[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 29, Volume 3]
[Revised as of July 1, 2004]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 29CFR782.5]

[Page 638-640]
 
                             TITLE 29--LABOR
 
         CHAPTER V--WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
 
PART 782_EXEMPTION FROM MAXIMUM HOURS PROVISIONS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYEES OF 
MOTOR CARRIERS--Table of Contents
 
Sec. 782.5  Loaders.

    (a) A ``loader,'' as defined for Motor Carrier Act jurisdiction (Ex 
parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 133, 134, 139), is an employee 
of a carrier subject to section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act (other than 
a driver or driver's helper as defined in Sec. Sec. 782.3 and 782.4) 
whose duties include, among other things, the proper loading of his 
employer's motor vehicles so that they may be safely operated on the 
highways of the country. A ``loader'' may be called by another name, 
such as ``dockman,'' ``stacker,'' or ``helper,'' and his duties will 
usually also include unloading and the transfer of freight between the 
vehicles and the warehouse, but he engages, as a ``loader,'' in work 
directly affecting ``safety of operation'' so long as he has 
responsibility when such motor vehicles are being loaded, for exercising 
judgment and discretion in planning and building a balanced load or in 
placing, distributing, or securing the pieces of freight in such a 
manner that the safe operation of the vehicles on the highways in 
interstate or foreign commerce will not be jeopardized. (Levinson v. 
Spector Motor Service, 300 U.S. 649; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. 
Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Walling v. Gordon's Transport (W.D. Tenn.), 10 
Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari 
denied 332 U.S. 774; Walling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 
855; Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 133, 134)
    (b) The section 13(b)(1) exemption applies, in accordance with 
principles previously stated (see Sec. 782.2), to an employee whose job 
involves activities consisting wholly or in part of doing, or 
immediately directing, a class of work defined: (1) As that of a loader, 
and (2) as directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles 
in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor 
Carrier Act, since such an employee is an employee with respect to whom 
the Secretary of Transporation has power to establish qualifications and 
maximum hours of service. (Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 
649; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Walling v. 
Silver Fleet Motor Express, 67 F. Supp.

[[Page 639]]

846; Walling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 855; Walling v. 
Gordon's Transports (W.D. Tenn.); 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 
162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6) certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Tinerella v. 
Des Moines Transp. Co., 41 F. Supp. 798.) Where a checker, foreman, or 
other supervisor plans and immediately directs the proper loading of a 
motor vehicle as described above, he may come within the exemption as a 
partial-duty loader. (Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; 
Walling v. Gordon's Transports (W.D. Tenn.), 10 Labor Cases, par. 
62,934; affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 
774; Walling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 885; Walling v. 
Silver Fleet Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 846; Crean v. Moran 
Transporation Lines, 57 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. N.Y.). See also 9 Labor 
Cases, par. 62,416; Walling v. Commercial Motor Freight (S.D. Ind.), 11 
Labor Cases, par. 63,451; Hogla v. Porter (E.D. Okla.), 11 Labor Cases, 
par. 63,389 6 W. H. Cases 608.)
    (c) An employee is not exempt as a loader where his activities in 
connection with the loading of motor vehicles are confined to classes of 
work other than the kind of loading described above, which directly 
affects ``safety of operation.'' (Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 
330 U.S. 695; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649) The mere 
handling of freight at a terminal, before or after loading, or even the 
placing of certain articles of freight on a motor carrier truck may form 
so trivial, casual, or occasional a part of an employee's activities, or 
his activities may relate only to such articles or to such limited 
handling of them, that his activities will not come within the kind of 
``loading'' which directly affects ``safety of operation.'' Thus the 
following activities have been held to provide no basis for exemption: 
Unloading; placing freight in convenient places in the terminal, 
checking bills of lading; wheeling or calling freight being loaded or 
unloaded; loading vehicles for trips which will not involve 
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of 
the Motor Carrier Act; and activities relating to the preservation of 
the freight as distinguished from the safety of operation of the motor 
vehicles carrying such freight on the highways. (Pyramid Motor Freight 
Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 
U.S. 649; Porter v. Poindexter, 158 F. (2d) 759 (C.A. 10); McKeown v. 
Southern Calif. Freight Forwarders, 49 F. Supp. 543; Walling v. Gordon's 
Transports (W.D. Tenn.), 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 162 F. 
(2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Walling v. Huber & 
Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 855; Walling v. Silver Fleet Motor 
Express, 67 F. Supp. 846; Crean v. Moran Transp. Lines, 50 F. Supp. 107, 
54 F. Supp. 765 (cf. 57 F. Supp. 212); Gibson v. Glasgow (Tenn. Sup. 
Ct.) 157 S.W. (2d) 814. See also Keeling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 
57 F. Supp. 617.) As is apparent from opinion in Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and 
MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, red caps of bus companies engaged in loading 
baggage on buses are not loaders engaged in work directly affecting 
safety of operation of the vehicles. In the same opinion, it is 
expressly recognized that there is a class of freight which, because it 
is light in weight, probably could not be loaded in a manner which would 
adversely affect ``safety of operations.'' Support for this conclusion 
is found in Wirtz v. C&P Shoe Corp. 335 F. (2d) 21 (C.A. 5), wherein the 
court held the loading of boxes of shoes, patterned on the last in, 
first out principle clearly was not of a safety affecting character ``in 
view of the light weight of the cargo involved.'' In the case of coal 
trucks which are loaded from stockpiles by the use of an electric bridge 
crane and a mechanical conveyor, it has been held that employees 
operating such a crane or conveyor in the loading process are not exempt 
as ``loaders'' under section 13(b)(1). (Barrick v. South Chicago Coal & 
Dock Co. (N.D. Ill.), 8 Labor Cases, par. 62,242, affirmed 149 F. (2d) 
960 (C.A. 7).) It seems apparent from the foregoing discussion that an 
employee who has no responsibility for the proper loading of a motor 
vehicle is not within the exemption as a ``loader'' merely because he 
furnishes physical assistance when necessary in loading heavy pieces of 
freight, or because he deposits pieces of freight in the vehicle for 
someone else to distribute and secure inplace, or even because he does 
the physical work of arranging pieces of freight in the vehicle where 
another

[[Page 640]]

employee tells him exactly what to do in each instance and he is given 
no share in the exercise of discretion as to the manner in which the 
loading is done. (See Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 
695; Yellow Transit Freight Lines Inc. v. Balven, 320 F. (2d) 495 (C.A. 
8); Foremost Dairies v. Ivey, 204 F. (2d) 186 (C.A. 5); Ispass v. 
Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 78 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. N.Y.); Mitchell v. 
Meco Steel Supply Co., 183 F. Supp. 779 (S.D. Tex.); Garton v. Sanders 
Transfer & Storage Co., 124 F. Supp. 84 (M.D. Tenn.); McKeown v. 
Southern Calif. Freight Forwarders, 49 F. Supp. 543; Walling v. Gordon's 
Transports (W.D. Tenn.) 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 162 F. 
(2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Crean v. Moran 
Transporation Lines, 50 F. Supp. 107 (see also further opinion in 54 F. 
Supp. 765, and cf. the court's holding in 57 F. Supp. 212 with Walling 
v. Gordon's Transports, cited above). See also Levinson v. Spector Motor 
Service, 330 U.S. 649.) Such activities would not seem to constitute the 
kind of ``loading'' which directly affects the safety of operation of 
the loaded vehicle on the public highways, under the official 
definitions. (See Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 133, 134).