[Code of Federal Regulations] [Title 15, Volume 2] [Revised as of January 1, 2002] From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access [CITE: 15CFR744.2] [Page 330-332] TITLE 15--COMMERCE AND FOREIGN TRADE CHAPTER VII--BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PART 744--CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED--Table of Contents Sec. 744.2 Restrictions on certain nuclear end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for items specified on the CCL, you may not export or reexport to any destination, other than countries in the Supplement No. 3 to this part, any item subject to the EAR without a license if at the time of the export or reexport you know 1 the item will be used directly or indirectly in any one or more of the following activities described in paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of this section: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Part 772 of the EAR defines ``knowledge'' for all of the EAR except part 760, Restrictive Trade Practices and Boycotts. The definition, which includes variants such as ``know'' and ``reason to know'', encompasses more than positive knowledge. Thus, the use of ``know'' in this section in place of the former wording ``know or have reason to know'' does not lessen or otherwise change the responsibilities of persons subject to the EAR. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) Nuclear explosive activities. Nuclear explosive activities, including research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, testing or maintenance of any nuclear explosive device, or components or subsystems of such a device.\2\ \3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Nuclear explosive devices and any article, material, equipment, or device specifically designed or specially modified for use in the design, development, or fabrication of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices are subject to export licensing or other requirements of the Office of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State, or the licensing or other restrictions specified in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Similarly, items specifically designed or specifically modified for use in devising, carrying out, or evaluating nuclear weapons tests or nuclear explosions (except such items as are in normal commercial use for other purposes) are subject to the same requirements. \3\ Also see Secs. 744.5 and 748.4 of the EAR for special provisions relating to technical data for maritime nuclear propulsion plants and other commodities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) Unsafeguarded nuclear activities. Activities including research on, or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any nuclear reactor, critical facility, facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel, facility for the conversion of nuclear material from one chemical form to another, or separate storage installation, where there is no obligation to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the relevant facility or installation when it contains any source or special fissionable material (regardless of whether or not it contains such material at the time of export), or where any such obligation is not met. (3) Safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear activities. Safeguarded and [[Page 331]] unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities, including research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of any of the following facilities, or components for such facilities: \4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Such activities may also require a specific authorization from the Secretary of Energy pursuant to Sec. 57.b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, as implemented by the Department of Energy's regulations published in 10 CFR 810. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (i) Facilities for the chemical processing of irradiated special nuclear or source material; (ii) Facilities for the production of heavy water; (iii) Facilities for the separation of isotopes of source and special nuclear material; or (iv) Facilities for the fabrication of nuclear reactor fuel containing plutonium. (b) Additional prohibition on exporters or reexporters informed by BXA. BXA may inform an exporter or reexporter, either individually by specific notice or through amendment to the EAR, that a license is required for export or reexport of specified items to specified end- users, because BXA has determined that there is an unacceptable risk of use in, or diversion to, any of the activities described in paragraph (a) of this section. Specific notice is to be given only by, or at the direction of, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. When such notice is provided orally, it will be followed by a written notice within two working days signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The absence of any such notification does not excuse the exporter or reexporter from compliance with the license requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. (c) Exceptions. Despite the prohibitions described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, you may export technology subject to the EAR under the operation technology and software or sales technology and software provisions of License Exception TSU (see Sec. 740.13 (a) and (b)), but only to and for use in countries listed in Country Group A:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR), Iceland and New Zealand. Notwithstanding the provisions of part 740 of the EAR, the provisions of Sec. 740.13 (a) and (b) will only overcome general prohibition five for countries listed in Country Group A:1, Iceland and New Zealand. (d) License review standards. The following factors are among those used by the United States to determine whether to grant or deny license applications required under this section: (1) Whether the commodities, software, or technology to be transferred are appropriate for the stated end-use and whether that stated end-use is appropriate for the end-user; (2) The significance for nuclear purposes of the particular commodity, software, or technology; (3) Whether the commodities, software, or technology to be exported are to be used in research on or for the development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any reprocessing or enrichment facility; (4) The types of assurances or guarantees given against use for nuclear explosive purposes or proliferation in the particular case; (5) Whether the end-user has been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities; (6) Whether an application for a license to export to the end-user has previously been denied, or whether the end-use has previously diverted items received under a license, License Exception, or NLR to unauthorized activities; (7) Whether the export would present an unacceptable risk of diversion to a nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel- cycle activity described in Sec. 744.2 of this part; and (8) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, based on consideration of the following factors: (i) Whether the importing country is a party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (see Supplement No. 2 to part 742 of the EAR), or to a similar international legally- binding nuclear nonproliferation agreement; [[Page 332]] (ii) Whether the importing country has all of its nuclear activities, facilities or installations that are operational, being designed, or under construction, under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards; (iii) Whether there is an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy between the U.S. and the importing country; (iv) Whether the actions, statements, and policies of the government of the importing country are in support of nuclear nonproliferation and whether that government is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of nonproliferation; (v) The degree to which the government of the importing country cooperates in nonproliferation policy generally (e.g., willingness to consult on international nonproliferation issues); (vi) Intelligence data on the importing country's nuclear intentions and activities. [61 FR 12802, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 61 FR 64284, Dec. 4, 1996; 62 FR 25459, May 9, 1997]