[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 71 (Wednesday, April 13, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 20571-20575]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-8915]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 284
[Docket No. RM11-15-000]
Bidding by Affiliates in Open Seasons for Pipeline Capacity
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking, DOE.
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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is proposing
revisions to its regulations governing interstate natural gas pipelines
to prohibit multiple affiliates of the same entity from bidding in an
open season for pipeline capacity in which the pipeline may allocate
capacity on a pro rata basis, unless each affiliate has an independent
business reason for submitting a bid. The Commission is also proposing
that if more than one affiliate of the same entity participates in such
an open season, then none of those affiliates may release any capacity
obtained in that open season pursuant to a pro rata allocation to any
affiliate, or otherwise allow any affiliate to obtain the use of the
allowed capacity.
DATES: Comments are due May 31, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number and in
accordance with the requirements posted on the Commission's Web site,
http://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be submitted by any of the following
methods:
Agency Web Site: Documents created electronically using
word processing software should be filed in native applications or
print-to-PDF format, and not in a scanned format, at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp.
Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments
electronically must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their
comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. These
requirements can be found on the Commission's Web site, see, e.g., the
``Quick Reference Guide for Paper Submissions,'' available at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp or via phone from FERC Online
Support at (202) 502-6652 or toll-free at 1-866-208-3676.
Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process,
[[Page 20572]]
see the Comment Procedures section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jennifer Kunz, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
[email protected]. (202) 502-6102.
Robert McLean, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
[email protected]. (202) 502-8156.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Table of Contents
(April 7, 2011)
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Paragraph
Nos.
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I. Background.............................................. 2
II. Prohibition on Multiple Affiliate Bidding in Open 9
Seasons for Pipeline Capacity.............................
III. Prohibition on Release of Capacity.................... 15
IV. Regulatory Requirements................................ 18
A. Information Collection Statement.................... 18
B. Environmental Analysis.............................. 19
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act.......................... 20
D. Comment Procedures.................................. 22
E. Document Availability............................... 26
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1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission proposes
to revise its Part 284 regulations to prohibit multiple affiliate
bidding in open seasons for interstate natural gas pipeline capacity
and the subsequent release of acquired capacity to affiliates under
certain circumstances. Specifically, the Commission proposes to
prohibit multiple affiliates of the same entity from bidding in an open
season for pipeline capacity in which the pipeline may allocate
capacity on a pro rata basis, unless each affiliate has an independent
business reason for submitting a bid. The Commission also proposes that
if more than one affiliate of the same entity participates in such an
open season, then none of those affiliates may release any capacity
obtained in that open season pursuant to a pro rata allocation to any
affiliate, or otherwise allow any affiliate to obtain the use of the
allowed capacity. These proposals would prevent anticompetitive gaming
of the pro rata allocation methodology by using multiple affiliates of
the same entity to acquire a larger share of the available capacity
than one affiliate would be able to acquire by itself.
I. Background
A. Open Seasons for Pipeline Capacity
2. The Commission's policy under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) \1\ is
to allocate available interstate pipeline capacity to the shipper that
values it the most, up to the maximum rate.\2\ In furtherance of this
goal, the Commission favors the use of open seasons to allocate
capacity and permits but does not require a net present value (NPV)
evaluation as a tool for determining the highest valued use.\3\
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 717 et al. (2006).
\2\ N. Natural Gas Co., 108 FERC ] 61,044, at P 11 (2004);
Texican N. La. Transport, LLC v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 129 FERC
] 61,270, at P 70 (2009) (Texican I), order on reh'g, 132 FERC ]
61,167, at P 23, 26 (2010) (Texican II).
\3\ Texican II, 132 FERC ] 61,167 at P 26.
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3. Some pipelines hold open seasons to alert shippers to the
availability of capacity on the pipeline and allow the shippers to bid
for available capacity. The pipeline's open season process is an open
and transparent procedure that is set forth in the pipeline's tariff.
The pipeline notifies shippers of the availability of capacity by
posting an open season notice on its EBB and/or Web site for the
available capacity. During the open season, the Commission requires
pipelines to sell all available capacity to shippers willing to pay the
pipeline's maximum recourse rate.\4\
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\4\ Promotion of a More Efficient Capacity Release Market, 72 FR
65916 (November 26, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,625, at P 40
(2007), (citing Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 91 FERC ] 61,053 (2000),
reh'g denied, 94 FERC ] 61,097 (2001), petitions for review denied
sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. FERC, 292 F.3d 831, 837 (DC
Cir. 2002)).
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4. NPV is a method for awarding capacity from the bids received
during the open season.\5\ NPV is a standard method of evaluating bids
for capacity by using the time value of money to determine the present
value of a time series of discounted cash flows.\6\ The highest bidder,
based on the NPV of the bid, receives the capacity. Factors determining
NPV are price, volume of gas, and duration of the contract. The
Commission has stated that a ``net present value evaluation * * *
allocates capacity to the shipper who will produce the greatest revenue
and the least unsubscribed capacity. As such, it is an economically
efficient way of allocating capacity and is consistent with Commission
policy.'' \7\
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\5\ NPV is not the only method a pipeline could use. Another is
the ``first come-first served'' approach, where the first shipper to
submit a qualifying bid receives the capacity.
\6\ Saltville Gas Storage Co., L.L.C., 128 FERC ] 61,257, at P 2
n.3 (2009).
\7\ Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 76 FERC ] 61,101, at 61,522 (1996),
order on reh'g, 79 FERC ] 61,297 (1997), order on reh'g, 82 FERC ]
61,008 (1998), remanded sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
FERC, 177 F.3d 995 (DC Cir. 1999), order on compliance, 91 FERC ]
61,333 (2000), order on remand, 91 FERC ] 61,053 (2000), reh'g
denied, 94 FERC ] 61,097 (2001), petitions for review denied sub
nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. FERC, 292 F.3d 831, 837 (DC Cir.
2002).
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5. In the event that there is not sufficient capacity to meet all
equal maximum bids, pipelines apply a tiebreaker mechanism. One such
mechanism is the pro rata allocation methodology. Under a pro rata
allocation tiebreaker mechanism, in the event that there is not
sufficient capacity to meet all qualifying bids, the capacity is
allocated pro rata, i.e., based on the ratio of each shipper's
respective nomination to all qualifying nominations, applied to the
total available capacity.\8\
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\8\ An alternative tiebreaker mechanism for multiple maximum
bids is to award the capacity to the earliest applicant. The
Commission has stated that ``no single tiebreaker method is
definitely better than other methods; each system has advantages and
disadvantages * * *. So long as its method is reasonable [a
pipeline] may choose any method it wishes for inclusion as the
default tiebreaker in its tariff.'' Trailblazer Pipeline Co., 103
FERC ] 61,225, at 61,869 (2003), order on reh'g and compliance
filing, 108 FERC ] 61,049, at 61,305 (2004).
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B. Multiple Affiliate Bidding
6. It has come to the attention of the Commission that some
entities have developed and applied a strategy of bidding with multiple
affiliates in open seasons for available capacity in order to defeat
the pro rata allocation tiebreaker mechanism and obtain a greater share
of the available capacity than a single bidder could have acquired by
itself. Under conditions where the available capacity is limited and
the value of the
[[Page 20573]]
capacity is high, shippers are strongly motivated to obtain as much of
that valuable capacity as possible in order to take advantage of the
opportunity for profit. Where the available capacity is finite, the
price is capped by the pipeline's maximum tariff rate, and the
tiebreaker is a pro rata allocation, shippers can obtain more capacity
than they would be able to obtain themselves by bidding multiple
affiliates to defeat the pro rata allocation mechanism.
7. Since the pro rata allocation mechanism will result in
proportional shares of the capacity being distributed to the qualifying
bidders, each affiliate with a maximum NPV bid could then release the
capacity to a single affiliate or otherwise allow its affiliate
effectively to obtain the use of the allocated capacity, resulting in
an entity receiving a larger share than it would have been able to
acquire by itself. Such gaming of the pro rata allocation mechanism has
a chilling effect on competition and permits entities that apply a
multiple affiliate bidding strategy inappropriately to gain a
disproportionate share of available capacity by denying a fair
distribution to all maximum bidders. This has the effect of harming
entities that submit only one bid and, by extension, harming their
customers.
8. The foregoing discussion is based upon recent Commission
experience with multiple affiliate bidding.\9\ Based on that
experience, the Commission now proposes to revise its regulations to
make explicit that, unless independent business reasons exist, as
discussed further below, such bidding is inappropriate and, therefore,
prohibited.
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\9\ Tenaska Marketing Ventures, et al., 126 FERC ] 61,040 (2009)
(order approving stipulations and agreements). See also Trailblazer
Pipeline Co., 101 FERC ] 61,405 (2002), order on technical
conference and denying reh'g, 103 FERC ] 61,225 (2003), order on
reh'g and compliance filing, 108 FERC ]61,049 (2004). The Commission
notes that the conduct on Trailblazer predated section 4A of the
NGA, 15 U.S.C. 717c-1 (2006), the anti-manipulation authority
granted to the Commission in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public
Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
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II. Prohibition on Multiple Affiliate Bidding in Open Seasons for
Pipeline Capacity
9. The Commission is of the view that multiple affiliate bidding as
described above lessens competition because other bidders not engaging
in similar conduct will necessarily receive less capacity--not because
such bidders value the capacity any less, but because they bid only
through the unit of the company intending to use the capacity or
because they did not have multiple affiliates. Those who submit bids by
multiple affiliates receive a disproportionate share of the available
capacity, placing bidders that did not submit bids by multiple
affiliates at a competitive disadvantage. In theory, a company could
employ this strategy to the extreme by bidding hundreds or even
thousands of affiliates in a single open season to squeeze out
competitors and give that company a dominant share of the capacity. The
affiliates bidding would not need to have any direct customers or
employees to confer the competitive advantage to the affiliate designed
to benefit from the multiple affiliate bidding--in fact, a company
could create affiliate corporations merely for the sake of bidding in
open seasons to obtain the benefit of multiple affiliate bidding.
Regardless of the degree to which multiple affiliate bidding is used to
obtain a competitive advantage, ultimately bidders that do not submit
bids by multiple affiliates will be harmed, and by extension their
customers will be harmed, by losing valuable capacity to bidders that
employ a multiple affiliate bidding strategy.
10. Furthermore, this multiple bidding behavior frustrates the
Commission's policy of allocating capacity to the shipper that values
it the most. By bidding multiple affiliates under a pro rata
tiebreaker, an entity can gain a greater share of valuable capacity not
because it values the capacity more than other bidders, but merely
because it arranges to submit more maximum NPV bids through the use of
affiliates.
11. The Commission, however, recognizes that not all multiple
affiliate bidding is used to defeat a pro rata allocation mechanism. In
some cases, affiliates may have independent business reasons for
submitting their bids. For example, a marketing arm of an energy
company may bid to secure capacity for its wholesale customers and a
retail operation of the same company may bid to secure capacity to
serve its retail customers, and each would have an independent business
reason for its bid. Or a marketing company may have two or more
affiliates operating in different geographic areas, thus serving
distinct markets all of which may be served by transportation on the
same pipeline. When affiliates bid in such cases, other bidders are not
unduly harmed, undue discrimination is not practiced, and Commission
policy is not violated.
12. Although there may be instances where affiliates have an
independent business reason for bidding for given capacity, in the
Commission's view amendments to our existing regulations are necessary
to prevent entities without such independent reasons from defeating a
pro rata allocation mechanism by using multiple affiliate bidding to
lessen competition and obtain more capacity than they could
independently. Therefore, the Commission proposes to add a new section
284.15 to its regulations, prohibiting multiple affiliates of the same
entity from participating in an open season for pipeline capacity
conducted by any interstate pipeline providing service under subparts B
and G of part 284 of the Commission's regulations in which the pipeline
may allocate capacity on a pro rata basis, unless each affiliate has an
independent business reason for submitting a bid. The Commission
proposes that, for purposes of the new regulation, the term
``affiliate'' be defined as provided in section 358.3(a)(1) and (3) of
the Commission's existing regulations.\10\
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\10\ 18 CFR 358.3(a)(1) and (3) (2010). Section 358.3(a)(1)
provides that an affiliate of a specified entity is ``another person
that controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the
specified entity. An affiliate includes a division of the specified
entity that operates as a functional unit.'' Section 358.3(a)(3)
defines the term ``control.''
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13. It is impossible to describe in advance every situation that
demonstrates an independent business reason. This phrase is intended to
assure companies bidding for capacity that our rule will not prohibit
transactions with economic substance, in which the bidding affiliate is
providing service of value to its customers that is facilitated or
enhanced by the capacity being acquired, such as the scenarios
described in P 11. Those scenarios are illustrative of situations in
which a business unit uses awarded capacity to serve its own customers
or otherwise acts consistently with its business plan, interests, and
obligations. Indications that a company is not acting independently
would be if the business unit is used by its parent or affiliate in a
way that differs from its usual business operations, is used to perform
transactions that an affiliate or parent could not, or is acting as an
``alter ego'' of an affiliate or parent. The independent business
reason criterion ensures that bidders for pipeline capacity act in a
market-driven, pro-competitive manner, not in an effort to gain an
unfair competitive advantage in acquiring capacity. The general
guidance provided here reflects the fact that we oversee a dynamic and
evolving market where addressing yesterday's concerns may not address
tomorrow's concerns. Over time, however, experience in applying this
rule should be instructive to both the Commission and capacity market
participants. As we
[[Page 20574]]
apply the rule, we will be mindful of the fact that we are not only
taking steps to assure non-discriminatory access to capacity but also
providing guidance to market participants in general.\11\
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\11\ The approach taken here is similar to that taken in Order
No. 644, which adopted market behavior rules for sellers of natural
gas. Amendments to Blanket Sales Certificates, Order No. 644, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,153 (2003), reh'g denied 107 FERC ] 61,174
(2004). Order No. 644 adopted rules that prohibited transactions
without a ``legitimate business purpose'' and that were ``intended
to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions,
or market rules for natural gas.'' In that case the rule prohibited
certain transactions (such as wash trades and collusion), but the
Commission specifically declined to limit the rule to pre-determined
circumstances. Order No. 644, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,153 at P 32-
36. Similarly, here we recognize scenarios in which the independent
business reason standard can be met, and decline to limit the rule
to pre-determined circumstances. The relevant market behavior rules
adopted in Order No. 644 were rescinded after the Commission adopted
section 1c.1 of the Regulations. Amendments to Codes of Conduct for
Unbundled Sales Service and for Persons Holding Blanket Marketing
Certificates, Order No. 673, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,207 (2006).
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14. This proposed rule is designed to ensure that an entity cannot
use multiple affiliates solely to secure a larger allocation of
capacity than it could acquire by itself. The proposed rule would also
provide clear notice to parties participating in open seasons for
interstate pipeline capacity that multiple affiliate bidding and
subsequent release of acquired capacity to one affiliate, or other
devices to confer the value of the capacity on one affiliate, are
prohibited.
III. Prohibition on Release of Capacity
15. The Commission adopted its capacity release program as part of
the restructuring of interstate natural gas pipelines required by Order
No. 636.\12\ The capacity release program permits firm shippers to
release their capacity to others when they are not using it.\13\ The
Commission notes that some companies bidding with multiple affiliates
have used capacity release as the final step in consolidating multiple
shares of capacity for use by one of the company's units.\14\ By
releasing the capacity acquired in the open season, affiliates are able
to transfer the capacity each acquires to a single company that
benefits by obtaining more capacity than it could have obtained by
itself.
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\12\ Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations
Governing Self-Implementing Transportation and Regulation of Natural
Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 636, 57 FR
13267 (April 16, 1992), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles
January 1991-June 1996 ] 30,939 (1992), order on reh'g, Order No.
636-A., 57 FR 36128 (August 12, 1002), FERC Stats. & Regs.,
Regulations Preambles January 1991-June 1996 ] 30,950 (1992); order
on reh'g, Order No. 636-B, 57 FR 57911 (Dec. 8, 1992), 61 FERC ]
61,272 (1992), order on reh'g, 62 FERC ] 61,007 (1993), aff'd in
part, vacated and remanded in part, United Dist. Cos. v. FERC, 88
F.3d 1105 (DC Cir. 1996), order on remand, Order No. 636-C, 78 FERC
] 61,186 (1997).
\13\ In brief, under the Commission's capacity release program,
a firm shipper (releasing shipper) sells its capacity by returning
its capacity to the pipeline for reassignment to the buyer
(replacement shipper). The pipeline contracts with, and receives
payment from, the replacement shipper and then issues a credit to
the releasing shipper. The replacement shipper on a long term, year
or more release, may pay less than the pipeline's maximum tariff
rate, but not more. 18 CFR 284.8(e) (2010). The results of all
releases are posted by the pipeline on its Internet Web site and
made available through standardized, downloadable files.
\14\ Tenaska Marketing Ventures, et al., 126 FERC ] 61,040 at P
13, 18.
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16. In order to prevent the use of capacity release or other
mechanisms as part of a scheme to game a pro rata allocation by
transferring the benefit of the capacity to the affiliate that has a
business use for the capacity, the Commission proposes to prohibit
affiliates from releasing any capacity obtained in an open season
pursuant to a pro rata allocation to any affiliate or otherwise from
allowing any affiliate effectively to obtain the use of the allocated
capacity. This will not inhibit two or more affiliates from obtaining
and using valuable pro rated capacity where they each have an
independent business reason for their bids. If the affiliate has an
independent business reason for initially bidding on the capacity, it
presumably has a need for the capacity once it has been awarded it.
Therefore, requiring the capacity-winning affiliate to retain the
capacity in such a circumstance should present little, if any, hardship
to such affiliate. If a company believes that retaining capacity in a
certain case would in fact create a hardship to an affiliate, the
company can seek a waiver of the prohibition.\15\
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\15\ If multiple affiliate bidding occurs in open seasons for
relatively short term capacity, hardship is unlikely. If multiple
affiliates acquire longer-term capacity, later changes in markets or
corporate structure could create a hardship for an affiliate to keep
the capacity it had been awarded. For example, a successful bidder
might lose the market for which the capacity had been obtained and
wish to release the capacity to an affiliate for other use, or a
company may reorganize to merge the successful bidder with another
affiliate or to reassign the successful bidder's functions to
another affiliate. In such cases, the affected entity should seek a
waiver of the prohibition and present the facts that support a
release of the capacity to an affiliate.
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17. This prohibition against capacity release reinforces the
prohibition against multiple affiliate bidding unless each affiliate
has an independent business reason for submitting a bid by further
deterring affiliates from bidding for capacity for which they have no
independent use. Should an affiliate violate the prohibition against
multiple affiliate bidding, that affiliate would incur an additional
violation with resulting penalties for transferring the advantage of
the multiple affiliate bidding to the affiliated entity that would
benefit from it. This complementary prohibition provides an additional
deterrent to violation of the first prohibition, helping to ensure that
the only instances of multiple affiliate bidding are those with
independent business reasons for each bid. In the Commission's view,
this prohibition, in combination with the provision prohibiting
multiple affiliate bidding unless each affiliate has an independent
business reason for submitting a bid, will fairly ensure that both
steps of the gaming process are prohibited.
IV. Regulatory Requirements
A. Information Collection Statement
18. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require OMB
to approve certain information collection requirements imposed by
agency rule.\16\ The proposed regulations discussed above do not impose
reporting or recordkeeping requirements on applicable entities as
defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act.\17\ As a result, the Commission
is not submitting this NOPR to OMB for review and approval.
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\16\ 5 CFR 1320.11 (2010).
\17\ 44 U.S.C. 3502(2)-(3) (2006).
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B. Environmental Analysis
19. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\18\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from these
requirements as not having a significant effect on the human
environment.\19\ The actions proposed to be taken here fall within
categorical exclusions in the Commission's regulations for rules that
are corrective, clarifying or procedural, for information gathering,
analysis, and dissemination, and for sales, exchange, and
transportation of natural gas that requires no construction of
facilities.\20\ Therefore an environmental review is unnecessary and
has not been prepared in this rulemaking.
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\18\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats.
& Regs., Regulation Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987).
\19\ 18 CFR 380.4 (2010).
\20\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii), 380.4(a)(5), and
380.4(a)(27)(2010).
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[[Page 20575]]
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
20. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \21\ generally
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The Commission is not required to make such an analysis if proposed
regulations would not have such an effect.\22\ Most companies regulated
by the Commission do not fall within the RFA's definition of a small
entity.\23\
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\21\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612 (2006).
\22\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b) (2006).
\23\ 5 U.S.C. 601(3) (citing section 3 of the Small Business
Act, 15 U.S.C. 623 (2006)). Section 3 defines a ``small-business
concern'' as a business which is independently owned and operated
and which is not dominant in its field of operation.
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21. The rule proposed herein should have no significant negative
impact on those entities, be they large or small, subject to the
Commission's regulatory jurisdiction under the NGA. Most companies to
which the rules proposed herein, if finalized, would apply, do not fall
within the RFA's definition of small entities. In addition, the
proposed rule is only triggered if more than one affiliate of the same
entity participates in an open season for pipeline capacity in which
the pipeline may allocate capacity on a pro rata basis, and each
affiliate does not have an independent business reason for submitting a
bid. Therefore, the rule would only affect a limited number of small
entities. The rules proposed herein, if finalized, will not have a
significant economic effect on these small entities because the rule
does not impose any reporting or recordkeeping requirements. Therefore,
the Commission certifies that the proposed rules will not have a
significant economic effect on a substantial number of small entities.
D. Comment Procedures
22. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish
to discuss. Comments are due 45 days from publication in the Federal
Register. Comments must refer to Docket No. RM11-15-000, and must
include the commenter's name, the organization they represent, if
applicable, and their address in their comments.
23. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically
via the eFiling link on the Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing
software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
24. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically
must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their comments to:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
25. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.
E. Document Availability
26. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
27. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
28. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web
site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202)502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 284
Continental shelf, Natural gas, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
By direction of the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission proposes to amend
part 284, Chapter I, Title 18, Code of Federal Regulations, to read as
follows:
PART 284--CERTAIN SALES AND TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS UNDER THE
NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978 AND RELATED AUTHORITIES
1. The authority citation for part 284 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 717-717w, 3301-3432; 42 U.S.C. 7101-7352;
43 U.S.C. 1331-1356.
2. Section 284.15 is added to read as follows.
Sec. 284.15 Bidding by affiliates in open seasons for pipeline
capacity.
(a) Multiple affiliates of the same entity may not participate in
an open season for pipeline capacity conducted by any interstate
pipeline providing service under subparts B and G of this part, in
which the pipeline may allocate capacity on a pro rata basis, unless
each affiliate has an independent business reason for submitting a bid.
(b) If more than one affiliate of the same entity participates in
an open season subject to paragraph (a) of this section, none of those
affiliates may release any capacity obtained in that open season to any
affiliate, or otherwise allow any affiliate effectively to obtain the
use of the allocated capacity.
(c) For purposes of this section, an affiliate is any person that
satisfies the definition of affiliate in Sec. Sec. 358.3(a)(1) and (3)
of this chapter with respect to another entity participating in an open
season subject to paragraph (a) of this section.
[FR Doc. 2011-8915 Filed 4-12-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P