mr. Brogan or Ms. Toone at the following
address: [email protected]; [email protected]
OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this proposed rule between 30 and
60 days after publication of this document in the Federal Register.
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. The final rule will
respond to any OMB or public comments on the information collection
requirements contained in this proposal.
FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of the final rule.
The OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate
notice in the Federal Register.

Federalism Implications

FRA has analyzed this proposed rule in accordance with the
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132, issued on
August 4, 1999, which directs Federal agencies to exercise great care
in establishing policies that have federalism implications. See 64 FR
43255. This proposed rule will not have a substantial effect on the
States, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
various levels of government. This proposed rule will not have
federalism implications that impose any direct compliance costs on
State and local governments.
FRA notes that the RSAC, which endorsed and recommended the
majority of this proposed rule to FRA, has as permanent members, two
organizations representing State and local interests: AASHTO and the
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM). Both of these State
organizations concurred with the RSAC recommendation endorsing this
proposed rule. The RSAC regularly provides recommendations to the FRA
Administrator for solutions to regulatory issues that reflect
significant input from its State members. To date, FRA has received no
indication of concerns about the Federalism implications of this
rulemaking from these representatives or of any other representatives
of State government. Consequently, FRA concludes that this proposed
rule has no federalism implications, other than the preemption of state
laws covering the subject matter of this proposed rule, which occurs by
operation of law as discussed below.
This proposed rule could have preemptive effect by operation of law
under certain provisions of the Federal railroad safety statutes,
specifically the former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (former
FRSA), repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106, and the former
Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act at 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and
recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703. The former FRSA provides that
States may not adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or
order related to railroad safety or security that covers the subject
matter of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security
matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies
under the ``local safety or security hazard'' exception to section
20106. Moreover, the former LIA has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court as preempting the field concerning locomotive safety. See Napier
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this proposed regulation in accordance with its
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures)
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National

[[Page 2225]]

Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental
statutes, Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA
has determined that this proposed regulation is not a major FRA action
(requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment) because it is categorically excluded from
detailed environmental review pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA's
Procedures. 64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Section 4(c)(20) reads as
follows: (c) Actions categorically excluded. Certain classes of FRA
actions have been determined to be categorically excluded from the
requirements of these Procedures as they do not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Promulgation of railroad safety rules and policy statements that do not
result in significantly increased emissions or air or water pollutants
or noise or increased traffic congestion in any mode of transportation
are excluded.
In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's Procedures, the
agency has further concluded that no extraordinary circumstances exist
with respect to this regulation that might trigger the need for a more
detailed environmental review. As a result, FRA finds that this
proposed regulation is not a major Federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

Pursuant to Section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless
otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector
(other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate
requirements specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act
(2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general
notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may
result in expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted
annually for inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any
final rule for which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was
published, the agency shall prepare a written statement'' detailing the
effect on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector.
For the year 2010, this monetary amount of $100,000,000 has been
adjusted to $140,800,000 to account for inflation. This proposed rule
would not result in the expenditure of more than $140,800,000 by the
public sector in any one year, and thus preparation of such a statement
is not required.

Privacy Act

FRA wishes to inform all potential commenters that anyone is able
to search the electronic form of all comments received into any agency
docket by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing
the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70;
Pages 19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 229

Locomotive headlights, Locomotives, Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 238

Passenger equipment, Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

The Proposed Rule

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA proposes to amend
parts 229 and 238 of chapter II, subtitle B of Title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 229--[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-03, 20107, 20133, 20137-38, 20143,
20701-03, 21301-02, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2401, note; and 49 CFR 1.49.

2. Section 229.5 is amended by adding in alphabetical order the
following definitions to read as follows:

Sec. 229.5 Definitions.

* * * * *
Alerter means a device or system installed in the locomotive cab to
promote continuous, active locomotive engineer attentiveness by
monitoring select locomotive engineer-induced control activities. If
fluctuation of a monitored locomotive engineer-induced control activity
is not detected within a predetermined time, a sequence of audible and
visual alarms is activated so as to progressively prompt a response by
the locomotive engineer. Failure by the locomotive engineer to
institute a change of state in a monitored control, or acknowledge the
alerter alarm activity through a manual reset provision, results in a
penalty brake application that brings the locomotive or train to a
stop.
* * * * *
Assignment Address means a unique identifier of the RCL that
insures that only the OCU's linked to a specific RCL can command that
RCL.
* * * * *
Controlling locomotive means a locomotive from where the operator
controls the traction and braking functions of the locomotive or
locomotive consist, normally the lead locomotive.
* * * * *
Locomotive Control Unit (LCU) means a system onboard an RCL that
communicates via a radio link which receives, processes, and confirms
commands from the OCU, which directs the locomotive to execute them.
* * * * *
Operator Control Unit (OCU) means a mobile unit that communicates
via a radio link the commands for movement (direction, speed, braking)
or for operations (bell, horn, sand) to an RCL.
* * * * *
Remote Control Locomotive (RCL) means a remote control locomotive
that, through use of a radio link can be operated by a person not
physically within the confines of the locomotive cab. For purposes of
this definition, the term RCL does not refer to a locomotive or group
of locomotives remotely controlled from the lead locomotive of a train,
as in a distributed power arrangement.
Remote Control Operator (RCO) means a person who utilizes an OCU in
connection with operations involving a RCL with or without cars.
Remote Control Pullback Protection means a function of a RCL that
enforces speeds and stops in the direction of pulling movement.
* * * * *
3. Section 229.7 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.7 Prohibited acts and penalties.

(a) Federal Rail Safety Law (49 U.S.C. 20701-20703) makes it
unlawful for any carrier to use or permit to be used on its line any
locomotive unless the entire locomotive and its appurtenances--
(1) Are in proper condition and safe to operate in the service to
which they are put, without unnecessary peril to life or limb; and
(2) Have been inspected and tested as required by this part.
(b) Any person (including but not limited to a railroad; any
manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a
railroad; any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of

[[Page 2226]]

railroad equipment, track, or facilities; any employee of such owner,
manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or independent contractor) who violates
any requirement of this part or of the Federal Rail Safety Laws or
causes the violation of any such requirement is subject to a civil
penalty of at least $650, but not more than $25,000 per violation,
except that: Penalties may be assessed against individuals only for
willful violations, and, where a grossly negligent violation or a
pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death
or injury to persons, or has caused death or injury, a penalty not to
exceed $100,000 per violation may be assessed. Each day a violation
continues shall constitute a separate offense. Appendix B of this part
contains a statement of agency civil penalty policy.
(c) Any person who knowingly and willfully falsifies a record or
report required by this part is subject to criminal penalties under 49
U.S.C. 21311.
4. Section 229.15 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 229.15 Remote control locomotives.

(a) Design and operation. (1) Each locomotive equipped with a
locomotive control unit (LCU) shall respond only to the operator
control units (OCUs) assigned to that receiver.
(2) If one or more OCUs are assigned to a LCU, the LCU shall
respond only to the OCU that is in primary command. If a subsequent OCU
is assigned to a LCU, the previous assignment will be automatically
cancelled.
(3) If more than one OCU is assigned to a LCU, the secondary OCUs'
man down feature, bell, horn, and emergency brake application functions
shall remain active.
The remote control system shall be designed so that if the signal
from the OCU to the RCL is interrupted for a set period not to exceed
five seconds, the remote control system shall cause:
(i) A full service application of the locomotive and train brakes;
and
(ii) The elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
(4) Each OCU shall be designed to control only one RCL at a time.
OCUs having the capability to control more than one RCL shall have a
means to lock in one RCL ``assignment address'' to prevent simultaneous
control over more than one locomotive.
(5) If an OCU is equipped with an ``on'' and ``off'' switch, when
the switch is moved from the ``on'' to the ``off'' position, the remote
control system shall cause:
(i) A full service application of the locomotive train brakes; and
(ii) The elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
(6) Each RCL shall have a distinct and unambiguous audible or
visual warning device that indicates to nearby personnel that the
locomotive is under active remote control operation.
(7) When the main reservoir pressure drops below 90 psi, a RCL
shall initiate a full service application of the locomotive and train
brakes, and eliminate locomotive tractive effort.
(8) When the air valves and the electrical selector switch on the
RCL are moved from manual to remote control mode or from remote control
to manual mode, an emergency application of the locomotive and train
brakes shall be initiated.
(9) Operating control handles located in the RCL cab shall be
removed, pinned in place, protected electronically, or otherwise
rendered inoperable as necessary to prevent movement caused by the
RCL's cab controls while the RCL is being operated by remote control.
(10) The RCL system (both the OCU and LCU), shall be designed to
perform a self diagnostic test of the electronic components of the
system. The system shall be designed to immediately effect a full
service application of the locomotive and train brakes and the
elimination of locomotive tractive effort in the event a failure is
detected.
(11) Each RCL shall be tagged at the locomotive control stand
throttle indicating the locomotive is being used in a remote control
mode. The tag shall be removed when the locomotive is placed back in
manual mode.
(12) Each OCU shall have the following controls and switches and
shall be capable of performing the following functions:
(i) Directional control;
(ii) Throttle or speed control;
(iii) Locomotive independent air brake application and release;
(iv) Automatic train air brake application and release control;
(v) Audible warning device control (horn);
(vi) Audible bell control, if equipped;
(vii) Sand control (unless automatic);
(viii) Bi-directional headlight control;
(ix) Emergency air brake application switch;
(x) Generator field switch or equivalent to eliminate tractive
effort to the locomotive;
(xi) Audio/visual indication of wheel slip/slide;
(xii) Audio indication of movement of the RCL; and
(xiv) Require at least two separate actions by the RCO to begin
movement of the RCL.
(l3) Each OCU shall be equipped with the following features:
(i) A harness with a breakaway safety feature;
(ii) An operator alertness device that requires manual resetting or
its equivalent.
The alertness device shall incorporate a timing sequence not to
exceed 60 seconds. Failure to reset the switch within the timing
sequence shall cause an application of the locomotive and train brakes,
and the elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
(iii) A tilt feature that, when tilted to a predetermined angle,
shall cause:
(A) An emergency application of the locomotive and train brakes,
and the elimination of locomotive tractive effort; and
(B) If the OCU is equipped with a tilt bypass system that permits
the tilt protection feature to be temporarily disabled, this bypass
feature shall deactivate within 15 seconds on the primary OCU and
within 60 seconds for all secondary OCUs, unless reactivated by the
RCO.
(14) Each OCU shall be equipped with one of the following control
systems:
(A) An automatic speed control system with a maximum 15 mph speed
limiter; or
(B) A graduated throttle and brake. A graduated throttle and brake
control system built after (90 days after date of rule) shall be
equipped with a speed limiter to a maximum of 15 mph.
(15) RCL systems built after (DATE 90 DAYS AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF
THE FINAL RULE) shall be equipped to automatically notify the railroad
in the event the RCO becomes incapacitated or OCU tilt feature is
activated.
(16) RCL systems built prior to (DATE 90 DAYS AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE FINAL RULE) not equipped with automatic notification of operator
incapacitated feature may not be utilized in one-person operation.
(b) Inspection, testing, and repair. (1) Each time an OCU is linked
to a RCL, and at the start of each shift, a railroad shall test:
(i) The air brakes and the OCU's safety features, including the
tilt switch and alerter device; and
(ii) The man down/tilt feature automatic notification.
(2) An OCU shall not continue in use with any defective safety
feature identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(3) A defective OCU shall be tracked under its own identification
number assigned by the railroad. Records of repairs shall be maintained
by the railroad and made available to FRA upon request.

[[Page 2227]]

(4) Each time an RCL is placed in service and at the start of each
shift locomotives that utilize a positive train stop system shall
perform a conditioning run over tracks that the positive train stop
system is being utilized on to ensure that the system functions as
intended.
5. Section 229.19 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.19 Prior waivers.

Waivers from any requirement of this part, issued prior to January
12, 2011, shall terminate on the date specified in the letter granting
the waiver. If no date is specified, then the waiver shall
automatically terminate on January 12, 2016.
6. Section 229.20 is added to subpart A to read as follows:

Sec. 229.20 Electronic record keeping.

(a) General. For purposes of compliance with the recordkeeping
requirements of this part, except for the daily inspection record
maintained on the locomotive required by Sec. 229.21, the cab copy of
Form FRA F 6180-49-A required by Sec. 229.23, the fragmented air brake
maintenance record required by Sec. 229.27, and records required under
Sec. 229.9, a railroad may create, maintain, and transfer any of the
records required by this part through electronic transmission, storage,
and retrieval provided that all of the requirements contained in this
section are met.
(b) Design requirements. Any electronic record system used to
create, maintain, or transfer a record required to be maintained by
this part shall meet the following design requirements:
(1) The electronic record system shall be designed such that the
integrity of each record is maintained through appropriate levels of
security such as recognition of an electronic signature, or other
means, which uniquely identify the initiating person as the author of
that record. No two persons shall have the same electronic identity;
(2) The electronic system shall ensure that each record cannot be
modified, or replaced, once the record is transmitted;
(3) Any amendment to a record shall be electronically stored apart
from the record which it amends. Each amendment to a record shall
uniquely identify the person making the amendment;
(4) The electronic system shall provide for the maintenance of
inspection records as originally submitted without corruption or loss
of data; and
(5) Policies and procedures shall be in place to prevent persons
from altering electronic records, or otherwise interfering with the
electronic system.
(c) Operational requirements. Any electronic record system used to
create, maintain, or transfer a record required to be maintained by
this part shall meet the following operating requirements:
(1) The electronic storage of any record required by this part
shall be initiated by the person performing the activity to which the
record pertains within 24 hours following the completion of the
activity; and
(2) For each locomotive for which records of inspection or
maintenance required by this part are maintained electronically, the
electronic record system shall automatically notify the railroad each
time the locomotive is due for an inspection, or maintenance that the
electronic system is tracking. The automatic notification tracking
requirement does not apply to daily inspections.
(d) Accessibility and availability requirements. Any electronic
record system used to create, maintain, or transfer a record required
to be maintained by this part shall meet the following access and
availability requirements:
(1) The carrier shall provide FRA with all electronic records
maintained for compliance with this part for any specific locomotives
at any mechanical department terminal upon request;
(2) Paper copies of electronic records and amendments to those
records that may be necessary to document compliance with this part,
shall be provided to FRA for inspection and copying upon request. Paper
copies shall be provided to FRA no later than 15 days from the date the
request is made;
(3) Inspection records required by this part shall be available to
persons who performed the inspection and to persons performing
subsequent inspections on the same locomotive.
7. Section 229.23 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.23 Periodic inspection: General.

(a) Each locomotive shall be inspected at each periodic inspection
to determine whether it complies with this part. Except as provided in
Sec. 229.9, all non-complying conditions shall be repaired before the
locomotive is used. Except as provided in Sec. 229.33, the interval
between any two periodic inspections may not exceed 92 days. Periodic
inspections shall only be made where adequate facilities are available.
At each periodic inspection, a locomotive shall be positioned so that a
person may safely inspect the entire underneath portion of the
locomotive.
(b) Each new locomotive shall receive an initial periodic
inspection before it is used. Except as provided in Sec. 229.33, each
locomotive shall receive an initial periodic inspection within 92 days
of the last 30-day inspection performed under the prior rules (49 CFR
230.331 and 230.451). At the initial periodic inspection, the date and
place of the last tests performed that are the equivalent of the tests
required by Sec. Sec. 229.27, 229.29, and 229.31 shall be entered on
Form FRA F 6180-49A. These dates shall determine when the tests first
become due under Sec. Sec. 229.27, 229.29, and 229.31. Out of use
credit may be carried over from Form FRA F 6180-49 and entered on Form
FRA F 6180-49A.
(c) Each periodic inspection shall be recorded on Form FRA F 6180-
49A. The form shall be signed by the person conducting the inspection
and certified by that person's supervisor that the work was done. The
form shall be displayed under a transparent cover in a conspicuous
place in the cab of each locomotive. A railroad maintaining and
transferring records as provided for in Sec. 229.20 shall print the
name of the person who performed the inspections, repairs, or certified
work on the Form FRA F 6180-49A that is displayed in the cab of each
locomotive.
(d) At the first periodic inspection in each calendar year the
carrier shall remove from each locomotive Form FRA F 6180-49A covering
the previous calendar year. If a locomotive does not receive its first
periodic inspection in a calendar year before April 2 because it is out
of use, the form shall be promptly replaced. The Form FRA F 6180-49A
covering the preceding year for each locomotive, in or out of use,
shall be signed by the railroad official responsible for the locomotive
and filed as required in Sec. 229.23(f). The date and place of the
last periodic inspection and the date and place of the last tests
performed under Sec. Sec. 229.27, 229.29, and 229.31 shall be
transferred to the replacement Form FRA F 6180-49A.
(e) The railroad mechanical officer who is in charge of a
locomotive shall maintain in his office a secondary record of the
information reported on Form FRA F 6180-49A. The secondary record shall
be retained until Form FRA F 6180-49A has been removed from the
locomotive and filed in the railroad office of the mechanical officer
in charge of the locomotive. If the Form FRA F 6180-49A removed from
the locomotive is not clearly legible, the secondary record shall be
retained until the Form FRA F 6180-49A for the succeeding year is
filed. The Form F 6180-49A removed from a locomotive shall be retained
until the Form FRA F

[[Page 2228]]

6180-49A for the succeeding year is filed.
(f) The railroad shall maintain, and provide employees performing
inspections under this section with, a list of the defects and repairs
made on each locomotive over the last ninety-two days;
(g) The railroad shall provide employees performing inspections
under this section with a document containing all tests conducted since
the last periodic inspection, and procedures needed to perform the
inspection.
8. Section 229.25 is amended by revising paragraphs (d) and (e),
and adding paragraph (f) to read as follows:

Sec. 229.25 Test: Every periodic inspection.

* * * * *
(d) Event recorder. A microprocessor-based self-monitoring event
recorder, if installed, is exempt from periodic inspection under
paragraphs (d)(1) through (5) of this section and shall be inspected
annually as required by Sec. 229.27(c). Other types of event
recorders, if installed, shall be inspected, maintained, and tested in
accordance with instructions of the manufacturer, supplier, or owner
thereof and in accordance with the following criteria:
(1) A written or electronic copy of the instructions in use shall
be kept at the point where the work is performed and a hard-copy
version, written in the English language, shall be made available upon
request to FRA.
(2) The event recorder shall be tested before any maintenance work
is performed on it. At a minimum, the event recorder test shall include
cycling, as practicable, all required recording elements and
determining the full range of each element by reading out recorded
data.
(3) If the pre-maintenance test reveals that the device is not
recording all the specified data and that all recordings are within the
designed recording elements, this fact shall be noted, and maintenance
and testing shall be performed as necessary until a subsequent test is
successful.
(4) When a successful test is accomplished, a copy of the data-
verification results shall be maintained in any medium with the
maintenance records for the locomotive until the next one is filed.
(5) A railroad's event recorder periodic maintenance shall be
considered effective if 90 percent of the recorders on locomotives
inbound for periodic inspection in any given calendar month are still
fully functional; maintenance practices and test intervals shall be
adjusted as necessary to yield effective periodic maintenance.
(e) Remote control locomotive. Remote control locomotive system
components that interface with the mechanical devices of the locomotive
shall be tested including, but not limited to, air pressure monitoring
devices, pressure switches, and speed sensors.
(f) Alerters. The alerter shall be tested, and all automatic timing
resets shall function as intended.
9. Section 229.27 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.27 Annual tests.

(a) All testing under this section shall be performed at intervals
that do not exceed 368 calendar days.
(b) Load meters that indicate current (amperage) being applied to
traction motors shall be tested. Each device used by the engineer to
aid in the control or braking of the train or locomotive that provides
an indication of air pressure electronically shall be tested by
comparison with a test gauge or self-test designed for this purpose. An
error greater than five percent or greater than three pounds per square
inch shall be corrected. The date and place of the test shall be
recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A, and the person conducting the test and
that person's supervisor shall sign the form.
(c) A microprocessor-based event recorder with a self-monitoring
feature equipped to verify that all data elements required by this part
are recorded, requires further maintenance and testing only if either
or both of the following conditions exist:
(1) The self-monitoring feature displays an indication of a
failure. If a failure is displayed, further maintenance and testing
must be performed until a subsequent test is successful. When a
successful test is accomplished, a record, in any medium, shall be made
of that fact and of any maintenance work necessary to achieve the
successful result. This record shall be available at the location where
the locomotive is maintained until a record of a subsequent successful
test is filed; or,
(2) A download of the event recorder, taken within the preceding 30
days and reviewed for the previous 48 hours of locomotive operation,
reveals a failure to record a regularly recurring data element or
reveals that any required data element is not representative of the
actual operations of the locomotive during this time period. If the
review is not successful, further maintenance and testing shall be
performed until a subsequent test is successful. When a successful test
is accomplished, a record, in any medium, shall be made of that fact
and of any maintenance work necessary to achieve the successful result.
This record shall be kept at the location where the locomotive is
maintained until a record of a subsequent successful test is filed. The
download shall be taken from information stored in the certified
crashworthy crash hardened event recorder memory module if the
locomotive is so equipped.
10. Section 229.29 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.29 Air brake system calibration, maintenance, and testing.

(a) A locomotive's air brake system shall receive the calibration,
maintenance, and testing as prescribed in this section. The level of
maintenance and testing and the intervals for receiving such
maintenance and testing of locomotives with various types of air brake
systems shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs (d) through
(f) of this section. Records of the maintenance and testing required in
this section shall be maintained in accordance with paragraph (g) of
this section.
(b) Except for DMU or MU locomotives covered under Sec. 238.309 of
this chapter, the air flow method (AFM) indicator shall be calibrated
in accordance with section 232.205(c)(1)(iii) at intervals not to
exceed 92 days, and records shall be maintained as prescribed in
paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
(c) Except for DMU or MU locomotives covered under Sec. 238.309 of
this chapter, the extent of air brake system maintenance and testing
that is required on a locomotive shall be in accordance with the
following levels:
(1) Level one: Locomotives shall have the filtering devices or dirt
collectors located in the main reservoir supply line to the air brake
system cleaned, repaired, or replaced.
(2) Level two: Locomotives shall have the following components
cleaned, repaired, and tested: Brake cylinder relay valve portions;
main reservoir safety valves; brake pipe vent valve portions; and, feed
and reducing valve portions in the air brake system (including related
dirt collectors and filters).
(3) Level three: Locomotives shall have the components identified
in this paragraph removed from the locomotive and disassembled, cleaned
and lubricated (if necessary), and tested. In addition, all parts of
such components that can deteriorate within the inspection interval as
defined in

[[Page 2229]]

paragraphs (d) through (f) of this section shall be replaced and
tested. The components include: All pneumatic components of the
locomotive equipment's brake system that contain moving parts, and are
sealed against air leaks; all valves and valve portions; electric-
pneumatic master controllers in the air brake system; and all air brake
related filters and dirt collectors.
(d) Except for MU locomotives covered under Sec. 238.309 of this
chapter, all locomotives shall receive level one air brake maintenance
and testing as described in this section at intervals that do not
exceed 368 days.
(e) Locomotives equipped with an air brake system not specifically
identified in paragraphs (f)(1) through (3) of this section shall
receive level two air brake maintenance and testing as described in
this section at intervals that do not exceed 368 days and level three
air brake maintenance and testing at intervals that do not exceed 736
days.
(f) Level two and level three air brake maintenance and testing
shall be performed on each locomotive identified in this paragraph at
the following intervals:
(1) At intervals that do not exceed 1,104 days for a locomotive
equipped with a 26-L or equivalent brake system;
(2) At intervals that do not exceed 1,472 days for locomotives
equipped with an air dryer and a 26-L or equivalent brake system and
for locomotives not equipped with an air compressor and that are semi-
permanently coupled and dedicated to locomotives with an air dryer; or
(3) At intervals that do not exceed 1,840 days for locomotives
equipped with CCB-1, CCB-2, CCB-26, EPIC 1 (formerly EPIC 3102), EPIC
3102D2, EPIC 2, KB-HS1, or Fastbrake brake systems.
(g) Records of the air brake system maintenance and testing
required by this section shall be generated and maintained in
accordance with the following:
(1) The date of AFM indicator calibration shall be recorded and
certified in the remarks section of Form F6180-49A.
(2) The date and place of the cleaning, repairing and testing
required by this section shall be recorded on Form FRA F6180-49A, and
the work shall be certified. A record of the parts of the air brake
system that are cleaned, repaired, and tested shall be kept in the
railroad's files or in the cab of the locomotive.
(3) At its option, a railroad may fragment the work required by
this section. In that event, a separate record shall be maintained
under a transparent cover in the cab. The air record shall include: The
locomotive number; a list of the air brake components; and the date and
place of the inspection and testing of each component. The signature of
the person performing the work and the signature of that person's
supervisor shall be included for each component. A duplicate record
shall be maintained in the railroad's files.
11. Section 229.46 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.46 Brakes: General.

(a) Before each trip, the railroad shall know the following:
(1) The locomotive brakes and devices for regulating pressures,
including but not limited to the automatic and independent brake
control systems, operate as intended; and
(2) The water and oil have been drained from the air brake system
of all locomotives in the consist.
(b) A locomotive with an inoperative or ineffective automatic or
independent brake control system will be considered to be operating as
intended for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, if all of the
following conditions are met:
(1) The locomotive is in a trailing position and is not the
controlling locomotive in a distributed power train consist;
(2) The railroad has previously determined, in conjunction with the
locomotive and/or air brake manufacturer, that placing such a
locomotive in trailing position adequately isolates the non-functional
valves so as to allow safe operation of the brake systems from the
controlling locomotive;
(3) If deactivation of the circuit breaker for the air brake system
is required, it shall be specified in the railroad's operating rules;
(4) A tag shall immediately be placed on the isolation switch of
the locomotive giving the date and location and stating that the unit
may only be used in a trailing position and may not be used as a lead
or controlling locomotive;
(5) The tag required in paragraph (b)(4) of this section remains
attached to the isolation switch of the locomotive until repairs are
made; and
(6) The inoperative or ineffective brake control system is repaired
prior to or at the next periodic inspection.
12. Section 229.85 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.85 High voltage markings: Doors, cover plates, or barriers.

All doors, cover plates, or barriers providing direct access to
high voltage equipment shall be marked ``Danger--High Voltage'' or with
the word ``Danger'' and the normal voltage carried by the parts so
protected.
13. Section 229.114 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 229.114 Steam generator inspections and tests.

(a) Periodic steam generator inspection. Except as provided in
Sec. 229.33, each steam generator shall be inspected and tested in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section at intervals not to
exceed 92 days, unless the steam generator is isolated in accordance
with paragraph (b) of this section. All non-complying conditions shall
be repaired or the steam generator shall be isolated as prescribed in
paragraph (b) of this section before the locomotive is used.
(b) Isolation of a steam generator. A steam generator will be
considered isolated if the water suction pipe to the water pump and the
leads to the main switch (steam generator switch) are disconnected, and
the train line shut-off-valve is wired closed or a blind gasket is
applied. Before an isolated steam generator is returned to use, it
shall be inspected and tested pursuant to paragraph (d) of this
section.
(c) Each periodic steam generator inspection and test shall be
recorded on Form FRA F6180-49A required by paragraph Sec. 229.23. When
Form FRA F6180-49A for the locomotive is replaced, data for the steam
generator inspections shall be transferred to the new Form FRA F6180-
49A.
(d) Each periodic steam generator inspection and test shall include
the following tests and requirements:
(1) All electrical devices and visible insulation shall be
inspected.
(2) All automatic controls, alarms and protective devices shall be
inspected and tested.
(3) Steam pressure gauges shall be tested by comparison with a
dead-weight tester or a test gauge designed for this purpose. The
siphons to the steam gauges shall be removed and their connections
examined to determine that they are open.
(4) Safety valves shall be set and tested under steam after the
steam pressure gauge is tested.
(e) Annual steam generator tests. Each steam generator that is not
isolated in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, shall be
subjected to a hydrostatic pressure at least 25 percent above the
working pressure and the visual return water-flow indicator shall be
removed and inspected. The testing under this paragraph shall be
performed at intervals that do not exceed 368 calendar days.

[[Page 2230]]

14. Section 229.119 is amended by revising paragraph (d) to read as
follows:

Sec. 229.119 Cabs, floors, and passageways.

* * * * *
(d) Any occupied locomotive cab shall be provided with proper
ventilation and with a heating arrangement that maintains a temperature
of at least 60 degrees Fahrenheit 6 inches above the center of each
seat in the cab compartment.
* * * * *
15. Section 229.123 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.123 Pilots, snowplows, end plates.

(a) Each lead locomotive shall be equipped with a pilot, snowplow,
or end plate that extends across both rails. The minimum clearance
above the rail of the pilot, snowplow or end plate shall be 3 inches.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the maximum
clearance shall be 6 inches. When the locomotive is equipped with a
combination of the equipment listed in this paragraph, each extending
across both rails, only the lowest piece of that equipment must satisfy
clearance requirements of this section.
(b) To provide clearance for passing over retarders, locomotives
utilized in hump yard or switching service at hump yard locations may
have pilot, snowplow, or end plate maximum height of 9 inches.
(1) Each locomotive equipped with a pilot, snowplow, or end plate
with clearance above 6 inches shall be prominently stenciled at each
end of the locomotive with the words ``9-inch Maximum End Plate Height,
Yard or Trail Service Only.''
(2) When operated in switching service in a leading position,
locomotives with a pilot, snowplow, or end plate clearance above 6
inches shall be limited to 10 miles per hour over grade crossings.
(3) Train crews shall be notified in writing of the restrictions on
the locomotive, by label or stencil in the cab, or by written operating
instruction given to the crew and maintained in the cab of the
locomotive.
(4) Pilot, snowplow, or end plate clearance above 6 inches shall be
noted in the remarks section of Form FRA 6180-49a.
(5) Locomotives with a pilot, snowplow, or end plate clearance
above 6 inches shall not be placed in the lead position when being
moved under section Sec. 229.9.
16. Section 229.125 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and
(d)(2) and (3) to read as follows:

Sec. 229.125 Headlights and auxiliary lights.

(a) Each lead locomotive used in road service shall illuminate its
headlight while the locomotive is in use. When illuminated, the
headlight shall produce a peak intensity of at least 200,000 candela
and produce at least 3,000 candela at an angle of 7.5 degrees and at
least 400 candela at an angle of 20 degrees from the centerline of the
locomotive when the light is aimed parallel to the tracks. If a
locomotive or locomotive consist in road service is regularly required
to run backward for any portion of its trip other than to pick up a
detached portion of its train or to make terminal movements, it shall
also have on its rear a headlight that meets the intensity requirements
above. Each headlight shall be aimed to illuminate a person at least
800 feet ahead and in front of the headlight. For purposes of this
section, a headlight shall be comprised of either one or two lamps.
(1) If a locomotive is equipped with a single-lamp headlight, the
single lamp shall produce a peak intensity of at least 200,000 candela
and shall produce at least 3,000 candela at an angle of 7.5 degrees and
at least 400 candela at an angle of 20 degrees from the centerline of
the locomotive when the light is aimed parallel to the tracks. The
following operative lamps meet the standard set forth in this
paragraph: A single incandescent PAR-56, 200-watt, 30-volt lamp; a
single halogen PAR-56, 200-watt, 30-volt lamp; a single halogen PAR-56,
350-watt, 75-volt lamp, or a single lamp meeting the intensity
requirements given above.
(2) If a locomotive is equipped with a dual-lamp headlight, a peak
intensity of at least 200,000 candela and at least 3,000 candela at an
angle of 7.5 degrees and at least 400 candela at an angle of 20 degrees
from the centerline of the locomotive when the light is aimed parallel
to the tracks shall be produced by the headlight based either on a
single lamp capable of individually producing the required peak
intensity or on the candela produced by the headlight with both lamps
illuminated. If both lamps are needed to produce the required peak
intensity, then both lamps in the headlight shall be operational. The
following operative lamps meet the standard set forth in this paragraph
(a)(2): A single incandescent PAR-56, 200-watt, 30-volt lamp; a single
halogen PAR-56, 200-watt, 30-volt lamp; a single halogen PAR-56, 350-
watt, 75-volt lamp; two incandescent PAR-56, 350-watt, 75-volt lamps;
or lamp(s) meeting the intensity requirements given above.
(i) A locomotive equipped with the two incandescent PAR-56, 350-
watt, 75 volt lamps which has an en route failure of one lamp in the
headlight fixture, may continue in service as a lead locomotive until
its next daily inspection required by Sec. 229.21 only if:
(A) Auxiliary lights burn steadily;
(B) Auxiliary lights are aimed horizontally parallel to the
longitudinal centerline of the locomotive or aimed to cross no less
than 400 feet in front of the locomotive.
(C) Second headlight lamp and both auxiliary lights continue to
operate.
(ii) [Reserved]
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Each auxiliary light shall produce a peak intensity of at least
200,000 candela or shall produce at least 3,000 candela at an angle of
7.5 degrees and at least 400 candela at an angle of 20 degrees from the
centerline of the locomotive when the light is aimed parallel to the
tracks. Any of the following operative lamps meet the standard set
forth in this paragraph: An incandescent PAR-56, 200-watt, 30-volt
lamp; a halogen PAR-56, 200-watt, 30-volt lamp; a halogen PAR-56, 350-
watt, 75-volt lamp; an incandescent PAR-56, 350-watt, 75-volt lamp; or
a single lamp having equivalent intensities at the specified angles.
(3) The auxiliary lights shall be aimed horizontally within 15
degrees of the longitudinal centerline of the locomotive.
* * * * *
17. Section 229.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)
introductory text, (b)(1) and (2), and (c) to read as follows:

Sec. 229.133 Interim locomotive conspicuity measures--auxiliary
external lights.

* * * * *
(b) Each qualifying arrangement of auxiliary external lights shall
conform to one of the following descriptions:
(1) Strobe lights. (i) Strobe lights shall consist of two white
stroboscopic lights, each with ``effective intensity,'' as defined by
the Illuminating Engineering Society's Guide for Calculating the
Effective Intensity of Flashing Signal Lights (November 1964), of at
least 500 candela.
(ii) The flash rate of strobe lights shall be at least 40 flashes
per minute and at most 180 flashes per minute.
(iii) Strobe lights shall be placed at the front of the locomotive,
at least 48 inches apart, and at least 36 inches above the top of the
rail.
(2) Oscillating light. (i) An oscillating light shall consist of:
(A) One steadily burning white light producing at least 200,000
candela in a moving beam that depicts a circle or a

[[Page 2231]]

horizontal figure ``8'' to the front, about the longitudinal centerline
of the locomotive; or
(B) Two or more white lights producing at least 200,000 candela
each, at one location on the front of the locomotive, that flash
alternately with beams within five degrees horizontally to either side
of the longitudinal centerline of the locomotive.
(ii) An oscillating light may incorporate a device that
automatically extinguishes the white light if display of a light of
another color is required to protect the safety of railroad operations.
* * * * *
(c)(1) Any lead locomotive equipped with oscillating lights as
described in paragraph (b)(2) that were ordered for installation on
that locomotive prior to January 1, 1996, is considered in compliance
with Sec. 229.125(d) (1) through (3).
(2) Any lead locomotive equipped with strobe lights as described in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section and operated at speeds no greater than
40 miles per hour, is considered in compliance with Sec. 229.125(d)
(1) through (3) until the locomotive is retired or rebuilt, whichever
comes first.
* * * * *
18. Section 229.140 is added to subpart C to read as follows:

Sec. 229.140 Alerters.

(a) Except for locomotives covered by part 238 of this chapter,
each of the following locomotives shall be equipped with a functioning
alerter as described in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section:
(1) A new locomotive that is placed in service for the first time
on or after [DATE 90 DAYS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE]
when used as a controlling locomotive and operated at speeds in excess
of 25 mph.
(2) All controlling locomotives operated at speeds in excess of 25
mph on or after January 1, 2016.
(b) The alerter on locomotives subject to paragraph (a) of this
section shall be equipped with a manual reset and the alerter warning
timing cycle shall automatically reset as the result of any of the
following operations, and at least three of the following automatic
resets shall be functional at any given time:
(1) Movement of the throttle handle;
(2) Movement of the dynamic brake control handle;
(3) Movement of the operator's horn activation handle;
(4) Movement of the operator's bell activation switch;
(5) Movement of the automatic brake valve handle; or
(6) Bailing the independent brake by depressing the independent
brake valve handle.
(c) All alerters shall provide an audio alarm upon expiration of
the timing cycle interval. An alerter on a locomotive that is placed in
service on or after [DATE 90 DAYS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL
RULE] shall display a visual indication to the operator at least five
seconds prior to an audio alarm. The visual indication on an alerter so
equipped shall be visible to the operator from their normal position in
the cab.
(d) Alerter warning timing cycle interval shall be within 10
seconds of the calculated setting utilizing the formula (timing cycle
specified in seconds = 2400 / track speed specified in miles per hour).
(e) Any locomotive that is equipped with an alerter shall have the
alerter functioning and operating as intended when the locomotive is
used as a controlling locomotive.
(f) A controlling locomotive equipped with an alerter shall be
tested prior to departure from each initial terminal, or prior to being
coupled as the lead locomotive in a locomotive consist by allowing the
warning timing cycle to expire that results in an application of the
locomotive brakes at a penalty rate.
19. Part 229 is amended by adding a new subpart E to read as
follows:
Subpart E--Locomotive Electronics
Sec.
229.301 Purpose and scope.
229.303 Applicability.
229.305 Definitions.
229.307 Safety Analysis.
229.309 Safety-critical changes and failures.
229.311 Review of SAs.
229.313 Product testing results and records.
229.315 Operations and Maintenance Manual.
229.317 Training and qualification program.
229.319 Operating personnel training.

Subpart E--Locomotive Electronics

Sec. 229.301 Purpose and scope.

(a) The purpose of this subpart is to promote the safe design,
operation, and maintenance of safety-critical, as defined in Sec.
229.305, electronic locomotive control systems, subsystems, and
components.
(b) Locomotive control systems or their functions that commingle or
interface with safety critical processor based signal and train control
systems are regulated under part 236 subparts H and I of this chapter.

Sec. 229.303 Applicability.

(a) The requirements of this subpart apply to all safety-critical
electronic locomotive control systems, subsystems, and components
(i.e.; ``products'' as defined in Sec. 229.305), except for the
following:
(1) Products that are in service prior to January 12, 2011.
(2) Products that are under development as of July 12, 2011, and
are placed in service prior to July 14, 2014.
(3) Products that commingle or interface with safety critical
processor based signal and train control systems;
(4) Products that are used during on-track testing within a test
facility; and
(5) Products that are used during on-track testing out-side a test
facility, if approved by FRA. To obtain FRA approval of on-track
testing outside of a test facility, a railroad shall submit a request
to FRA that provides:
(i) Adequate information regarding the function and history of the
product that it intends to use;
(ii) The proposed tests;
(iii) The date, time and location of the tests; and
(iv) The potential safety consequences that will result from
operating the product for purposes of testing.
(b) Railroads and vendors shall identify all products that are
under development to FRA by [DATE 6 MONTHS FROM PUBLICATION OF THE
FINAL RULE].
(c) The exceptions provided in paragraph (a) of this section do not
apply to products or product changes that result in degradation of
safety, or a material increase in safety-critical functionality.

Sec. 229.305 Definitions.

As used in this subpart--
Component means an electronic element, device, or appliance
(including hardware or software) that is part of a system or subsystem.
Configuration management control plan means a plan designed to
ensure that the proper and intended product configuration, including
the electronic hardware components and software version, is documented
and maintained through the life-cycle of the products in use.
Executive software means software common to all installations of a
given electronic product. It generally is used to schedule the
execution of the site-specific application programs, run timers, read
inputs, drive outputs, perform self-diagnostics, access and check
memory, and monitor the execution of the application software to detect
unsolicited changes in outputs.
Initialization refers to the startup process when it is determined
that a product has all required data input and the product is prepared
to function as intended.

[[Page 2232]]

Materials handling refers to explicit instructions for handling
safety-critical components established to comply with procedures
specified by the railroad.
New or next-generation locomotive control system means a locomotive
control system using technologies or combinations of technologies not
in use in revenue service as of January 12, 2011, or without
established histories of safe practice.
Product means any safety critical electronic locomotive control
system, subsystem, or component.
Revision control means a chain of custody regimen designed to
positively identify safety-critical components and spare equipment
availability, including repair/replacement tracking.
Safety Analysis refers to a formal set of documentation which
describes in detail all of the safety aspects of the product, including
but not limited to procedures for its development, installation,
implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, testing and
modification, as well as analyses supporting its safety claims.
Safety-critical, as applied to a function, a system, or any portion
thereof, means the correct performance of which is essential to safety
of personnel or equipment, or both; or the incorrect performance of
which could cause a hazardous condition, or allow a hazardous condition
which was intended to be prevented by the function or system to exist.
Subsystem means a defined portion of a system.
System refers to any electronic locomotive control system and
includes all subsystems and components thereof, as the context
requires.
Test facility means a track that is not part of the general
railroad system of transportation and is being used exclusively for the
purpose of testing equipment and has all of its public grade crossings
protected.

Sec. 229.307 Safety Analysis.

(a) A railroad shall develop a Safety Analysis (SA) for each
product subject to this subpart prior to the initial use of such
product on their railroad.
(b) The SA shall:
(1) Establish and document the minimum requirements that will
govern the development and implementation of all products subject to
this subpart, and be based on good engineering practice and should be
consistent with the guidance contained in Appendix F of this part in
order to establish that a product's safety-critical functions will
operate with a high degree of confidence in a fail-safe manner;
(2) Include procedures for immediate repair of safety-critical
functions; and
(3) Be made available to FRA upon request.
(c) Each railroad shall comply with the SA requirements and
procedures related to the development, implementation, and repair of a
product subject to this subpart.

Sec. 229.309 Safety-critical changes and failures.

(a) Whenever a planned safety-critical design change is made to a
product subject to this subpart, the railroad shall:
(1) Notify FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety of the design
changes;
(2) Update the SA as required;
(3) Conduct all safety critical changes in a manner that allows the
change to be audited;
(4) Specify all contractual arrangements with suppliers and private
equipment owners for notification of any and all electronic safety
critical changes as well as safety critical failures in their system,
subsystem, or components, and the reasons from the suppliers or
equipment owners, whether or not the railroad has experienced a failure
of that safety critical system, sub-system, or component;
(5) Specify the railroad's procedures for action upon receipt of
notification of a safety-critical change or failure of an electronic
system, sub-system, or component, and until the upgrade, patch, or
revision has been installed; and
(6) Identify all configuration/revision control measures designed
to ensure that safety-functional requirements and safety-critical
hazard mitigation processes are not compromised as a result of any such
change, and that any such change can be audited.
(b) Product suppliers and private equipment owners shall report any
safety critical changes and previously unidentified hazards to each
railroad using the product.
(c) Private equipment owners shall establish configuration/revision
control measures for control of safety critical changes and
identification of previously unidentified hazards.

Sec. 229.311 Review of SAs.

(a) Prior to the initial planned use of a product subject to this
subpart, a railroad shall inform the Associate Administrator for
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC
20590 of the intent to place this product in service. The notification
shall provide a description of the product, and identify the location
where the complete SA documentation described in Sec. 229.307 and the
training and qualification program described in Sec. 229.319 is
maintained.
(b) FRA may review and/or audit the SA within 60 days of receipt of
the notification or anytime after the product is placed in use.
(c) A railroad shall maintain and make available to FRA upon
request all documentation used to demonstrate that the product meets
the safety requirements of the SA for the life-cycle of the product.
(d) After a product is placed in service, the railroad shall
maintain a database of all safety relevant hazards encountered with the
product. The database shall include all hazards identified in the SA
and those that had not been previously identified in the SA. If the
frequency of the safety-relevant hazards exceeds the threshold set
forth in the SA, then the railroad shall:
(1) Report the inconsistency by mail, facsimile, e-mail, or hand
delivery to the Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance,
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE., Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590,
within 15 days of discovery;
(2) Take immediate countermeasures to reduce the frequency of the
safety relevant hazard(s) below the threshold set forth in the SA; and
(3) Provide a final report to the FRA, Director, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, on the results of the analysis and
countermeasures taken to reduce the frequency of the safety relevant
hazard(s) below the calculated probability of failure threshold set
forth in the SA when the problem is resolved. For hazards not
identified in the SA the threshold shall be exceeded at one occurrence.

Sec. 229.313 Product testing results and records.

(a) Results of product testing conducted in accordance with this
subpart shall be recorded on preprinted forms provided by the railroad,
or stored electronically. Electronic record keeping or automated
tracking systems, subject to the provisions contained in paragraph (e)
of this section, may be utilized to store and maintain any testing or
training record required by this subpart.
(b) The testing records shall contain all of the following:
(1) The name of the railroad;
(2) The location and date that the test was conducted;
(3) The equipment tested;
(4) The results of tests;
(5) The repairs or replacement of equipment;
(6) Any preventative adjustments made; and,

[[Page 2233]]

(7) The condition in which the equipment is left.
(c) Each record shall be:
(1) Signed by the employee conducting the test, or electronically
coded, or identified by the automated test equipment number;
(2) Filed in the office of a supervisory official having
jurisdiction, unless otherwise noted; and
(3) Available for inspection and copying by FRA.
(d) The results of the testing conducted in accordance with this
subpart shall be retained as follows:
(1) The results of tests that pertain to installation or
modification of a product shall be retained for the life-cycle of the
product tested and may be kept in any office designated by the
railroad;
(2) The results of periodic tests required for the maintenance or
repair of the product tested shall be retained until the next record is
filed and in no case less than one year; and
(3) The results of all other tests and training shall be retained
until the next record is filed and in no case less than one year.
(e) Electronic or automated tracking systems used to meet the
requirements contained in paragraph (a) of this section shall be
capable of being reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to ensure
the integrity of the system. FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety
may prohibit or revoke a railroad's authority to utilize an electronic
or automated tracking system in lieu of preprinted forms if FRA finds
that the electronic or automated tracking system is not properly
secured, is inaccessible to FRA, or railroad employees requiring access
to discharge their assigned duties, or fails to adequately track and
monitor the equipment. The Associate Administrator for Safety will
provide the affected railroad with a written statement of the basis for
the decision prohibiting or revoking the railroad from utilizing an
electronic or automated tracking system.

Sec. 229.315 Operations and Maintenance Manual.

(a) The railroad shall maintain all documents pertaining to the
installation, maintenance, repair, modification, inspection, and
testing of a product subject to this part in one Operations and
Maintenance Manual (OMM).
(1) The OMM shall be legible and shall be readily available to
persons who conduct the installation, maintenance, repair,
modification, inspection, and testing, and for inspection by FRA.
(2) At a minimum, the OMM shall contain all product vendor
operation and maintenance guidance.
(b) The OMM shall contain the plans and detailed information
necessary for the proper maintenance, repair, inspection, and testing
of products subject to this subpart. The plans shall identify all
software versions, revisions, and revision dates.
(c) Hardware, software, and firmware revisions shall be documented
in the OMM according to the railroad's configuration management control
plan.
(d) Safety-critical components, including spare products, shall be
positively identified, handled, replaced, and repaired in accordance
with the procedures specified in the railroad's configuration
management control plan.
(e) A railroad shall determine that the requirements of this
section have been met prior to placing a product subject to this
subpart in use on their property.

Sec. 229.317 Training and qualification program.

(a) A railroad shall establish and implement training and
qualification program for products subject to this subpart. These
programs shall meet the requirements set forth in this section and in
Sec. 229.319.
(b) The program shall provide training for the individuals
identified in this paragraph to ensure that they possess the necessary
knowledge and skills to effectively complete their duties related to
the product. These include:
(1) Individuals whose duties include installing, maintaining,
repairing, modifying, inspecting, and testing safety-critical elements
of the product;
(2) Individuals who operate trains or serve as a train or engine
crew member subject to instruction and testing under part 217 of this
chapter;
(3) Roadway and maintenance-of-way workers whose duties require
them to know and understand how the product affects their safety and
how to avoid interfering with its proper functioning; and
(4) Direct supervisors of the individuals identified in paragraphs
(b)(1) through (3) of this section.
(c) When developing the training and qualification program required
in this section, a railroad shall conduct a formal task analysis. The
task analysis shall:
(1) Identify the specific goals of the program for each target
population (craft, experience level, scope of work, etc.), task(s), and
desired success rate;
(2) Identify the installation, maintenance, repair, modification,
inspection, testing, and operating tasks that will be performed on the
railroad's products, including but not limited to the development of
failure scenarios and the actions expected under such scenarios;
(3) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks
identified; and
(4) Identify any the additional knowledge, skills, and abilities
above those required for basic job performance necessary to perform
each task.
(d) Based on the task analysis, a railroad shall develop a training
curriculum that includes formally structured training designed to
impart the knowledge, skills, and abilities identified as necessary to
perform each task;
(e) All individuals identified in paragraph (b) of this section
shall successfully complete a training curriculum and pass an
examination that covers the product and appropriate rules and tasks for
which they are responsible (however, such persons may perform such
tasks under the direct onsite supervision of a qualified person prior
to completing such training and passing the examination);
(f) A railroad shall conduct periodic refresher training at
intervals to be formally specified in the program, except with respect
to basic skills for which proficiency is known to remain high as a
result of frequent repetition of the task.
(g) A railroad shall conduct regular and periodic evaluations of
the effectiveness of the training program, verifying the adequacy of
the training material and its validity with respect to the railroad's
products and operations.
(h) A railroad shall maintain records that designate individuals
who are qualified under this section until new designations are
recorded or for at least one year after such persons leave applicable
service. These records shall be maintained in a designated location and
be available for inspection and replication by FRA and FRA-certified
State inspectors.

Sec. 229.319 Operating personnel training.

(a) The training required under Sec. 229.317 for any locomotive
engineer or other person who participates in the operation of a train
using an onboard electronic locomotive control system shall address all
of the following elements and shall be specified in the training
program.
(1) Familiarization with the electronic control system equipment
onboard the locomotive and the functioning of that equipment as part of
the system and in relation to other onboard systems under that person's
control;
(2) Any actions required of the operating personnel to enable or
enter

[[Page 2234]]

data into the system and the role of that function in the safe
operation of the train;
(3) Sequencing of interventions by the system, including
notification, enforcement, penalty initiation and post penalty
application procedures as applicable;
(4) Railroad operating rules applicable to control systems,
including provisions for movement and protection of any unequipped
trains, or trains with failed or cut-out controls;
(5) Means to detect deviations from proper functioning of onboard
electronic control system equipment and instructions explaining the
proper response to be taken regarding control of the train and
notification of designated railroad personnel; and,
(6) Information needed to prevent unintentional interference with
the proper functioning of onboard electronic control equipment.
(b) The training required under this subpart for a locomotive
engineer, together with required records, shall be integrated into the
program of training required by part 240 of this chapter.
20. Part 229 is amended by adding Appendix F to read as follows:

Appendix F to Part 229--Recommended Practices for Design and Safety
Analysis

The purpose of this appendix is to provide recommended criteria
for design and safety analysis that will maximize the safety of
electronic locomotive control systems and mitigate potential
negative safety effects. It seeks to promote full disclosure of
potential safety risks to facilitate minimizing or eliminating
elements of risk where practicable. It discuses critical elements of
good engineering practice that the designer should consider when
developing safety critical electronic locomotive control systems to
accomplish this objective. The criteria and processes specified this
appendix is intended to minimize the probability of failure to an
acceptable level within the limitations of the available engineering
science, cost, and other constraints. Railroads procuring safety
critical electronic locomotive controls are encouraged to ensure
that their vendor addresses each of the elements of this appendix in
the design of the product being procured. FRA uses the criteria and
processes set forth in this appendix (or other technically
equivalent criteria and processes that may be recommended by
industry) when evaluating analyses, assumptions, and conclusions
provided in the SA documents.

Definitions

In addition to the definitions contained in Sec. 229.305, the
following definitions are applicable to this Appendix:
Hazard means an existing or potential condition that can result
in an accident.
High degree of confidence, as applied to the highest level of
aggregation, means there exists credible safety analysis supporting
the conclusion that the risks associated with the product have been
adequately mitigated.
Human factors refers to a body of knowledge about human
limitations, human abilities, and other human characteristics, such
as behavior and motivation, that shall be considered in product
design.
Human-machine interface (HMI) means the interrelated set of
controls and displays that allows humans to interact with the
machine.
Risk means the expected probability of occurrence for an
individual accident event (probability) multiplied by the severity
of the expected consequences associated with the accident
(severity).
Risk assessment means the process of determining, either
quantitatively or qualitatively, the measure of risk associated with
use of the product under all intended operating conditions.
System Safety Precedence means the order of precedence in which
methods used to eliminate or control identified hazards within a
system are implemented.
Validation means the process of determining whether a product's
design requirements fulfill its intended design objectives during
its development and life-cycle. The goal of the validation process
is to determine ``whether the correct product was built.''
Verification means the process of determining whether the
results of a given phase of the development cycle fulfill the
validated requirements established at the start of that phase. The
goal of the verification process is to determine ``whether the
product was built correctly.''

Safety Assessments--Recommended Contents

The safety-critical assessment of each product should include
all of its interconnected subsystems and components and, where
applicable, the interaction between such subsystems. FRA recommends
that such assessments contain the following:
(a) A complete description of the product, including a list of
all product components and their physical relationship in the
subsystem or system;
(b) A description of the railroad operation or categories of
operations on which the product is designed to be used;
(c) An operational concepts document, including a complete
description of the product functionality and information flows;
(d) A safety requirements document, including a list with
complete descriptions of all functions, which the product performs
to enhance or preserve safety, and that describes the manner in
which product architecture satisfies safety requirements;
(e) A hazard log consisting of a comprehensive description of
all safety relevant hazards addressed during the life cycle of the
product, including maximum threshold limits for each hazard (for
unidentified hazards, the threshold shall be exceeded at one
occurrence);
(1) The analysis should document any assumptions regarding the
reliability or availability of mechanical, electric, or electronic
components. Such assumptions include MTTF projections, as well as
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) projections, unless the risk assessment
specifically explains why these assumptions are not relevant to the
risk assessment. The analysis should document these assumptions in
such a form as to permit later automated comparisons with in-service
experience (e.g., a spreadsheet). The analysis should also document
any assumptions regarding human performance. The documentation
should be in a form that facilitates later comparisons with in-
service experience.
(2) The analysis should also document any assumptions regarding
software defects. These assumptions should be in a form which
permits the railroad to project the likelihood of detecting an in-
service software defect and later automated comparisons with in-
service experience.
(3) The analysis should document all of the identified safety-
critical fault paths. The documentation should be in a form that
facilitates later comparisons with in-service faults.
(f) A risk assessment.
(1) The risk metric for the proposed product should describe
with a high degree of confidence the accumulated risk of a
locomotive control system that operates over a life-cycle of 25
years or greater. Each risk metric for the proposed product should
be expressed with an upper bound, as estimated with a sensitivity
analysis, and the risk value selected is demonstrated to have a high
degree of confidence.
(2) Each risk calculation should consider the totality of the
locomotive control system and its method of operation. The failure
modes of each subsystem or component, or both, should be determined
for the integrated hardware/software (where applicable) as a
function of the Mean Time to Hazardous Events (MTTHE), failure
restoration rates, and the integrated hardware/software coverage of
all processor based subsystems or components, or both. Train
operating and movement rules, along with components that are layered
in order to enhance safety-critical behavior, should also be
considered.
(3) An MTTHE value should be calculated for each subsystem or
component, or both, indicating the safety-critical behavior of the
integrated hardware/software subsystem or component, or both. The
human factor impact should be included in the assessment, whenever
applicable, to provide an integrated MTTHE value. The MTTHE
calculation should consider the rates of failures caused by
permanent, transient, and intermittent faults accounting for the
fault coverage of the integrated hardware/software subsystem or
component, phased-interval maintenance, and restoration of the
detected failures.
(4) MTTHE compliance verification and validation should be based
on the assessment of the design for verification and validation
process, historical performance data, analytical methods and
experimental safety critical performance testing performed on the
subsystem or component. The compliance process shall be demonstrated
to be compliant and consistent with the MTTHE metric and
demonstrated to have a high degree of confidence.
(5) The safety-critical behavior of all non-processor based
components, which are part

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of a processor-based system or subsystem, should be quantified with
an MTTHE metric. The MTTHE assessment methodology should consider
failures caused by permanent, transient, and intermittent faults,
phase interval maintenance and restoration of failures and the
effect of fault coverage of each non-processor-based subsystem or
component. The MTTHE compliance verification and validation should
be based on the assessment of the design for verification and
validation process, historical performance data, analytical methods
and experimental safety critical performance testing performed on
the subsystem or component. The non-processor based quantification
compliance should also be demonstrated to have a high degree of
confidence.
(g) A hazard mitigation analysis, including a complete and
comprehensive description of all hazards to be addressed in the
system design and development, mitigation techniques used, and
system safety precedence followed;
(h) A complete description of the safety assessment and
verification and validation processes applied to the product and the
results of these processes;
(i) A complete description of the safety assurance concepts used
in the product design, including an explanation of the design
principles and assumptions; the designer should address each of the
following safety considerations when designing and demonstrating the
safety of products covered by this part. In the event that any of
these principles are not followed, the analysis should describe both
the reason(s) for departure and the alternative(s) utilized to
mitigate or eliminate the hazards associated with the design
principle not followed.
(1) Normal operation. The system (including all hardware and
software) should demonstrate safe operation with no hardware
failures under normal anticipated operating conditions with proper
inputs and within the expected range of environmental conditions.
All safety-critical functions should be performed properly under
these normal conditions. Absence of specific operator actions or
procedures will not prevent the system from operating safely. There
should be no hazards that are categorized as unacceptable or
undesirable. Hazards categorized as unacceptable should be
eliminated by design.
(2) Systematic failure. It should be shown how the product is
designed to mitigate or eliminate unsafe systematic failures--those
conditions which can be attributed to human error that could occur
at various stages throughout product development. This includes
unsafe errors in the software due to human error in the software
specification, design or coding phases, or both; human errors that
could impact hardware design; unsafe conditions that could occur
because of an improperly designed human-machine interface;
installation and maintenance errors; and errors associated with
making modifications.
(3) Random failure. The product should be shown to operate
safely under conditions of random hardware failure. This includes
single as well as multiple hardware failures, particularly in
instances where one or more failures could occur, remain undetected
(latent) and react in combination with a subsequent failure at a
later time to cause an unsafe operating situation. In instances
involving a latent failure, a subsequent failure is similar to there
being a single failure. In the event of a transient failure, and if
so designed, the system should restart itself if it is safe to do
so. Frequency of attempted restarts should be considered in the
hazard analysis. There should be no single point failures in the
product that can result in hazards categorized as unacceptable or
undesirable. Occurrence of credible single point failures that can
result in hazards shall be detected and the product should achieve a
known safe state before falsely activating any physical appliance.
If one non-self-revealing failure combined with a second failure can
cause a hazard that is categorized as unacceptable or undesirable,
then the second failure should be detected and the product should
achieve a known safe state before falsely activating any physical
appliance.
(4) Common Mode failure. Another concern of multiple failures
involves common mode failure in which two or more subsystems or
components intended to compensate one another to perform the same
function all fail by the same mode and result in unsafe conditions.
This is of particular concern in instances in which two or more
elements (hardware or software, or both) are used in combination to
ensure safety. If a common mode failure exists, then any analysis
cannot rely on the assumption that failures are independent.
Examples include: the use of redundancy in which two or more
elements perform a given function in parallel and when one (hardware
or software) element checks/monitors another element (of hardware or
software) to help ensure its safe operation. Common mode failure
relates to independence, which shall be ensured in these instances.
When dealing with the effects of hardware failure, the designer
should address the effects of the failure not only on other
hardware, but also on the execution of the software, since hardware
failures can greatly affect how the software operates.
(5) External influences. The product should operate safely when
subjected to different external influences, including:
(i) Electrical influences such as power supply anomalies/
transients, abnormal/improper input conditions (e.g., outside of
normal range inputs relative to amplitude and frequency, unusual
combinations of inputs) including those related to a human operator,
and others such as electromagnetic interference or electrostatic
discharges, or both;
(ii) Mechanical influences such as vibration and shock; and
climatic conditions such as temperature and humidity.
(6) Modifications. Safety must be ensured following
modifications to the hardware or software, or both. All or some of
the concerns previously identified may be applicable depending upon
the nature and extent of the modifications.
(7) Software. Software faults should not cause hazards
categorized as unacceptable or undesirable.
(8) Closed Loop Principle. The product design should require
positive action to be taken in a prescribed manner to either begin
product operation or continue product operation.
(j) A human factors analysis, including a complete description
of all human-machine interfaces, a complete description of all
functions performed by humans in connection with the product to
enhance or preserve safety, and an analysis of the physical
ergonomics of the product on the operators and the safe operation of
the system;
(k) A complete description of the specific training of railroad
and contractor employees and supervisors necessary to ensure the
safe and proper installation, implementation, operation,
maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, and modification of the
product;
(l) A complete description of the specific procedures and test
equipment necessary to ensure the safe and proper installation,
implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, test,
and modification of the product. These procedures, including
calibration requirements, should be consistent with or explain
deviations from the equipment manufacturer's recommendations;
(m) A complete description of the necessary security measures
for the product over its life-cycle;
(n) A complete description of each warning to be placed in the
Operations and Maintenance Manual and of all warning labels required
to be placed on equipment as necessary to ensure safety;
(o) A complete description of all initial implementation testing
procedures necessary to establish that safety-functional
requirements are met and safety-critical hazards are appropriately
mitigated;
(p) A complete description of all post-implementation testing
(validation) and monitoring procedures, including the intervals
necessary to establish that safety-functional requirements, safety-
critical hazard mitigation processes, and safety-critical tolerances
are not compromised over time, through use, or after maintenance
(repair, replacement, adjustment) is performed; and
(q) A complete description of each record necessary to ensure
the safety of the system that is associated with periodic
maintenance, inspections, tests, repairs, replacements, adjustments,
and the system's resulting conditions, including records of
component failures resulting in safety relevant hazards;
(r) A complete description of any safety-critical assumptions
regarding availability of the product, and a complete description of
all backup methods of operation; and
(s) The configuration/revision control measures designed to
ensure that safety-functional requirements and safety-critical
hazard mitigation processes are not compromised as a result of any
change. Changes classified as maintenance require validation.

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Guidance Regarding the Application of Human Factors in the Design of
Products

The product design should sufficiently incorporate human factors
engineering that is appropriate to the complexity of the product;
the gender, educational, mental, and physical capabilities of the
intended operators and maintainers; the degree of required human
interaction with the component; and the environment in which the
product will be used. HMI design criteria minimize negative safety
effects by causing designers to consider human factors in the
development of HMIs. As used in this discussion, ``designer'' means
anyone who specifies requirements for--or designs a system or
subsystem, or both, for--a product subject to this part, and
``operator'' means any human who is intended to receive information
from, provide information to, or perform repairs or maintenance on a
safety critical locomotive control product subject to this part.
I. FRA recommends that system designers should:
(a) Design systems that anticipate possible user errors and
include capabilities to catch errors before they propagate through
the system;
(b) Conduct cognitive task analyses prior to designing the
system to better understand the information processing requirements
of operators when making critical decisions;
(c) Present information that accurately represents or predicts
system states; and
(d) Ensure that electronics equipment radio frequency emissions
are compliant with appropriate Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulations. The FCC rules and regulations are codified in
Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The following
documentation is applicable to obtaining FCC Equipment
Authorization:
(1) OET Bulletin Number 61 (October, 1992 Supersedes May, 1987
issue) FCC Equipment Authorization Program for Radio Frequency
Devices. This document provides an overview of the equipment
authorization program to control radio interference from radio
transmitters and certain other electronic products and how to obtain
an equipment authorization.
(2) OET Bulletin 63: (October 1993) Understanding The FCC Part
15 Regulations for Low Power, Non-Licensed Transmitters. This
document provides a basic understanding of the FCC regulations for
low power, unlicensed transmitters, and includes answers to some
commonly-asked questions. This edition of the bulletin does not
contain information concerning personal communication services (PCS)
transmitters operating under Part 15, Subpart D of the rules.
(3) Title 47 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 0 to 19. The FCC
rules and regulations governing PCS transmitters may be found in 47
CFR, Parts 0 to 19.
(4) OET Bulletin 62 (December 1993) Understanding The FCC
Regulations for Computers and other Digital Devices. This document
has been prepared to provide a basic understanding of the FCC
regulations for digital (computing) devices, and includes answers to
some commonly-asked questions.
II. Human factors issues designers should consider with regard
to the general functioning of a system include:
(a) Reduced situational awareness and over-reliance. HMI design
shall give an operator active functions to perform, feedback on the
results of the operator's actions, and information on the automatic
functions of the system as well as its performance. The operator
shall be ``in-the loop.'' Designers should consider at minimum the
following methods of maintaining an active role for human operators:
(1) The system should require an operator to initiate action to
operate the train and require an operator to remain ``in-the-loop''
for at least 30 minutes at a time;
(2) The system should provide timely feedback to an operator
regarding the system's automated actions, the reasons for such
actions, and the effects of the operator's manual actions on the
system;
(3) The system should warn operators in advance when they
require an operator to take action;
(4) HMI design should equalize an operator's workload; and
(5) HMI design should not distract from the operator's safety
related duties.
(b) Expectation of predictability and consistency in product
behavior and communications. HMI design should accommodate an
operator's expectation of logical and consistent relationships
between actions and results. Similar objects should behave
consistently when an operator performs the same action upon them.
End users have a limited memory and ability to process information.
Therefore, HMI design should also minimize an operator's information
processing load.
(1) To minimize information processing load, the designer
should:
(i) Present integrated information that directly supports the
variety and types of decisions that an operator makes;
(ii) Provide information in a format or representation that
minimizes the time required to understand and act; and
(iii) Conduct utility tests of decision aids to establish clear
benefits such as processing time saved or improved quality of
decisions.
(2) To minimize short-term memory load, the designer should
integrate data or information from multiple sources into a single
format or representation (``chunking'') and design so that three or
fewer ``chunks'' of information need to be remembered at any one
time. To minimize long-term memory load, the designer should design
to support recognition memory, design memory aids to minimize the
amount of information that should be recalled from unaided memory
when making critical decisions, and promote active processing of the
information.
(3) When creating displays and controls, the designer shall
consider user ergonomics and should:
(i) Locate displays as close as possible to the controls that
affect them;
(ii) Locate displays and controls based on an operator's
position;
(iii) Arrange controls to minimize the need for the operator to
change position;
(iv) Arrange controls according to their expected order of use;
(v) Group similar controls together;
(vi) Design for high stimulus-response compatibility (geometric
and conceptual);
(vii) Design safety-critical controls to require more than one
positive action to activate (e.g., auto stick shift requires two
movements to go into reverse);
(viii) Design controls to allow easy recovery from error; and
(ix) Design display and controls to reflect specific gender and
physical limitations of the intended operators.
(4) Detailed locomotive ergonomics human machine interface
guidance may be found in ``Human Factors Guidelines for Locomotive
Cabs'' (FRA/ORD-98/03 or DOT-VNTSC-FRA-98-8).
(5) The designer should also address information management. To
that end, HMI design should:
(i) Display information in a manner which emphasizes its
relative importance;
(ii) Comply with the ANSI/HFS 100-1988 standard;
(iii) Utilize a display luminance that has a difference of at
least 35cd/m2 between the foreground and background (the displays
should be capable of a minimum contrast 3:1 with 7:1 preferred, and
controls should be provided to adjust the brightness level and
contrast level);
(iv) Display only the information necessary to the user;
(v) Where text is needed, use short, simple sentences or phrases
with wording that an operator will understand and appropriate to the
educational and cognitive capabilities of the intended operator;
(vi) Use complete words where possible; where abbreviations are
necessary, choose a commonly accepted abbreviation or consistent
method and select commonly used terms and words that the operator
will understand;
(vii) Adopt a consistent format for all display screens by
placing each design element in a consistent and specified location;
(viii) Display critical information in the center of the
operator's field of view by placing items that need to be found
quickly in the upper left hand corner and items which are not time-
critical in the lower right hand corner of the field of view;
(ix) Group items that belong together;
(x) Design all visual displays to meet human performance
criteria under monochrome conditions and add color only if it will
help the user in performing a task, and use color coding as a
redundant coding technique;
(xi) Limit the number of colors over a group of displays to no
more than seven;
(xii) Design warnings to match the level of risk or danger with
the alerting nature of the signal; and
(xiii) With respect to information entry, avoid full QWERTY
keyboards for data entry.
(6) With respect to problem management, the HMI designer should
ensure that the HMI design:
(i) Enhances an operator's situation awareness;
(ii) Supports response selection and scheduling; and
(iii) Supports contingency planning.
(7) Designers should comply with FCC requirements for Maximum
Permissible Exposure limits for field strength and power

[[Page 2237]]

density for the transmitters operating at frequencies of 300 kHz to
100 GHz and specific absorption rate (SAR) limits for devices
operating within close proximity to the body. The Commission's
requirements are detailed in Parts 1 and 2 of the FCC's Rules and
Regulations [47 CFR 1.1307(b), 1.1310, 2.1091, 2.1093. The FCC has a
number of bulletins and supplements that offer guidelines and
suggestions for evaluating compliance. These documents are not
intended to establish mandatory procedures, other methods and
procedures may be acceptable if based on sound engineering practice.
(i) OET Bulletin No. 65 (Edition 97-01, August 1997),
``Evaluating Compliance With FCC Guidelines For Human Exposure To
Radio Frequency Electromagnetic Fields'';
(ii) OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement A, (Edition 97-01, August
1997), OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement B (Edition 97-01, August 1997);
and
(iii) OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement C (Edition 01-01, June
2001). This bulletin provides assistance in determining whether
proposed or existing transmitting facilities, operations, or devices
comply with limits for human exposure to radio frequency RF fields
adopted by the FCC.

Guidance for Verification and Validation of Products

The goal of this assessment is to provide an evaluation of the
product manufacturer's utilization of safety design practices during
the product's development and testing phases, as required by the
applicable railroad's requirements, the requirements of this part,
and any other previously agreed-upon controlling documents or
standards. The standards employed for verification or validation, or
both, of products shall be sufficient to support achievement of the
applicable requirements of this part.
(a) The latest version of the following standards have been
recognized by FRA as providing appropriate risk analysis processes
for incorporation into verification and validation standards.
(1) U.S. Department of Defense Military Standard (MIL-STD) 882C,
``System Safety Program Requirements'' (January 19, 1993);
(2) CENELEC Standards as follows:
(i) EN50126: 1999, Railway Applications: Specification and
Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and
Safety (RAMS);
(ii) EN50128 (May 2001), Railway Applications: Software for
Railway Control and Protection Systems;
(iii) EN50129: 2003, Railway Applications: Communications,
Signaling, and Processing Systems-Safety Related Electronic Systems
for Signaling; and
(iv) EN50155:2001/A1:2002, Railway Applications: Electronic
Equipment Used in Rolling Stock.
(3) ATCS Specification 140, Recommended Practices for Safety and
Systems Assurance.
(4) ATCS Specification 130, Software Quality Assurance.
(5) Safety of High Speed Ground Transportation Systems.
Analytical Methodology for Safety Validation of Computer Controlled
Subsystems. Volume II: Development of a Safety Validation
Methodology. Final Report September 1995. Author: Jonathan F.
Luedeke, Battelle. DOT/FRA/ORD-95/10.2.
(6) IEC 61508 (International Electro-technical Commission),
Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable/Electronic
Safety (E/E/P/ES) Related Systems, Parts 1-7 as follows:
(i) IEC 61508-1 (1998-12) Part 1: General requirements and IEC
61508-1 Corr. (1999-05) Corrigendum 1-Part 1: General Requirements;
(ii) IEC 61508-2 (2000-05) Part 2: Requirements for electrical/
electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems;
(iii) IEC 61508-3 (1998-12) Part 3: Software requirements and
IEC 61508-3 Corr.1(1999-04) Corrigendum 1-Part3: Software
requirements;
(iv) IEC 61508-4 (1998-12) Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations
and IEC 61508-4 Corr.1(1999-04) Corrigendum 1-Part 4: Definitions
and abbreviations;
(v) IEC 61508-5 (1998-12) Part 5: Examples of methods for the
determination of safety integrity levels and IEC 61508-5 Corr.1
(1999-04) Corrigendum 1 Part 5: Examples of methods for
determination of safety integrity levels;
(vi) 1IEC 61508-6 (2000-04) Part 6: Guidelines on the
applications of IEC 61508-2 and -3; and
(vii) IEC 61508-7 (2000-03) Part 7: Overview of techniques and
measures.
(b) When using unpublished standards, including proprietary
standards, the standards should be available for inspection and
replication by the railroad and FRA and should be available for
public examination.
(c) Third party assessments. The railroad, the supplier, or FRA
may conclude it is necessary for a third party assessment of the
system. A third party assessor should be ``independent''. An
``independent third party'' means a technically competent entity
responsible to and compensated by the railroad (or an association on
behalf of one or more railroads) that is independent of the supplier
of the product. An entity that is owned or controlled by the
supplier, that is under common ownership or control with the
supplier, or that is otherwise involved in the development of the
product would not be considered ``independent''.
(1) The reviewer should not engage in design efforts, in order
to preserve the reviewer's independence and maintain the supplier's
proprietary right to the product. The supplier should provide the
reviewer access to any, and all, documentation that the reviewer
requests and attendance at any design review or walk through that
the reviewer determines as necessary to complete and accomplish the
third party assessment. Representatives from FRA or the railroad
might accompany the reviewer.
(2) Third party reviews can occur at a preliminary level, a
functional level, or implementation level. At the preliminary level,
the reviewer should evaluate with respect to safety and comment on
the adequacy of the processes, which the supplier applies to the
design, and development of the product. At a minimum, the reviewer
should compare the supplier processes with industry best practices
to determine if the vendor methodology is acceptable and employ any
other such tests or comparisons if they have been agreed to
previously with the railroad or FRA. Based on these analyses, the
reviewer shall identify and document any significant safety
vulnerabilities that are not adequately mitigated by the supplier's
(or user's) processes. At the functional level, the reviewer
evaluates the adequacy, and comprehensiveness, of the safety
analysis, and any other documents pertinent to the product being
assessed for completeness, correctness, and compliance with
applicable standards. This includes, but is not limited to the
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), all Fault Tree Analyses (FTA),
all Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and other
hazard analyses. At the implementation level the reviewer randomly
selects various safety-critical software modules for audit to verify
whether the system process and design requirements were followed.
The number of modules audited shall be determined as a
representative number sufficient to provide confidence that all un-
audited modules were developed in similar manner as the audited
module. During this phase the reviewer would also evaluate and
comment on the adequacy of the plan for installation and test of the
product for revenue service.
(d) Reviewer Report. Upon completion of an assessment, the
reviewer prepares a final report of the assessment. The report
should contain the following information:
(1) The reviewer's evaluation of the adequacy of the risk
analysis, including the supplier's MTTHE and risk estimates for the
product, and the supplier's confidence interval in these estimates;
(2) Product vulnerabilities which the reviewer felt were not
adequately mitigated, including the method by which the railroad
would assure product safety in the event of a hardware or software
failure (i.e., how does the railroad or vendor assure that all
potentially hazardous failure modes are identified?) and the method
by which the railroad or vendor addresses comprehensiveness of the
product design for the requirements of the operations it will govern
(i.e., how does the railroad and/or vendor assure that all
potentially hazardous operating circumstances are identified? Who
records any deficiencies identified in the design process? Who
tracks the correction of these deficiencies and confirms that they
are corrected?);
(3) A clear statement of position for all parties involved for
each product vulnerability cited by the reviewer;
(4) Identification of any documentation or information sought by
the reviewer that was denied, incomplete, or inadequate;
(5) A listing of each design procedure or process which was not
properly followed;
(6) Identification of the software verification and validation
procedures for the product's safety-critical applications, and the
reviewer's evaluation of the adequacy of these procedures;
(7) Methods employed by the product manufacturer to develop
safety-critical

[[Page 2238]]

software, such as use of structured language, code checks,
modularity, or other similar generally acceptable techniques; and
(8) Methods by which the supplier or railroad addresses
comprehensiveness of the product design which considers the safety
elements.

PART 238--[AMENDED]

21. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-20303,
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49
CFR 1.49.

22. Section 238.105 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(1) to read
as follows:

Sec. 238.105 Train electronic hardware and software safety.

* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) Hardware and software that controls or monitors a train's
primary braking system shall either:
(i) Fail safely by initiating a full service or emergency brake
application in the event of a hardware or software failure that could
impair the ability of the engineer to apply or release the brakes; or
(ii) Provide the engineer access to direct manual control of the
primary braking system (service or emergency braking).
* * * * *
23. Section 238.309 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (c), and
(e) to read as follows:

Sec. 238.309 Periodic brake equipment maintenance.

* * * * *
(b) DMU and MU locomotives. The brake equipment and brake cylinders
of each DMU or MU locomotive shall be cleaned, repaired, and tested,
and the filtering devices or dirt collectors located in the main
reservoir supply line to the air brake system cleaned, repaired, or
replaced at intervals in accordance with the following schedule:
(1) Every 736 days if the DMU or MU locomotive is part of a fleet
that is not 100 percent equipped with air dryers;
(2) Every 1,104 days if the DMU or MU locomotive is part of a fleet
that is 100 percent equipped with air dryers and is equipped with PS-
68, 26-C, 26-L, PS-90, CS-1, RT-2, RT-5A, GRB-1, CS-2, or 26-R brake
systems. (This listing of brake system types is intended to subsume all
brake systems using 26 type, ABD, or ABDW control valves and PS68, PS-
90, 26B-1, 26C, 26CE, 26-B1, 30CDW, or 30ECDW engineer's brake
valves.);
(3) Every 1,840 days if the DMU or MU locomotive is part of a fleet
that is 100 percent equipped with air dryers and is equipped with KB-
HL1, KB-HS1, or KBCT1; and,
(4) Every 736 days for all other DMU or MU locomotives.
(c) Conventional locomotives. The brake equipment of each
conventional locomotive shall be cleaned, repaired, and tested in
accordance with the schedule provided in Sec. 229.29 of this chapter.
* * * * *
(e) Cab cars. The brake equipment of each cab car shall be cleaned,
repaired, and tested at intervals in accordance with the following
schedule:
(1) Every 1,840 days for locomotives equipped with CCB-1, CCB-2,
CCB-26, EPIC 1 (formerly EPIC 3102), EPIC 3102D2, EPIC 2, KB-HS1, or
Fastbrake brake systems.
(2) Every 1,476 days for that portion of the cab car brake system
using brake valves that are identical to the passenger coach 26-C brake
system;
(3) Every 1,104 days for that portion of the cab car brake system
using brake valves that are identical to the locomotive 26-L brake
system; and
(4) Every 736 days for all other types of cab car brake valves.
* * * * *

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 29, 2010.
Karen J. Rae,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-33244 Filed 1-11-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P