[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 29, Volume 9]
[Revised as of July 1, 2005]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 29CFR1975.2]

[Page 187-188]
 
                             TITLE 29--LABOR
 
CHAPTER XVII--OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT 
                          OF LABOR (CONTINUED)
 
PART 1975_COVERAGE OF EMPLOYERS UNDER THE WILLIAMS-STEIGER OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970--Table of Contents
 
Sec. 1975.2  Basis of authority.

    The power of Congress to regulate employment conditions under the 
Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, is derived 
mainly from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. (section 2(b), Pub. 
L. 91-596; U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3; ``United States v. 
Darby,'' 312 U.S. 100.) The reach of the Commerce Clause extends beyond 
Federal regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce so as to empower Congress to regulate conditions or activities 
which affect commerce even though the activity or condition may itself 
not be commerce and may be purely intrastate in character. (``Gibbons v. 
Ogden,'' 9 Wheat. 1, 195; ``United States v. Darby,'' supra; ``Wickard 
v. Filburn,'' 317 U.S. 111, 117; and ``Perez v. United States,'' 91 S. 
Ct. 1357 (1971).) And it is not necessary to prove that any particular 
intrastate activity affects commerce, if the activity is included in a 
class of activities which Congress intended to regulate because the 
class affects commerce. (``Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States,'' 379 U.S. 241; ``Katzenbach v. McClung,'' 379 U.S. 294; and 
``Perez v. United States,'' supra.) Generally speaking, the class of 
activities which Congress may regulate under the commerce power may be 
as broad and as inclusive as Congress intends, since the commerce power 
is plenary and has no restrictions placed on it except specific

[[Page 188]]

constitutional prohibitions and those restrictions Congress, itself, 
places on it. (``United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,'' 315 U.S. 110; 
and ``United States v. Darby,'' supra.) Since there are no specific 
constitutional prohibitions involved, the issue is reduced to the 
question: How inclusive did Congress intend the class of activities to 
be under the Williams-Steiger Act?