[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 29, Volume 4]
[Revised as of July 1, 2006]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 29CFR1620.13]

[Page 312-314]
 
                             TITLE 29--LABOR
 
          CHAPTER XIV--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 
PART 1620_THE EQUAL PAY ACT--Table of Contents
 
Sec.  1620.13  ``Equal Work''--What it means.

    (a) In general. The EPA prohibits discrimination by employers on the 
basis of sex in the wages paid for ``equal work on jobs the performance 
of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility and which are 
performed under similar working conditions * * *.'' The word 
``requires'' does not connote that an employer must formally assign the 
equal work to the employee; the EPA applies if the employer knowingly 
allows the employee to perform the equal work. The equal work standard 
does not require that compared jobs be identical, only that they be 
substantially equal.
    (b) ``Male jobs'' and ``female jobs.'' (1) Wage classification 
systems which designate certain jobs as ``male jobs'' and other jobs as 
``female jobs'' frequently specify markedly lower rates for the 
``females jobs.'' Such practices indicate a pay practice of 
discrimination based on sex. It should also be noted that it is an 
unlawful employment practice under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 to classify a job as ``male'' or ``female'' unless sex is a bona 
fide occupational qualification for the job.
    (2) The EPA prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in the 
payment of wages to employees for work on jobs which are equal under the 
standards which the Act provides. For example, where an employee of one 
sex is hired

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or assigned to a particular job to replace an employee of the opposite 
sex but receives a lower rate of pay than the person replaced, a prima 
facie violation of the EPA exists. When a prima facie violation of the 
EPA exists, it is incumbent on the employer to show that the wage 
differential is justified under one or more of the Act's four 
affirmative defenses.
    (3) The EPA applies when all employees of one sex are removed from a 
particular job (by transfer or discharge) so as to retain employees of 
only one sex in a job previously performed interchangeably or 
concurrently by employees of both sexes. If a prohibited sex-based wage 
differential had been established or maintained in violation of the EPA 
when the job was being performed by employees of both sexes, the 
employer's obligation to pay the higher rate for the job cannot be 
avoided or evaded by the device of later confining the job to members of 
the lower paid sex.
    (4) If a person of one sex succeeds a person of the opposite sex on 
a job at a higher rate of pay than the predecessor, and there is no 
reason for the higher rate other than difference in gender, a violation 
as to the predecessor is established and that person is entitled to 
recover the difference between his or her pay and the higher rate paid 
the successor employee.
    (5) It is immaterial that a member of the higher paid sex ceased to 
be employed prior to the period covered by the applicable statute of 
limitations period for filing a timely suit under the EPA. The 
employer's continued failure to pay the member of the lower paid sex the 
wage rate paid to the higher paid predecessor constitutes a prima facie 
continuing violation. Also, it is no defense that the unequal payments 
began prior to the statutory period.
    (c) Standards for determining rate of pay. The rate of pay must be 
equal for persons performing equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, 
effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working 
conditions. When factors such as seniority, education, or experience are 
used to determine the rate of pay, then those standards must be applied 
on a sex neutral basis.
    (d) Inequalities in pay that raise questions under the Act. It is 
necessary to scrutinize those inequalities in pay between employees of 
opposite sexes which may indicate a pattern of discrimination in wage 
payment that is based on sex. Thus, a serious question would be raised 
where such an inequality, allegedly based on a difference in job 
content, is in fact one in which the employee occupying the job 
purportedly requiring the higher degree of skill, effort, or 
responsibility receives the lower wage rate. Likewise, because the EPA 
was designed to eliminate wage rate differentials which are based on 
sex, situations will be carefully scrutinized where employees of only 
one sex are concentrated in the lower levels of the wage scale, and 
where there does not appear to be any material relationship other than 
sex between the lower wage rates paid to such employees and the higher 
rates paid to employees of the opposite sex.
    (e) Job content controlling. Application of the equal pay standard 
is not dependent on job classifications or titles but depends rather on 
actual job requirements and performance. For example, the fact that jobs 
performed by male and female employees may have the same total point 
value under an evaluation system in use by the employer does not in 
itself mean that the jobs concerned are equal according to the terms of 
the statute. Conversely, although the point values allocated to jobs may 
add up to unequal totals, it does not necessarily follow that the work 
being performed in such jobs is unequal when the statutory tests of the 
equal pay standard are applied. Job titles are frequently of such a 
general nature as to provide very little guidance in determining the 
application of the equal pay standard. For example, the job title 
``clerk'' may be applied to employees who perform a variety of duties so 
dissimilar as to place many of them beyond the scope of comparison under 
the Act. Similarly, jobs included under the title ``stock clerk'' may 
include an employee of one sex who spends all or most of his or her 
working hours in shifting and moving goods in the establishment whereas 
another employee, of the opposite sex, may also be described as a 
``stock clerk'' but be

[[Page 314]]

engaged entirely in checking inventory. In the case of jobs identified 
by the general title ``retail clerk'', the facts may show that equal 
skill, effort, and responsibility are required in the jobs of male and 
female employees notwithstanding that they are engaged in selling 
different kinds of merchandise. In all such situations, the application 
of the equal pay standard will have to be determined by applying the 
terms of the Act to the specific facts involved.