[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 48 (Friday, March 11, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13397-13398]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-5608]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DOE Response to Recommendation 2010-2 of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation
2010-2, concerning Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant was published in the Federal Register on December
27, 2010 (72 FR 24279). In accordance with section 315(b) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b), the Secretary of
Energy transmitted the following response to the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board on February 10, 2011.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625
Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Steven Petras, Nuclear Engineer,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 28, 2011.
Mari-Jo Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004-2901
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your December 17, 2010 letter, which
provided Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board)
Recommendation 2010-2, Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant. Mr. Dale E. Knutson will be the responsible
Manager for this Recommendation.
The Department of Energy (DOE) agrees with the Board that more
testing and analysis should be completed to provide additional
confidence that pulse jet mixing (PJM) and transfer systems for the
Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will achieve their
design and operating requirements. DOE has previously made
commitments to address the concerns raised by the Board in its
Recommendation 2010-2. These commitments were made by the Federal
Project Director in August 2010 during an internal project
management meeting; in the October 7-8, 2010 public hearing on WTP;
and in our supplement to the public hearing record submitted to the
Board in January 2011. At each point, full disclosure of DOE plans,
with identified timelines for further details and schedules for
testing and analysis, was included. The implementation of these
commitments is on-going as part of WTP project plans that supports
scheduled testing to begin in 2012.
The Board acknowledged in its letter that DOE has taken and
continues to take steps to increase the confidence that the PJM
mixed vessels will comply with their designed operating
requirements. As outlined in your letter:
DOE contracted an independent technical review team,
Consortium for Risk Evaluation and Stakeholder Participation
(CRESP), that presented DOE with 13 recommendations. DOE is
continuing to take actions addressing the CRESP recommendations.
On October 7-8, 2010, DOE publicly committed to large-
scale testing and to complete relevant portions of the testing
before installing remaining process vessels in the WTP Pretreatment
Facility. As part of that commitment, the testing objectives and
summary schedule for the large-scale testing was included in the WTP
Project's January 2011 update to the public record.
We believe the Board's concerns regarding PJM at the WTP will be
addressed by DOE's current direction related to resolving PJM and
transfer system uncertainty. Accordingly, DOE accepts Recommendation
2010-2.
The Board's Recommendation includes specific sub-recommendations
that it believes need to be addressed as part of the DOE's pulse jet
mixed vessel testing program. There are certain specific details of
the Board's Recommendation that require clarification and are
summarized below. We believe our intended actions should satisfy the
Board's concerns.
Sub-recommendations 1 and 2: Wording in both sub-
recommendations calls for ``testing that envelope the complete range
of
[[Page 13398]]
physical properties for the high-level waste stored in the Hanford
Tank Farms.''
DOE intends to conduct large-scale testing with simulants
selected to represent the vast majority of the waste in the tank
farms, consistent with the approach used in WTP's pulse jet mixing
test program conducted to date. The WTP design and planned
operations approach is intended to address residual uncertainty with
other actions and design features. These include (1) waste feed pre-
qualification activities; and (2) specific design features,
including the ability to inspect vessels and equipment for vessel
heel dilution and cleanout, that would enable waste particles that
may not be mixing with the bulk of the waste to be moved forward to
the melters.
Sub-recommendation 3: This sub-recommendation calls for
``* * * verification and validation of any computational models used
by the WTP project team (e.g., Low Order Accumulation Model and
FLUENT) based on the results from the `large-scale testing.' ''
The verification and validation effort is expected to be
completed prior to the ``large scale testing.'' The WTP project
intends to compare the results from the ``large scale testing'' with
the computational models.
Sub-recommendation 4: This sub-recommendation calls for
``* * * including demonstrating that representative samples can be
obtained even if the assumed WTP design particle size or density is
exceeded. This will ensure that the sampling system does not exclude
large, dense particles and artificially bias the measured particle
size and density distribution.''
The vessel testing activities will include determining the
acceptability of vessel sampling in conditions where sampling may be
challenged by mixing performance, i.e., solids-containing vessels.
There may be cases where the sample system operation during normal
vessel operations does not retrieve some large dense particles for
analysis. As noted above, this is planned to be accommodated by the
feed-prequalification process and by the ability to pull a sample
during the heel dilution and cleanout process, when larger, denser
particles would be retrieved into the sample system. Consequently,
the large-scale testing program is not intending to demonstrate that
normal sampling activities can retrieve all waste particles.
DOE is committed to the safe design and operation of its nuclear
facilities, consistent with the principles of Integrated Safety
Management, and values input on how DOE can improve its activities.
We look forward to working further with the Board and its staff on
preparation of the DOE's Implementation Plan for Recommendation
2010-2 so that the WTP project can complete its design and
construction activities while promoting nuclear safety for the life
of WTP operations.
If you have any further questions, please contact me or
In[eacute]s R. Triay, Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, at (202) 586-7709.
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
[FR Doc. 2011-5608 Filed 3-10-11; 8:45 am]
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