[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 28, Volume 1]
[Revised as of July 1, 2004]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 28CFR16.74]

[Page 299-300]
 
                    TITLE 28--JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
 
                    CHAPTER I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 
PART 16_PRODUCTION OR DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMATION--Table of Contents
 
      Subpart E_Exemption of Records Systems Under the Privacy Act
 
Sec.  16.74  Exemption of Office of Intelligence Policy and Review 
Systems--limited access.

    (a) The following systems of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a 
(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f) 
and (g);
    (1) Policy and Operational Records System (JUSTICE/OIPR-001);
    (2) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Records System (JUSTICE/
OIPR-002);
    (3) Litigation Records System (JUSTICE/OIPR-003); and
    (4) Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations Records System 
(JUSTICE/OIPR-004).


These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in those 
systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1) 
and (k)(2).

[[Page 300]]

    (b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the 
following reasons:
    (1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of the disclosure 
accounting would put the target of a surveillance or investigation on 
notice of the investigation or surveillance and would thereby seriously 
hinder authorized United States intelligence activities.
    (2) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) 
because these provisions contemplate individual access to records and 
such access would compromise ongoing surveillances or investigations and 
reveal the sources and methods of an investigation.
    (3) From subsection (e)(2) because, although this office does not 
conduct investigations, the collection efforts of agencies that supply 
information to this office would be thwarted if the agency were required 
to collect information with the subject's knowledge.
    (4) From subsections (e)(3) and (e)(8) because disclosure and notice 
would provide the subject with substantial information which could 
impede of compromise an investigation. For example, an investigatory 
subject could, once made aware that an investigation was ongoing, alter 
his manner of engaging in intelligence or terrorist activities in order 
to avoid detection.

[Order No. 19-86, 51 FR 39374, Oct. 28, 1986]