

Parties on or after April 29, 2000, regardless whether the exporter has obtained an End-Use Certificate described in § 745.2 of the EAR.

(3) *Technology controlled under ECCN 1E355.* A license is required to non-States Parties (destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR), except for Israel and Taiwan, for CW reasons.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) *Schedule 1 chemicals.* (i) Applications to export Schedule 1 chemicals to States Parties (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) will generally be approved, provided that all of the following conditions are met:

(A) The chemicals are destined for purposes not prohibited under the CWC (e.g., research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes);

(B) The types and quantities of chemicals are strictly limited to those that can be justified for those purposes;

(C) The aggregate amount of Schedule 1 chemicals in the country of destination at any given time for such purposes is equal to or less than one metric ton and receipt of the proposed export or reexport will not cause the limit to be exceeded.

(ii) Applications to export Schedule 1 chemicals to non-States Parties (destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) will generally be denied.

(iii) Applications to reexport Schedule 1 chemicals will generally be denied.

(2) *Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals.* (i)(A) *ECCN 1C350.* Applications to export Schedule 2 chemicals prior to April 29, 2000, and Schedule 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350 to CWC non-States parties will generally be denied.

(B) *ECCN 1C355.* Applications to export Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C355 will generally be denied.

(C) *Exports of Schedule 2 chemicals on or after April 29, 2000.* Applications to export Schedule 2 chemicals controlled under 1C350 and 1C355 to non-States Parties (destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) on or after April 29, 2000, will generally be denied.

(ii) Purposes not prohibited under the CWC include:

(A) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes; and

(B) Law enforcement purposes.

(3) *Technology controlled under ECCN 1E355.* Exports and reexports of technology controlled under ECCN 1E355 will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

[64 FR 27142, May 18, 1999; 64 FR 49381, Sept. 13, 1999, as amended at 65 FR 58913, Oct. 3, 2000]

§ 742.19 Anti-terrorism: North Korea.

(a) *License requirements.* (1) All items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) (i.e., with a designation other than EAR 99) require a license for export or reexport to North Korea, except ECCNs 0A988 and 0A989. This includes all items controlled for AT reasons, including any item on the CCL containing AT column 1 or AT column 2 in the Country Chart column of the License Requirements section of an ECCN; and ECCNS 0A986, 0A999, 0B986, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1B999, 1C995, 1C999, 1D999, 2A994, 2B994, 2C994, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999.

(2) The Secretary of State has designated North Korea as a country whose Government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy on terrorism-supporting countries, BXA maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport of items described in Supplement 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA), if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users.

(ii) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to non-sensitive end-users, as well as items described in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(44) to all end-users, are controlled to North

Korea under section 6(a) of the EAA. (See Supplement No. 2 to part 742 for more information on items controlled under sections 6(a) and 6(j) of the EAA and §750.6 of the EAR for procedures for processing license applications for items controlled under EAA section 6(j).)

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in North Korea of the following items will generally be denied:

(i) Items controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These items contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Items controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These items have an MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iii) Items controlled for nuclear weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These items contain NP Column 1 or NP Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) Items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These items contain NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(v) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These items contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section in an ECCN on the CCL and are controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number "18."

(vi) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(vii) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and crypto-logic items controlled any destination. These are items that contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, AT Column 1 or AT Column 2 in the Coun-

try Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(viii) Submersible systems controlled under ECCN 8A992.

(ix) Scuba gear and related equipment controlled under ECCN 8A992.

(x) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment controlled under ECCN 9A991.

(xi) Explosive device detectors controlled under ECCN 2A993.

(xii) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.

(xiii) Computer numerically controlled machine tools controlled under ECCN 2B991.

(xiv) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines controlled under ECCN 2B991.

(xv) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment controlled under ECCN 3B991.

(xvi) Digital computers with a CTP above 2000.

(xvii) Microprocessors with a CTP of 550 or above.

(2) Applications for export and reexport to North Korea of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Applications for export and reexport to North Korea of items described in paragraphs (c)(12), (c)(24), (c)(34), (c)(37), (c)(38), and (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses. Applications for non-nuclear end-users or for non-nuclear end-uses, excluding items described in (c)(24)(iv)(A) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(4) License applications for items reviewed under section 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of section 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of North Korea, including its military logistics capability, or

could enhance North Korea's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.

[65 FR 38151, June 19, 2000]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO PART 742—NON-PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

NOTE: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application.

(1) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl methylphosphonate, methylphosphonyldifluoride, phosphorous oxychloride, thiodiglycol, dimethylamine hydrochloride, dimethylamine, ethylene chlorohydrin (2-chloroethanol), and potassium fluoride is April 28, 1986.

(2) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), methylphosphonyldichloride, 3-quinuclidinol, N,N-diisopropylamino-ethane-2-thiol, N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride, 3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, trimethyl phosphite, phosphorous trichloride, and thionyl chloride is July 6, 1987.

(3) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of items in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is February 22, 1989.

(4) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran of dimethyl methylphosphonate, methylphosphonyl difluoride, phosphorous oxychloride, and thiodiglycol is February 22, 1989.

(5) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran, Libya or Syria of potassium hydrogen fluoride, ammonium hydrogen fluoride, sodium fluoride, sodium bifluoride, phosphorus pentasulfide, sodium cyanide, triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989.

(6) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of phosphorous trichloride, trimethyl phosphite, and thionyl chloride is December 12, 1989.

For exports to Iran or Syria, paragraph (2) of this supplement applies.

(7) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran, Libya or Syria) of 2-chloroethanol and triethanolamine is January 15, 1991. For exports of 2-chloroethanol to Iran or Syria, paragraph (1) of this supplement applies. For exports of triethanolamine to Iran, Libya or Syria, paragraph (5) of this supplement applies.

(8) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran, Libya or Syria) of chemicals controlled by ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except for applications to export the following chemicals: 2-chloroethanol, dimethyl methylphosphonate, dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), methylphosphonyl dichloride, methylphosphonyl difluoride, phosphorous oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride, thiodiglycol, thionyl chloride triethanolamine, and trimethyl phosphite. (See also paragraphs (6) and (7) of this supplement.) For exports to Iran, Libya or Syria, see paragraphs (1) through (6) of this supplement.

(9) The contract sanctity date for exports and reexports of the following commodities and technical data is March 7, 1991:

(i) Equipment (for producing chemical weapon precursors and chemical warfare agents) described in ECCNs 2B350 and 2B351;

(ii) Equipment and materials (for producing biological agents) described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, and 2B352; and

(iii) Technology (for the development, production, and use of equipment described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, 2B350, 2B351, and 2B352) described in ECCNs 2E001, 2E002, and 2E301.

(10) The contract sanctity date for license applications subject to §742.2(b)(3) of this part is March 7, 1991.

(11) The contract sanctity date for reexports of chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except that the contract sanctity date for reexports of these chemicals to Iran, Libya or Syria is December 12, 1989.

(12) The contract sanctity date for reexports of human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens controlled by ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is March 7, 1991.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25459, May 9, 1997]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO PART 742—ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: IRAN, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND SUDAN CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED POLICIES

NOTE: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will

be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application. BXA will determine any applicable contract sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting documents is submitted.

(a) *Terrorist-supporting countries.* The Secretary of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).

(b) *Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a).* Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any of these countries could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory control under EAA section 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before a license for such an item may be issued.

(1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the export to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this Supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-users in any of these countries.

(2) License applications for items controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.

(3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 6(a) to Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are:

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and

(ii) The following items to all end-users: for Iran, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(42) of this Supplement; for North Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(44) of this Supplement; for Sudan, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14), and (c)(16)

through (c)(42) of this Supplement; and for Syria, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.

(c) The license requirements and licensing policies for items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons to Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea are generally described in §§742.8, 742.9, 742.10, and 742.19 of this part, respectively. This Supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan and related contract sanctity dates that may be available for transactions benefitting from pre-existing contracts involving Iran, Syria, and Sudan. Exporters are advised that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control administers a comprehensive trade and investment embargo against Iran (See Executive Orders 12957, 12959 and 13059 of March 15, 1995, May 6, 1995 and August 19, 1997, respectively.) Exporters are further advised that exports and reexports to Iran of items that are listed on the CCL as requiring a license for national security or foreign policy reasons are subject to a policy of denial under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note (1994)). Transactions involving Iran and benefitting from a contract that pre-dates October 23, 1992 may be considered under the applicable licensing policy in effect prior to that date.

(1) *All items subject to national security controls.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of items valued at \$7 million or more: January 23, 1984.

(B) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of all other national security controlled items: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for non-military end-users or end-uses: August 28, 1991, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available for items valued at \$7 million or more to military end-users or end-uses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. Contract sanctity date:

January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(2) *All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls*. Applications for all end-users in Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Sudan of these items will generally be denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates for Iran and Syria. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or unless an earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1 to part 742.

(3) *All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR)*. Applications for all end-users in Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Iran and Syria are not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(4) *All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls (NRL)*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. No contract sanctity date is available.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport to non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(5) *All military-related items, i.e., applications for export and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number "18"*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(6) *All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more: January 23, 1984.

(B) Contract sanctity date for other helicopters and aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by 9A991.d: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied.

(A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.

(B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.

(C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: December 16, 1986.

(D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(7) *Heavy duty, on-highway tractors*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-

by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(8) *Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9t (10 tons) or more*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(9) *Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts to power tank transporters*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(10) *Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for all national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of any such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of any such equipment will generally be denied.

(1) *Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(12) *Electronic test equipment.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(13) *Mobile communications equipment.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all end-users of all other mobile communications equipment: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile communications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(14) *Acoustic underwater detection equipment.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other acoustic underwater detection equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* A license is required for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses to Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(15) *Portable electric power generators.*

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(16) *Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other vessels and boats for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(17) *Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower)*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for outboard engines of 45 HP or more for all end-users: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for all other marine and submarine engines for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(18) *Underwater photographic equipment*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies

(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(19) *Submersible systems*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such systems will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(20) *Scuba gear and related equipment*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. No contract sanctity is available for such items to Iran.

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users and end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(21) *Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(22) *Computer numerically controlled machine tools*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other computer numerically controlled machine tools for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer numerically controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(23) *Vibration test equipment*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of

such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(24) *Digital computers with a CTP of 6 or above, assemblies, related equipment, equipment for development or production of magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for fabrication of head/disk assemblies.*

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for military end-users and end-uses of items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*.

(A) Computers with a CTP above 2000 MTOPS: Applications for all end-users will generally be denied.

(B) Computers with a CTP at or below 2000 MTOPS: Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(25) *Telecommunications equipment.*

(i) A license is required for the following telecommunications equipment:

(A) Radio relay systems or equipment operating at a frequency equal to or greater than 19.7 GHz or "spectral efficiency" greater than 3 bit/s/Hz;

(B) Fiber optic systems or equipment operating at a wavelength greater than 1000 nm;

(C) "Telecommunications transmission systems" or equipment with a "digital transfer rate" at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45 Mb/s.

(ii) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iv) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(v) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-

users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(26) *Microprocessors.*

(i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.

(A) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(1) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(2) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(B) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(1) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(2) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.

(C) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(i) With a CTP of 550 MTOPS or above.

(A) *North Korea.* Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(B) [Reserved]

(27) *Semiconductor manufacturing equipment.* For Iran, Syria, Sudan, or North Korea a license is required for all such equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was

subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(28) *Software specially designed for the computer-aided design*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(29) *Packet switches. Equipment described in ECCN 5A991.c.*

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses in Iran of packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other packet switches for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(30) *Specially designed software for air traffic control applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic tracking.*

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(31) *Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type.*

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such gravity meters for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(32) *Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz.*

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such magnetometers for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(33) *Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C006.d for cooling fluids for radar*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such compounds will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such fluorocarbon compounds for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(34) *High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210*.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such fibers will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-

uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(35) *Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(36) *Aircraft skin and spar milling machines.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines to all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(37) *Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 2B996.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other manual dimensional inspection machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional inspection machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(38) *Robots capable of employing feedback information in real time processing to generate or modify programs.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraphs (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(39) *Explosive device detectors described in ECCN 2A993.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(40) [Reserved]

(41) *Production technology controlled under ECCN 1C355 on the CCL.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of

these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(42) *Commercial Charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992 on the CCL.*

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

(iv) *North Korea.* Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(43) [Reserved]

(44) *Specific processing equipment, materials and software controlled under ECCNs 0A999, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL.*

(i) *North Korea.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) [Reserved]

[65 FR 38152, June 19, 2000]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 3 TO PART 742—HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS; SAFEGUARD CONDITIONS AND RELATED INFORMATION

This supplement sets forth the security conditions and safeguard plans for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of high performance computers that may be imposed by BXA to certain destinations. The licensing policies for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of high performance computers are set forth in §742.12 of this part.

(a) *Safeguard conditions.* Following inter-agency review of the application, the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) will instruct the exporter to submit a safeguard plan signed by the ultimate consignee and certified by the export control authorities of the importing country (see *Certification by export control authorities of importing country* in this supplement). The safeguard plan must indicate that the ultimate consignee agrees to implement those safeguards required by

the BXA as a condition of issuing the license. BXA will inform exporters concerning which of the following safeguards will be imposed as license conditions:

(1) The applicant will assume responsibility for providing adequate security against physical diversion of the computer during shipment (e.g., delivery by either attended or monitored shipment, using the most secure route possible—this precludes using the services or facilities of any country in Computer Tier 4).

(2) There will be *no* reexport or intra-country transfer of the computer without prior written authorization from BXA.

(3) The computer systems will be used only for those activities approved on the license or reexport authorization.

(4) There will be no changes either in the end-users or the end-uses indicated on the license without prior written authorization by BXA.

(5) Only software that supports the approved end-uses will be shipped with the computer system.

(6) The end-user will station security personnel at the computer using facility to ensure that the appropriate security measures are implemented.

(7) The exporter will station representatives at the computer using facility, or make such individuals readily available, to guide the security personnel in the implementation and operation of the security measures.

(8) The security personnel will undertake the following measures under the guidance of the exporter's representatives:

(i) The physical security of the computer using facility;

(ii) The establishment of a system to ensure the round-the-clock supervision of computer security;

(iii) The inspection, if necessary, of any program or software to be run on the computer system in order to ensure that all usage conforms to the conditions of the license;

(iv) The suspension, if necessary, of any run in progress and the inspection of any output generated by the computer to determine whether the program runs or output conform with the conditions of the license;

(v) The inspection of usage logs daily to ensure conformity with the conditions of the license and the retention of records of these logs for at least a year;

(vi) The determination of the acceptability of computer users to ensure conformity with the conditions of the license;

(vii) The immediate reporting of any security breaches or suspected security breaches to the government of the importing country and to the exporter's representatives;

(viii) The execution of the following key tasks:

(A) Establishment of new accounts;

(B) Assignment of passwords;

(C) Random sampling of data;

(D) Generation of daily logs;

(ix) The maintenance of the integrity and security of tapes and data files containing archived user files, log data, or system backups.

(9) The exporter's representatives will be present when certain key functions are being carried out (e.g., the establishment of new accounts, the assignment of passwords, the random sampling of data, the generating of daily logs, the setting of limits to computer resources available to users in the development mode, the certification of programs for conformity to the approved end-uses before they are allowed to run in the production mode, and the modification to previously certified production programs).

(10) The security personnel and the exporter's representatives will provide monthly reports on the usage of the computer system and on the implementation of the safeguards.

(11) The computer system will be housed in one secure building and protected against theft and unauthorized entry at all times.

(12) Restricted nationals, i.e., nationals of Computer Tier 4 countries, will not be allowed access to computers:

(i) No physical or computational access to computers may be granted to restricted nationals without prior written authorization from BXA, except that commercial consignees as described in this supplement are prohibited only from giving such nationals user-accessible programmability without prior written authorization;

(ii) No passwords or IDs may be issued to restricted nationals;

(iii) No work may be performed on the computer on behalf of restricted nationals; and

(iv) No conscious or direct ties may be established to networks (including their subscribers) operated by restricted nationals.

(13) Physical access to the computer, the operator consoles, and sensitive storage areas of the computer using facility will be controlled by the security personnel, under the guidance and monitoring of the exporter's representatives, and will be limited to the fewest number of people needed to maintain and run the computer system.

(14) The computer will be equipped with the necessary software to: Permit access to authorized persons only, detect attempts to gain unauthorized access, set and maintain limits on usage, establish accountability for usage, and generate logs and other records of usage. This software will also maintain the integrity of data and program files, the accounting and audit system, the password or computational access control system, and the operating system itself.

(i) The operating system will be configured so that all jobs can be designated and

tracked as either program development jobs or as production jobs.

(i) In the program development mode, users will be free, following verification that their application conforms to the agreed end-use, to create, edit, or modify programs, to use utilities such as editors, debuggers, or compilers and to verify program operation. Programs in the development mode will be subject to inspection as provided by paragraph (a)(8)(iii) of this supplement.

(ii) In the production mode, users will have access to the full range of computer resources, but will be prohibited from modifying any program or using utilities that could modify any program. Before being allowed to run in the production mode, a program will have to be certified for conformity to approved end-uses by the security personnel and the exporter's representatives.

(iii) Programs certified for execution in the production mode will be protected from unauthorized modification by appropriate software and physical security measures. Any modifications to previously certified production programs will be approved by the security personnel under the guidance and monitoring of the exporter's representatives.

(iv) The computer will be provided with accounting and audit software to ensure that detailed logs are maintained to record all computer usage. A separate log of security-related events will also be kept.

(v) For each job executed in the production mode, the operating system will record execution characteristics in order to permit generation of a statistical profile of the program executed.

(vi) The source code of the operating system will be accessible only to the exporter's representatives. Only those individuals will make changes in this source code.

(vii) The security personnel, under the guidance of the exporter's representatives, will change passwords for individuals frequently and at unpredictable intervals.

(viii) The security personnel, under the guidance of the exporter's representatives, will have the right to deny passwords to anyone. Passwords will be denied to anyone whose activity does not conform to the conditions of the license.

(ix) Misuse of passwords by users will result in denial of further access to the computer.

(x) The exporter's representatives will install a strict password system and provide guidance on its implementation.

(xi) Only the exporter's representatives will be trained in making changes in the password system and only they will make such changes.

(xii) No computer will be networked to other computers outside the computer center without prior authorization from BXA.

(xiii) Generally, remote terminals will not be allowed outside the computer using facil-

ity without prior authorization by BXA. If remote terminals are specifically authorized by the license:

(i) The terminals will have physical security equivalent to the safeguards at the computer using facility;

(ii) The terminals will be constrained to minimal amounts of computer resources (CPU time, memory access, number of input-output operations, and other resources);

(iii) The terminals will not be allowed direct computational access to the computer (i.e., the security personnel, under the guidance of the exporter's representatives, will validate the password and identity of the user of any remote terminals before any such user is permitted to access the computer); all terminals will be connected to the computer system by a dedicated access line and a network access controller.

(23) There will be no direct input to the computer from remote terminals. Any data originating from outside the computer using facility, except for direct input from terminals within the same compound as the computer using facility, will first be processed by a separate processor or network access controller in order to permit examination of the data prior to its entry into the computer.

(24) The exporter will perform all maintenance of the computer system.

(25) Spare parts kept on site will be limited to the minimum amount. Spares will be kept in an area accessible only to the exporter's representatives. These representatives will maintain a strict audit system to account for all spare parts.

(26) No development or production technology on the computer system will be sent with the computer to the ultimate consignee.

(27) The end-user must immediately report any suspicions or facts concerning possible violations of the safeguards to the exporter and to the export control authorities of the importing country.

(28) The exporter must immediately report any information concerning possible violations of the safeguards to BXA. A violation of the safeguards might constitute grounds for suspension or termination of the license, preventing the shipment of unshipped spare parts, or the denial of additional licenses for spare parts, etc.

(29) The end-user will be audited quarterly by an independent consultant who has been approved by the export control authorities of the importing and exporting countries, but is employed at the expense of the end-user. The consultant will audit the computer usage and the implementation of the safeguards.

(30) The installation and operation of the computer will be coordinated and controlled by the following management structure:

(i) *Steering Committee.* The Steering Committee will comprise nationals of the importing country who will oversee the management and operation of the computer.

(ii) *Security Staff.* The Security Staff will be selected by the end-user or the government of the importing country to ensure that the required safeguards are implemented. This staff will be responsible for conducting an annual audit to evaluate physical security, administrative procedures, and technical controls.

(iii) *Technical Consultative Committee.* This committee will comprise technical experts from the importing country and the exporting company who will provide guidance in operating and maintaining the computer. At least one member of the committee will be an employee of the exporter. The committee will approve all accounts and maintain an accurate list of all users. In addition, the committee will advise the Steering Committee and the Security Staff concerning the security measures needed to ensure compliance with the safeguards required by the license.

(31) An ultimate consignee who is a multiple-purpose end-user, such as a university, will establish a peer review group comprising experts who represent each department or application area authorized for use on the computer under the conditions of the license. This group shall have the following responsibilities:

(i) Review all requests for computer usage and make recommendations concerning the acceptability of all projects and users;

(ii) Submit these recommendations to the Security Staff and Technical Consultative Committee for review and approval (see paragraph (a)(28) of this supplement);

(iii) Establish acceptable computer resource parameters for each project and review the results to verify their conformity with the authorized end-uses, restrictions, and parameters; and

(iv) Prepare monthly reports that would include a description of any runs exceeding the established parameters and submit them to the security staff.

(32) The end-user will also cooperate with any post-shipment inquiries or inspections by the U.S. Government or exporting company officials to verify the disposition and/or use of the computer, including access to the following:

(i) Usage logs, which should include, at a minimum, computer users, dates, times of use, and amount of system time used;

(ii) Computer access authorization logs, which should include, at a minimum, computer users, project names, and purpose of projects.

(33) The end-user will also cooperate with the U.S. Government or exporting company officials concerning the physical inspection of the computer using facility, on short no-

tice, at least once a year and will provide access to all data relevant to computer usage. This inspection will include:

(i) Analyzing any programs or software run on the computer to ensure that all usage complies with the authorized end-uses on the license. This will be done by examining user files (e.g., source codes, machine codes, input/output data) that are either on-line at the time of the inspection or that have been previously sampled and securely stored.

(ii) Checking current and archived usage logs for conformity with the authorized end-uses and the restrictions imposed by the license.

(iii) Verifying the acceptability of all computer users in conformity with the authorized end-uses and the restrictions imposed by the license.

(34) Usage requests that exceed the quantity of monthly CPU time specified on the license shall not be approved without prior written authorization from the BXA. Requests for computational access approval shall include a description of the intended purpose for which access is sought.

(35) In addition to, or in lieu of, the normal access by on-site exporting company staff or its representatives, the company, when required by the exporting government, will provide a separate remote electronic access capability to the computer for the purposes of maintenance, troubleshooting, inspection of work in progress, and auditing of all work performed on the computer. On-site and central exporting company hardware and software maintenance facilities, at the direction of the exporting company staff or its representatives, to gather information such as:

(i) Statistical profiles of production jobs;

(ii) Logs of jobs run in both production and development mode;

(iii) Logs and reports of security related events.

If such method is used, the remote maintenance facilities will be considered part of the operating system and protected accordingly, and will be available only to exporting company operational staff or its representatives. The maintenance hardware and software and associated communication links will be protected to ensure the integrity and authenticity of data and programs and to prevent tampering with hardware.

(36) The export company staff or its representatives will be required to provide personnel for a specified period of time at the computer facility for management, operation, and safeguarding of the computer.

(b) *Certification by export control authorities of importing country.* (1) The following importing government certification may be required under §742.12 of this part:

This is to certify that (*name of ultimate consignee*) has declared to (*name of appropriate foreign government agency*) that the computer (*model name*) will be used only for

the purposes specified in the end-use statement and that the ultimate consignee will establish and adhere to all the safeguard conditions and perform all other undertakings described in the end-use statement.

The (*name of appropriate foreign government agency*) will advise the United States Government of any evidence that might reasonably indicate the existence of circumstances (e.g., transfer of ownership) that could affect the objectives of the security safeguard conditions.

(2) Other importing government assurances regarding prohibited activities may also be required on a case-by-case basis.

(c) *Commercial consignees.* Exports or re-exports of computers that are solely dedicated to the following non-scientific and non-technical commercial business uses will usually be eligible for a reduced set of security safeguard conditions:

- (1) Financial services (e.g., banking, securities and commodity exchanges);
- (2) Insurance;
- (3) Reservation systems;
- (4) Point-of-sales systems;
- (5) Mailing list maintenance for marketing purposes;
- (6) Inventory control for retail/wholesale distribution.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 4 TO PART 742—KEY ESCROW OR KEY RECOVERY PRODUCTS CRITERIA

Key Recoverable Feature

(1) The key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext shall be accessible through a key recoverable feature.

(2) The product's cryptographic functions shall be inoperable until the key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext is recoverable by government officials under proper legal authority and without the cooperation or knowledge of the user.

(3) The output of the product shall automatically include, in an accessible format and with a frequency of at least once every three hours, the identity of the key recovery agent(s) and information sufficient for the key recovery agent(s) to identify the key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt the ciphertext.

(4) The product's key recoverable functions shall allow access to the key(s) or other material/information needed to decrypt the ciphertext regardless of whether the product generated or received the ciphertext.

(5) The product's key recoverable functions shall allow for the recovery of all required decryption key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext during a period of authorized access without requiring repeated presentations of access authorization to the key recovery agent(s).

Interoperability Feature

(6) The product's cryptographic functions may:

(i) Interoperate with other key recoverable products that meet these criteria, and shall not interoperate with products whose key recovery feature has been altered, bypassed, disabled, or otherwise rendered inoperative;

(ii) Send information to non-key recoverable products only when assured access is permitted to the key(s) or other material/information needed to decrypt ciphertext generated by the key recoverable product. Otherwise, key length is restricted to less than or equal to 56-bit DES or equivalent.

(iii) Receive information from non-key recoverable products with a key length restricted to less than or equal to 56-bit DES or equivalent.

Design, Implementation and Operational Assurance

(7) The product shall be resistant to efforts to disable or circumvent the attributes described in criteria one through six.

(8) The product's cryptographic function's key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext shall be accessible to government officials under proper legal authority.

[63 FR 50523, Sept. 22, 1998, as amended at 63 FR 72164, Dec. 31, 1998]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 5 TO PART 742 [RESERVED]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 6 TO PART 742—GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING A CLASSIFICATION REQUEST FOR ENCRYPTION ITEMS

Classification requests for encryption items must be submitted on Form BXA-748P, in accordance with §748.3 of the EAR. Insert the phrase "License Exception ENC" in Block 9: Special Purpose in Form BXA-748P. Failure to insert this phrase will delay processing. BXA recommends that such requests be delivered via courier service to: Bureau of Export Administration, Office of Exporter Services, Room 2705, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20230. For electronic submissions via SNAP, you may fax a copy of the support documents to BXA at (202) 501-0784. In addition, you must send a copy of the classification request and all support documents to: Attn: ENC Encryption Request Coordinator, 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6131, Fort Meade, MD 20755-6000. For all classification requests of encryption items provide brochures or other documentation or specifications related to the technology, commodity or software, relevant

product descriptions, architecture specifications, and as necessary for the technical review, source code. Also, indicate any prior reviews and classifications of the product, if applicable to the current submission. Provide the following information in a cover letter with the classification request:

(a) State the name of the encryption item being submitted for review.

(b) State that a duplicate copy has been sent to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator.

(c) For classification request for a commodity or software, provide the following information:

(1) Description of all the symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms and key lengths and how the algorithms are used. Specify which encryption modes are supported (e.g., cipher feedback mode or cipher block chaining mode).

(2) State the key management algorithms, including modulus sizes, that are supported.

(3) For products with proprietary algorithms, include a textual description and the source code of the algorithm.

(4) Describe the pre-processing methods (e.g., data compression or data interleaving) that are applied to the plaintext data prior to encryption.

(5) Describe the post-processing methods (e.g., packetization, encapsulation) that are applied to the cipher text data after encryption.

(6) State the communication protocols (e.g., X.25, Telnet or TCP) and encryption protocols (e.g., SSL, IPSEC or PKCS standards) that are supported.

(7) Describe the encryption-related Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that are implemented and/or supported. Explain which interfaces are for internal (private) and/or external (public) use.

(8) Describe whether the cryptographic routines are statically or dynamically linked, and the routines (if any) that are provided by third-party modules or libraries. Identify the third-party manufacturers of the modules or toolkits.

(9) For commodities or software using Java byte code, describe the techniques (including obfuscation, private access modifiers or final classes) that are used to protect against decompilation and misuse.

(10) State how the product is written to preclude user modification of the encryption algorithms, key management and key space.

(11) For products that qualify as "retail", explain how the product meets the listed criteria in § 740.17(b)(3) of the EAR.

(12) For products which incorporate an open cryptographic interface as defined in part 772 of the EAR, describe the Open Cryptographic Interface.

(d) For classification requests regarding components, provide the following additional information:

(1) Reference the application for which the components are used in, if known;

(2) State if there is a general programming interface to the component;

(3) State whether the component is constrained by function; and

(4) the encryption component and include the name of the manufacturer, component model number or other identifier.

(e) For classification requests for source code, provide the following information:

(1) If applicable, reference the executable (object code) product that was previously reviewed;

(2) Include whether the source code has been modified, and the technical details on how the source code was modified; and

(3) Include a copy of the sections of the source code that contain the encryption algorithm, key management routines and their related calls.

(f) For step-by-step instructions and guidance on submitting classification requests for License Exception ENC, visit our webpage at www.bxa.gov/Encryption.

[65 FR 62608, Oct. 19, 2000]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 7 TO PART 742
[RESERVED]

PART 743—SPECIAL REPORTING

Sec.

743.1 Wassenaar Arrangement.

743.2 [Reserved]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO PART 743—WASSENAAR
ARRANGEMENT MEMBER COUNTRIES

AUTHORITY: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; Notice of August 3, 2000 (65 FR 48347, August 8, 2000).

SOURCE: 63 FR 2458, Jan. 15, 1998, unless otherwise noted.

§ 743.1 Wassenaar Arrangement.

(a) *Scope.* This section outlines special reporting requirements for exports of certain commodities, software and technology controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement. Such reports must be submitted to BXA semiannually in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (f) of this section, and records of all exports subject to the reporting requirements of this section must be kept in accordance with part 762 of the EAR. This section does not require reports for reexports.

(b) *Requirements.* You must submit two (2) copies of each report required under the provisions of this section and maintain accurate supporting records