

§ 780.126 Contract arrangements for raising poultry.

Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement, the activities of the farmers and their employees in raising the poultry are clearly within section 3(f). The activities of the feed dealer or processor, on the other hand, are not "raising of poultry" and employees engaged in them cannot be considered agricultural employees on that ground. Employees of the feed dealer or processor who perform work on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the raising of poultry on the farm are employed in "secondary" agriculture (see §§ 780.137 *et seq.* and *Johnston v. Cotton Producers Assn.*, 244 F. 2d 553).

§ 780.127 Hatchery operations.

Hatchery operations incident to the breeding of poultry, whether performed in a rural or urban location, are the "raising of poultry" (*Miller Hatcheries v. Boyer*, 131 F. 2d 283). The application of section 3(f) to employees of hatcheries is further discussed in §§ 780.210 through 780.214.

PRACTICES EXEMPT UNDER "SECONDARY" MEANING OF AGRICULTURE GENERALLY

§ 780.128 General statement on "secondary" agriculture.

The discussion in §§ 780.106 through 780.127 relates to the direct farming operations which come within the "primary" meaning of the definition of "agriculture." As defined in section 3(f) "agriculture" includes not only the farming activities described in the "primary" meaning but also includes, in its "secondary" meaning, "any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market delivery to storage or to mar-

ket or to carriers for transportation to market." The legislative history makes it plain that this language was particularly included to make certain that independent contractors such as threshers of wheat, who travel around from farm to farm to assist farmers in what is recognized as a purely agricultural task and also to assist a farmer in getting his agricultural goods to market in their raw or natural state, should be included within the definition of agricultural employees (see *Bowie v. Gonzalez*, 117 F. 2d 11; 81 Cong. Rec. 7876, 7888).

§ 780.129 Required relationship of practices to farming operations.

To come within this secondary meaning, a practice must be performed either by a farmer or on a farm. It must also be performed either in connection with the farmer's own farming operations or in connection with farming operations conducted on the farm where the practice is performed. In addition, the practice must be performed "as an incident to or in conjunction with" the farming operations. No matter how closely related it may be to farming operations, a practice performed neither by a farmer nor on a farm is not within the scope of the "secondary" meaning of "agriculture." Thus, employees employed by commission brokers in the typical activities conducted at their establishments, warehouse employees at the typical tobacco warehouses, shop employees of an employer engaged in the business of servicing machinery and equipment for farmers, plant employees of a company dealing in eggs or poultry produced by others, employees of an irrigation company engaged in the general distribution of water to farmers, and other employees similarly situated do not generally come within the secondary meaning of "agriculture." The inclusion of industrial operations is not within the intent of the definition in section 3(f), nor are processes that are more akin to manufacturing than to agriculture (see *Bowie v. Gonzales*, 117 F. 2d 11; *Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co.*, 113 F. 2d 52; *Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt*, 230 F. 2d 398; *Maneja v. Waialua*, 349 U.S. 254; *Mitchell v. Budd*, 350 U.S. 473).