

law in order to carry out their responsibilities of administration and enforcement (*Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). In order that these positions may be made known to persons who may be affected by them, official interpretations and rulings are issued by the Administrator with the advice of the Solicitor of Labor, as authorized by the Secretary (Secretary's Order No. 16-75, Nov. 21, 1975, 40 FR 55913; Employment Standards Order No. 2-76, Feb. 23, 1976, 41 FR 9016). These interpretations are a proper exercise of the Secretary's authority. *Idaho Sheet Metal Works v. Wirtz*, 383 U.S. 190, 208 (1966), reh. den. 383 U.S. 963 (1966). References to pertinent legislative history, decisions of the Comptroller General and of the Attorney General, and Administrative Law Judges' decisions are also made in this part where it appears they will contribute to a better understanding of the stated interpretations and policies.

(d) The interpretations of the law contained in this part are official interpretations which may be relied upon. The Supreme Court has recognized that such interpretations of the Act "provide a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it" and "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance" (*Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). Interpretations of the agency charged with administering an Act are generally afforded deference by the courts. (*Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); *Udall v. Tallman*, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).) Some of the interpretations in this part relating to the application of the Act are interpretations of provisions which appeared in the original Act before its amendments in 1972 and 1976. Accordingly, the Department of Labor considers these interpretations to be correct, since there were no amendments of the statutory provisions which they interpret. (*United States v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co.*, 371 F.2d 705, 711-12 (C.A. 4, 1967).)

(e) The interpretations contained herein shall be in effect until they are modified, rescinded, or withdrawn. This

part supersedes and replaces certain interpretations previously published in the FEDERAL REGISTER and Code of Federal Regulations as part 4 of this chapter. Prior opinions, rulings, and interpretations and prior enforcement policies which are not inconsistent with the interpretations in this part or with the Act as amended are continued in effect; all other opinions, rulings, interpretations, and enforcement policies on the subjects discussed in the interpretations in this part, to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules herein stated, are superseded, rescinded, and withdrawn.

(f) Principles governing the application of the Act as set forth in this subpart are clarified or amplified in particular instances by illustrations and examples based on specific fact situations. Since such illustrations and examples cannot and are not intended to be exhaustive, or to provide guidance on every problem which may arise under the Act, no inference should be drawn from the fact that a subject or illustration is omitted.

(g) It should not be assumed that the lack of discussion of a particular subject in this subpart indicates the adoption of any particular position by the Department of Labor with respect to such matter or to constitute an interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy. If doubt arises or a question exists, inquiries with respect to matters other than safety and health standards should be directed to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210, or to any regional office of the Wage and Hour Division. Safety and health inquiries should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210, or to any OSHA regional office. A full description of the facts and any relevant documents should be submitted if an official ruling is desired.

§ 4.102 Administration of the Act.

As provided by section 4 of the Act and under provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (49 Stat. 2036, 41 U.S.C. 38, 39), which are made expressly applicable

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for the purpose, the Secretary of Labor is authorized and directed to administer and enforce the provisions of the McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act, to make rules and regulations, issue orders, make decisions, and take other appropriate action under the Act. The Secretary is also authorized to make reasonable limitations and to make rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations, tolerances, and exemptions to and from provisions of the Act (except section 10), but only in special circumstances where it is determined that such action is necessary and proper in the public interest or to avoid serious impairment of the conduct of Government business and is in accord with the remedial purposes of the Act to protect prevailing labor standards. The authority and enforcement powers of the Secretary under the Act are coextensive with the authority and powers under the Walsh-Healey Act. *Curtiss Wright Corp. v. McLucas* 364 F. Supp. 750, 769 (D NJ 1973).

§4.103 The Act.

The McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-286, 79 Stat. 1034, 41 U.S.C. 351 *et seq.*), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was approved by the President on October 22, 1965 (1 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 428). It establishes standards for minimum compensation and safety and health protection of employees performing work for contractors and subcontractors on service contracts entered into with the Federal Government and the District of Columbia. It applies to contracts entered into pursuant to negotiations concluded or invitations for bids issued on or after January 20, 1966. It has been amended by Public Law 92-473, 86 Stat. 798; by Public Law 93-57, 87 Stat. 140; and by Public Law 94-489, 90 Stat. 2358.

§4.104 What the Act provides, generally.

The provisions of the Act apply to contracts, whether negotiated or advertised, the principal purpose of which is to furnish services in the United States through the use of service employees. Under its provisions, every contract subject to the Act (and any

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bid specification therefor) entered into by the United States or the District of Columbia in excess of \$2,500 must contain stipulations as set forth in §4.6 of this part requiring: (a) That specified minimum monetary wages and fringe benefits determined by the Secretary of Labor (based on wage rates and fringe benefits prevailing in the locality or, in specified circumstances, the wage rates and fringe benefits contained in a collective bargaining agreement applicable to employees who performed on a predecessor contract) be paid to service employees employed by the contractor or any subcontractor in performing the services contracted for; (b) that working conditions of such employees which are under the control of the contractor or subcontractor meet safety and health standards; and (c) that notice be given to such employees of the compensation due them under the minimum wage and fringe benefits provisions of the contract. Contractors performing work subject to the Act thus enter into competition to obtain Government business on terms of which they are fairly forewarned by inclusion in the contract. (*Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins*, 317 U.S. 501, 507 (1943).) The Act's purpose is to impose obligations upon those favored with Government business by precluding the use of the purchasing power of the Federal Government in the unfair depression of wages and standards of employment. (See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965); S. Rep. No. 798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1965).) The Act does not permit the monetary wage rates specified in such a contract to be less than the minimum wage specified under section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)). In addition, it is a violation of the Act for any contractor or subcontractor under a Federal contract subject to the Act, regardless of the amount of the contract, to pay any of his employees engaged in performing work on the contract less than such Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage. Contracts of \$2,500 or less are not, however, required to contain the stipulations described above. These provisions of the Service Contract Act are implemented by the regulations