

practicable and known, the RTG agreement should specify the terms and conditions under which transmission services will be offered.

(2) An RTG agreement should require, at a minimum, the development of a coordinated transmission plan on a regional basis and the sharing of transmission planning information, with the goal of efficient use, expansion, and coordination of the interconnected electric system on a grid-wide basis. An RTG agreement should provide mechanisms to incorporate the transmission needs of non-members into regional plans. An RTG agreement should include as much detail as possible with regard to operational and planning procedures.

(3) An RTG agreement should include voluntary dispute resolution procedures that provide a fair alternative to resorting in the first instance to section 206 complaints or section 211 proceedings.

(4) An RTG agreement should include an exit provision for RTG members that leave the RTG, specifying the obligations of a departing member.

(d) *Filing procedures.* Any proposed RTG agreement that in any manner affects or relates to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce by a public utility, or rates or charges for such transmission, must be filed with the Commission. Any public utility member of a proposed RTG may file the RTG agreement with the Commission on behalf of the other public utility members under section 205 of the FPA.

[58 FR 41632, Aug. 5, 1993]

**§ 2.22 Pricing policy for transmission services provided under the Federal Power Act.**

(a) The Commission has adopted a Policy Statement on its pricing policy for transmission services provided under the Federal Power Act. That Policy Statement can be found at 69 FERC 61,086. The Policy Statement constitutes a complete description of the Commission's guidelines for assessing the pricing proposals. Paragraph (b) of this section is only a brief summary of the Policy Statement.

(b) The Commission endorses transmission pricing flexibility, consistent

with the principles and procedures set forth in the Policy Statement. It will entertain transmission pricing proposals that do not conform to the traditional revenue requirement as well as proposals that conform to the traditional revenue requirement. The Commission will evaluate "conforming" transmission pricing proposals using the following five principles, described more fully in the Policy Statement.

(1) Transmission pricing must meet the traditional revenue requirement.

(2) Transmission pricing must reflect comparability.

(3) Transmission pricing should promote economic efficiency.

(4) Transmission pricing should promote fairness.

(5) Transmission pricing should be practical.

(c) Under these principles, the Commission will also evaluate "non-conforming" proposals which do not meet the traditional revenue requirement, and will require such proposals to conform to the comparability principle. Non-conforming proposals must include an open access comparability tariff and will not be allowed to go into effect prior to review and approval by the Commission under procedures described in the Policy Statement.

[59 FR 55039, Nov. 3, 1994]

**§ 2.23 Use of reserved authority in hydropower licenses to ameliorate cumulative impacts.**

The Commission will address and consider cumulative impact issues at original licensing and relicensing to the fullest extent possible consistent with the Commission's statutory responsibility to avoid undue delay in the relicensing process and to avoid undue delay in the amelioration of individual project impacts at relicensing. To the extent, if any, that it is not possible to explore and address all cumulative impacts at relicensing, the Commission will reserve authority to examine and address such impacts after the new license has been issued, but will define that reserved authority as narrowly and with as much specificity as possible, particularly with respect to the purpose of reserving that authority. The Commission intends that such articles will describe, to the maximum

## § 2.24

extent possible, reasonably foreseeable future resource concerns that may warrant modifications of the licensed project. Before taking any action pursuant to such reserved authority, the Commission will publish notice of its proposed action and will provide an opportunity for hearing by the licensee and all interested parties. Hydropower licenses also contain standard “re-opener” articles (see § 2.9 of this part) which reserve authority to the Commission to require, among other things, licensees of projects located in the same river basin to mitigate the cumulative impacts of those projects on the river basin. In light of the policy described above, the Commission will use the standard “re-opener” articles to explore and address cumulative impacts only (except in extraordinary circumstances) where such impacts were not known at the time of licensing or are the result of changed circumstances. The Commission has authority under the Federal Power Act to require licensees, during the term of the license, to develop and provide data to the Commission on the cumulative impacts of licensed projects located in the same river basin. In issuing both new and original licenses, the Commission will coordinate the expiration dates of the licenses to the maximum extent possible, to maximize future consideration of cumulative impacts at the same time in contemporaneous proceedings at relicensing. The Commission’s intention is to consider to the extent practicable cumulative impacts at the time of licensing and relicensing, and to eliminate the need to resort to the use of reserved authority.

[59 FR 66718, Dec. 28, 1994]

### **§ 2.24 Project decommissioning at relicensing.**

The Commission issued a statement of policy on project decommissioning at relicensing in Docket No. RM93-23-000 on December 14, 1994.

[60 FR 347, Jan. 4, 1995]

### **§ 2.25 Ratemaking treatment of the cost of emissions allowances in coordination transactions.**

(a) *General Policy.* This Statement of Policy is adopted in furtherance of the

## 18 CFR Ch. I (4–1–04 Edition)

goals of Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, Title IV, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990).

(b) *Costing Emissions Allowances in Coordination Sales.* If a public utility’s coordination rate on file with the Commission provides for recovery of variable costs on an incremental basis, the Commission will allow recovery of the incremental costs of emissions allowances associated with a coordination sale. If a coordination rate does not reflect incremental costs, the public utility should propose alternative allowance costing methods or demonstrate that the coordination rate does not produce unreasonable results. The Commission finds that the cost to replace an allowance is an appropriate basis to establish the incremental cost.

(c) *Use of Indices.* The Commission will allow public utilities to determine emissions allowance costs on the basis of an index or combination of indices of the current price of emissions allowances, provided that the public utility affords purchasing utilities the option of providing emissions allowances. Public utilities should explain and justify any use of different incremental cost indices for pricing coordination sales and making dispatch decisions.

(d) *Calculation of Amount of Emissions Allowances Associated With Coordination Transactions.* Public utilities should explain the methods used to compute the amount of emissions allowances included in coordination transactions.

(e) *Timing.* (1) Public utilities should provide information to purchasing utilities regarding the timing of opportunities for purchasers to stipulate whether they will purchase or return emissions allowances. A public utility may require a purchasing utility to declare, no later than the beginning of the coordination transaction:

(i) Whether it will purchase or return emissions allowances; and

(ii) If it will return emissions allowances, the date on which those allowances will be returned.

(2) Public utilities may include in agreements with purchasing utilities non-discriminatory provisions for indemnification if the purchasing utility fails to provide emissions allowances by the date on which it declares that the allowances will be returned.