[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 58 (Friday, March 25, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16758-16760]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-7085]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DOE Response to Recommendation 2010-1 of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation
2010-1, concerning Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate
Protection for the Public and the Workers was published in the Federal
Register on November 30, 2010 (75FR 74022). In accordance with section
315(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2286d(b), the Secretary of Energy transmitted the following response to
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board on February 28, 2011.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
[[Page 16759]]
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625
Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Amanda Anderson, Nuclear Engineer,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 17, 2011.
Mari-Josette Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.
February 28, 2011
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your October 29, 2010,
letter which provided Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is strongly dedicated to the safety
of the public, our workers, and the environment at all of our
facilities. We share your conviction that a clear set of requirements
and standards is vital for safe operations. In 2008, we began a
comprehensive re-examination of our nuclear safety requirements to
assure they were clear, concise, complete, and current. In March 2010,
we enhanced our Directives Reform effort to better define and expedite
it, and we have made good progress in revising key nuclear safety
Directives and the DOE Nuclear Safety Policy.
We have not changed our interpretation of requirements for
developing and approving Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs). We have
made significant nuclear safety improvements by upgrading facility
safety bases and designs and by improving our safety standards and
procedures. Much has been learned and will continue to be learned about
improving safety. With your assistance, we have applied the lessons
learned from industry incidents to upgrade our requirements. Our
improving safety record reflects these lessons.
Though DOE has an improving safety record, we always strive to do
better. Complacency will not be tolerated. With this in mind, the
Department has carefully evaluated Recommendation 2010-1 and how we can
use it to improve nuclear safety at the Department. The Department
partially accepts the Board's Recommendation; a detailed explanation is
provided below. We have clarified aspects of sub-recommendation 1, 2,
3c, 4 and 5e. Several elements of Recommendation 2010-1 will be
addressed in the revision of Standard 3009, Preparation Guide for U.S.
Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety
Analyses. As we develop the Implementation Plan for Recommendation
2010-1, we will further engage the Board.
Sub-recommendation 1--Immediately affirm the requirement that
unmitigated, bounding-type accident scenarios will be used at DOE's
defense nuclear facilities to estimate dose consequences at the site
boundary, and that a sufficient combination of SSCs must be designated
safety class to prevent exposures at the site boundary from approaching
25 rem TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent].
DOE Standard 3009 details DOE's expectations for accident analyses
to identify hazard controls for most DOE nuclear facilities. DOE agrees
that Standard 3009 specifies that the consequences of unmitigated
accidents should to be compared to the 25 rem TEDE Evaluation Guideline
to determine if safety class controls are warranted. As you know, new
facilities follow the 25 rem TEDE limit as a siting criteria according
to DOE Standard 1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process.
For existing facilities safety class Structures, Systems and Components
(SSCs) are normally utilized to prevent exposures from exceeding 25 rem
TEDE. Standard 3009 also includes provisions for use of other means and
controls to assure safety where off-site exposures are not reduced to
below 25 rem TEDE, or where SSCs are not available. The revised
Standard 3009 will further clarify the use of the Evaluation Guideline
in accident analyses for both new and existing facilities.
Sub-recommendation 2--For those defense nuclear facilities that
have not implemented compensatory measures sufficient to reduce
exposures at the site boundary below 25 rem TEDE, direct the
responsible program secretarial officer to develop a formal plan to
meet this requirement within a reasonable timeframe.
DOE's responsible Program Secretarial Officer has evaluated the
safety measures planned or currently in place to protect the public at
the few remaining defense nuclear facilities that have potential
accident doses above the 25 rem TEDE, and has determined that these
measures provide adequate protection. This conclusion is based on an
evaluation of all protective measures in place at these facilities,
including disciplined formal operations, training, safety management
programs, control of materials, and layers of controls to prevent
accidents and/or mitigate their consequences.
Consistent with DOE's commitment to continuous safety improvement,
we will continue to evaluate options for enhancing the safety of these
facilities. In some cases, such as the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los
Alamos National Laboratory, DOE anticipates that several near-term
planned improvements will reduce the bounding mitigated dose to below
25 rem TEDE. Additionally, we have already made substantial progress in
reducing the projected offsite dose that could result from specific
types of accidents. For many limited life facilities we will achieve
permanent, long-term risk reduction through deactivation and
decommissioning. Once we revise DOE Standard 3009, DOE will evaluate
the documented safety analyses for all facilities as part of the
required periodic update process. The Implementation Plan will describe
the steps that will be taken to evaluate safety improvement options for
those facilities determined to need such improvements.
Sub-recommendation 3--Revise DOE Standard 3009-94 to identify
clearly and unambiguously the requirements that must be met to
demonstrate that an adequate level of protection for the public and
workers is provided through a DSA. This should be accomplished, at a
minimum, by: (followed by four paragraphs labeled a-d).
DOE is revising DOE Standard 3009 to clearly indicate which of its
provisions are mandatory. DOE will implement the specific steps
identified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this sub-recommendation.
However, DOE will not commit to implementing paragraph (c) as written,
because doing so would predetermine a specific outcome to the current
revision process without any technical basis. This would be contrary to
DOE's standards development process. DOE will consider the advice
provided in paragraph (c) (i.e., identification of the criteria that
must be met for safety class Systems, Structures and Components
(SSCs)), during the Standard 3009 revision process.
The Implementation Plan will outline the development process and
how the steps identified in all the paragraphs in this sub-
recommendation will be followed.
[[Page 16760]]
Sub-recommendation 4--Amend 10 CFR Part 830 by incorporating the
revised version of DOE Standard 3009-94 into the text as a requirement,
instead of as a safe harbor cited in Table 2.
The purpose of a ``safe-harbor'' is to provide a standard
methodology that, if followed, will provide credible analyses and
adequate safety. Nothing in the concept implies that ``safe-harbor''
methodologies are the only way to meet requirements. Of course,
alternative approaches must be approved by DOE, and the criteria for
accepting these alternatives should be clearly defined.
DOE is planning to review 10 CFR 830 (issued in 2001), which
identifies nuclear safety requirements, but we cannot commit to the
exact language prescribed in the Recommendation-that is placing
Standard 3009 in the body of the rule. As a part of our review, we will
update DOE Standard 3009, clearly identifying those provisions that are
mandatory. When DOE Standard 3009 is not applied, appropriate means for
reviewing and improving alternative methodologies will be established.
This will assure implementation of DOE Standard 3009, where
appropriate, while maintaining the flexibility to improve the standard,
as needed. This approach has allowed DOE to make several important
improvements to DOE Standards in the past. Details of the revision
process will be provided in the Implementation Plan.
Sub-recommendation 5--Formally establish the minimum criteria and
requirements that govern Federal approval of the DSA, by revision of
DOE Standard 1104-2009, and other appropriate documents. The criteria
and requirements should include: (followed by five paragraphs labeled
a-e).
DOE agrees with the need for clear guidelines and requirements on
the appropriate delegation of nuclear safety authorities and will
revise DOE Standard 1104-2009 and other appropriate DOE documents to
achieve this. DOE will implement the specific steps identified in
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this sub-recommendation. However, DOE
cannot commit to implementing paragraph (e) as written, because it
implies that quantitative risk-based decision making must be
established and used. The Department is exploring how quantitative
methods could be applied to support decision-making on safety issues at
our sites and will keep the Board apprised of developments in this
area. Today, deterministic and qualitative means are used.
The Department agrees that the decision to approve safety bases
must rest on a documented conclusion. The conclusion should indicate
that the safety basis provides a reasonable assurance that the facility
can be operated safely, that the hazards have been adequately analyzed,
and that the engineered and administrative controls provide adequate
protection for the public, workers and the environment. The
Implementation Plan will outline DOE's revision to standard 3009 and
the safety basis development process, will clarify the safety basis
approval process, and identify how the steps in this sub-recommendation
will be addressed.
Sub-recommendation 6--Formally identify the responsible
organization and identify the processes for performing independent
oversight to ensure the responsibilities identified in Item 5 above are
fully implemented.
DOE has already identified the responsible organization for
performing independent oversight for the Secretary: the Office of
Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security
(HSS). However, HSS Independent Oversight protocols and delegation
processes will be reviewed and modified as necessary to assure adequate
oversight of nuclear safety delegations. The Implementation Plan will
describe the steps DOE will take, review and update the protocols and
delegation processes.
We appreciate your advice and will continue working closely with
the Board to improve the Department's Directives in a manner that meets
our shared objectives to the safe, effective, and efficient execution
of our mission. We look forward to working further with the Board and
its staff as we prepare the Implementation Plan.
If you have any further questions please contact Glenn Podonsky,
Chief, Office of Health, Safety and Security, at 202-287-6071.
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
[FR Doc. 2011-7085 Filed 3-24-11; 8:45 am]
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