[Code of Federal Regulations]

[Title 10, Volume 2]

[Revised as of January 1, 2006]

From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access

[CITE: 10CFR73.25]



[Page 406-407]

 

                            TITLE 10--ENERGY

 

          CHAPTER I--NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED)

 

PART 73_PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS--Table of Contents

 

Sec. 73.25  Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic 

special nuclear material in transit.



    (a) To meet the general performance objective and requirements of 

Sec. 73.20 an in-transit physical protection system shall include the 

performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this 

section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.

    (b) Restrict access to and activity in the vicinity of transports 

and strategic special nuclear material. To achieve this capability the 

physical protection system shall:

    (1) Minimize the vulnerability of the strategic special nuclear 

material by using the following subfunctions and procedures:

    (i) Preplanning itineraries for the movement of strategic special 

nuclear material;

    (ii) Periodically updating knowledge of route conditions for the 

movement of strategic special nuclear material;

    (iii) Maintaining knowledge of the status and position of the 

strategic special nuclear material en route; and

    (iv) Determining and communicating alternative itineraries en route 

as conditions warrant.

    (2) Detect and delay any unauthorized attempt to gain access or 

introduce unauthorized materials by stealth or force into the vicinity 

of transports and strategic special nuclear material using the following 

subsystems and subfunctions:

    (i) Controlled access areas to isolate strategic special nuclear 

material and transports to assure that unauthorized persons shall not 

have direct access to, and unauthorized materials shall not be 

introduced into the vicinity of, the transports and strategic special 

nuclear material, and

    (ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess 

and communicate any unauthorized penetration (or such attempts) of a 

controlled access area by persons, vehicles or materials so that the 

response will satisfy the general performance objective and requirements 

of Sec. 73.20(a).

    (3) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce 

unauthorized materials into the vicinity of transports by deceit using 

the following subsystems and subfunctions:

    (i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current 

authorization schedules and access criteria for persons, materials and 

vehicles; and

    (ii) Access controls and procedures to verify the identity of 

persons, materials and vehicles, to assess such identity against current 

authorization schedules and access criteria before permitting access, 

and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized entries.

    (c) Prevent or delay unauthorized entry or introduction of 

unauthorized materials into, and unauthorized removal of, strategic 

special nuclear material from transports. To achieve this capability the 

physical protection system shall:

    (1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce 

unauthorized materials into transports by deceit using the following 

subsystems and subfunctions:

    (i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current 

authorization schedules and entry criteria for access into transports 

for both persons and materials; and

    (ii) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons 

and materials and to permit transport entry only to those persons and 

materials specified by the current authorization schedules and entry 

criteria.

    (2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce 

unauthorized material into transports by stealth or force using the 

following subsystems and subfunctions:

    (i) Transport features to delay access to strategic special nuclear 

material sufficient to permit the detection and response systems to 

function so as to satisfy the general performance objective and 

requirements of Sec. 73.20(a);

    (ii) Inspection and detection subsystems and procedures to detect 

unauthorized tampering with transports and cargo containers; and

    (iii) Surveillance subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and 

communicate any unauthorized presence of persons or materials and any 

unauthorized attempt to penetrate the transport so that the response 

will satisfy the



[[Page 407]]



general performance objective and requirements of Sec. 73.20(a).

    (3) Prevent unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear 

material from transports by deceit using the following subsystems and 

subfunctions:

    (i) Authorization controls and procedures to provide current 

schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material 

which specify the persons authorized to remove and receive the material, 

the authorized times for such removal and receipt and authorized places 

for such removal and receipt.

    (ii) Removal controls and procedures to establish activities for 

transferring cargo in emergency situations; and

    (iii) Removal controls and procedures to permit removal of strategic 

special nuclear material only after verification of the identity of 

persons removing or receiving the strategic special nuclear material, 

and after verification of the identity and integrity of the strategic 

special nuclear material being removed from transports.

    (4) Detect attempts to remove strategic special nuclear material 

from transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and 

subfunctions:

    (i) Transport features to delay unauthorized strategic special 

nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist detection and 

permit a response to satisfy the general performance objective and 

requirements of Sec. 73.20(a); and

    (ii) Detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and 

communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special 

nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to 

satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of Sec. 

73.20(a).

    (d) Respond to safeguards contingencies and emergencies to assure 

that the two capabilities in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section are 

achieved, and to engage and impede adversary forces until local law 

enforcement forces arrive. To achieve this capability, the physical 

protection system shall:

    (1) Respond rapidly and effectively to safeguards contingencies and 

emergencies using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

    (i) A security organization composed of trained and qualifed 

personnel, including armed escorts, one of whom is designated as escort 

commander, with procedures for command and control, to execute response 

functions.

    (ii) Assessment procedures to assess the nature and extent of 

security related incidents.

    (iii) A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency 

events.

    (iv) Equipment and procedures to enable responses to security 

related incidents sufficiently rapid and effective to achieve the 

predetermined objective of each action.

    (v) Equipment, vehicle design features, and procedures to protect 

security organization personnel, including those at the movement control 

center, in their performance of assessment and response related 

functions.

    (2) Transmit detection, assessment and other response related 

information using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

    (i) Communications equipment and procedures to rapidly and 

accurately transmit security information among armed escorts.

    (ii) Equipment and procedures for two-way communications between the 

escort commander and the movement control center to rapidly and 

accurately transmit assessment information and requests for assistance 

by local law enforcement forces, and to coordinate such assistance.

    (iii) Communications equipment and procedures for the armed escorts 

and the movement control center personnel to notify local law 

enforcement forces of the need for assistance.

    (3) Establish liaisons with local law enforcement authorities to 

arrange for assistance en route.

    (4) Assure that a single adversary action cannot destroy the 

capability of armed escorts to notify the local law enforcement forces 

of the need for assistance.



[44 FR 68188, Nov. 28, 1979]