

§ 744.5

(2) The following factors are among those that will be considered to determine what action should be taken on an application required under this section:

- (i) The specific nature of the end-use;
- (ii) The significance of the export in terms of its contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons;
- (iii) The non-proliferation credentials of the importing country;
- (iv) The types of assurances or guarantees against design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons that are given in a particular case; and
- (v) The existence of a pre-existing contract.⁵

[61 FR 12802, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25459, May 9, 1997]

§ 744.5 Restrictions on certain maritime nuclear propulsion end-uses.

(a) *General prohibition.* In addition to the license requirements for items specified on the CCL, you may not export or reexport certain technology subject to the EAR without a license if at the time of the export or reexport you know the item is for use in connection with a foreign maritime nuclear propulsion project. This prohibition applies to any technology relating to maritime nuclear propulsion plants, their land prototypes, and special facilities for their construction, support, or maintenance, including any machinery, devices, components, or equipment specifically developed or designed for use in such plants or facilities.

(b) *Exceptions.* The exceptions provided in part 740 of the EAR do not apply to the prohibitions described in paragraph (a) of this section.

(c) *License review standards.* It is the policy of the United States Government not to participate in and not to authorize United States firms or individuals to participate in foreign naval nuclear propulsion plant projects, except under an Agreement for Cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion executed in accordance with § 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. However, it

⁵ See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 of the EAR for relevant contract sanctity dates.

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is the policy of the United States Government to encourage United States firms and individuals to participate in maritime (civil) nuclear propulsion plant projects in friendly foreign countries provided that United States naval nuclear propulsion information is not disclosed.

[61 FR 12802, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25459, May 9, 1997]

§ 744.6 Restrictions on certain activities of U.S. persons.

(a) *General prohibitions*—(1) *Activities related to exports.* (i) No U.S. person as defined in paragraph (c) of this section may, without a license from BXA, export, reexport, or transfer to or in any country any item where that person knows that such items:

(A) Will be used in the design, development, production, or use of nuclear explosive devices in or by a country listed in Country Group D:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

(B) Will be used in the design, development, production, or use of missiles in or by a country listed in Country Group D:4 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR); or

(C) Will be used in the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons in or by a country listed in Country Group D:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

(ii) No U.S. person shall, without a license from BXA, knowingly support an export, reexport, or transfer that does not have a license as required by this section. Support means any action, including financing, transportation, and freight forwarding, by which a person facilitates an export, reexport, or transfer without being the actual exporter or reexporter.

(2) *Other activities unrelated to exports.* No U.S. person shall, without a license from BXA:

(i) Perform any contract, service, or employment that the U.S. person knows will directly assist in the design, development, production, or use of missiles in or by a country listed in Country Group D:4 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR); or

(ii) Perform any contract, service, or employment that the U.S. person knows directly will directly assist in