when more than that number are so employed. For a discussion of the term ''workweek'' see part 778 of this chapter. The exemption will not be defeated, however, if one or more of the eight employees so engaged is replaced during the workweek, for example, by reason of illness. But if additional employees are employed during the workweek in the named operations, even if they work on a different shift, the exemption would no longer be available if the total number exceed eight. Similarly, all of an employer's employees employed in any workweek in the named operations must be counted in the eight regardless of where the work is performed or how it is divided. Thus if an employer employs four employees in felling timber and preparing logs at one location and five at another location in those operations, the exemption would not be available. Similarly, if he employs six employees in such operations and three other employees in transportation work as discussed in § 788.11, the exemption could not apply. Under such circumstances he would be employing more than eight employees in the named operations. The fact that some of these employees may not be engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce or may be engaged in other exempt operations will not affect these conclusions (*Woods Lumber Co.* v. *Tobin,* 199 F. 2d 455 (C.A. 5)). Except for replacements, therefore, all of an employer's employees employed in the named operations in a workweek must be counted, regardless of where they perform their work or in which of the named operations or combinations of such operations they are employed. The length of time an employee is employed in the named operations during a workweek is also immaterial for the purpose of applying the numerical limitation. Thus, even if an employee would not himself be exempt because he is engaged substantially in nonexempt work (see § 788.17), nevertheless, if, as a regular part of his duties, he is also engaged in the operations named in the exemption, he must be counted in determining whether the eight employee limitation is satisfied.

§ 788.14 Number employed in other than specified operations.

The exemption is available to an employer, however, even if he has a total of nine or more employees, if only eight of them or less are employed in the named operations. Thus, if such an employer employs only eight employees in the named operations and others in operations not named in the exemption, such as sawmill operations, the exemption is not defeated because of the fact that he employs more than eight employees altogether. It will not apply, however, to those engaged in the operations not named in the exemption.

§ 788.15 Multiple crews.

In many cases an employer who operates a sawmill or concentration yard will be supplied with logs or other forestry products by several crews of persons who are engaged in the named operations. Frequently some or all of such crews, separately considered, do not employ more than eight persons but the total number of such employees is in excess of eight. Whether the exemption will apply to the members of the individual crews which do not exceed eight will depend on whether they are employees of the sawmill or concentration yard to which the logs or other forestry products are delivered or whether each such crew is a truly independently owned and operated business. If the number of employees in such a truly independently owned and operated business does not exceed eight, the exemption will apply. On the other hand, the Secretary and the Administrator will assume that the courts will be reluctant to approve as bona fide a plan by which an employer of a large number of woods employees splits his employees into several allegedly ''independent businesses'' in order to take advantage of the exemption.

§ 788.16 Employment relationship.

(a) The Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no single rule or test for determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor, but that the ''total situation controls'' (see *Rutherford Food Corp.* v. *McComb,* 331 United States 722; *United States* v. *Silk,* 331 United States 704;