[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 29, Volume 9]
[Revised as of July 1, 2005]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 29CFR2509.94-2]

[Page 342-345]
 
                             TITLE 29--LABOR
 
 CHAPTER XXV--EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF 
                                  LABOR
 
PART 2509_INTERPRETIVE BULLETINS RELATING TO THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT 
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974--Table of Contents
 
Sec. 2509.94-2  Interpretive bulletin relating to written statements 
of investment policy, including proxy voting policy or guidelines.

    This interpretive bulletin sets forth the Department of Labor's (the 
Department) interpretation of sections 402, 403 and 404 of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) as those sections apply 
to voting of proxies on securities held in employee benefit plan 
investment portfolios and the maintenance of and compliance with 
statements of investment policy, including proxy voting policy. In 
addition, this interpretive bulletin provides guidance on the 
appropriateness under ERISA of active monitoring of corporate management 
by plan fiduciaries.

                            (1) Proxy Voting

    The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of 
corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those 
shares of stock. As a result, the responsibility for voting proxies lies 
exclusively with the plan trustee except to the extent that either (1) 
the trustee is subject to the directions of a named fiduciary pursuant 
to ERISA Sec. 403(a)(1); or (2) the power to manage, acquire or dispose 
of the relevant assets has been delegated by a named fiduciary to one or 
more investment managers pursuant to ERISA Sec. 403(a)(2). Where the 
authority to manage plan assets has been delegated to an investment 
manager pursuant to Sec. 403(a)(2),

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no person other than the investment manager has authority to vote 
proxies appurtenant to such plan assets except to the extent that the 
named fiduciary has reserved to itself (or to another named fiduciary so 
authorized by the plan document) the right to direct a plan trustee 
regarding the voting of proxies. In this regard, a named fiduciary, in 
delegating investment management authority to an investment manager, 
could reserve to itself the right to direct a trustee with respect to 
the voting of all proxies or reserve to itself the right to direct a 
trustee as to the voting of only those proxies relating to specified 
assets or issues.
    If the plan document or investment management agreement provides 
that the investment manager is not required to vote proxies, but does 
not expressly preclude the investment manager from voting proxies, the 
investment manager would have exclusive responsibility for voting 
proxies. Moreover, an investment manager would not be relieved of its 
own fiduciary responsibilities by following directions of some other 
person regarding the voting of proxies, or by delegating such 
responsibility to another person. If, however, the plan document or the 
investment management contract expressly precludes the investment 
manager from voting proxies, the responsibility for voting proxies would 
lie exclusively with the trustee. The trustee, however, consistent with 
the requirements of ERISA Sec. 403(a)(1), may be subject to the 
directions of a named fiduciary if the plan so provides.
    The fiduciary duties described at ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(A) and (B), 
require that, in voting proxies, the responsible fiduciary consider 
those factors that may affect the value of the plan's investment and not 
subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their 
retirement income to unrelated objectives. These duties also require 
that the named fiduciary appointing an investment manager periodically 
monitor the activities of the investment manager with respect to the 
management of plan assets, including decisions made and actions taken by 
the investment manager with regard toproxy voting decisions. The named 
fiduciary must carry out this responsibility solely in the interest of 
the participants and beneficiaries and without regard to its 
relationship to the plan sponsor.
    It is the view of the Department that compliance with the duty to 
monitor necessitates proper documentation of the activities that are 
subject to monitoring. Thus, the investment manager or other responsible 
fiduciary would be required to maintain accurate records as to proxy 
voting. Moreover, if the named fiduciary is to be able to carry out its 
responsibilities under ERISA Sec. 404(a) in determining whether the 
investment manager is fulfilling its fiduciary obligations in investing 
plans assets in a manner that justifies the continuation of the 
management appointment, the proxy voting records must enable the named 
fiduciary to review not only the investment manager's voting procedure 
with respect to plan-owned stock, but also to review the actions taken 
in individual proxy voting situations.
    The fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty to plan 
participants and beneficiaries require the responsible fiduciary to vote 
proxies on issues that may affect the value of the plan's investment. 
Although the same principles apply for proxies appurtenant to shares of 
foreign corporations, the Department recognizes that in voting such 
proxies, plans may, in some cases, incur additional costs. Thus, a 
fiduciary should consider whether the plan's vote, either by itself or 
together with the votes of other shareholders, isexpected to have an 
effect on the value of the plan's investment that will outweigh the cost 
of voting. Moreover, a fiduciary, in deciding whether to purchase shares 
of a foreign corporation, should consider whether the difficulty and 
expense in voting the shares is reflected in their market price.

                   (2) Statements of Investment Policy

    The maintenance by an employee benefit plan of a statement of 
investment policy designed to further the purposes of the plan and its 
funding policy is consistent with the fiduciary obligations set forth in 
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B). Since the fiduciary act of managing 
plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of 
proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock, a statement of proxy 
voting policy would be an important part of any comprehensive statement 
of investment policy. For purposes of this document, the term 
``statement of investment policy'' means a written statement that 
provides the fiduciaries who are responsible for plan investments with 
guidelines or general instructions concerning various types or 
categories of investment management decisions, which may include proxy 
voting decisions. A statement of investment policy is distinguished from 
directions as to the purchase or sale of a specific investment at a 
specific time or as to voting specific plan proxies.
    In plans where investment management responsibility is delegated to 
one or more investment managers appointed by the named fiduciary 
pursuant to ERISA Sec. 402(c)(3), inherent in the authority to appoint 
an investment manager, the named fiduciary responsible for appointment 
of investment managers has the authority to condition the appointment on 
acceptance of a statement of investment policy. Thus, such a named 
fiduciary may expressly require, as a condition of the investment 
management agreement, that an investment manager comply with

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the terms of a statement of investment policy which sets forth 
guidelines concerning investments and investment courses of action which 
the investment manager is authorized or is not authorized to make. Such 
investment policy may include a policy or guidelines on the voting of 
proxies on shares of stock for which the investment manager is 
responsible. In the absence of such an express requirement to comply 
with an investment policy, the authority to manage the plan assets 
placed under the control of the investment manager would lie exclusively 
with the investment manager. Although a trustee may be subject to the 
directions of a named fiduciary pursuant to ERISA Sec. 403(a)(1), an 
investment manager who has authority to make investment decisions, 
including proxy voting decisions, would never be relieved of its 
fiduciary responsibility if it followed directions as to specific 
investment decisions from the named fiduciary or any other person.
    Statements of investment policy issued by a named fiduciary 
authorized to appoint investment managers would be part of the 
``documents and instruments governing the plan'' within the meaning of 
ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D). An investment manager to whom such investment 
policy applies would be required to comply with such policy, pursuant to 
ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D) insofar as the policy directives or guidelines 
are consistent with titles I and IV of ERISA. Therefore, if, for 
example, compliance with the guidelines in a given instance would be 
imprudent, then the investment manager's failure to follow the 
guidelines would not violate ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D). Moreover, ERISA 
Sec. 404(a)(1)(D) does not shield the investment manager from liability 
for imprudent actions taken in compliance with a statement of investment 
policy.
    The plan document or trust agreement may expressly provide a 
statement of investment policy to guide the trustee or may authorize a 
named fiduciary to issue a statement of investment policy applicable to 
a trustee. Where a plan trustee is subject to an investment policy, the 
trustee's duty to comply with such investment policy would also be 
analyzed under ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D). Thus, the trustee would be 
required to comply with the statement of investment policy unless, for 
example, it would be imprudent to do so in a given instance.
    Maintenance of a statement of investment policy by a named fiduciary 
does not relieve the named fiduciary of its obligations under ERISA 
Sec. 404(a) with respect to the appointment and monitoring of an 
investment manager or trustee. In this regard, the named fiduciary 
appointing an investment manager must periodically monitor the 
investment manager's activities with respect to management of the plan 
assets. Moreover, compliance with ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B) would require 
maintenance of proper documentation of the activities of the investment 
manager and of the named fiduciary of the plan in monitoring the 
activities of the investment manager. In addition, in the view of the 
Department, a named fiduciary's determination of the terms of a 
statement of investment policy is an exercise of fiduciary 
responsibility and, as such, statements may need to take into account 
factors such as the plan's funding policy and its liquidity needs as 
well as issues of prudence, diversification and other fiduciary 
requirements of ERISA.

    An investment manager of a pooled investment vehicle that holds 
assets of more than one employee benefit plan may be subject to a proxy 
voting policy of one plan that conflicts with the proxy voting policy of 
another plan. Compliance with ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D) would require 
such investment manager to reconcile, insofar as possible, the 
conflicting policies (assuming compliance with each policy would be 
consistent with ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D)) and, if necessary and to the 
extent permitted byapplicable law, vote the relevant proxies to reflect 
such policies in proportion to each plan's interest in the pooled 
investment vehicle. If, however, the investment manager determines that 
compliance with conflicting voting policies would violate ERISA Sec. 
404(a)(1)(D) in a particular instance, for example, by being imprudent 
or not solely in the interest of plan participants, the investment 
manager would be required to ignore the voting policy that would violate 
ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D) in that instance. Such an investment manager 
may, however, require participating investors to accept the investment 
manager's own investment policy statement, including any statement of 
proxy voting policy, before they are allowed to invest. As with 
investment policies originating from named fiduciaries, a policy 
initiated by an investment manager and adopted by the participating 
plans would be regarded as an instrument governing the participating 
plans, and the investment manager's compliance with such a policy would 
be governed by ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(D).

                        (3) Shareholder Activism

    An investment policy that contemplates activities intended to 
monitor or influence the management of corporations in which the plan 
owns stock is consistent with a fiduciary's obligations under ERISA 
where the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable 
expectation that such monitoring or communication with management, by 
the plan alone or togetherwith other shareholders, is likely to enhance 
the value of the plan's investment in the corporation, after taking into 
account the costs involved. Such a reasonable expectation may exist in 
various circumstances, for example, where plan investments in corporate 
stock are held

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as long-term investments or where a plan may not be able to easily 
dispose such an investment. Active monitoring and communication 
activities would generally concern such issues as the independence and 
expertise of candidates for the corporation's board of directors and 
assuring that the board has sufficient information to carry out its 
responsibility to monitor management. Other issues may include such 
matters as consideration of the appropriateness of executive 
compensation, the corporation's policy regarding mergers and 
acquisitions, the extent of debt financing and capitalization, the 
nature of long-term business plans, the corporation's investment in 
training to develop its work force, other workplace practices and 
financial and non-financial measures of corporate performance. Active 
monitoring and communication may be carried out through a variety of 
methods including by means of correspondence and meetings with corporate 
management as well as by exercising the legal rights of a shareholder.

[59 FR 38863, July 29, 1994]