[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 29, Volume 3]
[Revised as of July 1, 2005]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 29CFR784.21]

[Page 624-625]
 
                             TITLE 29--LABOR
 
         CHAPTER V--WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
 
PART 784_PROVISIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT APPLICABLE TO FISHING 
AND OPERATIONS ON AQUATIC PRODUCTS--Table of Contents
 
                            Subpart A_General
 
Sec. 784.21  Guiding principles for applying coverage and exemption 
provisions.

    It is clear that Congress intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
be broad in its scope. ``Breadth of coverage is vital to its mission'' 
(Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497). An employer who claims an 
exemption under the Act has the burden of showing that it applies 
(Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545; Mitchell v. Kentucky 
Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290: Tobin v. Blue Channel Corp., 198 F. 2d 245, 
approved in

[[Page 625]]

Mitchell v. Myrtle Grove Packing Co., 350 U.S. 891; Fleming v. Hawkeye 
Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52). Conditions specified in the language of 
the Act are ``explicit prerequisites to exemption'' (Arnold v. Kanowsky, 
361 U.S. 388). In their application, the purpose of the exemption as 
shown in its legislative history as well as its language should be given 
effect. However, ``the details with which the exemptions in this Act 
have been made preclude their enlargement by implication'' and ``no 
matter how broad the exemption, it is meant to apply only to'' the 
specified activities (Addison v. Holly Hill, 322 U.S. 607; Maneja v. 
Waialua, 349 U.S. 254). Exemptions providedin the Act ``are to be 
narrowly construed against the employer seeking to assert them'' and 
their application limited to those who come ``plainly and unmistakably 
within their terms and spirit.'' This construction of the exemptions is 
necessary to carry out the broad objectives for which the Act was passed 
(Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490; Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 
supra; Arnold v. Kanowsky, supra; Calaf v. Gonzales, 127 F. 2d 934; 
Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Mitchell v. Stinson, 217 F. 2d 210; 
Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52).