

504(a) by extending the period of disability or by barring from union office persons who have been convicted of crimes other than those specified.

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§ 452.35 Qualifications for candidacy.

It is recognized that labor organizations may have a legitimate institutional interest in prescribing minimum standards for candidacy and office-holding in the organization. On the other hand, a dominant purpose of the Act is to ensure the right of members to participate fully in governing their union and to make its officers responsive to the members. A basic assumption underlying the concept of "free and democratic elections," is that voters will exercise common sense and good judgment in casting their ballots. In union elections as in political elections, the good judgment of the members in casting their votes should be the primary determinant of whether a candidate is qualified to hold office. Therefore, restrictions placed on the right of members to be candidates must be closely scrutinized to determine whether they serve union purposes of such importance, in terms of protecting the union as an institution, as to justify subordinating the right of the individual member to seek office and the interest of the membership in a free, democratic choice of leaders.

§ 452.36 Reasonableness of qualifications.

(a) The question of whether a qualification is reasonable is a matter which is not susceptible of precise definition, and will ordinarily turn on the facts in each case. However, court decisions in deciding particular cases have furnished some general guidelines. The Supreme Court in *Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6*, 391 U.S. 492 at 499 (1968) held that:

Congress plainly did not intend that the authorization in section 401(e) of 'reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed' should be given a broad reach. The contrary is implicit in the legislative history of the section and in its wording that 'every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office * * *'. This conclusion is buttressed by other provisions of the Act

which stress freedom of members to nominate candidates for Office. Unduly restrictive candidacy qualifications can result in the abuses of entrenched leadership that the LMRDA was expressly enacted to curb. The check of democratic elections as a preventive measure is seriously impaired by candidacy qualifications which substantially deplete the ranks of those who might run in opposition to incumbents.

Union qualifications for office should not be based on assumptions that certain experience or qualifications are necessary. Rather it must be assumed that the labor organization members will exercise common sense and judgment in casting their ballots. "Congress' model of democratic elections was political elections in this country" (*Wirtz v. Local 6*, 391 U.S. at 502) and a qualification may not be required without a showing that citizens assumed to make discriminating judgments in public elections cannot be relied on to make such judgments when voting as union members.

(b) Some factors to be considered, therefore, in assessing the reasonableness of a qualification for union office are:

(1) The relationship of the qualification to the legitimate needs and interests of the union;

(2) The relationship of the qualification to the demands of union office;

(3) The impact of the qualification, in the light of the Congressional purpose of fostering the broadest possible participation in union affairs;

(4) A comparison of the particular qualification with the requirements for holding office generally prescribed by other labor organizations; and

(5) The degree of difficulty in meeting a qualification by union members.

§ 452.37 Types of qualifications.

Ordinarily the following types of requirements may be considered reasonable, depending on the circumstances in which they are applied and the effect of their application:

(a) *Period of prior membership.* It would ordinarily be reasonable for a local union to require a candidate to have been a member of the organization for a reasonable period of time, not exceeding two years, before the election. However, if a member is involuntarily compelled to transfer from

one local to another, such a requirement would not be reasonable if he is not given credit for his prior period of membership.

(b) *Continuity of good standing.* A requirement of continuous good standing based on punctual payment of dues will be considered a reasonable qualification only if (1) it provides a reasonable grace period during which members may make up missed payments without loss of eligibility for office,²⁴ and (2) the period of time involved is reasonable. What are reasonable periods of time for these purposes will depend upon the circumstances. Section 401(e) of the Act provides that a member whose dues have been withheld by the employer for payment to the labor organization pursuant to his voluntary authorization provided for in a collective bargaining agreement may not be declared ineligible to vote or be a candidate for office by reason of alleged delay or default in the payment of dues. If during the period allowed for payment of dues in order to remain in good standing, a member on a dues checkoff system has no earnings from which dues can be withheld, section 401(e) does not relieve the member of the responsibility of paying his dues in order to remain in good standing.

§ 452.38 Meeting attendance requirements.

(a) It may be reasonable for a labor organization to establish a requirement of attendance at a specified number of its regular meetings during the period immediately preceding an election, in order to insure that candidates have a demonstrated interest in and familiarity with the affairs of the organization. In the past, it was ordinarily considered reasonable to require at-

tendance at no more than 50 percent of the meetings over a period not exceeding two years. Experience has demonstrated that it is not feasible to establish arbitrary guidelines for judging the reasonableness of such a qualification. Its reasonableness must be gauged in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case, including not only the frequency of meetings, the number of meetings which must be attended and the period of time over which the requirement extends, but also such factors as the nature, availability and extent of excuse provisions, whether all or most members have the opportunity to attend meetings, and the impact of the rule, i.e., the number or percentage of members who would be rendered ineligible by its application.²⁵

(a-1) In *Steelworkers, Local 3489 v. Usery*, 429 U.S. 305, 94 LRRM 2203, 79 L.C. ¶11,806 (1977), the Supreme Court found that this standard for determining validity of meeting attendance qualifications was the type of flexible result that Congress contemplated when it used the word "reasonable." The Court concluded that Congress, in guaranteeing every union member the opportunity to hold office, subject only to "reasonable qualifications," disabled unions from establishing eligibility qualifications as sharply restrictive of the openness of the union political process as the Steelworkers' attendance rule. The rule required attendance at fifty percent of the meetings for three years preceding the election unless prevented by union activities or working hours, with the result that 96.5 percent of the members were ineligible.

(b) Other guidance is furnished by lower court decisions which have held

²⁴In *Goldberg v. Amarillo General Drivers, Teamsters Local 577*, 214 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Tex. 1963), the disqualification of five nominees for union office for failure to satisfy a constitutional provision requiring candidates for office to have maintained continuous good standing for two years by paying their dues on or before the first business day of the current month, in advance, was held to be unreasonable. See also *Wirtz v. Local Unions No. 9, 9-A and 9-B, International Union of Operating Engineers*, 254 F. Supp. 980 (D. Colo. 1965), aff'd, 366 F. 2d 911 (CA 10 1966), vacated as moot 387 U.S. 96 (1967).

²⁵If a meeting attendance requirement disqualifies a large portion of members from candidacy, that large antidemocratic effect alone may be sufficient to render the requirement unreasonable. In *Doyle v. Brock*, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Circuit 1987), the court held that the impact of a meeting attendance requirement which disqualified 97% of the union's membership from candidacy was by itself sufficient to make the requirement unreasonable notwithstanding any of the other factors set forth in 29 CFR 452.38(a).