[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 29, Volume 3]
[Revised as of July 1, 2005]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 29CFR790.17]

[Page 683-685]
 
                             TITLE 29--LABOR
 
         CHAPTER V--WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
 
PART 790_GENERAL STATEMENT AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT 
OF 1947 ON THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938--Table of Contents
 
Sec. 790.17  ``Administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or 
interpretation.''

    (a) Administrative regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, and 
interpretations are all grouped together in sections 9 and 10, with no 
distinction being made in regard to their function under the ``good 
faith'' defense. Accordingly, no useful purpose would be served by an 
attempt to precisely define and distinguish each term from the others, 
especially since some of these terms are often employed interchangeably 
as having the same meaning.
    (b) The terms ``regulation'' and ``order'' are variously used to 
connote the great variety of authoritative rules issued pursuant to 
statute by an administrative agency, which have the binding effect of 
law, unless set aside upon judicial review as arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. \102\
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    \102\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on 
Administrative Procedure, Senate Document No. 8, 77th Cong. 1st sess. 
(1941) p. 27; 1 Vom Baur, Federal Administrative Law (1942) p. 486; 
sections 2(c), 2(d) and 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C.A. section 1001.
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    (c) The term ``interpretation'' has been used to describe a 
statement ``ordinarily of an advisory character, indicating merely the 
agency's present belief concerning the meaning of applicable statutory 
language.'' \103\ This would include bulletins, releases, and other 
statements issued by an agency which indicate its interpretation of the 
provisions of a statute.
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    \103\ Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on 
Administrative Procedure, Senate Document No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess. 
(1941), p. 27.
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    (d) The term ``ruling'' commonly refers to an interpretation made by 
an agency ``as a consequence of individual

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requests for rulings upon particular questions.'' \104\ Opinion letters 
of an agency expressing opinions as to the application of the law to 
particular facts presented by specific inquiries fall within this 
description.
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    \104\ Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee, page 27. To 
the same effect in 1 Vom Baur, Federal Administrative Law (1942), p. 
492.
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    (e) The term ``approval'' includes the granting of licenses, 
permits, certificates or other forms of permission by an agency, 
pursuant to statutory authority. \105\
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    \105\ See section 2(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C.A. sec. 1001.
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    (f) The terms ``administrative regulation order, ruling, approval, 
or interpretation'' connote affirmative action on the part of an agency. 
\106\ A failure to act or a failure to reply to an inquiry on the part 
of an administrative agency is not a ``regulation, order, ruling, 
approval, or interpretation'' within the meaning of sections 9 and 10. 
\107\ Thus, suppose that an employer writes a letter to the 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, setting forth the facts 
concerning his business. He goes on to state in his letter that he 
believes his employees are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
and that unless he hears to the contrary from the Administrator, he will 
not pay them in accordance with its provisions. When the employer does 
not receive a reply to his letter within what he regards as a reasonable 
time, he assumes that the Administrator agrees with his (the employer's) 
interpretation of the Act and he acts accordingly. The employer's 
reliance under such circumstances is not a reliance upon an 
administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation, 
within the meaning of sections 9 and 10.
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    \106\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Committee, p. 27; 1 Vom 
Baur, Federal Administrative Law, pp. 486, 492; Conference Report, p. 
16; statements of Representative Walter, 93 Cong. Rec. 4389; statements 
of Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1491; statements of Senator 
Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 2185; President's message of May 14, 1947, on 
approval of the Portal-to-Portal Act (93 Cong. Rec. 5281).
    \107\ That this is true on and after the effective date of the Act 
is clear from the requirement in section 10 that the regulation, order, 
ruling, approval or interpretation relied on must be that of the 
Administrator in writing. As to section 9, the terms appear to have no 
different meaning.
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    (g) The affirmative action taken by the agency must be one which 
actually results in a ``regulation, order, ruling, approval, or 
interpretation.'' If for example, the agency declines to express an 
opinion as to the application of the law in a particular fact situation, 
the agency is refraining from interpreting the law rather than giving an 
interpretation. \108\
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    \108\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on 
Administrative Procedure, p. 33.
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    (h) An employer does not have a defense under these two sections 
unless the regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, upon 
which he relies, is in effect and operation at the time of his reliance. 
To the extent that it has been rescinded, modified, or determined by 
judicial authority to be invalid, it is no longer a ``regulation, order, 
ruling, approval, or interpretation,'' and, consequently, an employer's 
subsequent reliance upon it offers him no defense under section 9 and 
10. \109\ On the other hand, the last sentence in section 9 and in 
section 10 expressly provides that where the employer's good faith 
reliance on a regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation 
occurs before it is rescinded, modified, or determined by judicial 
authority to be invalid, his claim of a ``good faith'' defense for such 
earlier period is not defeated by the subsequent rescission or 
modification or by the subsequent determination of invalidity.
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    \109\ See House Report, p. 7, and statements of Representative 
Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1491, 1492, 1563. It will be noted that the 
provisions of section 12 of the Act, affording relief of employers who 
acted in conformity with the invalidated ``area of production'' 
regulations, would have been unnecessary if reliance could be placed on 
a regulation no longer in effect. See statement of Representative 
Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 4388, and cf. remarks of Senator McCarran, 
discussing the bill before section 12 was added by the conference 
committee, 93 Cong. Rec. 2247.
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    (i) To illustrate these principles, assume that the Administrator of 
the Wage and Hour Division, in reply to an inquiry received from a 
particular employer, sends him a letter, in which the

[[Page 685]]

opinion is expressed that employees performing a particular type of work 
are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. The employer relied 
upon the Administrator's letter and did not pay his employees who were 
engaged in such work, in accordance with the provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. Several months later the Administrator issues a 
general statement, published in the Federal Register and given general 
distribution, that recent court decisions have persuaded him that the 
class of employees referred to above are within the coverage of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. Accordingly, the statement continues, the 
Administrator hereby rescinds all his previous interpretations and 
rulings to the contrary. The employer who had received the 
Administrator's letter, not learning of the Administrator's subsequent 
published statement rescinding his contrary interpretations, continued 
to rely upon the Administrator's letter after the effective date of the 
published statement. Under these circumstances, the employer would, from 
the date he received the Administrator's letter to the effective date of 
the published statement rescinding the position expressed in the letter, 
have a defense under section 9 or 10, assuming he relied upon and 
conformed with that letter in good faith. However, in spite of the fact 
that this employer did not receive actual notice of the subsequent 
published statement, he has no defense for his reliance upon the letter 
during the period after the effective date of the public statement, 
because the letter, having been rescinded, was no longer an 
``administrative * * * ruling * * * or interpretation'' within the 
meaning of sections 9 and 10. \110\
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    \110\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 
1563; colloquy between Representative Gwynne and Lee Pressman, Hearings 
before House Subcommittee on the Judiciary, pp. 156-7.
    The fact that an employer has no defense under section 9 or 10 of 
the Portal Act in the situation stated in the text would not, of course, 
preclude a court from finding that he acted in good faith having 
reasonable grounds to believe he was not in violation of the law. In 
such event, section 11 of the Act would permit the court to reduce or 
eliminate the employer's liability for liquidated damages in an employee 
suit. See Sec. 790.22.
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